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STATE, CAPITAL AND MIGRANT LABOUR 
IN ZAMBLIA, MOZAMBIQUE: A STUDY OF 
THE LABOUR FORCE OF SENA SUGAR ESTATES LIMITED 
Judith Frances Head 
ABSTRACT 
The concern of this thesis is the making of a labour force 
in the Zambdzia Province of colonial Mozambique. This examination 
focuses on a central question: why migrant labour, which emerged 
in Zambdzia with the growth of plantation production at the end 
of the nineteenth century, continued as the form of labour use by 
plantation capital until the 1960s. This problem can only be 
understood within the context of the historical development of 
state and capital in Zamb6zia. The thesis suggests that although 
the state and capital created a part-proletariat in the initial 
phases of their penetration of the region, they faced a continuing 
labour shortage which persisted until the 1930s. This was the 
result of certain contradictions within state policy. After 1930 
the state resolved these contradictions by taking direct control 
of labour and establishing a labour-selling monopoly. However, 
from the 1940s onwards a new shortage of labour arose. This 
resulted from the development of forced peasant production of 
cotton under a concession system and the growth of new plantations. 
The state confronted this problem by intensifying the pressure on 
the peasantry for labour and by redistributing this labour between 
the competing sections of capital. Yet, despite competition for 
labour no section of capital called for the ending of the migrant 
system. The second part of the thesis attempts to explain, therefore, 
why the migrant labour system persisted. It argues that state 
control of labour allowed capital to operate a low wages policy 
and to impose severe limitations on the workers' capacity to 
struggle for higher wages. Only at the end of the 1950s when 
the system of labour supply could no longer meet the needs of 
capital in the region were there signs of a change in state policy 
towards new forms of labour use. 
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A 
_NOTE 
ON SOURCE, ENO NOTES AND PRESENTATION 
The period spent in Mozambique researching this thesis was divided between archival work in Maputo and field work in Zamb4zia Province. In all approximately one year was spent in Maputo and one 
year in the field. Besides researching company records in Luabo and 
government records in Quelimane the field work also included interviews 
with managers and workers of Sena Sugar Estates at Luabo and a series 
of interviews with former workers of Sena Sugar Estates. The latter 
were held in various districts of the Province and were conducted 
under the auspices of the 1976 July Activities of the Eduardo Mondlane 
University. 
The dissertation is extensively endnoted. This is because 
the material has been derived from archives in Mozambique used, in 
some instances, the first time. These are the records of Sena Sugar 
Estates Limited at Luabo, the Archive of the Provincial Government 
of Zambdzia in Quelimane, the Archive of the Central Department of 
Agriculture and Forestry in Maputo and the Historical Archive of 
Mozambique, also in Maputo. An extensive list of these and other 
primary as well as secondary sources is included towards the end of 
the dissertation. 
Much of the material incorporated in the dissertation had to 
be translated into English. I have indicated in the appropriate 
endnote when a quotation is translated. In some cases, and especially 
in the correspondence cited, a letter in English includes a Portuguese 
or African word. Where a direct translation was possible it has been 
included in the text in brackets beside the appropriate word. Where, 
however, translation required an explanation which would have 
interrupted the flow of the exposition the term has been included 
in the glossary of foreign terms. 
As far as possible I have tried, in the endnotes, to follow 
the form of the original document. Hence, many of the references 
to letters held in Sena Sugar Estates' Archive include only the 
initials of the correspondents. This is because many of the letters 
cited were themselves initialled file copies of the original 
correspondence. The names to which the initials refer are 
included in the list of abbreviations used in the thesis. 
Provincial, district and locality names and boundaries have 
changed frequently within Zambezic since the 1890s. Indeed, the 
Province itself has variously been called the District of Quelimane, 
District of Zambezia and Province of Zambezia. The names of other 
Provinces have also changed. To avoid confusion, therefore, the 
modern usage has been adhered to unless the context clearly indicates 
otherwise. A map showing the modern administrative division of 
Zambdzia Province is included. From this one can locate the areas 
from which Sena Sugar Estates' labour was drawn since in general 
the men were called after the region from which they come. To 
avoid further confusion the men whom Sena Sugar Estates collectively 
designated as "Angurus", that is, men from that part of Zambezia 
Province administered directly by the state, as distinct from the 
prazos until 1930, are referred to as contract labour from Zambdzia. 
Strict y speaking, men from Mopeia, Chinde and their dependent posts 
were also from Zambozia. However, since Sena Sugar Estates considered 
these men as a distinct section of the labour force I have tried to 
adhere to Sena Sugar Estates' designation: labour from the 
local 
rrozos. 
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GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS 
capataz 
capitania-mor 
capit o 
chefe de posto 
cipäes/cipais/sipaios 
colono 
conto 
curador 
effectividade 
overseer/supervisor 
literally principal-captaincy; an administrative 
term. 
foreman 
administrator of a sub-district 
African policemen attached to the civil 
administration 
settler or peasant farmer, used here to mean 
the latter 
one thousand escudos 
curator (of Native Affairs), at local level 
this was the administrator 
regular attendance 
effectivos literally permanent employees but here referring 
to men who worked regularly (as opposed to 
those who were frequently absent from work). 
gerente geral general manager 
gr4mio board, syndicate, guild 
guia literally delivery note or authorisation 
(usually to travel). Groups of contracted 
workers would travel with a guia from which 
SSE derived its usage of the word, meaning 
a batch or contingent of contracted men. 
Lomwe a name used to refer to people from north 
western Zambezia after the ethnic/linguistic 
group of the region. 
machamba field, peasant plot. 
matabicho tip, gratuity; also used by SSE to mean bonus. 
regedoria the area under the jurisdiction of a reýgedor 
or chief. 
reis, (singular rdal) an old Portuguese unit of currency 
sangira the leader of a group of contracted men 
during 
the journey to the estates. The sa n giro 
was usually given light work such as compound 
cleaning on arriving at the plantation. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
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SSE Ar., Private Archive of Sena Sugar Estates Limited (Luabo) 
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INTRODUCTION 
For over 70 years the accumulation of capital in the enclave 
of plantation production which developed in Zamb4zia Province, 
Mozambique, rested on the exploitation of a partly proletarianised 
labour force which oscillated between periods of wage labour and 
periods spent in peasant production. This, then, was migrant labour. 
Using the example of Sena Sugar Estates (SSE) this study will seek 
to explain the origins of this form of labour use and the reasons for 
its persistance. Sena Sugar Estates was chosen as the object of the 
study for a number of reasons. Firstly, the company's founder first 
initiated sugar production on the plantations which became SSE in 
the 1890s. The company's history therefore spans the whole history 
of colonial capitalism in Mozambique. (1) Secondly, sugar was one of 
Mozambique's major export crops throughout the colonial capitalist 
period and SSE was the largest producer of sugar in the colony. 
Thirdly, SSE was the largest private employer of labour in Mozambique 
and recruited labour from a wide geographical area around the estates. 
Fourthly, SSE was only one of a number of plantations within Zamb4zia, 
yet their methods of labour recruitment, organisation of labour use 
and their wage policies were in essential respects the some as those 
of SSE. Through this history, therefore, it should be possible to 
reflect changes in the political economy of colonial Mozambique, 
including the social history of the making and utilisation of a 
plantation labour force. 
0 
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Migrant labour has been the dominant form of labour use to 
emerge in almost the whole of southern Africa. A number of scholars 
have analysed the phenomenon of migrant labour and have attempted to 
isolate the distinctive features of this form of labour use. (2) 
Using categories drawn from Marx's capital this material characterises 
capitalism as the system of wage labour through which workers, deprived 
of the means of production and subsistence, are compelled to seek wage 
work; this is described as the sale of labour-power. The wage the 
labourer receives for the sale of his labour-power is only a portion 
of the value created by him during that period, the balance being 
appropriated as unpaid labour - surplus value - by the owners of the 
means of production. Labour-power is thus conceptualised as a 
commodity, and its value is determined in the same way as other 
commodities - by the amount of socially necessary labour time which 
has been expended in its production. (3) Migrant labour, according 
to this literature, allows capital to buy wage-labour below its value. 
This is because a migrant labour force, working for capital only 
periodically, though in recurring spells, returns to production 
outside the capitalist mode where it either retains access to means 
of domestic production or has a claim on such means. This is the 
most important condition enabling capital to pay for labour-power 
below its cost of reproduction: 
When the migrant labourer has access to means of 
subsistence outside the capitalist sector... then the 
relationship between wages and the cost of production 
and reproduction of labour-power is changed. That is 
to say, capital is able to. pay the worker below the 
cost of his reproduction... Since in determining 
the level of wages necessary for the subsistence of 
the migrant worker and his family, account is taken 
of the fact that the family is supported to some 
extent, from the product of agricultural production 
in the Reserves this material refers to the South 
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African case where the Reserves were retained as 
areas of domestic production it becomes possible 
to fix wages at the level of subsistence of the 
individual worker. (4) 
The means of subsistence acquired by the worker and his family are 
thus derived from two sources: the direct wage paid to the worker 
during employment, and the social support derived from, for example, 
family agriculture, that is, care of the women and children and the 
aged, care during sickness and in between spells of employment. (5) 
In other words, the access of the migrant labourer and his family 
to domestic production provides part of the means of subsistence from 
which the capitalist sector benefits. Meillassoux has written: 
The agricultural self-sustaining communities, because 
of their comprehensiveness and their raison d'etre are 
able to fulfill functions that capita ism prefers not 
to assume... the functions of social security. (6) 
Capital is thus able to pay the worker below his cost of reproduction 
and in determining the level of wages necessary for the subsistence 
of the migrant worker, account is taken of the fact that the family 
is supported, to some extent, from agricultural production in the 
area from which the worker is drawn. This has been argued to be the 
basis of the cheap labour policy pursued not only in South Africa but 
also in Rhodesia. (7) 
Emerging from this material there has been a tendency to 
treat migrant labour as synonymous with cheap labour, 
but cheap for 
whom and under what conditions? This approach excludes other costs 
associated specifically and uniquely with the employment of migrant 
labour: the costs of recruiting, transport costs, and the general 
administrative costs of maintaining a regular and 
high labour turnover 
which, when, or if capable of being computed, might not 
be so readily 
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offset by savings on the reproduction of labour power. There is 
furthermore, the related consideration that migrant labour might be 
'cheap' in the sense that certain costs of reproduction are avoided, 
but costly to capital because migrant labour is essentially unstable 
and untrained and thus correspondingly unproductive. (8) It has been 
argued for the special conditions under which migrant labour is used 
in South Africa's goldmining industry that migrant labour has been 
cheap labour for that mining capital. (9) Firstly, in South Africa, 
the state assumed the costs of establishing and maintaining the system 
whereby the costs of supporting individual workers (on the mine 
compounds) were separated from the costs of renewing the labour force 
(supported by their families in the reserves). (10) Secondly, 
technological and cost constraints inhibited the mechanisation of 
gold mining. Mineowners required large numbers of unskilled workers 
to mine ore. They could support a high turnover of labour because 
they did not have to meet the costs of training a skilled labour 
force, nor support the losses that a high turnover of skilled labour 
would have presented. In addition, the fixed price of gold made it 
necessary and the labour reserve system made it possible for mining 
capital to direct part of the reproduction costs of the work force 
to the reserves. 
There are important parallels to be drawn from the above 
for 
the use of migrant labour by plantation capital and state in 
ZambAia. 
When the Portuguese colonial state first invited capital to invest 
in the region in the 1890s it offered investors concessions of 
land 
(prazos) and rights over the people resident on that 
land. The 
leaseholders of prazos could collect tax and demand an unpaid 
labour- 
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service from the peasantry living within their estates. Only after 
the peasants had fulfilled their labour-service was the leaseholder 
obliged to pay wages if he required additional work From them. (11) 
The recruitment costs of labour and the other costs associated with 
the employment of migrant labour were minimal because men lived in 
the vicinity of the estate where they worked. However, by the second 
decade of the 20th century the supply of labour from the p razos 
was already insufficient for the needs of plantation capital. 
Increasingly it had to seek labour further afield; labour moreover, 
which because of the legislation in force, had to receive wages for 
the whole of the period it was employed. As a result, both the 
direct and indirect costs of labour were increased. Yet the migrant 
system not only remained intact but it was actually consolidated. 
In 1930 the state extended its administration to the whole province, 
and, through labour legislation and direct intervention, assumed 
responsibility for guaranteeing a regular supply of labour to capital. 
This was a role which plantation capital welcomed. Firstly, 
state intervention to conscript labour meant that for capitol, the costs 
of employing migrant labour were limited to the fees payable to the 
state for recruitment licences and the supervision of contracts, 
the maintenance of recruiters and the transport of labour to and from 
the estates. The costs of establishing the administrative structure 
necessary to conscript labour fell mainly on the state. Secondly, 
state intervention to guarantee the supply of labour allowed 
plantation capital to rationally organise labour use around the 
particular needs of the crop. Like gold-mining, sugar production on 
the Zambesi was based on the use of large numbers of unskilled 
labourers. Most field tasks were easily and quickly learnt and 
19 
contracted men did not need an extensive training period before 
starting work. Thirdly, and especially in the case of this crop, 
the demand for labour in sugar production was seasonal. Labour 
needs were highest during the harvest or 'crop'. In addition, the 
price of sugar on world markets was highly sensitive to demand and 
fluctuated widely. Thus, besides a system which allowed sugar 
producers to adjust labour needs to the season, they also needed a 
system which allowed labour to be dismissed when production was 
reduced as a result of low world prices. (12) A migrant system 
fulfilled both of these needs. Planters could adjust their labour 
supply in both the short and the long term and were not committed to 
supporting unproductive labour either during the slack season or 
during periods of retrenchment. Fourthly, the repressive supervision 
methods, which were part and parcel of the labour process on 
plantations, which themselves arose from the migrant system and 
were sanctioned by the state, meant that productivity could gradually 
be increased through the use of physical coercion. Capital could 
'push' labour to its physical limits in the knowledge that when one 
man was exhausted another would replace him. Finally, wage levels 
in the plantation sector were determined by the state. They were 
not related to any estimated subsistence needs of the worker's family, 
nor indeed were they calculated on the basis of the subsistence needs 
of the individual worker. (13) Monthly and daily wage rates were 
calculated in relation to the 'native' tax in force and had only to 
cover a proportion of the annual tax. The state, through the migrant 
system, therefore, invited capital to operate a low wages policy. 
Yet within this system, capital sought to further reduce the overall 
cost of labour by driving down that portion of subsistence represented 
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by the direct wage paid to the worker in and during employment on 
the estates. This it did by reducing expenditure on food, housing, 
and health facilities and by manipulating the money wages of its 
labourers. In Zambezia, then, as in the South African goldmining 
industry, migrant labour was also cheap labour. And in Zambbzio, 
as in South Africa, the state intervened directly to guarantee the 
conditions in which capital was provided with cheap labour. 
The thesis elaborated by Meillassoux for the general case of 
migrant labour, and by Wolpe for the South African case, seeks to 
explain capital's capacity to pay for labour below its value, and thus 
more cheaply than if this labour were reproduced under conditions of 
capitalist production, by the conservation of the non-capitalist 
economy, that is, at the peasant base. This could serve to explain 
why capital can, under certain conditions, pay a low wage, but it 
does not explain why workers will accept a low wage. The 
prolongation of the peasant base, even its artificial preservation 
in the case of South Africa (14), could serve to help peasant 
producers stay out of the wage system. In other words, to argue the 
existence of a peasant base, or a domestic mode of production, is 
not a self -explanatory account of the impetus behind the changing 
process of labour migration. 
The Wolpe account argues for a necessary 'equilibrium' to 
this system: namely a level of production of the peasantry which 
is neither too high to inhibit the process of migration nor too low 
to prevent the destruction of the peasant economy and with it its 
function of reproducing the labour force: 
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The production and reproduction of the migrant labour force... depended upon the existence of a 
rough equilibrium between production, distribution 
and social obligation in the reserves - the level 
of production in the Reserves together with wages being more or less sufficient to meet the (historica. y etermined) subsistence requirements 
of migrants and their families, while land tenure 
and familial community relationships ensured the 
appropriate distribution of the Reserve product. (15) 
This notion of equilibrium could reduce the dynamics of the process 
of the installation and maintenance of a system of migrant labour to 
the level of calculations of production and costs of subsistence at 
the peasant base. To be tested empirically this would require a 
careful study of the changing conditions of peasant production; this 
is not the scope of this dissertation. In any case while the 
retention of peasant production in labour reserves creates the 
structural conditions within which the wage can/could be driven down 
below the value of labour-power, this process of wage-fixing is not 
a matter of any calculation of the value of reserve production, 
but of workers responding, say, to their declining living standards 
by initiating forms of defensive action. If the argument for the 
maintenance of a migrant labour system is not to be reduced to any 
simple economic proposition, the wider factors of the economy and 
polity must be inserted. These would require, above all a study of 
the changing forms of capital and its labour requirements; the changing 
role of the state and the forms in which struggle between capital 
and labour took place. (16) 
A more complete account of the role of the state in securing 
and maintaining the flow of migrant labour to capital is presented 
by Legassick and de Clerq. (17) At the start, they argue, state 
policy needs to be directed towards attracting labour to production. 
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Over time this role is supplemented by the need to redistribute 
labour in production. At other periods still, the tendency is for 
the state to repel labour from production. The role of the state, 
therefore, moves through a series of phases which are intimately 
related to the changing requirements of capital. 
Where the migrant system grew initially out of the 
social relations of production, and out of the social 
movement of workers between domestic production and 
wage-labour under limited compulsions, it has become 
increasingly a system regulated by the state... limited by the pace and forms of capital accumulation. (18) 
Though the analysis would have to be extended to the entire economy 
of colonial Mozambique the role of the state in relation to the 
changing forms of capital in the plantation sector of Zam zia 
Province begins to demonstrate these shifting forms in the role of 
the state. 
In the initial phases of capital accumulation in Zamb4zia 
(circa 1890-1913) because of the low level of capital accumulation 
in Portugal, the colonial state could neither secure the investment 
of Portuguese capital in the region nor could it create a labour 
force for the foreign capital attracted to the region, unaided. 
This is not to say that the state refrained from conscripting 
labour but merely that, lacking the financial means to impose an 
effective administration on the whole province it delegated some of 
the powers it would normally have retained to (foreign) capital. 
Thus, the burden of conscripting labour fell to capital. Through 
the prazo system, capital, (backed by the powers invested in it by 
the state) sought to secure a labour force through a variety of 
economic and extra-economic means; control of trade, imposition of 
a tax, imposition of periods of compulsory labour-service (imposed by 
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force if necessary). These mechanisms were successful in generating 
labour which worked on plantations for part of the year. 
During this period the state's revenue in Zamb4zia was derived 
from two principal sources. Firstly, it received rent from the 
leaseholders of the prazos, that is from plantation capital. 
Secondly, because plantation agriculture was only established in 
a small part of the province, and hence because the revenue from this 
source was limited, the colonial state sought to generate an additional 
source of revenue by encouraging recruiters to contract labour for 
the South African mines. However, the continued existence of an open 
land frontier and consequently, the inability of both plantation 
capital and the state to effectively control the movement of men meant 
that there was an upward pressure on wages as planters sought to 
protect their own supplies of labour from each other and from mine 
recruiters. 
In 1913 the recruitment of labour for the South African mines 
was banned. By this time, plantation production was weil-established 
and had entered a new phase of expansion. Expansion brought a growing 
demand for labour which could not be met from the rp azos alone. 
The state, therefore, sought to meet the labour needs of planters and 
to replace its source of revenue from the renting of labour to South 
Africa by organising labour recruitment for planters within the 
province. New legislation followed and colonial administrators were 
made responsible for directly conscripting labour from villages and 
hamlets. However, the machinery for providing labour operated 
inefficiently. Parts of the province had still not been wholly 
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'pacified' and plantations only occupied a tiny area of the land 
available. As a result peasants could still flee from the demands 
of planters and state alike. Thus although state intervention to 
"attract" labour to capital increased in the period between 1913 
and 1930 the years up to 1930 continued to be years of labour 
shortage. 
After 1930, however, the situation changed. On the one hand 
the seizure of power by the Salazar regime inaugurated a state 
committed to guaranteeing the expanded reproduction of capital in 
the province. (19) Among other measures taken to achieve this aim 
the regime sought to resolve the labour problem by extending its 
administration to the whole province and by introducing legislation 
which institutionalised migrant labour. Through a series of inter- 
locking mechanisms: the pass system, the tax, restrictions on 
peasant farming, a legal obligation to enter wage work, and 
punitive sanctions against those who broke the law, the state 
maintained the flow of labour to plantation capital. On the 
other hand, the first five years of the 1930s were years of 
general recession in central-southern Africa. Plantation capital 
used the abundant supplies of labour generated by the recession to 
cut the real wages of the labour force and to secure long-term areas 
of labour supply for future, ineeds. This was made possible 
by the 
state's reorganisation of the labour supply within Zambezia. 
However, the abundance of labour during the depression was 
only short-lived and by the mid-1930s recovery in 
Zambdzia and the 
areas surrounding it had given rise to a growing 
demand for labour. 
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This demand was exacerbated by the development of new forms of 
production in Zamb&zia itself. Part of the Salazar regime's policies 
were directed towards encouraging the investment of Portuguese capital 
in Mozambique. In Zambdzia this took two forms. Firstly, peasants 
were forced into cotton production on concessions granted to 
Portuguese companies. Secondly, new tea plantations were opened. 
The labour needs of both sections of capital were high and by the 
early 1940s there were fears of a labour shortage. In the mid-1940s, 
therefore, the state took measures to resolve the conflicting 
labour needs of the various sections of capital in the region. 
These were directed at three main areas. Firstly, the state moved to 
control the conditions of cotton production. It limited the areas 
sown and the numbers of men who could be employed but it allowed 
concessionaries to enlarge on the industrial reserve army by 
bringing women into cotton production. Secondly, the state sought to 
extend its control over the flow of labour to plantations. It 
redistributed the supply available between the competing plantations 
and introduced increasingly coercive methods to tighten up the supply 
of labour and cut down on labour wastage. Thirdly, the state, pushed 
by planters, resisted the attempts of South African capital to draw 
labour from the Angonia region of Tete. This then was the period 
when the state enlarged the workforce but also took on its 
redistributive role. 
However, there were limits to the capacity of the state to 
control the relation between the supply of labour and wage 
levels, 
that is to use the reserve army of labour to keep wage levels down, 
for there were other competing capitals operating in the areas 
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surrounding the province. They offered higher wages with which 
planters in Zambezia could not compete. In Monica and Sofala to the 
south and in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland to the west, industrialists, 
farmers and mining capital all sought to expand their own geographical 
areas of labour supply as the pace of capital accumulation accelerated. 
In all three areas wages were higher than those offered in Zambezia, 
because they in turn had to compete with the wages offered on the 
South African mines. (20) Despite attempts to control the movement 
of men, the authorities in Zambdzia could not seal the borders of 
the province, and there was, as a result, a steady trickle of 
clandestine migrants from Zamb4zia throughout the period. SSE which 
operated on both sides of the Zambesi river was particularly vulnerable 
to these pressures. 
A new period of labour use was opened in Zambezia at the end 
of the 1950s. Several coinciding factors accounted for the change. 
Of these the most important were, firstly, the physical exhaustion of 
the labour reserves within Zambezia and secondly, at a political 
level, international pressure on the colonial state induced it to make 
certain reforms in the colony's labour legislation and use. The 
effect of these changes was to push up wages. At this point, 
plantation capital in Zambezia sought to lessen its reliance on 
migrant labour. The idea of creating a settled labour force was 
mooted but rejected when the state refused to support the social 
overhead costs of settlement. Nevertheless, plantation capital 
sought to mechanise new areas of production and to create a pool of 
permanent workers who could be employed in various areas of mechanised 
production throughout the year. For technical reasons mechanisation 
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in the fields could not proceed very far. However, SSE increasingly 
sought to replace men recruited from a distance with casual (child 
and female) labour from the vicinity of the estates; child and female 
labour which was made available after cotton production was 
reorganised in some areas and abandoned in others. These changes 
culminated in 1975 in the disbanding of SSE's recruiting organisation. 
Apart from the small nucleus of permanent workers, the field labour 
force was casualised. During the 1960s, then, changes in the 
production process, themselves the result of an absolute labour 
shortage and political developments in Mozambique, were accompanied 
by a state policy directed at expelling workers from production. 
This process, was, however, overtaken by Mozambique's independence 
in 1975. 
The themes dealt with in this introduction are canvassed 
in the chapters which follow. The first part of the thesis examines 
the origins and changing functioning of the migrant labour system 
and thus the creation of a work force. The second part examines 
the 
effects of the system of institutionalised migrant 
labour in enabling 
plantation capital to operate a low wage policy, and to maintain 
this 
not only with the coercive assistance of the state 
but also by con- 
straining the development of workers' organisations. 
The conclusion 
takes up the theme expressed in the last part of this 
introduction 
and briefly reviews the impact of changes introduced 
in the 1960s 
at SSE. 
28 
NOTES 
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imperceptibly into the capitalist system of providing the 
estate with agricultural workers by allotting patches of land 
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world prices took a sharp upward turn. For a discussion 
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Mocambique eo Problema Acucareira (Lisboa, 1945), a ssim. 
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PARTI 
THE CONDITIONS OF LABOUR SUPPLY 1890-1960 
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CHAPTER I 
THE CREATION OF A LABOUR FORCE, ZAMBEZIA 1890 - 1930: 
THE BACKGROUND 
In 1890 an Englishman called John Peter Hornung floated the 
Companhia de Assucar de Mocambique (CAM) in Lisbon. With the backing 
of friends and the Banco Lusitano, the company was formed to establish 
a sugar plantation on the banks of the Zambesi river at Mopeic, some 
100 miles from the coastal town of Chinde. (1) 
The Zambesi region was in a state of turmoil in the 1880s. 
Only a few years before Hornung's new company was established the 
opium company which had preceded it was sacked in an uprising which 
spread throughout the region. So grave was the unrest, which came to 
be known as the Massingire Rising, that the governor of the province 
panicked and took refuge in a boat off Quelimane. (2) The area was not 
finally pacified until the early 1890s. (3) Besides political unrest, 
the managers of the new company had to overcome a series of other 
problems before production could start. There was no transport in 
the region and even the Zambesi was unnavigable to its mouth. Over 
500 tons of heavy equipment had to be towed from Quelimane to Mopeia 
in flat-bottomed barges along the river Qua Qua. There were no 
unloading facilities in Mopeia, bush had to be cleared and fields 
ploughed. (4) The experts and technicians brought from various parts 
of the world to build the factory, supervise cultivation and start 
production, quickly succumbed to disease. Many died. (5) Labour hod 
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to be recruited. The area in which the plantation was situated was 
depopulated as a result of the political unrest and African resistance 
to Portuguese demands for the tax. (6) The people who remained in the 
vicinity of the estate had no inclination to work on the company's 
plantation. Production on their own fields sufficed for their needs. 
Money meant nothing to them, and they could only be 
induced to work for the white man in return for payment 
of their head tax, and for articles they coverted, such 
as beads, gaudy cotton goods or old uniform coats. (7) 
Even when the production of sugar finally started in 1892 the first 
harvests were threatened by a series of devastating locust plagues. (8) 
The first harvest yielded only 605 tonnes of sugar and for the next five 
years production oscillated wildly between 77 tonnes in 1895 and 1094 
tonnes in 1898. (9) It seemed unlikely that the CAM would survive the 
19th Century. 
Nevertheless, the company survived these initial crises and 
also a financial and management crisis in 1903/4. (10) Within a few 
years Hornung had taken over the management of two other failing 
sugar companies in the region and in 1910 formed the Sena Sugar Factory, 
(SSF). (11) By then, production on the three estates had reached 
15,722 tonnes. It continued to expand almost without interruption 
over the next ten years. (12) In 1920 SSF became Sena Sugar 
Estates 
Ltd., (SSE) managed by the Hornung family through Hornung and 
Company. (13) 
Financial backing for the company was provided by the London Banking 
house of Baron Bruno Schr8der. (14) In 1924, Hornung opened 
his fourth 
and final plantation on the Zambesi at Luabo. 
Production on the four 
estates controlled by Hornung had now reached 
39,020 tonnes of sugar. (15) 
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In part the success of Hornungs venture was the result of 
Portuguese colonial policy. Sugar producers in Mozambique were 
offered protection against foreign competition on the home market. (16) 
More important, however, to Hornung's success was the colonial policy 
which allowed private capital to recruit cheap, and indeed, unpaid 
labour for its enterprises. Yet this was not a straightforward 
process. The years between 1890 and 1930 were years in which the 
mechanisms for creating a labour force were improvised. Not until 
the 1930s was the system which took root in the preceding years 
finally successfully applied to the whole province. 
COLONIAL POLICY IN MOZAMBIQUE AT THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY 
Portugal in the 1880s was still a predominantly agricultural 
society. The country's industrial base was small. Production was 
limited in the main to the light manufacturing sector including the 
processing of produce from the agricultural sector and the manufacture 
of inputs necessary for continued agricultural production. There was 
little heavy industry and the extractive industry and the transport 
sector were dominated by foreign capital. The economy was almost 
bankrupt and relied heavily on foreign loans. (17) The state of 
the economy was reflected in the political sphere. The industrial 
and financial bourgeoisie were still at an embryonic stage of 
formation. Even the commercial bourgeoisie, which had arisen as 
a result of its monopoly control of trade and transport with the 
colonies, was small and weak in comparison with its counterparts in 
Germany and England. The struggle for capitalist control of state 
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power was in its early stages, and constant political turmoil was 
characteristic of the period which ended with Salazar's seizure of 
power in the late 1920s. (18) 
It is within this context that Portugal entered the "Scramble 
for Africa". Confronted by German, British, French and Belgian 
attempts to impose direct political control over the continent as a 
means of guaranteeing conditions favourable for the control of raw 
materials and markets and the export of capital, Portugal was faced 
with the imminent loss of its colonies. It had neither the means or 
the manpower to retain them by force. Instead the Portuguese 
government was forced to fall back on diplomacy. By resting on the 
sponsorship of each of these powers at various times in both East and 
West Africa the Portuguese government sought to pre-empt the claims 
of its rivals. In this way Portugal gained recognition of its 
colonies, but only on the condition that it effectively occupied 
them. (19) 
The problem, then, which faced the Portuguese government 
after the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 was how to bring about 
effective occupation and how to generate revenue. 
As Antonio 
Enes pointed out in the study he made of Mozambique in 
1891-1892, 
two years before becoming Royal Commissioner 
for the colony, "national 
resources are not sufficient for such an undertaking, and 
if they were 
there would be other, more immediately profitable enterprises 
in which 
they would rather invest. "(20) Enes' solution and that 
favoured by 
the circle of influential colonial officers who surrounded 
him, was 
to encourage the investment of foreign capital. 
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We need foreigners, any foreigners, of all races and 
nationalities, to help us promote the prosperity of Mozambique... The most effective way, if not to 
attract and absorb, at least not to drive off 
foreigners, will certainly be to grant facilities 
and security to the capital they wish to employ 
in the Province "Mozambique 7, treating this 
capital not as a dangerous invader but as a 
necessary partner, to free it from burdens and 
problems ... 
(21) 
The northern third of the colony was leased to the Niassa 
Company. Financed largely from Germany and England, the Niassa 
Company was granted wide administrative powers. For a small percentage 
of annual profits the Portuguese government in effect allowed the 
company to operate as an autonomous state. Lacking the capital to 
open up the area to productive investment, the company confined its 
attentions to generating revenue through the sale of labour to South 
Africa and to planters within the colony. When the export of labour 
from the territory was finally banned in 1913 the Niassa Company sank 
into decay. (22) 
In the area of modern Monica and Sofala Province the Mozambique 
Company was granted a charter on much the same lines as the Niassa 
Company. Mainly financed from Britain the Mozambique Company suffered 
from the same problems of stretched resources and inadequate funds as 
its counterpart in the north. However, unlike the Niassa Company, 
the Mozambique Company benefitted from its position in relation to 
Rhodesia. Beira soon developed as a commercial centre and the transit 
trade provided revenue and the stimulus to some settler agriculture 
along the railway. (23) 
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In the southern half of the colony, the pattern of development 
had already been established before the Portuguese imposed an effective 
administration in the 1890s. From here, men had been migrating to 
the sugar plantations of Natal from the 1870s. The opening and 
expansion of the mines on the Rand in the decades that followed, with 
their high demand for labour, accelerated the flow of migrants. 
Capital investment was almost entirely restricted to the development 
of rail and port facilities serving the Transvaal. Unable to attract 
capital to invest in agricultural production the state legalised the 
flow of labour to the mines. Through numerous conventions it consolidated 
its role as a labour rentier; a role it was to continue to play through- 
out the colonial period. (24) 
With occupation, if not revenue, secured in the north and centre 
of the colony, and revenue in the south, it was on ZamWzia that the 
hopes of the Portuguese government were centred. Here there appeared 
to be the possibility of encouraging new forms of production through 
revitalising a system of land concessions first granted in the 17th 
Century. 
COLONIAL POLICY IN ZAMB'ZIA 
The Prazos 
The Prazos da Coroa were grants of land made to Portuguese 
settlers for three generations. The estates were 
inherited through 
the female line in order to encourage the emigration of European 
women and increase the Portuguese population of 
the area. Numerous 
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regulations governed the existence of the razos which were intended 
to stimulate agricultural production. These regulations were largely 
ignored and the state was too weak to enforce them. In general 
razo-leaseholders derived an income from monopolising trade. (25) 
In 1892 new legislation was enacted which was specifically designed 
to encourage the investment of capital and generate new forms of 
plantation production whose export would improve the colony's trade 
balance. The legislation sought to attract investors to the region 
by offering them the right to collect taxes and recruit labour from 
the African population living on the estates they leased. The rents 
of the estates were calculated on the amount of 'native' tax collected. 
Africans were to pay half the tax in cash or kind and the other half 
in labour-service. In addition, the leaseholder was entitled to a 
week's unpaid labour-service from the tax-payers resident on the 
estate. He could also oblige them to work for additional periods 
for wages whose minimum level was established by the government. 
To ensure that agricultural production was increased the leaseholder 
was expected to open new land regularly and to cultivate an area of 
land which was related proportionately to the number of taxes collected. 
To protect his investment the leaseholder was given security of 
tenure for 15 years, although most leases were automatically increased 
when they expired. He was also given a monopoly of trade within 
his concession and other settlers were prevented from opening 
land 
within the concession without the leaseholder's permission. 
Finally, 
the leaseholder was nominated as the "agent of authority". 
He was 
responsible for raising a police force, maintaining 
law and order, 
putting down rebellions and settling 
disputes. (26) In short, the state 
delegated wide powers of administration to the leaseholders of 
the 
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prazos. It also promised them an income through tax collection and 
a supply of labour through legislation designed to force men to work. 
On this basis plantation production was to be established. However, 
legislation designed to promote capital investment and new forms of 
agricultural production was one thing. Its practice was quite another. 
For from stimulating new forms of production the legislation 
seems largely to have worked against them. Most of those who leased 
prazos either did so with the sole aim of generating income through 
tax collection, or soon lapsed into this pattern of surplus 
appropriation when the difficulties of developing plantations thwarted 
their intentions. Thus, the Director of Agriculture wrote in his 1911 
Report that the razos tied up some of the best land in the province. 
Other settlers would not invest in the land because they had no rights. 
In the meantime the leaseholder sat on his land either unable or 
unwilling to develop it. 
A second objection is taken to the fact that in some 
cases the Prazo companies do no agricultural 
development or very little; devoting all their 
energies to making what they can out of the native 
tax and recruiting. One or two prazo companies 
show commendable enterprise yet even in the case 
of the most progressive I estimate that only about 
0.5% of the total holding is under cultivation. 
Want of capital is the reason given for this 
inactivity but this should not be admitted as 
an escusive [sic for an almost total neglect of 
cultivating enterprise ... 
(27) 
The 'get rich quick' attitude which influenced the activities 
of those who did not take their leases seriously was also reflected 
in the practises of those companies which were more concerned 
to 
generate expanding sources of income. Besides 
the CAM there were five 
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important companies operating in Zambeezia: the Companhia da 
Zambezia, the Companhic do Boror, the Companhia do Luabo, - the 
Sociedade Agricola do Modal, and the Empresa Agricola do Lugela. (28) 
All five companies were repeatedly criticised in early Agricultural 
Department Reports for their poor agricultural practises and lack 
of attention to the requirements of the various crops they planted. 
This attitude was in turn dictated by the companies' directors who were 
anxious not to sink more capital into ventures which did not promise 
short-term results. 
And so it is natural that the 'prazos' or land syndicates 
which now hold concessions for the most valuable lands 
of the Zambezia alluvial plains, are loathe to sink more 
funds in developing their enterprises till they see good 
returns coming in from the many thousands of pounds 
already invested. But, after making due allowance for 
the exigencies of the developing work and the natural 
difficulties of the managers and their assistants in 
those 'prazos' it must be admitted that a grievous 
amount of money has been wasted in agricultural 
operations in Zamb(zia during the last few years. (29) 
The Director of Agriculture in 1909 did not find a single company 
whose cultivation methods could not be improved easily. 
One prazo learning that in some countries castilloa 
trees yield good profits in rubber, orders a 
plantation of this sort to be made; and without 
considering the unchangeable habits of this forest 
tree, the tender young plants are transplanted at 
about 6 metres distance into a level field of heavy 
uncultivated soil, with weeds and grass poisoning 
their roots, the sun baking and cracking the earth 
all about them, and the hot dry winds (without a 
break for a hundred miles) during a large part of 
the year whipping their young leaves and 
drying the 
very sap out of them. And after some 8 years when 
the trees are the size they should be at 4 years - 
it does not require an expert to foretell what the 
result of tapping must be. 
Again, the managers of the various stations, or 
estates, have been overanxious to get along with 
the routine work as easily and expeditiously as 
possible... 
And this spirit of frantic effort for quick 
results, good or bad, had been largely 
to blame 
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for the lack of attention to important details; 
instead of studying the life habits of his plants the manager has felt obliged to study the pay 
sheets and statistical reports... (30) 
The Director of Agriculture also criticised the razo-leaseholders 
for their lack of experienced staff, and the lack of books and 
journals about current agricultural methods. He concluded that 
"effectiveness and future profits should be aimed at in all 
agricultural methods and work instead of temporary expediency and 
present economies... the output of the average Quelimane estates is 
deplorably below the economical status. "(31) 
The situation had changed little by 1924. In that year, 
according to another Agricultural Department Report, there were 43 
"true European farmers" in the District. Of these only the five major 
companies and two small leaseholders were worthy of note. Of the 
remainder, many had started their enterprises as a result of the 
high prices obtaining during the First World War. By 1924 many of 
these had already failed when the situation returned to normal. 
Others, who had established their plantations after the war had 
already failed by 1924, and still others "live or vegetate in an 
economic situation hardly prosperous when not CalreadyJ 
endcngered. "(32) There were, in addition, twenty "amateur" farmers, 
whose situation was even less encouraging than that of the "true" 
farmers. Most were ex-civil servants or the former employees of 
other companies. They suffered from lack of training, lack of 
capital, lack of technical assistance and lack of experience. (33) 
As in earlier reports the agricultural methods and practices 
of the successful companies were criticised. Referring, for example, 
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to copra, which was the principal export from the district, the 
writer of the 1924 Report noted that hundreds of coconut palms 
were planted in land which was not properly cleared or cleaned. 
Young plants had to struggle for light and air in dense fields of 
weeds. Fields were not properly drained. These and other mal- 
practices were reflected in the yields. "Lots and lots of adult palms 
give a tiny yield, with numerous sterile plants and others which do 
not manage to give a dozen coconuts per year. " The district did not 
have a single modern preparation plant for copra, which was dried in 
grass-covered sheds. (34) 
Only sugar escaped the damning criticisms to which the 
other crops were subjected, but even sugar producers (SSE) were 
criticised for growing too many ratoons. Whereas the first crop 
yielded up to 100 tonnes of cane per hectare, the fourth or fifth 
cutting of the same plant yielded only 15 tonnes on average. Planters 
were also criticised for irregular production and export. (35) 
Some of the criticisms made by the Agricultural Department 
can be discounted and others must be assessed within the context of 
the times. The Department itself was only formed in 1908 and its 
own record was hardly an example to others. (36) By 1924 the 
agricultural services of the province had all but collapsed. The 
writer of the 1924 Report on Agriculture in Zambd'zia made numerous 
criticisms of the failings of the department. (37) Lack of 
funds, 
transport, manpower, technical books and instruments meant that the 
government agricultural department had failed to provide planters with 
the assistance which on its own admission, they desperately needed. 
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In the absence of previous scientific surveys of soils, climates, 
pests and insects, they were necessarily forced to conduct their own 
crop trials and in effect to set up experimental plantations. 
Besides the lock of extension services and government support 
and advice, the planters in 1924 were still confronting an almost 
complete lack of communications. There were few roods and most 
of those that existed served no useful purpose. (38) The most common 
form of transport was the machila and most produce was carried by 
porters. (39) Thus, with the exception of those planters who had 
easy access to the river Zambesi, all produce had to be carried on 
human head to the coast. Not only did the produce deterioriate on 
the journey but human porterage tied up large numbers of men who 
could have been otherwise employed. The major difficulty, however, 
which confronted the planters was a shortage of labour. 
The Labour Shortage and the Methods Devised for Dealing with it 
Tax and labour demands could only operate effectively as a 
means of forcing peasants to work on plantations if land was alienated 
on a significant scale and/or if an effective system of control 
prevented peasants from moving to areas where these mechanisms did 
not exist and where land was available on which they could pursue 
their own production unimpeded. With access to independent means of 
production and the ability to produce sufficient to meet their own 
requirements there was no 'natural' or economic reason why peasants 
should opt to work for someone else. In Zamb9zia 
land was not 
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alienated on a significant scale nor was the system of control through 
tax and labour demands effective throughout the whole province. (40) 
Even in the areas leased as prazos peasants could find ways of 
avoiding tax and labour demands. Firstly, the vast tracts of land 
leased to companies could not be effectively policed all the time. 
Peasant families could therefore move out of the areas where company 
patrols were less regular, or they could move out of the prazo 
altogether. Secondly, and particularly where the prazos bordered 
on Nyasaland, peasants could flee to British-controlled territory 
where both tax and labour demands were less arduous than in Zambezia. (41) 
Thirdly, many prazo-leaseholders followed a policy of attracting 
people to their estates in order to reap a rich tax harvest. Here 
labour-service was not imposed or was less rigorous than on estates 
where labour was required for plantation production. (42) For all 
these reasons 
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azo-leaseholders who did require labour found it 
necessary to develop an effective system of policing their estates 
and a system of labour recruitment and payment which bound the tax- 
payer of the rp azo to the company and forced him to work on the 
company's plantations. The CAM, (later to become the 
SSF and then 
SSE in 1920) which required, above all, abundant supplies of cheap 
labour, is a case in point. 
With the exception of ploughing and irrigation all 
field 
tasks on the CAM's plantation were manual, including pest control and 
the application of fertilizer (manure). 
The cut cane was transported 
to the factory by rail. Even here 'native' labourers were used 
to 
pull the carts on the moveable rail 
between sections of cane. "The 
traction is all by blood, mules being employed on the 
fixed line and 
on the others native staff as well. 
"(43) 
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On the 340 hectares prepared for planting in 1896 757 Lazo- 
residents and 16 African supervisors were employed. The factory 
employed 203 workers. Wood cutting for the boilers and steam ploughs 
absorbed another 160-180 men a day. Additional labour was required 
to grow food crops for animals, European staff and African labourers. 
This was mainly provided by children, men working a punishment and 
men who arrived before they were needed in the fields. (44) Keeping 
the fields free of locusts required the immediate mobilisation of 
1000 people. (45) 
In 1896 the labour employed by the CAM on its Mopeic 
plantation was drawn from Prazo Maganja Aquem Chire, of which the 
CAM was the leaseholder, and from the two smaller razos of Mazaro 
and Barue which it sub-leased from Correia and Carvalho. These 
razos were divided into districts, whose chiefs were obliged to 
furnish a stipulated number of men calculated on the basis of the 
previous census. It was the chief's responsibility to organise the 
tax-payers of his district into groups who were obliged to work for 
24 days at a time. When the men had finished their period of service 
they were replaced by another group, whom they again replaced when 
that group had worked for 24 days. For 24 days labour the men 
received 2$020 reis each. None of this wage was paid in cash however. 
The men received three quarters of the value of the wage in cotton 
cloth and a ticket for the other quarter which represented one week's 
tax payment. If the man did not present his tax exemption certificate 
on the weekly tax-collection day, he was obliged to pay 
0$420 reis 
in cash. (46) 
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According to the CAA, the advantages of this system were that 
1. it calls the colono to work providing him with a sure 
means of paying his tax; 
2. it makes him work more than once, in order that he 
can, as he certainly wants to, earn other tax cards for the wife or wives that he has; 
3. it obliges those who do not work and who therefore 
cannot present the payment certificate, to work(47) 
Men who missed a day's work or who, according to the compound 
supervisory staff and medical staff, feigned illness, were obliged 
to work off the days they had missed. (48) Men who did not complete 
their task received half the day's payment and were not provided with 
their daily rations. (49) 
The organisation of ensacas (rotating groups of men who 
replaced each other at monthly intervals) meant that the inhabitants 
of the rP czo were divided among themselves. The failure of one group 
to work meant additional labour for its replacement group. The 
payment system, as the company stated, ensured that men were obliged 
to work regularly in order to meet the tax. Should these two 
mechanisms fail, the additional labour-service imposed as a 
punishment was intended to act as a deterrent against desertion or 
failure to work the stipulated period. 
Despite the system devised by the CAM there were still 
occasional labour shortages in the 1890s. For one thing, in the 
early years the prazo leased by the company lost people from one 
district because of the violent methods employed by the government to 
mobilise porters: 
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The decrease fin population] in the district of Charunda, where the CopitOnia-Mor of Mopea. is 
situated, is the result of the demands of the 
authorities and the process, a little violent, 
which is still used to obtain porters and which has led to the withdrawal of the negroes to other districts. (50) 
The company also lost people from its razo in the first years 
because the government obliged it to collect the taxes outstanding 
from the years before it took over the plantation:. 
The great labour shortage which we had during the 
first years. This... was principally caused by 
demanding the tax owed by the natives from the years 
before our administration, in which the prazo was 
administered directly by the government. We were 
compelled by the government to demand this tax. (51) 
The director who wrote this company report added that in 1897 things 
appeared to be returning to normal and the company was expecting a 
much larger population on its prazo than in previous years. Never- 
theless, it had been obliged to ask for labour from a prazo 
administered directly by the state, in this period, in order to open 
a canal between the rivers Qua Qua and Zambesi. Several hundred 
colonos were recruited from the state-run razo. (52) 
Thus, if in the early years, the CAM's labour needs could, 
more or less, be met from the people resident on its estate, this was 
not the case as production began to expand. And, notwithstanding 
the criticisms of the Agricultural Department, production of the 
four major export crops did expand considerably in the first two 
decades 
of the twentieth century. 
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Production of the Four Principal Export Crops from 1910 (or the 
Cate of their First Harvest) Until 1924 (53) 
Copra Sugar 
Year Tonnes Year Torries 
1910 3,256 1910 4,214 
1911 3,946 1911 3,916 
1912 4,451 1912 2,786 
1913 4,036 1913 1,070 
1914 5,001 1914 3,737 
1915 7,768 1915 4,249 
1916 9,386 1916 3,683 
1917 8,753 1917 2,912 
1918 2,995 1918 1,585 
1919 7,126 1919 2,306 
1920 8,159 1920 7,449 
1921 7,307 1921 8,870 
1922 13,083 1922 1,644 
1923 11,933 1923 10,257 
1924 12,905 1924 10,259 
Sisal Cotton 
Year Tonnes Year Tonnes 
1910 1910 23 
1911 - 
1911 12 
1912 155 1912 30 
1913 338 1913 141 
1914 282 1914 104 
1915 911 1915 190 
1916 2,030 1916 
179 
1917 927 1917 
119 
1918 1,230 1918 
115 
1919 1,515 1919 
184 
1920 1,646 1920 
195 
1921 2,138 1921 
220 
1922 3,317 
1922 218 
1923 2,549 
1923 232 
1924 2,950 
1924 401 
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Expansion of production meant an expanded labour force. 
By 1923 SSE was employing approximately 20,000 men a year. 
The plantations - with the great work of preparing 
the land and channelling water - were being 
enlarged; from the 200 hectares that they covered 
in 1897 they reached 1000 LhectaresJ in 1900 
and in 1923 7,850 Z-hectares J; the number of 
hands employed rose, in the same space, from 
a few hundred to about 20,000. (54) 
Besides trying to meet the shortfall in labour by recruiting men 
from Nyasaland, (55) SSE adopted an expedient to obtain more labour 
which appears to have been common practise among all the major 
companies in the region. It sub-leased further prazos in order to 
acquire the right to collect taxes and mobilise the men on them for 
plantation work. Thus, in 1915, the company asked for permission 
from the government to transfer labour from Prazo Angonia in modern 
Tete Province to the Mopeia sugar fields without paying a recruitment 
fee to the state. (56) SSE also took over Prazos Luabo and Marral 
in Zambe'zia and Prazo Mugova e Goma in the Mutarara region of 
Tete. (57) Finally, in 1926 by buying a third share in the Empress 
Agricola do Lugela, in northwestern Zambezia, SSE acquired the right 
to mobilise labour resident on the rp azos leased by that company. (58) 
However, even these expanded sources of labour were not enough 
for the company's needs, which, by 1920 included plans to open the 
fourth estate at Luabo. In 1921, therefore, Hornung. signed a 
contract with the High Commissioner for Mozambique under whose 
terms 
a guarantee by the company to produce more sugar would 
be met by a 
guarantee by the state to furnish morelabour. 
SSE was to receive 
up to 6000 men a year in two six month lots. 
(59) 
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Through the Hornung contract, the state first gave legal 
recognition at the national level to a role it had been playing on 
a small scale in Zambo! ýzia since the beginning of the century; that 
of a labour supplier to capital in the region. 
The State-Administered Areas of the Province 
Not all of Zambezia Province was leased as prazos. One third 
of the province was placed under the direct administration of the 
colonial state. Maganja da Costa was placed under a civil 
administration in 1908, while the areas of Alto and Baixo Molöcue 
remained under military rule until 1919. In a condition of intermittent 
rebellion, not even the head tax could be collected in these areas 
with any regularity. (60) 
While agricultural development on the prozos left a lot to 
be desired that on the state-administered areas of the province was 
virtually non-existent. In these areas the state itself was 
responsible for collecting the head tax imposed. It was also 
responsible for raising labour for those who required it; labour 
which had to receive the legal minimum wage in force. There was, 
therefore, little incentive for capital to invest in these regions. 
Unlike the companies which leased prazos, investors in the state- 
administered areas had neither the right to collect taxes, which 
generated an immediate income, nor could they 
demand part-payment 
of the tax in labour-service. The initial costs of opening new 
land 
in the state-administered areas were therefore much 
higher than on 
the prazos. Firstly, on the rp azos wages 
had only to be paid when 
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the tax-paying population was insufficient for the planter's needs. 
Secondly the initial costs could in part be offset by the sale of 
peasant produce where the tax was paid in kind, or from the money 
tax where peasants paid in cash. There were, however, additional 
disincentives to investment in the state-administered areas. Unlike 
the prazo-leaseholders, investors in these regions had no guaranteed 
labour supply. The amount of labour they received appears to have 
depended on the whim of the local administrator, and administrators 
were frequently replaced. (61) Furthermore, although the law obliged 
men to work for six months of the year, the labour needs of the 
colonial administration itself were high. Labour was needed to open 
roads, to serve as porters and machila bearers and to grow food for, 
and generally service, the civilian, military and auxilliary personnel 
of the administration. (62) 
Yet, it was not only the internal demand for labour which 
made the prospect of opening plantations in the state-controlled 
areas of the province unattractive. The mobilisation of labour to 
serve and produce food for the administration was unproductive. 
It did not generate revenue. The imposition of a money tax which 
was intended to generate revenue could only achieve this purpose 
if a money economy was generalised. Since it was not, and since 
people recruited for work for the administration were not paid 
for 
their labour, the state found itself in the same position as the 
Niassa Company to the north. It turned to labour export as a means 
of guaranteeing cash payment of the tax. 
In 1902 recruiters from 
the Rand were permitted to engage labour in the area of v4aganja 
da 
Costa and Prazos Lugela, Milange and Lomue, and shortly afterwards 
labour export to the island of Sao Tome also commenced. 
(63) 
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The recruiters were obliged to pay the tax of each man 
recruited before he was allowed to leave the province. In this way 
tax-collection was facilitated. Rounding up men for labour recruiters 
soon became one of the dominant activities of the administrative 
officials. 
It this circumscriptioný exports people to the 
Transvaal, in relatively hi gh numbers, which results 
in much easier tax collection, not because those 
returning bring back money, since few return and 
those who do do not bring anything with them, 
but because the recruiters advance important sums 
to pay the head tax when the census is taken. (64) 
Thus, potential investors in the state-administered areas not only 
faced heavier costs than those who leased prazos; they also faced 
a labour shortage. 
Labour export from the state-administered areas also contributed 
to the labour shortage on the rp a zos. Whereas labour recruitment 
for Sao Tome' led to a flight of people from the state-administered 
areas to areas outside the control of the state or to the prazos, 
labour recruitment for the Transvaal gave rise to a movement of 
people from the rp azos to the areas where the labour recruiters were 
operating. Men were attracted by the higher wages offered on the 
Transvaal. (65) In 1905 Hornung petitioned the government to take 
measures to overcome the labour shortage that recruitment for the 
Transvaal was creating. In this he appears to have been successful, 
although it is not clear whether the government controlled the 
exodus from lower Zombýgzia or provided Hornung with labour from the 
areas it administered. 
The important question of native hands has also been 
regularised - happily the government has agreed to take 
measures to reduce the difficulties we have been facing 
since migratory currents were established from the lower 
Zambesi to the Transvaal. (66) 
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The measures taken by the government to deal with the labour 
shortage on the prazos, were not, however, lasting, for four years 
later the Governor of Zambe"zia was to write: 
Low wages to correspond with the low output of labour, 
and abundant labour because, in many things, there is 
not, for the time being, a means of substituting it 
with machines, are the two vital necessities for the 
agriculture of this district. 
The prazos regime had guaranteed to the planter not 
only an abundance of labour necessary for the land 
clearance that he was obliged to undertake and which 
was fixed in proportion to the number of hands, but 
also low wages, fixing them, in law, at equal rates for everyone in the district, in order to avoid an 
absurd competition in supply from which derives a 
constant increase rin wages_7 and which results 
in general damage. - 
Came the authorisation for emigration to the 
Transvaal and recently to S. Tom' and both of these 
guarantees have been prejudiced and ruined. (67) 
Apart from the short-sighted nature of a policy which sought 
revenue through the sale of labour without any guarantees that the 
contracted men would return, the revenue which labour export was 
supposed to provide was irregular. In 1909, for example, the amount 
of tax collected from the town of Quelimane and the Circumscription 
of Maganja fell by six contos of reis. This was partly because 580 
fewer men were recruited for the Rand than in the previous year and 
partly because the population had fallen as men fled to escape labour 
recruitment for S8o Tome. (68) Furthermore, far from swelling the 
state coffers, the revenue from the tax was barely sufficient to meet 
the administrative cost of collecting it. In 1909 it was estimated 
that 67 per cent of the tax was lost through inefficient collection 
or absorbed in administrative costs. (69) 
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It was not only, however, lack of revenue through labour 
export and lack of capital investment which confronted the authorities 
in the state-administered regions of Zambe'zia. Peasant production 
for export also dropped during the period. Firstly, peasants were 
reluctant to bring their produce to Quelimane, or indeed to use the 
normal trade routes from the interior, as a result of the brutal 
pacification campaign. (70) Secondly, Portuguese protectionist policy 
itself contributed to a fall in peasant production for export. 
Anxious to protect metropolitan manufactured goods the government 
placed heavy duties on trade goods imported from other parts of 
Euope into Mozambique. Instead of extending the market for 
Portuguese goods in Zamb6zia the policy had the reverse effect. 
Much of the trade in peasant produce was diverted to Nyasaland 
where the terms of trade were more favourable to the producer. (71) 
Faced with a labour shortage on the prazos, pressure on wages 
which labour export to the Transvaal brought about, lack of capital 
investment in the state-administered lands and a lack of revenue, 
which labour export did not significantly improve, the state 
increasingly seized the only opportunity available to it for 
generating revenue. It started to organise the recruitment of 
additional labour to supplement planters' needs. 
At first this appears to have happened only on a small scale 
and was an ad hoc response to particular situations, such as 
Hornung's 
request for additional labour to open a canal. 
After recruitment 
for the Transvaal was banned in 1913 it can be assumed that 
this 
role was increased, for in 1914/15 the 
Governor of Zamb(zia drew up 
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a list of conditions governing the supply of labour from the 
state-administered areas to prazo-leoseholders. These included the 
important stipulation that the employer was to deposit the full 
amount of the wage for the contract period in the administrative 
office of the district where the men were engaged before they 
started their contract. (72) In this way not only was the state 
assured of the tax payment, it was also assured a cash income on 
which it could presumably earn interest. 
The organisation of labour recruitment by the state for 
private employers within the province provided a short-term solution 
to some of the problems which confronted the state. It provided 
revenue, ensured that the labour needs of planters within the 
district were at least partially met and prevented the drain on the 
province's labour resources which the export of labour had created. 
It did not, however, provide a long-term solution to the imbalance 
of the district's economy. Firstly, from the point of view of a 
potential investor in the state-administered areas of Zambc-rzia, there 
was little difference between labour export to the Transvaal and 
labour recruitment for the prazos. In both cases the investor faced 
a potential if not an actual labour shortage; and labour shortage 
implied an upward pressure on wages. Labour recruitment by the state 
was therefore a disincentive to investment in the region. Secondly, 
the differences between the labour regime on the prazos and the 
labour regime which operated in the state-administered areas led 
to a voluntary exodus of men from the latter to the 
former. 
Whereas on the prazos men generally worked close to home and 
for 
a six month period which was broken up into shorter periods 
to be 
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worked off at intervals during the year, those contracted by the 
state for razo-leaseholders generally worked far from home and 
for six consecutive months. (73) In 1924 it was estimated that the 
state lost 11,000 people to the prazos as a result of the differences 
in the two labour regimes. (74) This in turn meant a loss of revenue 
through tax and labour recruitment. It also contributed to the 
labour shortage which detracted investors from establishing 
plantations in the state-administered areas of the province. In 
the long-term, a state-run labour system while the dual administrative 
regime continued, meant a growing underdevelopment of the state-run 
areas for the sake of capital accumulation on the prazos, with the 
former merely serving as a labour reservoir for the latter. It did 
not even necessarily mean the creation of new forms of production 
for, as has been shown above, many prazo-leaseholders were interested 
only in collecting taxes. 
At the root of the problem was the continued existence of 
the prazos. There was an extensive debate, which can be traced 
through the reports of the time, on the effects of the prazos 
legislation. One school of thought argued that the solution to the 
province's problems was to extend the prazos. This would provide 
revenue for the state from rent at no cost. It would encourage 
investment because of the labour and tax clauses of the lease. It 
would lead to the general development of the whole region. 
This view 
effectively ignored the disadvantages of the system: 
increased 
competition for labour, and the problem of guaranteeing a 
labour 
supply for those who took over the state-administered areas. 
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It was the labour question which was central to the argument 
of those who opposed the extension of the razos. For them, a cheap 
and abundant supply of labour was the only way of attracting further 
capital to the region. To avoid the "absurd" competition for labour 
and the concommitant pressure on wages which the Governor had outlined 
in 1909 it was necessary to establish a uniform labour regime. State 
control of labour would ensure the rational apportionment of labour 
to those needing it at wages which would be the same throughout 
the district. Such a policy, with state control over the movement 
of men, would lead to investment in the state-run areas. The 
comparative advantages of leasing a prazo would disappear. 
It was this view which eventually won the day. In 1930, 
in line with the new policies of the Salazar regime, the prazos 
were abolished and a uniform labour regime, run by the state, was 
imposed on the whole district. The mechanisms for raising 
labour, tested and tried over the previous forty years, were brought 
together in a single system over which the state had complete control. 
Thereafter, men who had been able to avoid wage work and compulsory 
labour-service by fleeing from prazos and state lands alike, or who 
had been able to negotiate for higher wages by playing off one 
employer against another, were to find themselves hemmed in 
by a 
system which allowed them almost no room in which to manoeuvre. 
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Quadro XII Producäo de Acucar na am ezia oneladas Metricas) 
1893-1923. 
Anos Mopeia Marromeu Coia Total 
I893 605 - - 605 
1894 807 - - 807 
1895 77 - - 77 
1896 966 - - 966 
1897 261 - - 261 
1898 1094 - - 1094 
1899 1674 - - 1674 
1900 2600 - - 2600 
1901 1271 - - 1271 
1902 1796 2950 - 4746 
1903 2056 1190 - 3246 
1904 3719 3500 - 7219 
1905 4157 1900 - 6057 
1906 3165 700 - 3865 
1907 1770 1200 - 2970 
1908 6016 2000 5231 13247 
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(12) continued 
Anos o is 77 Marromeu Caia Total 
-` 2 9647 173- 5 
1910 6210 2680 6832 15722 
1911 6777 4201 10210 21188 
1912 5905 7060 8046 21011 
1913 7917 8814 10773 27504 
1914 9152 10475 9317 28944 
1915 7214 10394 10137 27145 
1916 9324 8101 8114 15539 
1917 11210 12136 9954 33300 
1918 5656 6219 3089 14964* 
1919 18207 9028 10011 27239 
1920 10183 9750 9796 29733 
*ibid., p. 30. There were "huge" floods on the Zambesi 
in 1918 which reduced the harvest by half. 
(13) Department of Trade, Companies Registration Office, 
Companies House, (London)Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., No. 162317 
(F. Vol. ). In 1975 a Management and Selling Agency Agreement 
still existed between SSE and Hornung and Co. Ltd., Sir John 
Hornung, Major N. H. Du Boulay and Mr S. P. Hornung, who were all descendents of the companies' founder, were directors and 
shareholders of both companies (SSE Ltd., Report and Accounts 
1975). For further information about SSE's capital, share- 
hho ers and the relationship between SSE and Hornung and 
Co., see the Sena Sugar Estates' files at Companies House. 
(14) Collin, op. cit., pp. 51-52. 
(15) Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., Moc .eo Prob. Acuc ., op. cit., P. 81. 
(16) ibid., passim. In part Hornung's success was related to the 
world price Tor sugar. Once the Portuguese quota had been met 
SSF was free to sell its surplus production on world markets. 
From the beginning of the First World War the price of sugar 
on the international market steadily rose. It remained high 
until the mid-1920s. The decision to expand production and 
open a fourth factory was made, at least in part, in response 
to the high price for sugar (Collin, op. cit., pp. 97-98 and 
p. 112). 
(17) Armando Castro, A Economia Portt uesa do Seculo XX 1900-1925 
(Ediyöes 70, Lisboa, 19 passim; ransisco Rafael et a ., 
Portugal, Capitalismo e Esta o . bvo: Algumas Contribuitoesr 
para o seu Estudo E ig es rontamento, Porto, 1976), pp. 91-92. 
(18) Rafael et al., op. cit., pp. 91-93 and pp. 115-117; Carlos 
Serra, das para uma Periodizacäo da Pentracäo Capitalists 
em Mocambique, (1505-1974)" (Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 
Centro de Estudos Africanos, Departamento de Historia, 
November, 1979), mimeo, p. 15. 
(19) James Duffy, Portuguese Africa (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1-93-9), pp. 201-224; Serra, op. cit., 
pp. 15-16. 
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(20) Antonio Enes, Mocambique: Relatorio A resentado ao Governo (1893) Agencia Gera do J' tramar itao, mprensa Nacional, 
Liisböa, 1971), p. 59. (Translation 7. H. ) 
((21) ibid., p. 59 and p. 64. (Translation J. H. ) 
(22) G. 6., Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty, A Manual 
of Portuguese East Africa (HMSO, London, 1920), pp. 167- 
an p. 180. 
(23) G. B., Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty, op. cit., 
pp. 154-162,179-180, and 184-186. See also: Barry Neil- 
Tomlinson "Manica and Sofala and the Mozambique Chartered 
Company, 1892-1910" (University of London, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, African History Seminar, paper 
presented 23 May 1979), mimeo, passim. 
(24) Centro de Estudos Africanos, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 
The Mozambican Miner: A Study in the Export of Labour (IICM, 
aputo, 1977), especially pp. 11-15. 
(25) Allen F. Isaacman, Mozambique: The Africanisation of a Europea 
Institution, The Zambesi razos 1750-1902 (University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1972), passim. For an overview of the period 
1505-1884 and a reinterpretation of pre-nineteenth century 
Mozambican history see Serra op. cit., pp. 1-14. Serra, p. 4, 
rejects Isaacman's theory that the razor were a- European 
political institution which was Africanised. "The prazos 
were not a feudal institution imported from Europe nor were 
they a specifically African feudal system. They were also 
not the 'Africanisation' of a European institution. They 
were rather a particular expression of the action and 
'fixing' of merchant capital... " 
(26) Rep. Port., Ministerio das Colonias, Regime dos Prazos da 
Zambezia: Relatorio Apresentado ao Conse o Colon-i-a3l, em Junho de 
pelo Vo a Re resentante da Provincia de Mogambi ue, 
Ernesto de Vilhena, Parecer do mesmo Conse o de 22 de Outubro 
oesse Ano Imprensa aciona de Lisboa, IM). 
(27) DSAF, R. H. Lyne, Report on Quelimane 1911, Secret6ria Geral do 
Governo Geral da rov. de oc, epartigdo de Agricultura. 
(28) For details of the prazos leased by these companies and their 
operations in the area see: G. B., Naval 
Intelligence Division 
of the Admiralty, op. cit., pp. 163-167, and 
F. Gavicho de 
Lacerda, Costumes e Lendas da Zambezia (Lisboa, 1925), 
pp. 121-I 7-. 
(29) DSAF, O. W. Barrett, Relatörio Geral sobre aA ricultura da 
Zambezia (1909), p. 
(30) ibid., p. 2. 
1915 
(31) ibid., p. 11 et passim. 
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(32) DSAF, Prov. de Mio;., Repartigao de Agricultura, Relatörio do Delegagao de Quelimane (Primeiros Elementos para os ocö Economico- grico a do Distrito e "ue imane 2, p, 76, (Translation J. H. ) 
(33) ibid., loc. cit. 
(34) ibid., p. 40 and p. 42. (Translation J. H. ). 
(35) ibid., p. 46 and p. 47. 
(36) In his 1911 report on the agriculture of Zamb(zia, for 
example, the director of the government Agricultural 
Department wrote that Mr. Zurcher, who had been appointed 
as government agronomist in Quelimane, had been unable to 
achieve anything in his first fifteen months of office. 
"Mr Zurcher's first act was to condemn the Maquival Station. 
This plot of ground had been selected at a spot 26 kilometres 
from the town of Quelimane, on the Quelimane-Maquival 
railway. It was surrounded on three sides by a mangrove 
swamp and in the wet season was submerged sometimes to a 
depth of two metres. The wire fence being under water, 
I think therefore, Mr Zurcher was quite right to condemn 
the site on these grounds alone as an experimental station; 
indeed he had no other alternative. £1,200 had ben %^sic 
expended on it but there was nothing at all to show for this 
money except the wire fence and some rolls of wire on the 
grass... We see here at work the same system that has helped 
to paralyse the work of the Department of Agriculture, namely, 
the division of responsibility from power. Mr Zurcher has 
been able to do nothing. During the time that he has held 
the appointment - 15 months - there have been eight changes 
in Governorship, every Governor or Acting Governor either 
postponing schemes that were never carried out or stating that 
it would be better to wait until his successor arrived. 
£400 was allocated for agriculture in Quelimane in the 
financial year 1910-11, but how this money was spent or 
whether it was ever spent at all is not known to the 
Agronomist, nor is it known to me... " (Lyne, op. cit., 
pp. 62-63). 
(37) Relatorio 
pp. 98-15 
da Delegacäo de Quelimane... 1924, op. cit., 
(38) ibid., pp. 83-84. 
(39) ibid., p. 101. The machila was a litter or sedan chair 
carried by four men. The men carrying the litter were 
expected to run about four kilometres after which they were 
replaced by another four men. The machila was still not an 
uncommon form of transport in the region in the 
1940s. 
(Interview at Alto Mol6cub, 16-17 July 1976). 
(40) Not all of Zamb(ýzia Province was under the administration of 
prazo-leaseholders. For the situation in the areas of 
the 
province administered directly by the state see pp. 
51-57. 
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(41) Relatorio do Governador do Distrito de Quelimane 1907-1909 
mprensa aciona 1909), p. 7. One argument against 
raising the 'native' tax in Zambezia was that it would lead 
to a flight of men to Nyasaland. The situation was little different in 1924. "Prazo Massingire, however, has been 
depopulated, according to all the witnesses, for other 
reasons. Amongst others, the proximity of the Protectorate 
of Nyasaland looms large, where the free labour market can 
lead to an eagerly desired laziness. He who travels along 
the Chire... hardly encounters a single living soul in 
Portuguese territory, but will see a string of huts on their 
bank where the inhabitants of Massingire, for various reasons, 
have settled and pay their tax, although they come to make 
their 'machambas', cut firewood and hunt on the fertile 
fields of the left /-Portuguese 7 side. " Relat6rio da 
Dele a ao de Quelimane... 1924, op. cit., p. 26. ranslation 
J. H. ) Clandestine emigration from Zambezia to Nyasaland 
continued until the 1960s, for the some reasons. See 
Chapter IX. 
(42) Relatdrio do Governador: Distrito de Quelimane 1914-1915 
(Imprensa Nacional, L 1916), pp. 61:: 62. 
(43) Com anhia do Assücar de N 
j. 43. (Translation J. H. 
(44) ibid., pp. 49-59. 
(45) ibid., p. 46. 
ue... 1895 e 1896, op. cit., 
(46) ibid., pp. 49-51. 
(47) ibid., p. 51. (Translation J .H. 
) 
(48) ibid., p. 49. If the illness was fictitious the man was 
obliged to work two days for every one missed. 
(49) ibid., p. 50. 
(50) ibid., p. 26. 
(51 ibid., p. 68. 
(Translation J. H. ) 
(Translation J. H. ) 
(52) ibid., pp. 9-10. 
(53) Compiled from Relatorio da Delega 
op. cit., pp. 45-54. The totals for 
locally. They also probably exclude 
Marromeu and Caia estates which lay i 
area; the Territory of the Mozambique 
under European cultivation (excluding 
following in 1923 (p. 38): 
de Quelimone... 1924 
sugar exclude sugar sold 
sugar produced on the 
na different administrative 
Company. The hectarage 
grazing land) was the 
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(53) continued 
crop hectares crop hectares 
coconut 25,532 groundnut 500 
sugar cane 8,651 tobacco 400 
sisal 7,520 rice 350 
cotton 7,400 tea 270 
maize 6,500 sorghum 151 
vegetables 2,607 millet 80 
cassava 1,000 salad veg. 47 kapok 652 sweet potato 40 
coffee 500 
TOTAL 62,200 
(54) Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., Mo g. eo Prob. uc., op. cit., 
p. 78. (Translation J .H .) 
(55) Gavicho de Lacerda, op. cit., p. 117. 
(56) AHM, NI, Cod. 3-54, Livro de Copias de Oficios e Ordens de 
Servico Enviados pela Secretaria dos Negdcios Indigenas 1905 
Abril 9- 1905 Setembro 6, (in fact the correspondence in this 
file refers to the years 1915-1916 and not 1905 as the 
catalogue states 7 7/46,13 Abril, o Secretario dos Negöcios 
Indigenas ao Governador de Quelimane. 
(57) AHM, Admin. Civil, Mato 77, Numero do Ordern 1026, Processo 
946, Pasta No. 93, Assunto Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., 501/856, 
14 Abril 30, Chefe da Repartigao do Gabinete, LM. 
(58) AHM, Admin. Civil, Maco 77, Pasta No. 93, op. cit., Secretdria 
Provincial do Interiror do Alto Comissariado da Prov. de Moc. 
Direc9do dos Servicos dos Negöcios Indrgenas, Informacäo, 
19 de Junho de 1926. 
(59) AHM, Admin. Civil, Mato 77, Pasta Pao. 93, op. cit., Alto 
Comissariado da Prov. de floc., Reporticäo do Gabinete, 
Envia-Se por Ordern de Sua Exa. o Alto Comissario ao Exmo. Snr. 
Secretario Provincial do Interior, Copia do Telegrama de 
Quelimane Datado de 6-7-926 e Registado nests Reparticäo em 
7-7-926 sob o Numero no. 437. 
(60) Relatdrio do Governador... Quelimane 1907-1909, op. cit., p. 47; 
GOV. 'Q, Prov. de Moc. , Zambe'zia, 
Circ. do Alto Moldcub, 
Relatorio Apresentado em Conformidade corn a Ordern de Servico 
No. 2/954, do Governo da Zambezia, de 4 de Marto de 1954, 
sobre: A Circunscricöo do Alto Molöcub ads os Comandos 
Militares em--1-919' ea undacdo dos sews ostos dministrativas 
ate P54. A eor anizagdo das Re e orias nf enas seus 
imites e ucessäo de ee ores, Ant nio Henriques e 
Oliveira, m., pp. 1-5. 
(61) Gavicho de Lacerda, op. cit., p. 101. 
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(62) Lyne, op. cit., pp. 46-47: "In these reserves (Moganja da 
Costa, Alto and Baixo Molocue) there is no development work 
going on by private companies or individuals; a somewhat 
surprising circumstance considering the natural advantages. I can find no explending Csic 7 for this except that for 
all practical purposes these reserves are government prazos 
and that as far as labour goes any settler would be at the 
mercy of the local administrator or commandant who exercises despotic ways over the people. He could not count on being 
able to obtain labour through the methods ordinarily employed 
in other countries, namely, by treating directly with the 
natives. If the commandant prohibited the chief from 
providing a settler with labour he could not obtain any and 
there is nothing to prevent a commandant so exercising his 
influence, if not openly, then secretly. At various stations 
numbers of boys and girls as well as adults are collected in 
from the kraals and set to work planting cassava, groundnuts, 
rice, cowpeas, potatoes and other annuals. The number so 
engaged is between 3000 and 4000 altogether. 
Levies are so arranged that everyone does a certain quantity 
of work in the year. This system results in the monopolising 
of all labour by the government officials. 
This labour is 
food for its 
useful public 
left alone in 
the interests 
and to direct 
being employed for the most part in growing 
own consumption, ana, therefore, serves no 
end as the people could do equally well if 
their own kraals. It would be, I think, in 
of the District to discontinue this system 
that no compulsory labour be employed except 
upon necessary public works. " 
(63) Relatorio do Governador... Quelimane 1907-1909, op. cit., 
pp. 233-M. 
(64) ibid., pp. 71-72. (Translation J. H. ) 
(65) ibid., pp. 240-241: "One of the pernicious effects of the 
emigration consists of the discontent with which the native 
returned from the mines afterwards receives the wages fixed 
by the law of the prazos... there is no doubt that it 
surprises and annoys him to see that for four weeks work some 
only pay him 1$ 600 reis when others gave him three pounds. " 
(Translation J. H. ) The Governor continued that higher wages 
on the Rand were putting pressure on wages on the prazos. 
When one leaseholder put his wages up to attract la our the 
others were forced to follow suit if they did not want to 
see their labour force disappear. 
(66) C', AMri... 1904-1905 op. cit., p. 5. (Translation J .H. 
) 
(67) Relatorio do Governador... Quelimane 1907-1909, op. cit., 
pp. 237-238. (Translation J. H. 
(68) ibid., p. 131. 
(69) ibid., p. 73. 
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(70) ibid., p. 52. 
(71) ibid., pp. 98-100. 
(72) Relatdrio do Governador... Quelimane 1914-1915, op. cit., 
pp. b -6 ; Serra, op. cit., p. 21, argues that the ban on the recruitment of labour for the South African mines above 
parallel 22° after 1913 was not the result of employers' 
concern about the health of men from the tropics, which was the official justification for the ban. Rather it was brought into force because planters in Zambeezia and northern Mozambique themselves required cheap labour. "Parallel 22 
became, especially from 1913, rather than a geographical 
division between areas with different levels of physical 
robustness a battlefield between two sections of capital 
struggling for the provision of cheap labour: the south, 
South African mining capital acting through WENELA, and the 
north, plantation capital... " (Translation J. H. ) Martin 
Legassick and Francine de Clerq, on the other hand, argue that 
the restriction on recruiting labour north of parallel 220 
was the result of internal developments in South Africa. 
From 1900 onwards, white workers in South Africa called on 
the state to redistribute labour in production by protecting 
jobs on a racial basis and to intervene "to ensure that the 
undercutting effect on wage levels of the penal contract 
system did not extend to them... As a result of economic and 
political struggles of white workers... the state did 
intervene in these chauvinistic, racist ways: the job colour 
bar regulations under the 1911 Mines and Works Act, the ending 
of "tropical" recruitment in 1913, ... are examples. Simultaneously, the state and em lo ers began to institutionalise 
an "interne recruitment network which, to the extent that it 
could secure a sufficient su , would provide the sis 
or a nationalistic asin out o "Foreign labour. " 
(Emphasis a ae ("Capitalism and Migrant labour in Southern 
Africa: The Origins and Nature of the System" (University of 
London, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Postgraduate 
Seminar, Labour Migration within the Empire-Commonwealth 
from 1780,13 June 01977%). Given the Portuguese state's 
overwhelming need for revenue during this period; revenue 
which could most easily be secured by the recruitment of 
labour for South Africa, it seems unlikely that the 
Portuguese state would have been able to oppose the interests 
of South African mining capital if internal developments 
both within the mining industry and in the society had not 
themselves led to a restriction on the recruitment of 
"tropical" labour. Thus although planters in 2ambd'zia and 
northern Mozambique benefitted from the ban, they 
benefitted 
not because of their growing importance and ability to shape 
Portuguese colonial policy, but because the changing pattern 
of capital accumulation in South Africa enabled them to 
pursue their own interests. 
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(73) Relatorio da Delegacäo de Quelimane.. 1924, op. Cit., p. 34. 
Many men were absent from their homes for longer than six 
months. The journey from Alto Molocue, from where much of 
the labour engaged under the terms of the Hornung Contract 
came, to Mopeia, took three weeks each way (ibid., p. 31). 
Thus men recruited from the state-administered area of Alto 
Molocue for labour on the razos could expect to be away at 
least seven and a half mont s and longer still if they had 
not worked consistently throughout the contract period. 
(74) Relatörio da Delegacäo de Quelimane... 1924, op. cit., p. 27. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE LABOUR LEGISLATION OF 1930 
If the first 40 years of colonial capitalism in Mozambique 
can be characterised as ones in which the state was too weak to 
impose a policy which would aid capital accumulation in Portugal, 
the next 30 years were notable for the growing strength of the 
state and its ability to reorientate colonial policy to serve both 
the interests of metropolitan capital in Portugal and Portuguese 
capital in Mozambique. Admittedly, the state was never strong enough 
to break the pattern of dependence established in the previous era. 
The massive export of labour to South Africa and the rail-links and 
port facilities which served South Africa and Rhodesia continued as 
the main fonts of revenue. Nevertheless, from the last years of the 
1920s a new colonial policy began to take shape in Lisbon which sought 
to integrate the colonial and metropolitan economies, and to open up 
the possibility of expanded production and accumulation in both. 
In Salazar's words, the role of the colonies was henceforth to be 
one of "producing and selling raw materials to the metropole and 
with the price of these to buy manufactured goods from it. "(1) 
The regime headed by Antonio Salazar from 1928 until his 
death in 1968 came to power as a result of a military coup in 
1926. 
The regime, promising strong government and an end to the political 
turmoil which had characterised the country for the past 
decades, 
united the various fractions of the Portuguese 
bourgeoisie. Each too 
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weak in themselves to assume state power, they came together in 
support of a government which was pledged to struggle against the 
effects of the growing international recession and strengthen the 
economy. (2) 
The thrust of the new regime's policies was directed at 
boosting national capital and protecting it from foreign competition. 
The state intervened in the banking system and introduced fiscal 
measures designed to resolve the country's acute financial crisis 
and reduce the national debt. It intervened in the manufacturing 
sector to save the tobacco industry which was in danger of collapse. 
It gave subsidies to the national shipping industry. It supported 
the mining sector and pledged investment in communications designed 
to help agricultural producers. (3) 
Similar policies were pursued in the colonies with the aim 
of counteracting the effects of the depression, encouraging colonial 
production and providing protected markets for Portuguese manufactured 
goods. To this end colonial policy was directed from Lisbon through 
the Minister of the Colonies, who was responsible for appointing and 
supervising colonial governors. The finances of the colonies were 
overhauled and in Mozambique strict foreign-exchange regulations 
were introduced to prevent the flow of gold and foreign exchange 
from the colony. Protectionist measures were strengthened to reduce 
colonial dependence on foreign-manufactured goods and encourage the 
import of Portuguese-manufactured goods, and to increase the export 
of colonial produce to Portugal. In addition the state provided aid 
to enterprises which were in danger of failing as a result of the 
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fall in the value of their exports during the depression. It also 
made available credit and special terms for those wishing to invest 
in the colonies. These measures culminated in the 1932 Monetary 
Decree which tightened and drew together the existing legislation, 
and in a series of proposals arising from a Commercial Conference 
held in Lisbon in the same year, designed to strengthen the existing 
policy. Together they formed the embryo of a comprehensive development 
plan for Mozambique. (4) 
From the point of view of this study, however, the most 
important changes introduced by the new regime concerned labour. 
Underpinning the policies of the Salazar government was the need to 
guarantee the conditions under which accumulation took place in the 
colonies and to extend these to new investors. In Mozambique this 
meant ironing out the anomalies of the old labour regime. To this 
end state administration was extended to the area conceded to the 
Niassa Company and to the prazos, both of which ceased to exist. 
In place of the two labour regimes which had previously existed 
a uniform state-administered labour system was imposed. Central to 
the new labour system was the labour legislation. This covered 
everything related to the employment of 'native' labour in the colony. 
THE LABOUR LAW 
The Government of the Republic does not impose, nor 
does 
it permit that any form of obligatory or 
forced labour 
is demanded of the natives of its colonies for private 
ends, but it does insist that they 
fulfill the moral 
duty which necessarily falls on them of seeking 
through 
work the means of subsistence, thus contributing 
to 
the general interest of humanity. 
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The boldly stated words of the preamble of the 1928 Cow 
do Trabalho dos Indigenas nas Colonias Portugueses de Africa (5) 
sum up the ambiguity of the legislation enacted by the Salazar regime. 
Forced labour for private ends was expressly prohibited, but Africans 
had a moral duty to work. It was by citing the first words of this 
preamble that the colonial government was to consistently deny that 
it resorted to forced labour practises, when challenged over the 
next 30 years. It was through enforcing the clauses of the law which 
established how Africans were to fulfil their duty to work that the 
government made sure that forced labour, where voluntary labour was 
not available, continued to furnish the needs of private employers. 
Denials of forced labour practises notwithstanding, the whole thrust 
of the labour law and other laws which supplemented it was to oblige 
men to take up regular wage work whether they wanted to or not. 
The 1928 Cödigo do Trabalho dos Indigenas (UI) was the basic 
document covering the conditions of 'native' employment in all the 
Portuguese colonies in Africa. It remained in force until 1962. 
This law laid down the guidelines to be followed by the individual 
colonial governments in matters relating to labour but allowed them 
to adapt the law to suit their own specific circumstances. (6) The 
CTI was therefore supplemented by a Regulation governing 'native' 
labour in each of the major African colonies. In many places the 
individual Regulations exactly repeat the words of the CTI. In 
other places they amplify its clauses or abbreviate them 
by referring 
back to them. However, they differ only in substance to the degree 
that the individual legislation introduces new material to govern 
a particular set of circumstances which 
do not apply generally, such as, 
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for example, labour recruitment to South Africa from Mozambique. 
The I and the Regulamento do Trabalho dos Indienas na Coldnia de 
Mocambique (RTI)(7) which was approved in 1930, can, therefore, be 
treated as one body of legislation; a body of legislation which ruled 
the lives of African peasants and workers in Zambdzia until 1962. 
However, to avoid confusion, the analysis which follows will 
concentrate on the RT I, making occasional references back to the CTI. 
Just as the CTI prohibited forced labour for private ends, 
so did the RTI. "Obligatory work for private ends is absolutely 
forbidden. Those who impose it will be punished. "(8) However, the 
prohibition on raising labour by force for private employers was 
not a prohibition on the use of forced labour as such. In certain 
circumstances forced labour could be mobilised for public work, or 
work of interest to the 'natives' themselves. 
There were three categories of obligatory labour recognised 
in law. Firstly, where government agencies or the municipality were 
unable to attract sufficient volunteer labour they were allowed to 
recruit workers by force. In this situation workers were to be 
afforded the same conditions and wages as voluntary labour. Secondly, 
the government and its agents were permitted to resort to force to 
mobilise labour to deal with natural calamities. Natural calamities 
ranged from floods and insect plagues to the extermination of rodents 
and control of epidemics. People obliged to work in these circumstances 
received food and shelter and a gratuity at the end of their period 
of service, but no wages. Finally, the local authorities were 
allowed to forcibly recruit people for a whole range of services 
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connected with 'native' living conditions and agriculture. These 
included road maintenance, cleaning villages and suburbs, maintaining 
wells and watering points for animals, and growing crops in African 
reserves whose income would revert to the peasants. For services 
of this type the government provided tools, materials and seeds but 
it did not pay any wages. (9) 
It was the responsibility of the local administrative officials 
to raise labour for public works. Theoretically they could only 
resort to force when persuasion was not effective. However, whether 
they used force or persuasion they were enjoined to work through 
the 'native' authorities and choose men for public works who had 
shown themselves the most 'lazy'. 
As much in the employment of persuasion as the forceful 
means they might need to use, they (the administrative 
officials) will always act through the native chiefs, 
and, in agreement with them, distribute the burdens of 
work and choose the natives who most abuse laziness 
and who without prejudicing their economic activities 
can be employed on work of public interest. (10) 
The meaning of laziness becomes clear if we examine the categories 
of people exempt from public work. 
There were several categories of 'natives' who were exempt 
from the obligation to do public work: boys under 14 and men over 
60; the sick and invalid; si ios and anyone else who worked for 
the state or the security services; recognised 'native' chiefs. 
Also exempt were men who had worked for at least six months in the 
colony or men who had returned from working a contract abroad, as 
long as neither group had been out of work for more than six months. 
Women were exempt from the first type of public work but could be 
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recruited for either of the other two types of work as long as this 
did not involve them leaving the area where they lived. (11) In 
effect, all able-bodied women and young boys, and any man who was 
not attached to the civil service or military, and who had been 
without regular employment for six months, could be forcibly 
recruited for public work by the state. 
The law, therefore, not only made provision for the labour 
needs of the government, by allowing administrators to press men 
into public work when volunteer labour was not forthcoming in sufficient 
numbers, but it also established a deterrent against "laziness". 
Men who refused to take up employment after a six month period were 
the first to be recruited for public work. The prohibition on the 
use of forced labour by private employers was, therefore, no more 
than a legal nicety designed to disguise the real object of the 
labour law, which was to establish the conditions in which men would 
be obliged to seek employment with private companies and individuals. 
Besides establishing a system of punishments the effect of 
which was to discourage men from avoiding regular wage work, the 
law also included clauses intended to ensure that men fulfilled 
their contracts with private employers. Firstly, any man who had 
signed a contract but who had failed to appear at the work place, 
or any man who had failed to complete a contract, could be sent 
or returned to his employer. 
It is not considered as an imposition of obligatory work 
any act practised by the authorities or civil servants 
to oblige natives to take or retake work for which 
they have entered a voluntary contract, when, without 
a just cause recognised by the curador or 
his agents, 
they refuse to take this work, or abandon it before 
finishing the contract. (12) 
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Secondly any man who committed a minor crime or who infringed the 
labour law could be condemned to correctional work. There were 
numerous infringements of the labour law. Article 311 of the RTI 
stated that: 
Workers will be punished with correctional work up to 
a year, depending on the gravity of the fault committed: 1. who do not fulfill the duties which fall on them in terms of Article 107... 
Article 107 defined these duties as: 
1. To obey the orders of the boss in everything that 
is in agreement with the prescriptions of the 
present Regulation; 
2. to carry out the work with which he is entrusted, 
with zeal and in the best possible way, compatible 
with his strength and aptitudes; 
3. to compensate the boss for the losses and damage he 
wilfully causes, agreeing to the discounts which 
are authorised by the authorities; 
4. not to leave the work-place without the prior 
authorisation of the boss. 
Article 311 continued: 
Workers will be punished with correctional work... 
2. who sell goods... or any other products of the 
same type as those which are harvested or made 
on the property or the establishment where they work, 
if they cannot prove that they acquired them 
legally; 
3. who disturb or try to disturb the discipline and 
good order of the places where they work; 
4. who are absent from the workplace without the 
permission of the boss or his representative, 
except when they are going to present 
complaint or protest to the local authority; 
5. who are habitually drunk or who habitually 
engage in other vices or practise immoral acts 
which disturb the discipline of the workers or 
which show a lack of respect for the bosses and 
other people; 
6. who engage in theft, wilful damage and other 
crimes or contraventions to which a more serious 
penalty does not apply; 
7. who refuse to carry out the duties for which they 
were engaged when such services are compatible with 
their aptitudes and robustness and conform with 
the dispositions of this Regulation; 
8. who disobey the instructions, orders or notices of 
the authorities. (13) 
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Men condemned to correctional work were liable to work only 
for the government or local municipality. They received 30-60 
per cent of the wage payable for identical work elsewhere. (14) 
However, half of this wage was discounted to cover any losses such 
as advances on wages, recruiting costs and the like, which the 
employer might have incurred as a result of the worker's 'desertion' 
or error. Only if no compensation was owing to the employer, did 
the worker receive the other half of the wage-(15) 
Like those men who did not 'voluntarily' seek employment 
after a six month break, and who were therefore liable to obligatory 
work, men who transgressed the labour laws or general laws of the 
colony found themselves liable to undertake correctional work. 
This involved not only an extension of the period worked but also a 
loss of earnings. Thus, correctional work, like obligatory work, 
was intended as a deterrent. It was designed to discourage men 
from desertion, shirking and inciting indiscipline at the work place. 
Taken together, those clauses of the labour law which 
allowed various forms of forced labour for public work undermined 
the prohibition on the use of forced labour for private ends. 
They ensured that, even if not directly recruited by force, men 
would take up and complete a regular contract with a private 
employer. The combined effect of these aspects of the 
labour law 
was to guarantee not only that labour would be available to those 
who needed it, but that the contracted men would also work 
hard 
and refrain from criticising or rebelling against the conditions 
of their labour. 
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ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW 
All African men over the age of 18 were required by law to 
carry a caderneta or pass. (16) The pass contained a comprehensive 
biography of the individual and his background. More importantly, 
however, from the point of view of law enforcement, it also contained 
details of his last period of employment. Firstly, the pass 
registered the colony, concelho (urban district) or circumscrigoo 
(rural district) where the pass was issued, and gave the number of 
the register in which it was recorded. Secondly the pass recorded 
the name and domicile of the bearer, and the concelho or circumscrigoo 
in which he normally lived; the names of his parents and their place 
of residence if known; the name and probable age of his wife if the 
bearer was married and sexes and probable ages of his children. 
Thirdly, the pass contained a print of the left or both thumbs. 
Fourthly, it contained details of his normal employment. These 
included the name of the employer and place of employment, the 
bearer's salary and the date and length of the last contract. 
Fifthly, the pass registered the date on which the bearer had left 
his employment and 'the way in which he fulfilled his obligations 
as a native worker. "(17) Finally the law included the recommendation 
that: 
besides these details, it is obligatory that those 
which refer to the payment of the native tax ... 
and any other details which are of practical use- 
fulness with regard to the life of the natives and 
easy proof of his identit , rights and 
fulfilment of 
is duties, should be ec ared. "(18 
emp asis added) 
Through the pass system the agents of the colonial government 
who were responsible for enforcing the 
law: administrators, their 
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assistants and the 'native authorities', were armed with an 
efficient and reliable weapon for putting the law into immediate 
effect. If the pass did not record the date of a contract, or if 
six months had lapsed since the previous contract had terminated, 
the bearer was liable to instant arrest and punishment in the form 
of obligatory or correctional labour. The pass thus allowed colonial 
officials to apprehend at a glance any man who had failed to take up 
a contract or who had failed to complete one. 
The pass system also served another purpose. Without a valid 
pass a man could neither leave the area where he lived nor seek 
voluntary employment. (19) The pass system therefore facilitated 
control of the physical movement of African men. It helped 
administrators and their assistants to prevent men from leaving 
the province in search of better-paid work elsewhere. It also 
enabled administrators to keep a register of the numbers of men 
available for work and a record of their employment, which, when 
combined with the other labour statistics kept by administrators, 
and the returns of employers, allowed the provincial authorities 
to control the distribution of labour. 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF LABOUR 
Recruiting Licences 
With a few minor exceptions all private employers were 
obliged to possess annual recruiting licences, which were issued 
by the administrative authorities. (20) Four types of licences were 
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issued depending on the type of recruitment undertaken. Firstly, 
employers could request a licence to recruit directly on their own 
behalf. For this type of licence a deposit of 500 escudos was 
required and an annual sum of 100 escudos was paid for the licence. (21) 
When the applicant for a licence of this type was a company with 
properties in more than one administrative district its managers 
could be nominated as recruiters. In this case an additional annual 
tax was payable on the licence. (22) Men recruited by such firms 
could not leave their own administrative district without first being 
presented to the administrator. (23) A company applying for a licence 
to recruit on its own behalf was obliged to hand in to the 
administrator in whose district his company was located, among 
other things, the names of his properties, the type of work they 
undertook and where they were situated, the number of workers 
employed monthly during the previous year, the annual wages bill, 
a list of the regions where the company wanted to recruit and the 
number of workers required during the period of the licence's 
validity. (24) 
The second type of licence applied to recruitment agencies 
operating on behalf of other employers in the colony. Recruitment 
agencies were allowed to engage labour for agricultural and 
industrial concerns which asked for their services. The Governor 
General of the colony decided on the number of such agencies and 
the length of time that they were considered necessary. 
(25) Each 
recruitment agency was staffed by a general engager with 
the help 
of one or two European auxiliaries and an equal number of 
African 
auxiliaries. The area in which the society could operate, while 
not 
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necessarily confined to one administrative district, was limited 
by the Governor General. Within this area the general engager could 
recruit workers for anyone who asked for his services. However, 
the area in which the general engager operated in no way constituted 
a reserve and anyone else who held a recruiting licence was entitled 
to recruit within the area. (26) general engagers paid a deposit of 
5000 escudos for their licences and an annual fee of 2000 escudos. (27) 
The third type of recruiting licence was granted to farmers, 
industrialists, business men and proprietors who formed non-profit 
making societies to recruit workers for their establishments. 
Workers recruited by these societies were distributed among the 
members on a ration basis. These societies were obliged to have a 
representative in Lourenco Marques to liaise with the Governor General 
who chose the recruiting agent. (28) 
Finally, there were agencies which recruited men for work 
outside the Colony. They were regulated by the Modus Vivendi and 
any other Treaties or Conventions in force. (29) In practise, 
labour 
recruitment for work abroad was only permitted in the south of the 
country and in Tete Province. In the area south of the river 
Save 
WENELA held a monopoly on labour recruitment. (30) Hence this 
type 
of licence only effectively applied to Tete. 
Zambezia as a Labour Reserve 
In Zamb9zia Province the ban on recruitment of labour for 
work outside the colony(31) was extended 
to a ban on recruitment of 
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workers for projects in other provinces of the colony. A law of 
1929(32) described Zambezia as a 'labour reserve' for employers 
within the province. The 1929 law was a re-enactment of an earlier 
law of 1919(33), which appears to have lapsed in the intervening 
years. There is little direct evidence available about either of 
the laws. However circumstantial evidence suggests possible 
reasons for their creation. In the case of the 1919 law there were 
probably three reasons. Firstly, wages were always higher in Monica 
and Sofala (the territory of the Mozambique Company) than in Zambc'zia. (34) 
Secondly, until the world recession of the late 1920s there was a 
continual labour shortage in central Mozambique. The law was therefore, 
presumably created to prevent the outward flow of labour to the south 
which would have exacerbated the labour problems of planters in 
Zamb6zia. The third reason relates directly to the second and 
concerns SSE's labour recruiting policy. By 1919, as we have 
already seen, SSF was already employing some 20,000 men a year. 
SSF's plantations straddled the Zambesi river and were therefore 
located both in the territory of the Mozambique Company and Zamb4zia. 
To avoid paying the higher wages in force in the territory of the 
Mozambique Company SSF employed large numbers of men from Zambtdzia, 
at the rate in force there, on its plantations on the south bank 
of the river. (35) The law was probably, at least in part, designed 
to prevent this practise. It was presumably not put into effect, 
because, as one of the few successful plantations in the province, 
SSE was in a strong bargaining position with regard to labour. 
However, by 1929 the threat of an outward flow of labour to the south 
was not acute. Indeed the general shortage of labour in the region 
had given way to a glut of men on the labour market as peasants were 
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forced to seek work to pay their taxes; taxes which they could not 
meet through the sale of their produce because of falling prices. (36) 
It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that the re-enactment of 
the law in 1929 was part of the general labour policy brought into 
force by the new regime. Fearing another labour shortage when the 
region recovered from the depression, the regime was anxious to 
protect local planters and safeguard their labour supply. In the 
short-term while the supply of labour was abundant the law could 
be ignored. (37) Whatever the reasons for the law its aim was to 
consolidate the ability of the provincial government to distribute 
labour. The province, in theory, at least formed a sealed area from 
which labour recruitment for other provinces was banned. 
The law defining Zambezia as a labour reserve was consolidated 
by those clauses of the Rh which allowed administrators to control 
the physical movement of men (through the pass system) and control 
the distribution of labour through the issuing of recruiting licences. 
Together they were intended to ensure that the labour available in 
the province was sufficient for employers' needs, and was distributed 
on the basis of those needs. In this way competition between employers 
for labour could be held in check. 
Contracts 
Besides issuing recruiting licences, local administrators 
were also responsible for supervising contracts 
between employers/ 
recruiters and the men they wished to engage. 
These contracts were 
of two types: contracts with the intervention of 
the authorities and 
contracts without the intervention of the authorities. 
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Contracts with the intervention of the authority could only 
be made after the contracted men had presented their passes to the 
administrator who verified that they were eligible to be recruited. 
It was the administrator's duty to establish that both parties had 
agreed to all the clauses of the contract without coercion, and that 
the contract was legal. Contracts celebrated in this way were 
individual, (unless the worker's wife and children accompanied him), 
except when they involved a group of men recruited to work for the 
same length of time in the same place. All contracts had to be 
signed in the presence of the administrator or his agent if they 
involved the contracted men leaving the administrative area where 
they lived. (38) Given the pattern of labour recruitment in Zambezia, 
where large firms recruited much of their labour outside the 
administrative division where the plantation was situated, the 
majority of workers signed their contracts in the presence of the 
a, dministrator. (39) 
Contracts without the intervention of the authority could 
only be made when the worker intended to work in the administrative 
division where he lived, or voluntarily appeared before an employer 
outside this area. In the latter case he could only be employed 
if his pass indicated that he was free to offer his services. (40) 
Contracts made without the intervention of the authorities were of 
two types: verbal or written. Verbal contracts were usually made by 
private families requiring domestic workers. They 
lasted for an 
indefinite period of time although they had to be renewed either 
weekly or monthly. The employer was obliged to 
inform the local 
administrator about the principal conditions of 
the contract and the 
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identity of the contracting parties. (41) Written contracts could be 
either individual or collective, and had to be signed by the employer 
or his representative at the work place. These contracts had to be 
sent to the administrator of the area where the work-place was 
located within eight days. When workers agreeing to this type 
of contract came from another administrative district copies of 
the contract had to be sent to their own administrator. (42) 
If the employer normally employed more than ten workers he was 
required to send monthly returns of the numbers of men employed to 
the local administrator. (43) 
Contracts without the intervention of the authority were 
designed principally for large employers who drew casual labour from 
the immediate vicinity of the work place, for employers who engaged 
volunteer labour from other areas, for small employers who relied 
on local labour for their needs, and for families who engaged volunteer 
labour for domestic work. Contracts without the intervention of the 
authority, therefore, in general, only applied to men who worked in 
the area where they lived or to men who voluntarily sought work in 
another administrative district. However, the number of men who 
voluntarily sought work outside their own administrative 
district 
was limited. There were two main reasons for this, both of which 
related to the revenue the state acquired from controlling 
the supply 
of labour to private employers. 
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REVENUE DERIVING FROM THE STATE'S CONTROL OF LABOUR 
Fees Payable on Contracts 
For each worker contracted with the intervention of the 
authorities (men recruited for work in another administrative 
district) the employer was obliged to pay a tax of three escudos 
fifty centavos. For each man recruited without the intervention of 
the authorities on a written contract (for work in the administrative 
division where he lived) the employer was obliged to pay a tax of 
three escudos. In both cases two escudos fifty centavos was paid 
directly into the state coffers by the local administrator. The 
balance of the tax was retained by the administrator to cover the 
cost of issuing or dealing with contracts. (44) No tax was 
collected for men who voluntarily sought work outside their own 
administrative district. Thus not only did the existence of large 
numbers of volunteer workers undermine efficient administrative 
control of labour but it also meant a loss of revenue. It was 
therefore in the state's interest to restrict the number of volunteer 
workers. 
The 'Native' Tax 
One of the major responsibilities of the colonial adminis- 
trators and the hierarchy of 'native chiefs' who assisted them, was 
to organise the collection of the 'native' tax. To this end the 
administrative divisions of the colony were organised on the 
basis 
of population distribution in order that the maximum number of 
people could be covered for tax-collection purposes with the minimum 
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expense. (45) They rarely took account of the economic, social and 
ethnic composition of particular regions. Changes in the administrative 
divisions of the colony were usually the result of changes in the 
composition of the population or the administrator's inability to 
effectively supervise the areas under his jurisdiction. (46) Likewise, 
the reorganisation of the 'native authorities' was undertaken at 
various times to ensure a more efficient system of tax collection 
and the application of the labour laws. (47) 
An annual census was taken ostensibly to provide accurate 
information about the number of tax payers in each administrative 
district. In fact, census taking was usually deficient and 
irregular because of the lack of resources and manpower and often 
took place in the administrative office using the previous year's 
figures as a base. (48) Nevertheless, however inaccurate, the census 
did provide a guide to the number of taxes which were available for 
collection. It also provided information about the numbers of men 
available for wage work, since,,, with a few exceptions, men eligible 
for the full tax contribution were also those who were obliged to 
work for six months of the year. 
From the reports available, the tax collected from the 
African population of Zamb! rzia appears to have been the single most 
important item of direct revenue in the district budget in 
the twentieth 
century. (49) Administrators were, therefore, anxious 
to collect 
as many taxes as possible. Their zeal was such, or 
the census 
unreliability was such, that reports 
for the 1940s and 1950s show 
that in many instances the percentage of tax collected was greater 
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than the percentage estimated as owing. (50) To facilitate tax 
collection and to guarantee regular revenue for the state from this 
source, both the DTI and the RTI allowed administrators to demand 
the tax when passes were examined either before men left to take up 
a contract or when they returned from a contract. 
Tax Collection 
Without a valid pass, as we have seen, men could not be 
recruited for work outside their own administrative district. Before 
they left the district they were obliged to hand their pass to the 
administrator. Among other things the pass registered the date of 
the last tax payment. If the tax was due and the man was unable 
to pay it the pass was invalid and the man could not leave the 
district. To facilitate both tax collection and labour recruitment 
therefore recruiters were allowed to advance a sum towards the payment 
of the tax when they contracted workers. (51) Thus, encouraging men 
to take up a contract with a private employers was a sure means of 
guaranteeing tax payment. 
The law also allowed administrators to collect the tax at 
the end of the contract. All men recruited for work outside their 
own district on a contract with the intervention of the authorities, 
and men working in their own district on a written contract of over 
three months duration (without the intervention of the authorities) 
received half their wages for the contract period at the workplace. 
The employer was obliged to remit the other half of the monthly 
wage to the administrator of the men's home district for payment at 
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the end of the contract. (52) Since men were obliged to hand in their 
pass to the administrator when they came to receive the deferred 
wage the tax could be deducted from the wage before it was paid. 
Only men who worked in their own district for less than three 
consecutive months, and men on a verbal contract outside their home 
district, received their wages in full at the work place. (53) In the 
former case the administrator still retained control over the 
tax payer since he could not leave the area without first 
presenting his pass to the authorities. In the latter case, control 
was less easy to maintain since the man had already left the 
district. Collecting the tax was also less easy for the same reason. 
Thus the second reason volunteer labour was discouraged by 
administrators was to ensure regular tax payment in the home 
district. (54) 
ADMINISTRATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN RECRUITING 
Through the RTI colonial administrators were responsible for 
issuing recruitment licences and supervising recruiters. They were 
responsible for issuing and supervising contracts. They were 
responsible for collecting the 'native' tax, which could most 
easily be done by making sure that men took up a regular contract 
with a private employer. They were responsible 
for punishing 
men who abused 'laziness' and who infringed the 
labour law. They 
were responsible, in fact, for supervising every aspect of 
the law 
and carrying it out, except one. Administrators were specifically 
prohibited from raising labour by force 
for private employers. They 
89 
were, therefore, also forbidden from directly recruiting men for 
private employers. 
The authorities... are absolutely prohibited from: 
1. recruiting native workers for the service of 
private individuals or companies, either 
directly or through the mediation of the 
civil servants or agents of authority who 
are subordinate to them. (55) 
Yet cdministrators, as we have seen, had powerful reasons for 
intervening directly in the recruitment of workers for private 
companies, not least of which were the need to collect the 'native' 
tax and to make sure that the 'natives' fulfilled their duty to work. 
It therefore seems unlikely, given the whole thrust of the law, 
and given also the close and regular contact administrators 
necessarily maintained with both recruiters and the men they recruited, 
that the prohibition should stand without qualification. A careful 
reading of the law reveals that qualifications indeed existed. 
Article 34 of the RTI, for example, states that administrators were 
not prevented from helping recruiters to carry out their work. 
Indeed, it was their duty to do so: 
All the authorities who exercise jurisdiction over 
the native population or who, in the exercise of their 
functions, are in direct contact with those populations, 
have a duty to facilitate the work of all those who 
need to recruit workers, as long as those who exercise 
this office seek to convince the natives to contract 
their services by legal and honest means. (56) 
Article 35 described the forms this help could take. 
The facilities to be given to recruiters must be limited 
to the following acts: 
1. indicate to them the places in which, because of 
greater population density, less need for the 
natives to attend to their own agriculture, or 
other reasons of the moment, they can most easily 
proceed with recruitment... 
3. To advise the natives, and their chiefs, in the 
presence of the recruiters themselves or outside it, 
to procure work, but always explaining to them that 
in no way can they be obliged to contract their 
services with these recruiters... (57) 
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Finally, Article 36 stated that although - cdministrators were not 
allowed to be seen recruiting for private companies, nor could they 
direct their subordinates to do so, this injunction did not include 
"the fortuitous cases where the authorities of their subordinates 
travel in the company of recruiters, as long as they do not do so 
with the intention of, through their presence, coercing the natives 
to enter a contract... "(58) 
As we shall see in Chapter IV the 'fortuitous' cases in which 
administrators or their subordinates accompanied private recruiters 
were numerous. Indeed, so numerous were they that more fortuitous 
were the cases when administrators were not helping recruiters. 
Far from being the exception, the direct recruitment of forced 
labour for private companies was the rule. If administrators 
wished to carry out their duties diligently they had little option 
but to help private recruiters. The 1930 labour law therefore 
established the conditions in which plantation capital in Zambezia 
could call on the state for abundant supplies of labour. However, 
planters not only required large numbers of workers they also 
needed cheap labour. Through the clauses of the law which established 
the wage levels to be paid to African labourers the state also 
ensured that the second principal need of planters in the region 
would be fulfilled. 
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAXES, WAGES AND CONTRACT LABOUR - THE 
PROVISION OF CHEAP LABOUR 
Besides its obvious function as a source of revenue for the 
state the 'native' tax was also designed to serve another purpose. 
It was intended as an additional means of forcing men to enter 
a regular contract with a private employer. 
Some diplomas, and all those who have tramped the 
colonies with their eyes open, recognise that the 
work of taking the census and collecting the native 
tax are, without doubt, the most important of all 
the duties which fall on the circumscriptions and 
posts, because they make the native feel the 
obedience which he owes to the sovereign power and 
to the people of whom he is becoming a part and who 
hope to integrate him in their civilisation; and they 
are also the most rigorous and intelligent stimulation 
for the natives to take up work and are at the same 
time a token of their submission and discipline. (59) 
(emphasis added) 
To this end the RTI contained a series of clauses which regulated 
the relationship between taxes and wages. 
The RTI established the minimum wage levels for the different 
types of work 'natives' were to undertake. These were related 
directly to the tax in force. When the tax altered the minimum 
wage levels altered correspondingly. The monthly wage of a worker 
was to vary between 25 per cent and 40 per cent of the annual tax. 
The minimum percentage applied to workers engaged for agricultural 
work in their own districts. The maximum percentage applied to 
men working outside the colony or who were engaged for special work 
inside it. Workers engaged on contracts for agricultural work 
outside their home districts or for other types of work in them 
received the difference between the two percentages, that is, 
32.5 
per cent of the annual tax, per month-(60) 
92 
In effect, these percentages meant that in the extreme 
case where men had no alternative means of paying the tax, it was 
necessary for them to spend at least four months in wage work to 
pay off the tax if they were contracted for agricultural work in 
their own district, and three months in wage labour if they were 
contracted for agricultural work outside it. In both cases these 
were minimum periods since, clearly, any man without alternative 
means of paying the tax also had other financial commitments. 
Furthermore, the tax could only be met within these periods if 
the man worked every day of the contract and completed his daily 
task, on which payment of the day's wages depended. (61) Failure 
to do so meant a loss of earnings and a consequent extension of the 
period spent in wage labour to meet the tax. However, most men in 
Zambezia had access to land and independent means of production. 
Indeed, it was precisely because peasants would not willingly leave 
the land in search of wage work that the elaborate legislation was 
necessary in the first place. To prevent men from meeting the tax 
by selling their own produce, and hence avoiding wage labour, the 
clauses of the law designed to encourage them to take up wage work 
came into play. 
As we have seen, men who did not voluntarily take up a 
contract with a private employer could be forced to work 
for the 
government. Whether men volunteered for wage work or were 
directly 
coerced into it, the effects were the same. 
The man's family 
was deprived of male labour for a significant period of 
the year. 
The absence of the man for six months increased the amount of 
time 
his family needed to spend on the production of crops either 
for 
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direct consumption or for sale to meet additional subsistence needs. 
This in turn reduced the amount of time available for the production 
of a surplus which could be sold to pay the tax. Hence it increased 
the likelihood of at least part of the tax being met from the man's 
wages. This in turn acted as an additional indirect means of ensuring 
that men took up regular wage work. 
Through the mechanisms designed to ensure that men worked 
regularly, for six months of the year, including the financial 
mechanism of the tax, the law established the conditions in which 
a rotating supply of labour would be made available to private 
employers. Put another way, the state established the mechanisms 
for institutionalising migrant labour. Resting on the use of labour 
drawn from the peasantry, and therefore on the use of labour which 
had access to independent means of production, the migrant system 
had one major advantage over the use of permanent proletarianised 
labour from the employer's point of view. Capital was able to buy 
labour power below value. Whereas the wage normally paid to a 
worker who had no other means of support to fall back on had to 
cover, among other things, the cost of any taxes demanded by the 
state, the worker's own subsistence needs and those of his family 
throughout his working life, the wage paid to these migrant workers 
barely covered the cost of the tax and the means for keeping the 
worker alive during the contract period. It did not cover his 
family's needs, nor his needs between contracts. The migrant system 
thus provided employers with a supply of cheap labour. It is within 
this context that the meaning of the wage levels established in 
the legislation become clear. Although described as minimum wage 
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levels they were in fact designed as a ceiling beyond which wages 
should not rise. They were intended as maximum wage levels, which, 
because of their inability to sustain the families of contract workers 
(through the. stipulation that the monthly wage only had to cover a 
proportion of the annual tax) would ensure the reproduction of the 
migrant system and hence the reproduction of cheap labour. (62) 
The cheap labour system as a whole was protected from erosion 
from within by the clauses of the law which guaranteed the rational 
distribution of labour between employers. This meant that pressure 
on wages which might have arisen through competition for labour was 
controlled (by ensuring that all employers had access to sufficient 
labour for their needs). The system was also protected by the clauses 
of the law which denied Africans any human or civil rights, and 
restricted their freedom to seek better-paid employment elsewhere. 
Any attempt by men to avoid wage labour was prima facie evidence of 
'laziness' with the legal penalty that laziness invoked: obligatory 
labour. Any attempt to struggle for higher wages or improve 
conditions could be construed as a contravention of the labour law. 
Infringements of the labour law, as we have seen, were punished by 
a term of correctional labour. Workers were therefore denied any 
legal means of protecting or furthering their own interests. 
Employers' interests, on the other hand, were fully protected by the 
law. By giving the state monopoly control over labour the 
law 
established the conditions in which private capital could call on 
cheap and abundant supplies of labour. 
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MAIN AREAS FROM WHICH SSE DREW ITS LABOUR 1930-1960 
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a-HAPTER III 
SSE REORGANISATION OF LABOUR SUPPLY AND RECRUITMENT, 
THE DEPRESSION YEARS OF THE 1930s 
During the early years of the 1930s, the new labour legislation 
was to have little direct impact on the mobilisation of labour within 
Zambezia. Drawn up on the premise that African men were loathe to 
seek wage work, the legislation was designed to establish an inter- 
locking set of mechanisms which would force them to enter an annual 
contract. It was intended, therefore, to provide a practical means 
of overcoming the problem of obtaining a guaranteed supply of labour. 
However, when the state moved to take over the prazos and implement 
its new labour policy Zambd'zia was in the midst of a general 
recession. Falling prices for agricultural commodities on world 
markets had forced many planters in the region to retrench. "The 
very bad times indeed" that agricultural enterprises in Zambezia 
and Nyasaland were experiencing had led to a wholesale reduction in 
the numbers of men employed. (l) The employment situation was 
exacerbated by two additional related factors. Firstly, the price 
of peasant produce was also falling. Secondly, the government was 
pressing Africans to pay their taxes, "compelling a great number of 
natives, who, in the ordinary way, would probably not seek work 
here, 
to look for work on the Zambesi. "(2) Planters in the region suddenly 
found themselves confronted with abundant supplies of labour. 
Indeed, 
in 1930, SSE remarked on "its present unusual difficulty of 
being 
saddled with more labour than it actually needed. 
"(3) 
ý ,, 
k ýý 
;ý; 
,ý_. 
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SSE was unable to take advantage of the "unusual" number of 
men who voluntarily sought work on the estates. Firstly, SSE 
recognised that the abundance of labour would probably be short- 
lived. Writing to the company's directors, SSE's General Manager gave 
voice to this view when he noted that the firm had a very good 
reputation among "the labour-seeking classes of natives within our 
neighbourhood, but it is difficult to believe that when conditions 
improve elsewhere... things will go on in the same way. "-(4) Secondly, 
SSE was itself forced to retrench. Although the company received 
protection for a proportion of its output on the Portuguese market, 
the remainder was sold on world markets, at prices which steadily 
declined after 1924. (5) To counteract the drop in prices on 
unprotected markets, SSE sought ways of introducing economies and 
cutting the costs of production. These economies included laying 
off labour. However, the economies introduced by SSE were not only 
intended to deal with the immediate crisis. By 1930, and before SSE 
undertook any major reorganisation, the Portuguese Government had 
introduced legislation which guaranteed the survival of the colonial 
sugar industry. (6) The economies were introduced, as much, if not 
more, therefore, to protect SSE's interests in the long term. 
SSE's long-term interests centred on reducing the overall cost of 
labour and securing a guaranteed supply of low-paid labour. Fearing 
that another shortage of labour would arise after the region recovered 
from the crisis SSE saw in the depression the means of reorganising 
its labour supply and recruiting organisation in order to consolidate 
its right to recruit labour from Zambezia which would 
be guaranteed 
in the long term through the implementation of the labour legislation. 
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REORGANISATION OF LABOUR SUPPLY 
Until 1930 the labour employed on SSE's four estates was 
drawn from four principal supply areas. Firstly, the company 
recruited labour from the local prazos of which it was leaseholder: 
Prazos Maganja Aquem Chire, Luabo and Marral in Zamb(zia and Mugova 
e Goma in the Mutarara region of Tete Province. Secondly, it 
recruited labour from Prazo Angonia in the northwestern region of 
Tete Province, of which it was also leaseholder. Thirdly, labour 
was furnished by the authorities from the areas of Zambe'zia 
administered directly by the state. Fourthly, SSE was also obliged 
to recruit labour from the territory administered by the . Mozambique 
Company, where two of its plantations (Marromeu and Caia) were 
situated. (7) Finally, the company also employed men from Nyasaland, 
Niassa Province and from all the other areas where it recruited labourers, 
who voluntarily sought work on the estates. As a result of historical 
precedent and agreements with the various administrative authorities 
in the region men from the different areas worked contracts of 
different lengths, received different rates of pay and received their 
wages in different currencies. 
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SSE Wages 1931 f -Excluding Bonus payments 7(8) 
Labour We Period 
Angonia 10 shillings BS° per month of 26 days 
"Anguru" contract 
labour 1 escudo BNUb " 30 days (s_i %* 
"Charre" labour 5 escudos PSc 30 days 
local prazos 0.091 " PS'" per day 
Moz. Company 
Volunteers 10 shillings BS° per month 
"Up-country" 
Volunteers 10 shillings BS a per month of 26 days 
"Anguru" 
Volunteers (6 months) 
"Anguru" 
Volunteers 12 (12 months) 
"Nyassas" 10 .. .. .. .. °. .. ------------ 
*the writer must have meant one escudo per day. This would be 
consistent with the wage paid to "Anguru" contract labour in 1932. 
aBritish Sterling 
bBanco Nacional Ultramarino 
cPortuguese Silver 
Using a rate of 100 escudos to the pound for Banco Nocional 
Ultramarino currency and one escudo Portuguese Silver at two 
shillings, and reducing the working month to 26 days in all cases, 
the wages of SSE's contracted labour force were approximately the 
following in 1931: 
Angonia 
"Anguru" contract 
labour 
"Charre" labour 
local rPr azos labour 
10 shillings 
5 shillings 5 pence 
8 shillings 8 pence 
3 shillings 5 pence 
(for 26 days labour) 
11 11 11 
(1 11 » 
II 11 11 
The most costly section of the labour force were men recruited 
from the territory of the Mozambique Company. Whereas in 
1932 a 
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contracted worker from Zambia Province received 30 escudos a month 
a comparable worker from the Mozambique Company's territory received 
the equivalent of 71, es udos 50 centavos a month in gold. (9) In order 
to reduce the amount of labour employed from the Mozambique Company Is 
territory, SSE°s first move in the depression was to close the Caia 
factory. It alleged that it had done so simply because of the 
falling world price of sugar. (10) The ! '4ozambique Company, angered by 
this move, and as anxious as the Government of Zambezia to secure a 
means of ensuring that Africans paid their taxes, retaliated by 
refusing to allow any "foreign" labour into its territory. (11) 
SSE promptly responded by closing its second factory in the Mozambique 
Company's territory. Its real reasons for the closures then become 
clear. The Mozambique Company had retained the gold standard. 
As Hornung explained in an article to the Beira News "in view of 
the fact that the difference between the sterling price of sugar and 
the sterling cost of producing that sugar is now almost infinitesimal, 
there is a distinct loss when the cost of production is forced onto 
or maintained on the gold standard. "(12) Related to this was the 
fact that labour from the area was paid more highly than labour from 
Zamb6zia. 
The principal point, however, is that such labour 
from the Territories of the Mozambique Company had 
to be paid in gold or its equivalent, and at a much 
higher rate than that paid to natives coming from 
areas under the direct administration of the state 
in Zamb6ia; a fact which has increased our costs of 
production to such an extent that it will be 
impossible to get economic results at a time when 
we are already struggling with great difficulties 
as a result of the general world crisis which 
particularly affects the sugar industry. 
(13) 
In the petition to the Minister of the Colonies, in which 
this point 
was made, SSE threatened to close both plantations permanently, 
and 
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to transfer its operations elsewhere unless it received certain 
guarantees. Among them was the right to transfer labour freely from 
Zamb(zia, at the lower wage in force there, to the plantations in the 
Mozambique Company's territory. (14) 
The temporary closure of the Marromeu and Caia plantations(15) 
besides enabling SSE to dismiss labour from the Mozambique Company's 
territory, also allowed SSE to lay off other sections of the work 
force, on whom it did not intend to rely in the long term. Firstly, 
the company tackled the problem of labour from Prazo Mugova e Goma, 
(in Mutarara) or 'Charre' labour as it was called. Labour from 
Prazo Mugova e Doma was a problem for three reasons. The abolition of 
the prazos meant that SSE had lost its exclusive recruiting rights 
in the area. In addition, work on the construction of a bridge 
across the Zambesi was then beginning. It was expected that when 
the work on the bridge was in full swing some 16,000-20,000 men 
would be required. (16) SSE anticipated that much of this labour would 
be drawn from Mutarara. Men from the area would resist going to SSE 
because "the /-bridge 7 contractors are paying ridiculously high wages. 
"(17) 
Finally, according to SSE's mineral Manager "of all our prazo 
labour 
Charre boys are unfortunately the most insolent, unreliable and 
troublesome. "(18) In 1930, therefore, SSE started to lay off labour 
from Mutarara when the men had worked off the advances paid- on 
their 
wages. (19 ) 
Secondly, SSE laid off 2,000 men from Niassa Province and 
limited the number of "up-country" volunteers employed. 
Volunteer 
labour was cheaper than contract labour 
because no recruiting costs 
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were involved in its employment. Further, men who volunteered for 
work were more likely to work harder than men recruited by force. 
Nevertheless, SSE felt that the numbers of volunteers would drop 
dramatically from Nyasaland and the border areas of Mozambique 
when the economic situation improved. (20) Its reliance on labour 
from these sources would have led to a withdrawal of its de facto 
reserves of contract labour in other areas. SSE could not afford to 
take on cheaper volunteer labour in the short-term and lose the right 
to guaranteed supplies of contract labour in the long term, especially 
if the feared labour shortage materialised after the depression. An 
additional reason for the dismissal of this source of volunteer labour 
was the payment of their wages in gold. 
It must also not be lost sight of that in the case 
of up-country volunteers, we invariably have to 
obtain gold from Beira, which, with very little 
exception, leaves the country when the boys have 
finished their time, we only reaping the benefit 
of local advances given now and then (this from 
the trading point of view). (21) 
Having dispensed with labour which was either costly or not 
guaranteed in the long term SSE was left with three major sources of 
supply. Firstly, there were men from the rp azos around the estates. 
These men were the lowest paid section of the work force. Men from 
the razos had been employed since the 1890s. By the 1930s the 
company had come to rely on them for much of the specialised work on 
the plantations. (22) It also used labour from the rý a zos extensively 
in Marromeu and Coia, for the some reasons that it had tried to employ 
contract labour from Zambe'zia there. Labour from the prazos received 
lower wages than men from the Mozambique Company's territory. 
Men 
from the rp azos also received their wages in Portuguese currency which 
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was "a convenient outlet for surplus escudos - and they spend their 
earnings locally, which is another advantage to us (SSE). "(23) When 
the state extended its administration to the whole of ZamWzia Province 
SSE had received assurances from the government that no other recruiter 
would be allowed to operate within the area of the formerrazos for 
a period of four years. Thereafter SSE expected the government to 
continue to honour the precedent established and to prevent any threat 
to its recruiting monopoly in the area. (24) Men from the local 
razos were, therefore, not only low-paid and essential for certain 
types of work, but they were also a guaranteed source of labour in 
the long-term. With the closure of Marromeu and Caia SSE decided to 
redeploy some of the " rP azos" labour to the estates in Zambezia and 
to cut down on recruiting in the region, without giving up the reserve 
completely. (25) 
Secondly, there were men from Angonia in Tete Province. Men 
from Angonia tended to be employed mainly, although not exclusively, 
as cone-cutters at Marromeu. Their productivity was high. In 1931, 
for example, one man from Angonia cut as much cane as two men recruited 
from ZambAia. Yet their high output was not confined to cutting. 
In almost every aspect of field work men from Angonia consistently 
produced more than men from other areas. (26) Since SSE was also 
granted exclusive recruiting rights in Angonia for a period of four 
years after the prazo was handed back to the state the company was 
anxious not to lose this source of labour. Thus, when Marromeu and 
Caia were closed SSE avoided dismissing men from Angonia. Instead 
the company's General Manager was instructed to find other work for 
them. (27) 
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Thirdly, there were the men recruited from the state- 
administered areas of Zambc! rzia, or "Angurus". Under the terms of the 
Hornung Contract of 1921 SSE was to continue to receive labour from 
these areas for a period of twenty years, even if the razos legislation 
was revoked in the meantime. With the extension of direct state 
administration to the whole of Zambcczia and a labour law which 
committed the authorities to raise labour for planters in the province, 
SSE saw in Zamb(zia a long-term supply of guaranteed labour. Labour, 
moreover, which, with labour from the local 12razos, was also the 
lowest paid section of the work force. To avoid dismissing men from 
Zambezia when the Mozambique Company prohibited their employment at 
Marromeu and Caia, SSE transferred workers from those plantations to 
Luabo and Mopeia. (28) 
SSE's labour policy during the depression then, centred 
on the retention of "Anguru" labour which it considered the "back-bone 
of the labour force and likely to remain so for a considerable time 
to come. " Men from the razos were to make up its labour requirements, 
with men from Angonia in first place. (29) The company dispensed with 
labour from the Mozambique company as far as possible. It also 
dispensed with labour from Mutarara ("Charre" labour) and limited the 
number of volunteers. Recognising that the depression and with it 
the abundance of labour were probably temporary phenomena, SSE moved 
to secure low-paid guaranteed labour from Zambezia Province and 
from 
the local rrazos for work on the estates on both sides of the river, 
and highly paid but efficient labour from Angonia for work in 
Marromeu. 
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MEASURES TO REDUCE THE COST OF LABOUR 
Besides affording SSE the opportunity to reorganise its labour 
supply, the abundance of labour brought about by the depression also 
enabled SSE to reduce the wages of its labour force and increase their 
productivity. Marshalling economic arguments which focused on the 
serious nature of the crisis SSE was able to use the threat of the 
sugar industry's collapse to lower the cost of labour. 
In 1934 SSE reduced the wages paid to volunteer workers on 
the estates from ten to eight shillings (sterling) a month. (30) 
A year later the wages of men from Angonia were reduced by the same 
amount. (31) This decision was taken in spite of the advice of the 
company's recruiter in Angonia. The recruiter had argued that this 
was a dangerous move and should be the last measure to be adopted in 
view of its possible consequences. 
We do not face other recruiters in Angonia at the 
moment but it is reported to me that the Rhodesian 
gold mines, which had stopped production, are going 
to open again, and if this happens, under the terms 
of the contract or agreement existing between the 
Portuguese Government and that of that country, 
which was only renewed a little while ago, it ought 
not to surprise us if, from one moment to the next, 
we have a competitor within Angonia. (32) 
The second way in which SSE attempted to reduce the cott 
of labour during the depression was by imposing new and 
larger tasks 
without a corresponding increase in wages. In 
1930, for example, the 
standard cane cutting task for labour from 
Angonia was 3.5 tons on 
overstands and 2.5 tons a day on ratoons. 
In 1931 the ratoon task was 
increased to 3 tons a day. Likewise, the numbers of men employed on 
collective tasks was reduced. In 
1930, for example, eight contracted 
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labourers from Zamb¬zia were expected to load three cane trucks a day. 
In 1931 five men were allocated to this task. Similarly, whereas in 
1930 12 men lifted, pushed forward and relayed 400 yards of portable 
field railway track a day, in 1931 only eight men were detailed to 
this task. The gangs responsible for ballasting 400 yards of track 
were reduced from 16 to nine men. Most other field tasks on the 
estates were increased in similar ways. (33) 
In 1936, the Mopeia factory closed. Some workers were 
permanently laid off. Others were transferred to the two remaining 
properties at Marromeu and Luabo. SSE seized this opportunity to 
impose heavier tasks on the men transferred from Mopeia, although this 
was not accomplished without protest from the men in question. 
The Mopeias gave more trouble than most, complained 
continually of having to load four trucks instead of 
three as at Mopeia, turned out late for work and if 
they didn't run away from their trucks, usually 
finished after everyone else. Mr Ferguson told 
me that he had the same experience with them at 
Luabo and Mr Clydesdale also confirms it. (34) 
Finally, the company was able to use the administrative 
reorganisation of Zamb(zia to reduce the costs of engaging labour from 
the Brazos. Until 1930 workers from the local rP azos were recruited 
for periods of six months and a year which were worked off in two 
month periods with a two month interval. (35) In 1931 the contract 
period was increased to three months to be worked consecutively. 
Under the new labour legislation men had the option of completing 
another three month contract immediately or completing 
the second 
three months later in the year. If they chose to stay on 
the 
estates for more than three months at a time 
SSE was obliged to issue 
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blankets, singlets and shorts to the 
items SSE argued that when the men's 
bonuses were taken into consideratioi 
which was above the legal minimum in 
were enforced the company would have 
the bonuses %matabichos 7. 
men. To avoid issuing these 
attendance and productivity 
i they earned a monthly wage 
force. If the law on clothing 
no option but to cease paying 
In accordance with the labour regulations any boys 
contracted for periods in excess of 3 months receive 
blankets, singlets etc., but after discussing the 
matter with the local administrator it was explained 
that should he compel us to issue such clothing to 
the boys we would have no other course but to deduct 
its value against matabichos. It was accordingly 
put to the boys as to whether they would prefer 
blankets, singlets or the usual matabichos, having 
without exception chosen the latter. (36) 
Besides the reduction of recruiting costs SSE benefitted from the 
longer contracts in other ways. Under the new system SSE was allowed 
to pay the entire wage at the work place. It therefore avoided 
depositing 50 per cent of the salary with the administrator before 
the men had worked their term. It also avoided paying out large sums 
to guarantee payment of the hut tax. (37) 
Important though the direct measures to reduce wages were, 
SSE did not confine its attempts to cut the cost of labour to reducing 
the wages of the workforce alone. As part of its overall strategy 
to reduce labour costs SSE also attempted to cut the indirect costs 
of labour. It used the depression as an excuse for reducing its 
recruiting expenses. 
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REORGANISATION OF RECRUITMENT 
Prior to the 1930s SSE's recruiters appear to have had unlimited 
access to company funds. The company's accounting system was far from 
rigorous and the expenses incurred by recruiters seem to have been 
accepted by SSE almost without question. Personal accounts were not 
separated from recruiting accounts and some recruiters had access to 
unlimited credit. (38) In line with the greater financial stringency 
enforced as a result of the depression SSE began to demand strict, 
itemised budgets from its recruiters. It also cut off the recruiters' 
unlimited credit and where they still had access to company funds 
separated their personal from their recruiting accounts. (39) This 
change in policy was facilitated by the discovery that two of the 
company's recruiters had been involved in dishonest deals. The 
first concerned the company appointed Administrator of Prazo Mugova 
e Goma who automatically became SSE's recruiter in Mutarara when the 
razos were abolished. In 1930 SSE's Acting General Manager asked 
the recruiter how the company could get back the advances on wages 
paid to the men waiting to go to the estates who were no longer required. 
The recruiter suggested that the men should be handed over to any 
other recruiter who guaranteed to refund the advances, which in 
effect meant giving labour SSE had recruited to the company's 
competitiors. (40) SSE's Acting General Manager was not impressed 
by this solution. In a letter to the London Management 
Company he 
pointed out that such a move in effect meant that 
SSE would be 
supporting the recruiting costs of other companies. 
It is obvious that a very firm hand will be necessary 
in so far as Mr Rebello Z-the recruiter] is concerned, 
for I regret to say that he is a distinct representative 
of the period of many years ago when money was no object 
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and SSE was considered as a good old Zambesi milch 
cow. We must avoid at all costs that outsiders 
reap the benefits of our labour, remaining as 
onlookers without putting a stop to it. (41) 
Thinking that SSE would not require the labour from Mutarara and would 
only demand the refund of the advances made, Mr Rebello passed the 
labour in question to a contractor for the Zambesi Bridge. SSE 
discovered this deal when, as a result of the Mozambique Company's 
ban on "foreign" labour, it thought it might need the labour from 
Mutarara ("Charre" labour) after all. When the company asked how 
quickly the men could leave for Marromeu it discovered that of 900 
men contracted 607 had already left for work on the bridge. To make 
matters worse, Mr Rebello had entered negotiations with the contractor 
on the bridge while the latter was still employed as SSE's General 
Manager. 
The supply of this labour was made by Mr Rebello in 
terms of instructions received from Mr Rapozo prior 
to his handing over the company's powers to myself, 
and in accordance with verbal agreements made with 
him... worlds fail me to express my surprise at such 
an attitude, and all I can say is that Mr Rebello's 
action calls, to my mind, for instant dismissal. (42) 
At about the same time the practises of SSE's recruiter in 
the state-administered areas of Zambe"zia come to light. 
The whole matter in a nutshell is that Mr Ignacio's 
(Ignacio de Paiva RapozoJ financial state of 
affairs has reached such a critical situation that 
to my mind he cannot see to get clear of his debts 
in any way, unless it were with unlimited credits 
from the S. S. E., which, as you know, have fortunately 
been stopped by you at the right moment. 
(43) 
Firstly, Paiva Rapozo was in debt to the tune of £9000. These 
debts 
had partly been contracted in SSE's name. 
Secondly, he had not paid 
the railfare of a large number of men recruited 
in the second half of 
1930 "which resulted apparently in a saving 
for Mr Ignacio but at 
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the same time in a bad name for the S. S. E. and for the natives in a 
much longer stretch to walk until they reached Mopeia. "(44) Thirdly, 
Paivo Raposo had circulated cheques for hundreds of pounds without 
cover. Fourthly, SSE had left money with the Administrator of Alto 
Molocue for payment of the hut tax of men recruited from the district. 
Notwithstanding these deposits, the cdministrator repeatedly called on 
SSE for the payment of a debt of C430. 
It now appears that monies deposited by the S. S. E. 
as far back as 1928 were withdrawn by Mr Ignacio 
without our knowledge, and that a change of 
administration in Alto Molocue disclosed certain 
discrepancies, with the result that when monies 
were sent by us to Alto Molocue in payment of 
time expired labour from the region, the 
administrator thought fit of retaining a 
sufficient amount to cover the outstandings 
against Mr Ignacio, which automatically resulted 
in the disgraceful fact that labour that had been 
working on the estates for 6 months had been 
withheld payment for about three months. 
Although Paiva Rapozo's assistant temporarily pacified the administrator 
and ensured that the labourers were paid he did not manage to prevent 
the aJministrator from threatening legal action. Nor could he stop 
Paiva Rapozo's actions rebounding on the company's recruiting in 
the area. As SSE's General tAanager remarked "this also resulted in 
a certain amount of difficulty in so far as the present recruiting 
in Alto Molocu6 is concerned, as, for obvious reasons, the 
Administrator did not show much inclination to assist us as usual. "(45) 
SSE's General Manager cut off Paiva Rapozo's funds and 
suggested that his assistants took over the recruiting. He offered 
them the recruiting on the condition that the expenses were reduced. 
Instead of 30 shillings per man the recruiter was to receive 
28 
shillings per man delivered at the estates. (46) This reduction 
in 
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recruiting expenses, was, however, only one of a number of such 
reductions, for in 1932 the company made a new contract with Paiva 
Raposo's substitute in Zambe'zia. He was paid 20 shillings for the 
first 3000 men engaged and a salary of £750 a year irrespective of 
the number of men he recruited. (47) By 1935 the recruiter in Zambe'zia 
was receiving only 16 shillings a 'head' for the first 2000 men engaged 
and a salary of £600 per annum. (48) Besides a reduction in salary 
and the per capita fee, the drop in the numbers of men for whom he 
received a fee implied a drop in the recruiter's profits. 
In Angonia SSE used the excuse of rigid economies and a possible 
suspension of recruitment in the area (which the company had no intention 
of doing) to dismiss the recruiter who had worked for them for 14 years. 
Instead they employed his assistant. Whereas the former had earned 
£1,200 per annum the latter received an annual salary of only £400. (49) 
Similarly the recruiting budget for ' rrazo" labour was reduced. In 
1934 "all round reductions" resulted in a saving of 30 per cent. 
Staff were laid off, the 'tip' paid to the 'native authorities' for 
their help in rounding up men was reduced and European jobs were 
re-defined in order to allow for salary cuts. In one case an employee 
took a drop in annual salary of £400 a year. (50) 
By 1944 the financial reorganisation of recruitment was 
completed. All recruiting expenses, both direct and indirect, were 
controlled by SSE. The per capita fee was abolished and recruiters 
and their assistants received a fixed salary. In 
Zambezia, where 
SSE's recruiting areas had expanded considerably since 
the early 
1930s, the recruiter and his assistant received a combined salary of 
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£1,200 per year. This was less than the total salary of the chief 
recruiter alone in Angonia in 1931. (51) 
The early years of the 1930s are best characterised as a 
watershed in SSE's history. Until then the major problem which 
confronted the company was that of securing adequate supplies of 
labour for its expanding needs. Unable to recruit sufficient workers 
locally SSE was forced to seek labour from a variety of sources. For 
reasons beyond the company's control men from the different areas 
received different rates of pay for the same work. While the 
administrative division of the colony remained unchanged and while 
the labour available, even from these heterogeneous sources of 
supply, was barely adequate to meet the company's needs, there was 
little SSE could do to overcome the anomalies of its labour regime 
and specifically the disparity in wages. 
The international recession of the 1930s, coinciding as it did 
with the abolition of the prazos and the extension of state rule to 
the whole of Zamb6zia Province altered this situation dramatically. 
Suddenly, SSE found itself faced with large numbers of men seeking 
work and two administrations, the colonial state in Zamb6zia and the 
Mozambique Company south of the river, which were anxious to secure 
employment for the tax payers under their jurisdiction. SSE was able 
to take advantage of this situation in two ways. Firstly, it set 
about making overall reductions in the cost of labour; reductions 
it 
had been unable to make on such a wide scale in the previous period 
of labour shortage, and reductions it feared it would not 
be able to 
make on the same scale when the region recovered 
from the depression. 
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SSE's policy was directed towards reducing real wages. The company 
dismissed sections of the labour force, notably from territory 
administered by the Mozambique Company. Instead, it employed lower- 
paid labour from Zambezia Province for the same work. It reduced 
the money wages of other sections of the labour force, for example men 
from Angonia and volunteer labour. It increased the productivity 
of labour without a commensurate increase in wages. Finally, SSE 
also attempted to reduce indirect labour costs by reducing the 
recruitment budget. 
Taken in isolation this policy might appear to have been no 
more than an immediate and obvious response to the international 
recession. With the falling price of sugar on the world market it 
might be argued that SSE was forced to reduce the costs of production 
in order to protect its profit margins. To a certain extent, of 
course, this was true. However, such a view ignores the implications 
of SSE's policies. Thus it fails to ask, for example, why SSE 
introduced selective cuts rather than across the board reductions 
in money wages. It also fails to ask why SSE was so concerned to 
protect certain sources of labour supply and to dispense with others. 
When these questions are taken into consideration it becomes clear 
that the policies SSE introduced in the depression were not intended 
simply to cope with the immediate crisis. With the introduction of 
the new legislation and guarantees from the colonial government 
that SSE could continue to recruit in Zambezia without interference, 
SSE was guaranteed a supply of low-paid labour. It no 
longer needed 
men from the Mozambique Company's territory. By threatening 
to 
suspend production completely on its Marromeu and 
Caia estates SSE 
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was able to dispense with all but a token labour force from the 
Mozambique Company's territory, and to secure the right to employ 
lower-paid labour from Zamb(zia on its plantations there in the long 
term. Thus, the second major way in which SSE was able to take 
advantage of the depression was by using it as an excuse to reorganise 
its labour supply in order to secure the most favourable conditions 
for continued production. In short, the first years of the 1930s 
were years in which SSE, hiding behind the excuse of the immediate 
crisis, sought to put its affairs in order. The company sought to 
reduce its labour costs and to reorganise its labour supply in order 
to take full advantage of the new labour legislation when agricultural 
production in central Mozambique recovered from the effects of the 
recession. 
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NOTES 
(1) SSE Ar., File 133, Recruitin Quelimane and Angonia 1930-1939), MT to Hornung and Ltd., 14 Nov. 0. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) ibid. 
(4) ibid. 
(5) Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd., Mocambique eo Problema A ucareira (Lisboa, 1945), pp. 11-13. In 1920 the price of sugar on 
the international market reached a peak of £104 per short ton. 
By 1930 the price of sugar on the same market had fallen to 
£5.17.1 per short ton. However, it was not until 1924-1925 
that the price of sugar on the international market had ceased 
to be remunerative; until then protection on the Portuguese 
market was an attraction but not a necessity. 
(6) ibid., p. 29. Pages 47-48 describe the measures introduced 
by the government to save the colonial industry from 
collapse. In addition to other measures these included 
the introduction of a monthly tax on foreign imported sugar 
which altered according to the world price. The aim of this 
legislation was to guarantee colonial producers the same 
protection that they had received in 1928. The protected 
market therefore acted as a safety net for SSE. 
(7) The Mozambique Company's Charter only expired in 1942. In 
that year the state assumed direct responsibility for 
administering the company's territory which was roughly 
bounded by the modern Provinces of Monica and Sofala. Until 
1942, the Mozambique Company acted as a virtually autonomous 
state. Among other things, it circulated its own currency 
and imposed its own labour regime. 
(8) SSE Ar., File 94, Labour for Marromeu, Reply to Labour 
Questionnaire, n. n. T-Luabo T. ' 1931. It is impossible to 
give an accurate picture of the wages paid to SSE's labour 
force in the early 1930s because the situation is complicated 
by three factors. Firstly, Portuguese currency was devalued 
between 1929 and 1931. Secondly there appear to have 
been five different currencies in use on the lower Zambesi at 
the time; paper sterling, gold sterling, paper escudos, gold 
escudos, Mozambique Company gold coinage and Portuguese silver 
currency. Thirdly, SSE used abbreviations 
for the currencies 
in which wages were paid. It has only been possible 
to make 
an informed guess about the meaning of these abbreviations. 
For currencies in circulation at the time and their sterling 
equivalents see: J. Pyke, Economic 
Conditions in Portuguese 
East Africa, December 1929, Department of erseas Trade 
on on, , p. 6, and 
H. A. Ford, Economic Conditions 
in Portuguese East Africa, October 1932, No. 537, partment 
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(8) (Continued) 
of Overseas Trade (HMSO, London, 1933), pp. 8-9. From the figures presented men from the local prazos appear to have been the lowest paid section of the la our force in 1930. 
According to SSE's General Manager their bonus earnings were higher than those of other groups of workers. However, in 
that year he ordered that their basic wages were to be 
increased (SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Hornung and Co., 14 Nov. 
1930, op. cit. ). After 1930 men from the prazos would, anyway, have been entitled to receive the new minimum wage of thirty 
escudos a month, thus bringing their basic wage into line 
with other contracted agricultural labour from Zambezia. 
(9) SSE Ar., File 94, G Hornung, Director SSE Mopea to Governador 
da Companhia de Mocambique, Beira, 9 July 1932. 
(10) ibid. 
(11) SSE Ar., File 94, Article from The Beira News 22 June 1932. 
"The suspension was made at the request 7--Me government of 
the Territory of the Companhia de Mocambique owing to the 
unavoidable necessity of assuring work for the thousands of 
natives of the Territory, who because of the world crisis and 
the competition of imported native labour, were faced with 
great difficulty in obtaining the necessary means of 
subsistence and the money for the payment of their 
obligations. " 
(12) ibid. (quoting an interview with Captain G. Hornung, Director 
of SSE, with the Lourengo Marques Guardian, 19 May 1932). 
(13) SSE Ar., File 94, MT Mopea to Ministro das Colonias, 25 June 
1932. (Translation J .H. 
) 
(14) ibid. SSE Ar., File 94A, Labour for Marromeu, MT Gerente Geral 
SSE to Ministro das Colönias, July , gives the subsequent 
his history of labour from Zambezia employed at Marromeu until 1942. 
(15) Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., Moc. eo Prob. Acuc., op. cit., p. 81. 
The Caia factory closed temporarily in 1931 and 1932, re-opened 
in 1933 and 1934 and closed permanently in 1935, although its 
plantation continued to feed cane to the Marromeu 
factory. 
In 1936 the Mopeia factory went out of production, probably 
because its equipment was old and fields not suited to cane 
cultivation. The Mopeia plantation became instead part of 
SSE's cotton concession, (see Chapter IV) and was also used 
as grazing land for the company's herds of cattle. 
(16) SSE Ar., File 133, MT Acting General Manager to Hornung and 
Co. 27 Dec. 1930, Private and Confidential, Mr Thomas de Paiva 
Rapozo. 
(17) SSE Ar., File 133, Charles Bernard Rafael Hornung (CBRH) to 
General Manager, 16 Dec 1930, No. 477/30, 'General' H. & 
Co. 
Ltd., Native Labour. 
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(18) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Hornung & Co. Ltd., 14 Nov. 1930, No. 529/30. 
(19) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Estate Manager, Marromeu, 14 Nov. 1930, No. 29/30 'Mgt' - Reduction of labour strength. 
(20) ibid. 
(21) ibid. 
(22) SSE Ar., File 94, Reply to Labour Questionnaire, n. n. LuaboJ, 1931 and Labour Questionnaire Reply, H. N. Usher, 
rromeu, ,2 Nov. 1931. Specialised work included: moving the portable field railway, transporting firewood and 
making charcoal for the factory boilers, and mooring, loading 
and unloading the river steamers. On all but the first task 
eight men from Prazo Luabo did the some work as 12"Angurus". Men from the local p ozos were also extensively employed in 
the company's factories. (SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Estate 
Manager Luabo, 20 May 1931, Prazo labour recruited by Mr 
Pinto Basto, General Factory Labour from the Prazos). On 
all its estates SSE employed local men for factory work 
almost exclusively from the 1890s until the 1960s. 
(23) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Hornung and Co., 14 Nov. 1930, 
No. 529/30. 
(24) ibid. 
(25) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Estate Manager Luabo, 14 Nov. 1930, 
No. 25/30 'Mgt', Re. Labour. 
(26) SSE Ar., File 94, Reply to Labour Questionnaire, 1931, op. cit., 
in ditching, moulding and flood defence work for example, 
two men from Angonia (and Prazo Mugova e Goma) did the work 
of three "Angurus". On taonnected with the moving of 
the portable field railway one man from Angonia did the work 
of two men from Ile ("Angurus"). 
(27) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Estate Manager Marromeu, No. 29/30, 
op. cit. 
(28) ibid. 
(29) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Hornung and Co. , No. 529/30 op. cit. 
(30) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Fernando Clavel do Carmo, Angonia, 
27 Sep. 1934, Particular. 
(31) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Fernando Clavel do Carmo, Mopea 
(do Passagem), 3 June 1935. 
(32) SSE Ar., File 133, F. Clavel do Carmo, Angonia, to MT Mopea, 
1934, n. d. (Translation J. H. ) 
123 
(33) SSE Ar., File 94, H. N. Usher, Labour Questionnaire Reply 1931, op. cit. 
(34) SSE Ar., File 94, Estate Manager M'meu/Cain to Mr Durrant, Assistant Manager Luabo, 10 Apr. 1936, Copy for General Manager. 
(35) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Estate Manager Luabo, 20 May 1931, Prazo Labour Recruited by Mr Pinto Basto. In the 1890s men from the Erazos were recruited for one month with a month's interval between the next period of wage labour, (see Chapter I). Hence already by 1930 SSE had gradually been 
able to increase the period men worked. This meant that the 
company saved on recruiting expenses and avoided some of the disruption to work that a high turnover of labour implied. 
(36) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Estate Manager Luabo, 20 May 1931, 
op. cit. 
(37) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Gastao Ferreira Pinto Basto, 28 May 
1931, No. 9/31 H. O., Recrutamento de Mäo-de-Obra nas #Creas dos Antigas Prazos. 
(38) SSE Ar., File 133, see correspondence referring to recruitment, 
ssim. 
(39) ibid. 
(40) SSE Ar., File 133, Acting General Manager to Hornung and 
Co ., 27 Dec. 1930, No. 617/30 'GM', Recruiting in Charre, Armando Teixeira Rebello. 
(41) ibid. 
(42) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Hornung and Co., 3 Jan. 1931, Private 
and Confidential, Recruiting in Charre, Armando Teixeira 
Rebello. The letter continued "it is amazing and unbelievable 
to think that we should be used and abused in such an 
unprecedented manner, and if it were only for the question 
of obtaining refund of the advances made to such Charre natives 
the position would not actually be so serious, but those 
concerned have apparently conveniently lost sight of the fact 
that the recruiting of this Charre labour colt the S. S. E. 
a good bit of money, (I reckon that the all-round figure for 
the whole year's expenditure' will be in the vicinity of £5 
per native) and it is obvious that the S. S. E. once more has 
been badly used as a milch cow: ' 
(43) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Captain G Hornung, 3 Jan. 1931, 
Recruiting in Quelimane District. Ignacio and Tomas de 
Paiva Rapo zo (the contractor for the Zambesi bridge and 
SSE's former General Manager) were both nephews of J. P. 
Hornung. The history of the Paiva Rapoz, o family in 
Zambezia goes back to the middle of the nineteenth century. 
For an account of the notoriety of the family, recorded in the 
songs of the lower Zambesi region see Leroy Vail and 
Landeg 
White, "Plantation Protest: The History of a Mozambican Song", 
Journal of Southern African Studies, V, No. 1 
(Oct. 1978), pp. 1-25. 
124 
(44) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Hornung, 3 Jan. 1931, op. cit. 
(45) ibid. The letter continued "I would also add that to my 
mind Mr Ignacio will be only too glad to get rid of the 
recruiting for S. S. E. in Quelimane District - for the time 
being he is certainly afraid of returning to his camp for 
fear of being constantly molested by his creditors, besides 
I know it be his intention to join contractors on the Bridge 
(the fever of gold diggers moving towards the Zambesi Bridge 
like towards a rising sun in general). " The analogy to 
gold-digging aptly sums up the mood of the times. A reading 
of the 1930-1931 correspondance on this file indicates a 
history of intrigue and double-dealing to obtain the high 
profits available from rounding up labour for private firms. 
(46) ibid. 
(47) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Dr Fernando Beleza dos Santos, 31 
Dec. 1932, No. 23/32/HO, Futuro Recrutamento no Alto Distrito 
de Quelimane Para a SSE Ltd. e ao Cargo de V. Exa. 
(48) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to D. Carlos de Camara, 11 May 1935, 
No. 9/35/HO, Recrutamento no Alto Distrito de Quelimane para 
a SSE Ltd., Referente co A no de 1935, ao Cargo 
Unico e 
Exclusivo de V. Exa. 
(49) SSE Ar., File 133, Gerente Geral to Fernando Clavel do Carmo, 
5 Aug. 1931, No. 40/31/HO, Orgamento Referente ao Recrutamento 
Para o Ano Cultural de 1932 and MT to Antönio Barreto, 
26 Aug. 
1935. 
(50) SSE Ar., File 133, Notes for Col. Hornung Re. Prazos Recruiting, 
Mopea, 12 June 1935. 
(51) SSE Ar., File 133A, Recruiting, A onia Quelimane Local, 
MT to Col. Hornung, Nov. 1944, Private. cf. r., File 
133, Director SSE to Fernando Clavel de Carmo, 3 July 1931. 
In addition to his salary and per capita 
fee, the Angonia 
Recruiter also received a house, cash to purchase 
furniture, 
free lighting, a car, travelling expenses and a 
first class 
passage to Europe. 
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CHAPTER IV 
aNPETITION WITHIN THE QONDITIONS OF LABOUR SUPPLY, 
1936 - 1960 
As SSE had feared, the abundance of labour in the early 1930s 
was a temporary phenomenon. By the end of the 1930s agriculture 
and industry in Zambe(zia and the regions surrounding it were recovering 
from the depression. As agriculture and industry recovered so the 
demand for labour increased. In Angonia, for example, the earlier 
predictions of SSE°s recruiter were soon confirmed. By 1937 SSE was 
facing stiff competition for labour from the Rhodesian mines. Indeed, 
in that year the company was obliged to offer men from Angonia a wage 
rise and to allow the wives and families of recruited men to accompany 
them to the estates. "The latter is the chief attraction and one that 
the mines cannot offer, otherwise the competition of recruiting in 
Angonia for the mines (clandestine and otherwise) is seriously being 
felt. "(1) 
In the territory administered by the Mozambique Company there 
was also a growing shortage of labour. In 1938, a group of maize 
farmers in the Vila Pery region formed a recruiting society to 
engage labour in the Provinces of Tete and Mocambique because they 
could not recruit enough labour locally for their needs. 
SSE was 
not threatened by this move because the society was prohibited 
from 
recruiting in Angonia, where, among employers inside 
Mozambique, SSE 
still had exclusive rights to recruit labour. 
(2) By 1947 however, 
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the situation had changed. Not only was SSE still facing competition 
from the Rhodesian mines but employers in Vila Pery were "enticing" 
SSE's contracted workers away from the company while they were waiting 
to go to the estates, (3) and by 1950 SSE's recruiter was reporting 
that men returning from Marromeu would not return to the company. 
They said that they would not come and work for us any 
more and that now they only want to go to Vila Pery. 
The motive is the difference in wages, and in fact 
they are right. While these men receive between 
four and six pounds, those in other work, I mean for 
all our competitors, receive between 10 and 14 
pounds. Furthermore, through bad luck, which 
emphasised the difference more, as soon as I had 
finished making some payments some men arrived 
to receive their wages from a saw mill for which 
Mr Maciel recruits. I had just finished paying 
five or six pounds to my men and the others 
received 11 and 12 pounds! (4) 
The recruiter noted that the wages paid by SSE's competitors were 
for industrial work whereas SSE's wage was calculated on the lower 
rate for agricultural work. However, the "black" did not understand 
this. "What he understands is that he receives much less working for 
us than for any other boss. "(5) Competition for labour in Angonia 
continued to plague SSE until the end of the period. In 1957, for 
example, SSE's General Manager noted that "the area is one where 
great competition exists both in the form of direct recruiting as 
well as clandestine emigration. "(6) 
Recruiters from the territory administered by the Mozambique 
Company (which became Manica and Sofala Province when the state 
extended its administration to the area in 1942) not only threatened 
SSE's labour supplies in Angonia. Men who managed to cross the river 
Zambesi illegally from Zambezia Province were welcomed by employers 
in Monica and Sofala with "open arms". Higher wages south of 
the 
128 
river was the chief reason for the exodus. The Governor of Zambeiia 
tried to stop men leaving his province on various occasions, but, 
finally, at the end of the 1950s, capitulated. 
As for the exit to Monica and Sofala, it must in 
fact be influenced by the attraction of better 
wages, and we understand that the entry of those 
natives is facilitated by the shortage of labour 
which is pressing in that district. We must seek, 
in the meantime, without excessive pressure to 
legalise the situation of those natives, because... 
it is better that they should work in other districts 
of Portuguese territory, than that they should be 
brought, through fear of reprisals, to look for work 
in foreign territory. (7) 
In Zambdrzia, too, recovery after the depression was accompanied 
by a growing demand for labour. For example, in 1937, besides SSE, 
Namagoa Plantations, the Zamb(zia Company, the Modal Company and 
the Boror Company, were all recruiting in the Mugeba region. In the 
same year Namagoa Plantations started to recruit labour in Alto Molbcue 
and Mulevala. In the latter area they were offering "attractive 
conditions". As a result SSE considered withdrawing its recruiters 
from the area. (8) Yet it was not only the expanding needs of 
established firms which gave rise to growing fears of a labour 
shortage in Zambezia. Here the situation was compounded by two 
new developments. Both were the result of the Salazar regime's new 
policies. Anxious to harness colonial production to the needs of 
the metropolitan economy and to encourage the investment of 
Portuguese 
capital in Mozambique, the regime began to encourage new 
forms of 
production under Portuguese control. The first 
development in this 
direction took place in 1926 when a Decree established 
the conditions 
under which cotton production would be encouraged 
in the colonies. (9) 
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THE EFFECTS OF THE SPREAD OF COTTON CULTIVATION 
Cotton production in Zambezia was organised on a concessionary 
system modelled on that established in the Belgian Congo. Companies 
were granted large areas of land and the right to organise cotton 
production among the peasants residing on the concession. The 
concessionary distributed seed to the peasantry, supervised cultivation 
and organised markets. Capital investment seems to have been limited 
to the installation of ginneries, purchase of seed, construction of 
rudimentary sheds to serve as markets and warehouses, transport for 
the marketed crop and expenditure on the employment of supervisory 
staff to oversee and supervise production. Accumulation rested on 
the difference between the purchasing price of cotton from the 
peasantry and the selling price on the Lisbon market. Prices were 
fixed by the government in conjunction with the Cotton Board which 
represented the concessionaries' interests. (10) In order, then, to 
make profits, the companies needed to produce as large a crop as 
possible, and in the absence of mechanised cultivation they needed 
as many producers as possible. 
It was only in the mid-1930s that the cotton scheme really 
took root in Zamb(zia, but almost immediately its effects were 
felt. 
Of the four major concessionaries three were Portuguese. 
One of them 
Lopes Irmaos, had opened a concession in Morrumbalo which was 
traditionally a recruiting reserve for SSE. In 1936 
Lopes Irmaos 
accused SSE of recruiting labour at gun-point. 
SSE responded by 
saying that far from using force it had been unable 
to raise any 
labour in the region. This was because the Lopes 
Irmäos' cotton 
agent was telling peasants that they were not obliged 
to work but 
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only to grow cotton. He guaranteed payment of the hut-tax in the 
event of damage to the crop or a failed harvest. (11) The local 
administrator confirmed SSE's account. He reported that "workers, 
they have been the devil, because these gentlemen do not want to go 
to work. The good work of the cotton propaganda. '"(12) 
Lopes Irm®os' cotton operations continued to jeopardise SSE's 
recruitment in Morrumbala until the 1960s. (13) Yet it was not only 
in Morrumbala that SSE's labour supply was threatened. Foreseeing 
the consequences of the spread of cotton cultivation SSE had itself 
taken a concession around its estates. On its concession SSE 
distributed seed only to women, thus ensuring that men continued to 
take up an annual contract with the company. 
We again and again stressed our policy of distributing 
seed to women only as a good one and assuring us of 
the male population for labour needs in other 
directions, also avoiding that men, under the cloak 
of cotton growing (with work anyway done by women 
and children almost exclusively) should be enabled 
to evade agricultural work in connection with and 
for equally important enterprises of a for more 
lasting and stable nature. (14) 
Profit considerations were secondary to the need to prevent others 
from opening a concession in the area and depriving the plantations 
of their local supply of male labour. (15) However, SSE was unable 
to 
prevent the spread of the crop elsewhere; nor could it prevent other 
concessionaries from using male labour. By the beginning of 
the 1940s 
its recruiting areas in Zambezia coincided with cotton concessions 
and cotton was being advanced as the major reason 
for a growing 
labour shortage. 
If, during 1941, and this despite the extreme official 
pressure in favour of cotton growing 
by the natives, 
there was no question of a shortage ofo native 9labour for other needs, it was entirely 
due 
drought with resultant famine conditions... 
the same 
cannot be said in relation to 
1942. 
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Ever so many factors have no doubt contributed to 
the acute native labour shortage this year, but not least the native cotton growing under official 
pressure and this mainly in relation to the areas 
where the concession holder is the sole master, 
as is exactly the case with all the districts where 
we have been in the habit of drawing our recruited 
Anguru labour ... (16) 
By the middle of the 1940s the effects of forced cotton 
cultivation were beginning to alarm the authorities. Firstly, over- 
cultivation of the crop and its spread to areas which were patently 
unsuitable for its cultivation were beginning to give rise to problems 
of soil erosion. Secondly, there was a growing food shortage in the 
district. Not only did peasant diet deteriorate as fields were 
ploughed for cotton but there was also a shortage of food on 
plantations which was supplied in the main by the peasantry. (17) 
In an attempt to deal with the food situation the government 
ordered that the areas encompassed by the cotton concessions should 
be restricted. However, this did not materially help the labour 
situation for instead of cotton, peasants were obliged to grow more 
food crops, either under the supervision of the concessionary or 
the local administrator. (18) To confront the labour shortage, 
therefore, the government also introduced legislation in the mid- 
1940s which restricted the numbers of men who could avoid wage 
labour 
either by forming in their own right or by registering as 
full-time 
farmers of cotton. Only men who fulfilled a series of stringent 
conditions were issued with the card which exempted 
them from 
forced labour. (19) Instead cotton concessionaries were encouraged 
to draw on the labour of women. In some areas 
they were also encouraged 
to use men who were deemed too old 
for plantation work. (20) However, 
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despite this move, the evidence suggests that in some areas cotton 
concessionaries evaded the law, by issuing false cards to peasant men. 
In 1953, for instance, a government circular warned that concessionaries 
who broke the law would be punished: 
The administrative authorities will rigorously reprimand the abuse of cards for cotton and rice farmers, making 
sure that their holders are in fact farmers of cotton 
and rice, and punishing the agents of the concessionaries 
who distribute cards outside these conditions. (21) 
The continuing competition for labour between cotton con- 
cessionaries and plantations at local level probably resulted from 
the interpretation of the regulations made by the local administrator. 
Where, for whatever reasons, administrators favoured the interests 
of the concessionary, competition continued. In 1960/1, for instance, 
when cotton growing had ceased on SSE's own concession because women 
refused to continue the cultivation(22) it was still upsetting SSE's 
recruitment operations in other areas. For example, in a letter to 
a director of the company, SSE's General Manager noted in August 1960 
that during September, October and November 3680 "Angurus" would leave 
the estates. Under the conditions then prevailing it would only be 
possible to recruit 2500 men to replace them. "Difficulties are 
specially to be found in the Maganja and Pebane area due to the 
increase in cotton growers and lack of energy of the authorities. "(23) 
(emphasis added) 
THE GROWTH OF TEA PLANTATIONS 
The spread of forced cotton cultivation to almost all 
the 
circumscriptions within Zamb'zia from which 
SSE recruited labour was 
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not the only threat to SSE's labour supply. Another threat to 
SSE's labour supplies was posed by the expansion of tea production 
in the Gurue region of North-west Zambezia. Most, if not all, of 
the planters were Portuguese. The most important of them, Manuel 
Saraiva Junqueiro, Carlos Ribeiro and Americo Felizardo were men who 
had started their careers in Zombe'zia as employees of other companies. 
Aided by "Credito Agricola" and promises of labour they had branched 
out on their own. (24) By 1945, the combined needs of the ten major 
planters in Gurue had already exceeded the capacity of the circum- 
scription to furnish labour. Whereas the able-bodied male population 
of Gurue (men who were available for contracts) amounted to 7000 men 
the planter's annual labour needs amounted to 18,000 men. Eleven 
thousand men had, therefore, to be recruited from other circum- 
scriptions. (25) 
One area from which the tea planters hoped to recruit labour 
was Ile, where SSE recruited labour. On several occasions they had 
tried to obstruct SSE`s recruiting there which they had never 
"viewed with pleasure". Their policy of obstruction was unsuccessful, 
however, because the governor of the time had not favoured one firm 
to the detriment of another, nor had he allowed exclusive recruiting. 
With the nomination of a new provincial governor in 
1950 everything 
"began to get shaken up agoin". (26) Manuel Junqueiro 
had returned 
from Portugal with a letter from the Governor General of 
Mozambique 
instructing the Interim Governor of Zambd1rzia to favour the 
Gurue 
planters at the expense of SSE in Ile. 
SSE's General Manager advised 
the company's representative to raise 
the matter in Lourengo Marques 
while the Managing Director took it up 
in Lisbon with the Governor 
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General and the Minister of the Colonies. He suggested that SSE's 
case should rest on two points. Firstly it should stress that 
Guru 's labour needs were exaggerated, and secondly, it should point 
out that the tea planters already had exclusive recruiting rights in 
Gurub, Namarroi and much of Alto Molocue. If they needed more labour 
they should be encouraged to recruit it in Niossa Province-(27) 
However, before SSE could take any action the company's General 
Manager was called to a meeting with the Interim Governor of Zamb4zia. 
He was told that Ile had been re-allocated to the Gurue planters, on 
the private instructions of the Minister of the Colonies. SSE's 
General Manager was "very surprised" although he understood why the 
Minister should want to help Gurue. The Minister had family ties 
with Junqueiro. He had also formerly been the tea planters' 
representative in Lisbon. (28) 
SSE protested to the Interim Governor of Zamb6zia and to the 
Minister of the Colonies. The company pointed out that it had been 
recruiting in Ile for twenty years and that in the post three years 
it had recruited a total of 16,850 men and boys from the region. 
SSE added that labour from Ile had been trained for cutting and 
loading work and that opening recruitment in a new area would 
involve 
training completely fresh men, which would lead to problems with 
the 
harvest. SSE therefore asked for Ile to be re-opened to their 
recruiters again, or failing this for two years in which 
to organise 
recruitment elsewhere. (29) Further to this protest 
SSE felt that 
there was little it could do except explain 
the situation to the 
new Governor of Zambezia when he arrived. 
The company decided not to 
bring up the subject with the Minister of 
Colonies immediately but to 
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mention it again when labour needs were discussed in relation to 
increased sugar production. 
There is no doubt that Junqueiro is clever and has 
played his cards well, but sooner or later those in 
authority will realise that the production of his 
tea crop is of little importance compared with the 
larger interests which Portugal has in seeing that 
the production of sugar is increased. (30) 
But SSE lost its reserve in Ile. Instead the company was allowed to 
recruit labour in Morrumbala and Maganja. This decision was a blow 
for SSE. The company felt that labour from Maganja would not be able 
to cope with the work on the estates, besides which SSE faced 
competition for labour in the district from the Boror Company. (31) 
In 1956 SSE once more faced the loss of a recruiting reserve 
to the Gurue tea planters. As in the districts of Alto Moldcue and 
Ile, SSE had been recruiting labour in Gilt District for 25-30 years. 
Indeed, these three areas were the principal sources of SSE's labour 
under the Hornung Contract. The matter of Gile probably arose as the 
direct result of local Government policy. In an attempt to overcome 
the growing labour shortage, the Governor of Zambezia had issued 
instructions in 1953 which ordered employers to cease from engaging 
more men than they actually required. This was common policy among 
employers in the region, not only to guard against absenteeism 
but 
also to ensure that labour needs were adequate 
for peak periods of 
the year. (32) The Administrator of Chinde 
had discovered that SSE 
had 300 men on its books against daily needs of 
60 men. (33) At a 
meeting of recruiters called by the Provincial 
Governor to discuss 
the labour situation, the Governor revealed 
that he was "horrified" 
to learn of SSE's practise in Chinde. 
He asserted that if Chinde were 
properly recruited it would yield 
120 men a month. He therefore 
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prohibited SSE from recruiting in Gile. SSE's recruiter protested. 
The Governor waived aside his objections. He argued that during the 
period he had held office SSE had not lost a ton of sugar through 
labour shortage whereas "Gurue had lost hundreds of pounds of tea 
for this reason. "(34) SSE feared that it would not be possible 
to recruit 120 men a month from Chinde. Even if this number were 
forthcoming the company felt, on the basis of past experience, that 
the rates of absenteeism would be high. (35) Notwithstanding its 
objections, however, the government withdrew SSE's rights to recruit 
in Gile, which went to the tea planters, and obliged it to recruit 
labour in Chinde instead. 
Whereas in 1940 most of the labour recruited from Zambezia 
to work on SSE's plantations was drawn from the north and northwestern 
parts of Zambezia; Alto Molocüe, Ile, Gi1e and Namarroi, by the 
mid-1950s there had been a perceptible eastward shift in the company's 
recruiting zones. Increasingly, following the expansion of tea- 
production in Gurue, SSE's labour was drawn from the littoral: 
Quelimane, Inhassunge, Pebane, Naburi and Chinde. This move was 
not propitious from SSE's point of view. It lost the right to recruit 
in areas where it had been recruiting men since the 1920s, and it lost 
men whose productivity had gradually increased over the years. (36) 
Instead it received labourers whose output was low and who were 
frequently absent from work. (37) SSE's competitors, on the other 
hand stepped in and received labour which had been 
formed and 
disciplined by SSE. 
The fact of the origins (Portuguese settlers) of 
the tea 
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planters, the reference to planters receiving agricultural credit 
and their personal links with members of the administration and 
government, all suggest that the loss of SSE's principal reserves 
is an indication of a shift in government policy. Whereas until 
1930 the colonial state had little option but to accept and support 
foreign capital, after that date it was able to foster policies to 
encourage accumulation by Portuguese, both in the plantation sector 
and through forced cotton cultivation. The growth of these two 
sectors in turn led to a change in the balance between Portuguese 
and foreign capital in the region. Through its redistributive labour 
policies the state sought to make available labour to all those who 
needed it. This it did by ending the system of exclusive reserves 
(NB this happened also in Angonia, see above) and by readjusting 
supply areas to meet changed needs. As a result, the monopoly 
labour supply position of the largest companies in the region was 
inevitably eroded in favour of newer and smaller enterprises. 
Tea production continued to expand in Zamb(zia. In 1944 
a new tea-producing region was demarcated in Socone. By 
1955 the 
Socone plantations were absorbing 5000 men a year. (38) 
At the some 
time there was a general expansion of settlement and commerce 
in 
the region, and the rapid growth of Quelimane, Mocu! 
ba and other towns 
in the interior. (39) On the whole the labour needs of new settlers 
were low. Families required domestic workers, and small enterprises 
seldom employed more than a few workers. 
Hence the growth of 
settlement in itself did not lead to any major reallocation 
of 
labour reserves. It did, however, eat 
into the labour reserves of 
the district, and contributed to the growing 
labour shortage. Thus, 
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whereas in 1947 there was an overall surplus of 25,718 men over 
the needs of the province(40) by 1957 over 93 per cent of all 
men eligible for a contract were being recruited. The Provincial 
Governor estimated that it was almost impossible to surpass this 
percentage "if we take into account the movement of natives who 
clandestinely seek work outside the district, many indeed in foreign 
territory, which it is impossible to stop. "(41) 
THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO THE LABOUR SHORTAGE: RECRUITING METHODS 
IN ZAMBEZIA 
Only at the end of the 1950s did the absolute shortage of 
labour within Zambezia lead to the need for major changes in 
government labour policy. Until then, the system of labour 
mobilisation established in the RTI of 1930 was adequate to provide 
the men required. The law only needed minor adjustments to ensure 
that it operated efficiently and took account of changing circumstances. 
Re-allocating recruiting reserves between employers was one aspect of 
government policy. Enacting additional legislation to tie up loopholes 
in the law and strengthen the role of the state was another. 
Throughout the period of this study administrators in Zambia 
were directly involved in the recruitment of labour. The most common 
system of recruitment was the 'concentration'. Using the census the 
local administrator compiled a list of men who had been without wage 
work for more than six months. His police were sent into the various 
'chiefdoms' of the administrative district and in collaboration with 
the 'chiefs' and their subordinates rounded up the men involved. 
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The captured men were then taken to the office of the administrator 
where they were put to work on public works projects for a period of 
two weeks. They received no payment for this service which was 
imposed as a punishment for their 'idleness'. At the end of the 
period of unpaid labour-service the recruiters operating in the area 
were called together and the men were distributed among them. (42) 
Despite the obvious advantages of such a system both from 
the employers' and administrators' point of view there were various 
attempts to end the concentration. In 1944, for example, when workers 
from the Mopeic region were already angry about falling wages and 
rising prices(43) a government inspector suggested, among other 
things, that the use of force in the recruitment of labour should end. 
The consequences of the continued use of force, would, he felt, be 
higher rates of absenteeism at the work place and migration to 
neighbouring territories. (44) In 1947 a government circular again 
condemned the concentration because the use of direct force was 
leaving the 'natives' with the idea 
obligation" rather than a "pressing 
of the individual and the community 
the reports available it is obvious 
divided about the labour question. 
labour would only become plentiful 
that work was a "painful 
necessity for the very existence 
to which he belongs. "(45) From 
that administrative opinion was 
Some administrators felt that 
if wages and conditions were not 
artificially depressed by forced labour and administrative 
interference 
in recruiting, which had the effect of discouraging competition 
for 
labour. There were others who felt that an improvement 
in wages 
and conditions and freedom to opt out of wage work would result 
in 
the disappearance of the labour force. Obviously 
the latter viewpoint 
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was an ideological argument for the maintenance of a cheap labour 
system. It was an argument which appealed to employers. Wanting 
to keep the costs of labour as low as possible employers were not 
willingly going to agree to a system whose effect would have been 
to push up their costs, especially when the state had shown itself 
only too willing to ensure that labour was forthcoming by whatever 
means. In any event, the latter viewpoint won the day, for as late 
as 1953 the Governor of Zambezia again condemned the concentration 
and admitted that earlier attempts to end it had failed. (46) Despite 
stronger measures to control the activities of recruiters, but not the 
activities of the authorities, who were instrumental in organising 
the system, the 'concentration' was still common in Zambezia in the 
early 1960s. (47 ) 
Notwithstanding the differences of opinion which emerge from 
reports of the 1940s and 1950s, the trend of government policy was 
to increase the use of coercion to call forth labour as the labour 
shortage increased. Thus, between the mid-1940s and mid-1950s a 
number of measures were introduced to tackle both ends of the labour 
problem. Firstly, it was necessary to make sure that men who were 
eligible for wage work entered an annual contract. One means of 
increasing men's dependence on wages was to increase the rate of 
the 
'native' tax or to introduce additional taxes which reduced 
the amount 
of time men could spend on the production of their own crops. 
To this 
end, a new tax, the contribuirröo bracal, was 
introduced in 1943. Tax 
payers were required to give five days unpaid 
labour-service a year 
to the administration. (48) 
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In 1947, the Native Affairs Department moved to increase 
the penalties for men who abused the 'rest' period after a contract. 
The department ruled that men who were defined as 'idle', and who 
were therefore liable to a period of obligatory labour, could be 
employed on road-building without payment for periods up to six 
months, if the administrator had no other paid work to offer them. (49) 
Men, who, in terms of the RTI could be obliged to work for the 
administration for less than the wage they would have received with 
a private employer, now found that they had to work without payment 
if they failed to take up a contract six months after completing 
their last period of paid employment. Forced labour for private 
ends was now officially and directly sanctioned in law. 
The second way in which the labour problem was tackled was 
by finding means of ensuring that once men had been signed on for 
employment they completed their contract. It was the administrator's 
duty to supervise men at the work place. It was also the 
administrator's duty to punish men who failed to complete the 
contract or who in other ways infringed the law. In theory, such 
men were supposed to be condemned to a period of correctional labour. 
In practise, administrators usually extended the contract period 
as well. In 1945, for example, the Governor ruled that the practise 
of the Pebane Administrator, which was designed to overcome the 
problem of absenteeism, was legal. The administrator sent back to 
the employer any man who, during the contract period, had not earned 
enough money to pay the tax and to buy a pair of trousers. 
Such men 
were recontracted for a further period of six months. 
(50) In Chinde 
District, men who 'volunteered' for a contract were allowed 
to work 
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for two periods of three months. Those who were forcibly recruited 
were obliged to work six months without a break. Those men, on the 
other hand, who, having volunteered for a contract, then deserted 
the plantations before having completed two thirds of the contract, 
were sent back to the workplace for a further period of three 
months. (51) In Lugela, the Administrator noted in his 1952 Report to 
the Native Affairs Department, that "in the circumscription, by virtue 
of an old ruling still in use, all contracts are extended by 30 days 
above the 180 until 180 have been worked. "(52) 
To facilitate administrative control of labour SSE started 
in the 1950s to keep its own file of workers. The company informed 
the local authorities when the six month 'rest' period had 
been exceeded. The local authorities then rounded up the men 
affected and sent them to the estates. (53) Similarly, SSE sent in 
regular lists of men who had deserted from the estates before 
completing their contracts to the local authorities. The authorities 
were responsible for capturing the men, punishing them and sending 
them back to the estates. (54) Part of the punishment meted out by 
the authorities for desertion or unsatisfactory work included the 
administration of corporal punishment. As late as 1960 corporal 
punishment was still being used to deter 'shirking', absenteeism 
and desertion, although according to SSE less frequently than in the 
past. 
It is true that the 'palmatoria' is on its way out 
but it is being substituted by pretty stiff prison 
sentences where a prisoner is employed on government 
work. For instance we had some trouble over 
absenteeism with the Quelimanes and Micuanes and 
I heard from Mr Amarel in Quelimane that as offenders 
return here they are immediately put in prison and 
that this has had a very sobering influence on the 
new Guias arriving at Marromeu. (55) 
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Corporal punishment, extension of the contract period worked, 
imprisonment and periods of unpaid labour-service are examples of 
some of the measures introduced by the state to deal with the growing 
demand for labour in Zambiia between 1936 and 1960. Yet, as has been 
shown, the state did not limit its action to strengthening the 
deterrents against 'idleness', absenteeism and desertion which were 
first sanctioned in the 1930 labour legislation. It did not, in 
other words, limit its actions to increasing the use of coercion to 
call forth the labour available and to cut down on labour wastage. 
The marked increase in direct state intervention to "attract" labour 
to capital (accompanied by a growing collusion between the state and 
capital in the labour conscription process) was only one aspect of 
government policy during this period. 
To cope with the changed situation within Zambezia, namely, 
the growing demand for labour on new plantations and in the cotton 
sector, the state also pursued two other, interrelated, policies. 
Unable to expand the geographical area from which labour was drawn 
because of the growing demand for labour in the regions which 
bordered the province, the state sought firstly to re-distribute the 
supply of labour available within the plantation sector. 
This 
inevitably meant that the labour needs of new (Portuguese) 
plantations were accommodated at the expense of the supply of old- 
established (foreign-controlled) plantations. 
The latter had to bear 
the financial burden of establishing a recruiting network 
in new areas. 
Nevertheless, despite the comparative disadvantages of 
this policy 
for old-established plantation capital, state 
intervention to 
re-distribute labour guaranteed the 
labour needs of the plantation 
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sector as a whole. All needs could be met as long as the demand for 
labour did not outstrip the physical capacity of the region to supply 
it. The rapid spread of cotton cultivation did, however, threaten 
the physical capacity of the region to supply sufficient labour 
for all needs. The second strand of state policy was, therefore, 
directed towards restoring the balance between cotton concessionaries 
and plantation capital by controlling the conditions of cotton 
production and re-structuring the supply of labour to the cotton 
sector. Besides limiting the areas which could be sown with cotton 
the state also moved to reserve male labour for plantation capital 
and to encourage concessionaries to use female labour. In other 
words, the state sought to extend the labour supply to meet the 
needs of both sections of capital by making available a reserve 
army of (female) labour to cotton concessionaries. Clearly, these 
policies were not uniformly applied over time or over regions. Their 
application at local level depended on a multiplicity of factors, 
not least of which was the individual administrator's own attitude to 
the labour question and the planters and concessionaries within his 
district. However, at provincial level they were successful in holding 
off the labour crisis until the end of the 1950s. 
Despite state intervention to furnish labour and regulate the 
supply of labour to different sections of capital in the region 
individual employers and concessionaries were often dissatisfied with 
the measures taken. Besides 'poaching' labour from each other 
they 
also attempted to safeguard their own position 
by negotiating with 
the authorities to redress the perceived imbalance 
in labour supply, 
or adopted other legal measures to protect 
their own sources of labour. 
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The example of negotiations over labour from Ile typifies the former 
response. SSE's cotton concession is an example of the latter. Yet, 
notwithstanding their complaints, none called for the ending of the 
system and the establishment of a free labour market. As a whole, 
capital in the region, whether Portuguese or foreign, invested in 
cotton or plantation production, was united in its support for a system 
of forced migrant labour run by the state. Cotton concessionaries 
were supplied with unpaid labour. Peasants forced into the production 
found themselves entirely at the disposal of the concessionary 
who determined the areas and amounts to be sown and the price of 
the crop. Planters, on the other hand were guaranteed a supply of 
low--paid labour. The implementation of those clauses of the labour 
legislation which dealt with wages and working conditions on the 
estates, ensured that, even with the tensions in the system and the 
upward pressure on wages that competition implied, migrant labour still 
remained cheap labour. It is to the application of the labour system 
on the plantations that I shall now turn. Part II of this thesis, 
will attempt to show, through a detailed discussion of the various 
aspects of SSE's labour policy, why the migrant system persisted 
in 
Zambe is in spite of a growing shortage of labour. 
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NOTES 
(1) SSE AR., File 133A, Recruitin2 An onia Quelimane Local, Recruiting, Marromeu, (paper discussed v. 1937). Nevertheless, despite the attraction of higher wages in Rhodesia which planters in Zambezia could not control, they were successful in this period in inhibiting South African 
mining capital from expanding the geographical area of its reserve army of labour to include 'natives' from Portuguese Angonia (SSE Ar., File 133, Recruiting, Quelimane, and Angonia (1930-1939), W. Gemmill, Transvaal Chamber o Mines, Johannesburg, to Col. C. B. R. Hornung, 10 June 1938, Private; C. B. R. Hornung to W. Gemmill, 20 June 1938; J. Barros Gomes, Lourenco Marques, to Coronel C. B. R. Hornung, 15 Oct. 1938). 
Recovery after the depression in South Africa brought with it 
a return to the recruitment of 'tropical' labour. That 
plantation capital in Zambezia was able to prevent renewed 
recruitment for South Africa north of parallel 22 in Mozambique suggests the increasing strength of this sector 
of capital vis-a-vis mining capital. It also suggests that the policies of the Salazar regime, which sought to boost internal capital accumulation in Mozambique, were beginning to bear fruit. cf. note 72, Chapter I. 
(2) SSE Ar., File 133, MT to A. Sarmento Pimental, 29 Mar. 1938. 
(3) SSE Ar., File 133A, MT to Col. Hornung, 9 May 1947, No. 67/47, 
Recruiting. 
(4) SSE Ar., File 133A, Antonio de Noronha, M'kame to Gerente 
Geral SSE Ltd., 20 May 1950, No. 19/50, Recrutamento. 
(Translation J. H. ). 
(5) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) 
(6) SSE Ar., File 93, Labour and Recruiting, Government Side, NFDB 
(Du Boulay) Lual; o, to ornung and Co., 15 May 1957, 
No. 143/57, Labour Position. 
(7) GOV. Q., Rep. Port., Prov. de Mo;., Governo do Distrito da 
Zambezia, Acta da Conferencia dos Administradores 28.8.1957 
a 31.8.195 p. . 
(8) SSE Ar., File 118, Native Co ound, A. Sarmento Pimento!, to 
Gerente Geral SSE Ltd. uuabo, Aug. 1937. Namagoa 
Plantations' policy of attraction included not complaining about 
absenteeism and not obliging the recruited men to work hard. 
The company also gave each man a blanket when he left the 
estate to encourage him to return to the firm after the six 
month 'rest' period was over. 
(9) Ministe'rio do Ultramar, Junta de Exportacöo do Algodao, 
Rea'ustamento das Zonas Algodoeiras de Mo ambi ue, de Acordo 
com as isposigdes do Decreto No. 35: 844 e com 
Base no 
Recenseamento Ecolägico-Agrfcola da Provincia, 1953, Decreto 
No. 11: 994,1926. 
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(10) SSE Ar., File 44, Annual Cotton Re orts, Final Cotton Report, Season 1942. For further details of e organisation of the cultivation see SSE Ar., File 44A, Details for Annual Cotton Report, 1943-1946, passim0 
(11) SSE Ar., File 133, A. Teixeira Rebello to MT Gerente Geral 
SSE, 23 Mar. 1936 and Pinto Basto to Gerente Geral, SSE, 
Mopea, 16 Apr. 1936. Lopes Irmaos' cotton agent was SSE's former recruiter in Mutarara who was dismissed by the 
company, see Chapter III. 
(12) SSE Ar., File 133, Pinto Basto to Gerente Geral, SSE, Mopea, 
16 May 1936, transcribing passages of letters received from 
the Chefe do Posto da Morrumbala and from the Administrator 
of Massingire. 
rpomingos Arouca 7 
(13) SSE Ar., File l33Ä, DA /to Major "R. H. Du Boulay 11 Oct. 1960, 
No. 355/60, Recruiting, "The numbers recruited 
t' in Morrumbala 
have dropped considerably compared with past years and the 
reason seems to be the emphasis which the Administrator is 
putting on cotton, the concession for which belongs to Lopes 
Bros. " 
(14) SSE Ar., File 44, Final Cotton Report... 1942, op. cit. 
(15) SSE 
DA 
No. 
only 
was 
and 
Ar., File 44B, Details for Annual Cotton Re 
Luabo to J .A. dos -Santos Callodo SSE, LM. 21/62/Reservada, Concessdo Algodoeira, "As 
aim of our cotton. concession in the Mopeia 
to avoid another firm coming to work it and 
its (1946-1964), 
(16) 
cane 
L6 reD. LY6L, 
you know the 
and Luabo zones 
thus disrupting 
P11- 
aamaging the recruitment of labour necessary tor the sugar 
plantations. " (Translation J. H. ) 
SSE Ar., File 44, Final Cotton Report, Season 1941, Luabo 
30 Nov. 1942. 
(17) GJV. Q, Col. de Mo;., Prov. da Zambezia, Relatorio do 
Governador, Capitao da Infantaria, Cesar aria e erpa Rosa, 
Respeitante. ao Periodo de 4 de Maio de 1943 a 31 de Dezembro 
de 1947, pp. 177-178. 
(18) ibid., pp. 178-182. 
(19) Relatorio do Governador Zambezia ... 1943... 
1947, op. cit., 
nstrucyöes 18 Oct. 1943 rem a rovincia No. 2 
of 31 Dec. 1943), pp. 162-163; SSE Ar., File 44A, Director 
Provincial da Admin. Civil, A. Mendes Gil, to Chefe da 
Seccäo de Algodäo da SSE, 5 Nov. 1945, Nota No. 2886/D/11/2, 
Companha Algodoeira, Instrucgdes da Inscriyao e Registo dos 
Agri'cultores de Algoddo. 
(20) AHM, NI 198,1952-1957, Relatorios dos Agentes do Curador e 
Delegados de Satde, No. 50, Circ. do Ile, Agencia do Curadoria 
dos Indi'genas da Circunscricäo do Ile, Relatorio do Ano de 1954. 
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(21) SSE Ar., File 93, MT to Hornung and Co. Ltd., 28 Apr. 1953, 
No. 266/53 GA, Enclosing: Administragoo do Concelho do 
Chinde, Direcg6o de Admin. Civil da Zambezia, Circular No. 
95/C, 24 Mar. 1953. (Translation J. H. ) In 1943 rice growing 
on the concession system also started in Zambezia. See 
Relatorio do Governador (Zambezia ... 1943... 1947, op. cit., 
p. 183 and Leroy Vail and Lan deg White, 'Tawani, Machambero. " 
Forced Cotton and Rice Growing on the Zambesi, " Journal of 
African History, XIX, No. 2 (1978), p. 257 ff. 
(22) SSE Ar., File 44B, DA to J. A. dos Santos Callado, SSE, LM, 
26 Feb. 1962, No. 21/62/Reservada, Concessäo Algodoeira and A. F. S. 
(Souza) to J. A. dos Santos Callado, 18 June 1962; Vail and 
White, op. cit., pp. 261-262. 
(23) SSE Ar., File 133A, DA to Major N. H. Du Boulay, 25 Aug. 1960, 
No. 2 97/ 60 . 
(24) Fransisco Gavicho de Lacerda, A Cultura do Chi Feita pelos 
Portugueses na Zambezia (Lisboa, 32re ito 
grzco a` was probably government agricultural credit. 
(25) AHM. NI 16, A/31/ 945, Respostas co Questionario que 
Acompanhou a Circular No. 1356/A/31 de 22 5 1945, Gurue. 
(26) SSE Ar., File 270, Ille Recruitin , MT to Dr. 
J. dos Santos 
Callado, 8 Nov. 1957-- Recrutamento no Ille. (Translation J. H. ) 
(27) ibid. 
(28) SSE Ar., File 270, MT to Dr. J. dos Santos Callado, LM, 
28 Oct., 1950, Recrutamento no Ille. 
(29) SSE Ar., File 270, MT to Dr. J. dos Santos Callodo, 22 Dec. 
1950, enclosing letters of protest to the Minister of 
the 
Colonies and the Acting Governor of Zamb(zia. 
(30) SSE Ar., File 270. CBRH (Charles Bernard Rafael Hornung) 
to Thurnheer, 10 Jan. 1951. Quelimane Recruiting. 
(31) SSE Ar., File 270, MT to Dr. J. dos Santos Callado LM, 
28 Nov. 1950, Recrutamento no Ille and CBRH to Thurnheer, 
Lisbon 29 Nov. 1950, No. 328/50, Quelimane Recruiting. 
(32) SSE Ar., File 93, Governo da Zambezia, Ordern Geral 
No. 3/53. 
(33) SSE Ar., File 305, Native Labour Transport of 
Labour etc., EH(? ) 
to Major J. D. Hornung, Dec. 14 c1954, 
No. rec 
Series', Native Labour. 
(34) ibid. 
(35) ibid. 
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(36) SSE Ar., File 184, Native Labour Organisation, Hut Tax, 
Usher, General Fiel Manager to General Manager, y 1955 Re. Matabichos to Native Labour. The "Angurus" started loading 
cane in the early 1920s. They were then "far inferior in 
physique" to labour bordering on the Zambesi and also "more backward mentally. " At first they did one quarter of the work 
of a local man then one third and finally three quarters. 
(37) By 1963 SSE only recruited on the littoral when it suffered from a labour shortage because of the low output and high 
rate of absenteeism among workers from the coastal area (SSE Ar., File 133A, Recrutamento, 12 Aug. 1963). 
(38) COV. Q, Rep. Port., Prov. de Moy., Governo da Zambe'zia, 
Relat6rio do Governo do Distrito, 1.1.56 a 31.12.56, pp. 18-19. 
(39) ibid., ssim. See also other Governors' Reports and the 
minutes of te annual meetings of administrators for the 1950s. 
(40) Relatorio do Governador (Zambezia)... 1943... 1947, op. cit., p. 161. 
(41) Acta da Conferencia dos Administradores... 1957, op. cit., 
p. 89. Translation T. R. 
(42) Interview with Vasco Batalha Santos, Maputo, 27 May 1977. 
Mr Batalha Santos was SSE's recruiter in Mutarara between 
1951 and 1960. The broad details of his account are 
confirmed by the administrator who was appointed to the 
Circumscription of Mopeia in 1953. "When I arrived here the 
recruitment was, in practise, done by the authorities. 
Periodically and on the appointed day, the native authorities 
brought to the headquarters of the circumscription and 
post all the natives whose rest period had expired and who 
were eligible for a new contract. It was among the mass 
of congregated natives that the recruiters did their work. " 
(AHM, NI 202,1952-1957, Relatorios dos Agentes do Curador e 
Delegados de Sadde, No. 54, Circ. de Mopeia, Ladislau 
Bataiha Junior, 12 Jan. 1954). (Translation J. H. ). 
(43) SSE Ar., File 133A, G. Amado Mopeia to M1', 11 Nov. 1944. 
(44) 1bid. 
(45) Reparticäo Central dos Negöcios Indigenas, Circular No. 566/D/7, 
LM, 15 May 1947. 
(46) SSE Ar., File 93, Gov. da Zambcfzia, Ordern Geral 3/53, op. cit. 
(47) For example, in 1962, and after the 
LTI hod been abolished, 
the Governor of Zambia called the Administrator of 
Mopeia 
a coward in front of SSE's recruiter, and gave 
him 
instructions to travel round the bush every day 
bringing 
File 
in those men whose 'rest' period had expired. 
(SSE Ar., 
Fil , 133A, AFS Gerente Geral to Hornung and Co. Ltd., 
3 Nov. 
No. 443/62/Private Series. ) 
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(48) Rep. Port. Princi al Le isla 8o licavel aos Indienas do Prov. de Mo g. (Imprensa ciona de KUoc., 6 ortaria No. 4963, Approvando o Regulamento da Contribuigoo Bräcal Indrgena, 29 Dec. 1942. In his 1943-7 Report the Governor of Zombezia 
strongly recommended a periodic review of the `native' tax, 
which being within the means of the people was ceasing to act as an indirect means of forcing men to work. He also insisted that 'natives' should dress decently. "As an indirect way 
of making the native seek work and consequently to facilitate 
the work of the recruiters, the administrative authority must, 
with keen and special interest, oblige the people of both 
sexes to dress decently. " (Relatorio do Governador Zamtiezia) 
... 1943... 1947, op. cit., p. 16 and p. 117 (Translation J. H. ) 
(49) Provincia de Monica e Sofala, Direco o Provincial de Admin. 
Civil, Circular No. 5.842/B/15, de 8 de Setembro de 1947. 
(50) AHM, NI 32, B/24/4/1,1945-1947, Relatirios Trimestrais dos 
Agentes do Curador, Pebane, Official Communication from 
the Gov. da Prov. da Zambezia, Quelimane, 7 Nov. 1945. 
(51) NI 32,6/24/4/1, op. cit., Admin. do Concelho do Chinde, 
Relatorio da Wo-de-Obra Relativo ao Terceiro Trimestre do 
Corrente Ano de 1946, Admin. Ladislau Batalha Junior. 
(52) AHM, NI 199,1952-1957, Relatörios dos Agentes do Curador 
e Delegados de Saude, No. 51, Circ_. de Lugela, Relatdrio 
sobre ! moo-de-Obra em Geral Referente ao 2a semestre de 1952. 
(Translation J. H. ) 
(53) SSE Ar., File 93, H. Felizardo to Gerente Geral 30 Jan. 1957, 
Ref. Carta 7/57/Reservada, Trabalhadores Chinde. 
(54) SSE Ar., File 347, 
. 
Policy Cantinas Acampamentos 
Public Address S stem, S Ltd. to minis ra or do Posto 
Lua o, 28 Sep. 63. 
(55) SSE Ar,, File 184, NHDB to S. P. Hornung London, 18 June 1960, 
No. 229/60 Private Series, Native Wages Recruiting and General 
Policy. Leroy Vail and Landeg White, "Plantation Protest: 
The History of a Mozambican Song", Journal of Southern African 
Studies, V, No. 1 (Oct. 1978), p. 9, cite a young Eng ism 
who worked for SSE briefly in 1923. "The youthful labour clerk 
(Portuguese) was resident magistrate and inflicted with the 
assistance of a band of cut-throat retainers - 'Paposo's men' - 
what seemed to me c terrible ý unishment with an instrument 
called a "Palmetoria' /-sic /. This thing was the shape and 
size of a ping-pong bat but much thicker and was perforated 
with holes like the colander. The hand of the victim was 
seized and many blows were struck on the palm; 
then the other 
palm and then the buttocks. On one occasion 
I saw the 
instrument handed over to a second retainer to carry on. 
The result of this treatment is to 
leave the victim in agony 
which must endure for a considerable 
time and renders him 
completely collapsed. The action of 
the instrument is that 
when a blow is struck the skin 
is drawn up into the manyoholes 
and a certain amount of force appears necessary 
to pulr 
twist the thing away from the flesh" 
(PRO. FO. 371/11989 
'ýý ,, rris 
26 Feb. 1927) 
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PART II 
THE IMPACT OF THE COERCIVE LABOUR REGIME, 1930-1960 
i. SENA SUGAR ESTATES'LABOUR POLICY 
152 
CHAPTER V 
THE ORGANISATION OF WORK AND PAYMENT 
AT SENA SUGAR ESTATES 
The production of sugar on plantations is divided into two 
distinct parts; the field and specifically agricultural operations 
and the milling and processing of the cane in the factory. The 
factory must be located as close to the fields as possible since cane 
is highly perishable and rapidly loses its sucrose content after being 
cut. The construction of a factory to crush and process the cane 
is a costly undertaking. Thus, loss of production and inefficient use 
of the factory plant push up the overall costs of production. A basic 
aim of the sugar producer, therefore, is to extend the harvest period 
for as long as possible and to supply as much cane to the factory 
as possible within that period. In other words, through careful 
organisation of field operations the sugar producer seeks to ensure 
maximum productive use of the factory within the natural limits 
dictated by the climate and type of soil. (l) 
It is only relatively recently that sugar producers have 
turned to more mechanised methods of production in the fields, 
(2) 
Thus, another important consideration in the past was to ensure 
the 
most efficient use of the large labour force needed to grow and 
harvest the crop. 
Sugar cane is a perennial crop. The cutting of 
the stem 
stimulates the growth of secondary shoots 
in the dormant eyes of the 
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part of the plant which lies under the soil. The primary shoot is 
known as the overstand. The secondary shoots are called ratoons. 
The number of ratoons varies considerably. (3) Besides natural 
limitations such as soil type and climate, the number of ratoons 
is dictated by commercial considerations. These include the 
amount of fertilisation and weed/insect control considered economic; 
the irrigation and drainage necessary; the variety of cane used; 
the optimum yield of sugar per plant considered profitable and the 
amount of labour needed. However, by a judicious organisation of 
planting the estate management tries to ensure that different sections 
of new cane or ratoons are harvested in sequence. (4) Careful planning 
of planting not only ensures that a continuous supply of cane is fed 
into the factory during the harvest but it also enables management to 
rationally deploy labour and/or machinery during the rest of the 
year. (5) Nevertheless there are limits to the degree of rationalisation 
of labour use which can be introduced in the fields. These are 
dictated by the requirements of the crop. Unlike industrial production 
where a contnuous cycle of production can be established irrespective 
of the season, plantation production requires different inputs of 
labour over the period of the crop's growth. Thus, another major 
preoccupation of the plantation producer is to develop a system of 
labour use which can be adjusted to the seasonal needs of the crop. 
Finally, where cane production is not mechanised, a fourth and 
major preoccupation of the plantation producer is to 
find ways of 
containing the costs of labour. 
Sugar production at SSE between 1930 and 1960 operated within 
the general conditions described above. 
(6) To ensure optimum use of 
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the factory and labour in the fields several agricultural programmes 
operated simultaneously. For the sake of clarity these programmes 
have been simplified and only the basic process of cultivation is 
described below. 
The agricultural year on Sena Sugar Estates' plantations was 
divided into two main periods: the harvest or 'crop' from May to the 
end of November, when the main field jobs were cutting the cane, 
loading the cane onto trucks attached to locomotives to be transported 
to the factory and gleaning; and the period of the 'off-crop', which 
was further sub-divided into two periods. The first of these included 
the vital months of December, January and February when the land was 
prepared and new seed planted, and when ratoons were weeded and pests 
controlled. The second period, from March until the beginning of the 
'crop' was the time when weeding, drainage, the making of mounds around 
the cane to encourage secondary shoots, and the building of fire 
barriers to defend the crop, took place. (7) Despite the spread of 
agricultural work to ensure optimum utilisation of labour in the 
fields the harvest still absorbed a greater number of workers than 
the 'off-crop' and labour needs were at their lowest between March 
and the beginning of the 'crop'. (8) 
Land preparation and ploughing were mechanised at SSE 
from 
before the 1930s, as was the transport of the cane from the 
fields 
to the factory. However, all other field operations were manual 
until the latter years of the 1950s. Thus, seed preparation, planting, 
weeding, moulding, insect control, fertilisation, cutting and 
loading 
were all done by hand. In 1932 SSE 
had 14,000 hectares under 
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cultivation and by 1955 this figure had risen to 20,000 hectares. (9) 
The combination of a production process based on manual labour and 
the large areas under cultivation meant that labour needs were high. 
On average between 1930 and 1960 SSE appears to have employed 
approximately 13,000 to 20,000 men a day. (10) For the three years 
1940-1942, the only years for which complete figures exist, the 
breakdown of the labour force employed on the estates was as shown 
on the tables overleaf. 
Thus, like sugar producers in general, SSE was confronted 
with two major problems, which arose from the particular demands of 
unmechanised sugar cane production. Firstly, the company required 
an employment programme which would allow labour numbers to be 
odjus+ed to the particular demands of the crop, and secondly it 
needed to contain and control the costs of labour. It is the object 
of this chapter to show how the particular form of labour conscription 
which developed in Zambezia helped SSE to overcome these problems. 
The first section of the chapter will examine the effects of migrant 
labour use on field production. The second and subsequent sections 
of the chapter will examine the organisation of work and payment on 
the estates in more detail. They will attempt to show how, as a 
result of state intervention to ensure that plantation capital was 
provided with a cheap and powerless labour force, 
SSE could implement 
a range of policies aimed at increasing the productivity, of 
labour_ 
and holding back wages. 
s 15 
WORKERS EMPLOYED ON THE PROPERTIES IN 1940,1941 and 1942(11) 
Remaining from Volunteers (a) 
Year Property last year Contracted Men Boys Specialised Total 
1940 Luabo 4605 7296 2404 1556 572 16433 Marromeu 4112 8387 416 637 689 14241 Mopeia (b) 297 - 498 116 180 1091 Matilde) ýcý 808 1125 39 237 - 2209 Chinde ) - - 1140 - - 1140 
9822 16808 4497 2546 1441 35114 
1941 Luabo 4499 3942 1814 2062(d) 947 16291 
Marromeu 3994 6732 923 653 644 12946 
Mopeia 372 135 480 190 55 1232 
Matilde) - 828 772 - 308 1908 Chinde ) - 368 369 - - 737 
8865 12005 7358 2905 1981 33114 
1942 Luabo 5831 4838 3300 1626 1169 16764 
Marromeu 3513 6025 442 448 662 11090 
Mopeia 500 - 569 165 130 1364 
Matilde) 1136 450 190 181 7 1964 
Chinde ) 102 - 263 - 425 790 
11082 11313 4764 2420 2393 31972 
(a) Child labour was all volunteer labour because boys could not be 
obliged, to work until they were 18 years old. 
(b) The men and boys employed at Mopeia were probably employed as 
cattle men and on the main reception camp for incoming workers. 
(c) Matilde/Chinde were not sugar plantations. At Matilde SSE had 
salt pans and a coconut plantation. Chinde was a port. Here the 
company had warehouse facilities. 
(d) The numbers of volunteer workers generally increased in 1941. 
This was a year of severe drought. For a breakdown of the 
origins of volunteer workers see SSE Ar., File 94, Labour for 
Marromeu, SSE Ltd. M66-de-Obra Ind gena, 1942, "Maya dos 
Tra a adores que se apresentarem voluntariament a pedir 
servigo nos anos 1939 - 1942 nas Propriedades de Luabo e 
Marromeu". 
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THE ORGANISATION OF PRODUCTION IN THE FIELDS 
The Division of Labour in the Fields 
On arriving at the estates, all workers were registered at SSE's 
Native Labour Off ice . They were then distributed among the various 
compounds, and after settling in, were called to work. In the mornings, 
the men on each compound were distributed among the field supervisory 
staff. Assimilated and European overseers (cam tazes) took charge 
of groups of 200 men, while 'native' capatazes were responsible for 
supervising groups of 100 men. These groups were then further sub- 
divided into groups of 25 men to each 'native' foreman (ca itäo). (13) 
The numbers in the work groups, were not, however, invariable. They 
depended on the type of work in hand. On weeding and harvest work, 
for example, a general European overseer normally supervised the 
work of 500 labourers. (14) 
The variable numbers employed in work groups at SSE was a 
direct result of the organisation of production in the fields. With 
the exception of a small number of workers engaged in skilled work, 
such as, steam-plough operators, locomotive drivers, and later 
tractor drivers, (15) the bulk of the labour force was employed to do 
routine work with simple implements: the axe, hoe and cane-knife. 
Weeding, cutting, planting and loading, indeed every manual field 
task,, relied more on the individual's strength and dexterity than 
on any skill acquired through a lengthy training process. The lack 
of skill needed in turn meant that work could be distributed amongst 
the labourers according to the needs of the season. This is not to 
say that where men from a particular region had developed an aptitude 
for certain sorts of work SSE did not attempt to organise 
field 
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production with this in mind. As has already been shown in 
Chapter III the company attempted to employ both men from the local 
prazos and men from Angonia in specific areas of production. 
Nevertheless, the relative aptitude of certain groups of men for certain 
types of work does not override the central feature of the labour 
process at SSE, namely, that field tasks were interchangeable. (16) 
The absence of a specialised division of labour in the fields 
had two important and related consequences. Firstly, it meant that 
SSE could allocate the daily field work in the most efficient way. 
Changes in weather conditions affected the output of workers in the 
fields. (17) For example, heavy overnight rain during the harvest 
period slowed down the work of the cane cutters. This in turn meant 
that bottlenecks were created throughout the production cycle 
which resulted in inefficient use of the factory. These problems 
could be partially overcome because SSE could deploy and redeploy 
men in different areas of production in response to daily conditions 
in the fields. Secondly, SSE could organise its recruiting operations 
so that the numbers engaged were adjusted to seasonal needs. 
Unskilled labour required: Luabo and Marromeu 1953-1955(18) 
Year Estate Crop Period 31.11-28.2 28.2 - start of crop 
1953 Luabo 7500 6850 5700 
M'meu 6400 6875 6000r 
1954 Luabo 7500 6200 5700 
M'meu 7500 6875 6125 
1955 Luabo 7500 6200 5700 
8125 6625 6125 
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The operation of different contract lengths facilitated this process. 
While the bulk of the labour force was engaged on six month contracts, 
which coincided roughly with the major division of the agricultural 
year, the company could employ local men on shorter contracts to cover 
exceptional needs. (19) By paring down labour numbers to the seasonal 
requirements of the crop SSE could avoid supporting unproductive labour 
during the 'off-crop' period. 
There were, however, limits to the degree of efficiency which 
could be implemented. Precisely because the company had no control 
over the weather it could never assess its actual labour needs with 
complete accuracy. The company had to allow itself a certain amount of 
leeway, and hence, had to carry a number of men in excess of its 
actual requirements, in order to cope with any unforeseen contingency. 
Nevertheless, within these limits, the general point still held true. 
The migrant labour system allowed SSE to adjust its labour needs 
to the particular demands of sugar cane production. 
Another potential limitation of the migrant system was the 
high labour turnover which was a feature of it. A high labour turnover 
implied disruption to work. This in turn suggested inefficient use 
of labour and machinery and meant increased costs of production. 
At SSE, however, this problem was minimised. Firstly, the unskilled 
nature of field work meant that men could start working almost as soon 
as they arrived at the estates. The company 
did not have to support 
unproductive labour during a training period, nor 
did it have to 
support the costs of training labour which only worked 
for a short 
period of time. In so for as training was given 
it was given on 
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the job. Furthermore, as we shall see below, the company could 
recoup the costs of supporting inefficient workers during the initial 
part of their contract by withholding payment if they failed to complete 
the task demanded of them. Secondly, the company sought to stagger 
the arrival and departure of contracted men. At SSE only relatively 
small groups of men arrived and left the estates at any one time. 
This meant that men could be slotted into field production and 
withdrawn from it without major upheavals in the overall production 
cycle. Thus, by employing migrant labour, or labour on short-term 
contracts, SSE was able to organise labour use around the particular 
needs of sugar cane production. The efficient use of labour in the 
fields in turn meant that SSE could avoid unnecessary expenditure on 
labour and hence control the overall costs of production. 
However, SSE was still faced with the necessary costs of 
maintaining the labour force in production; with field operations 
largely dependent on manual labour these must have absorbed most of 
the working capital set aside for cane production. (20) Therefore, 
besides attempting to reduce overall labour costs by adjusting the 
numbers employed to the particular demands of the crop, SSE also 
sought to reduce its expenditure on labour as such. It is in 
relation to this aspect of its labout policy that the specific 
features of the system of labour conscription which developed in 
ZambIzia, come into play. 
162 
METHODS EMPLOYED BY SSE TO CONTAIN LABOUR COSTS - MANIPULATING 
PRODUCTIVITY 
The Task System 
At Sena Sugar Estates all work was divided into tasks. 
In order to earn a day's wage each man had to complete a specified 
amount of work. Some tasks were individual, such as weeding, hoeing, 
moulding and planting. Others were distributed among a group or 
gang of workers. Examples of group tasks were cane-loading, and 
laying t he portable field railway track. Cane cutting was a 
task detailed to individual workers but loaders could only complete 
their task if cutters kept up the pace of the work. Yet, whether 
tasks were allocated to individuals or groups the task system as a 
whole was intended to encourage high productivity. Workers either 
had to complete the stipulated task or forego that day's wage. 
There was no legal definition of what constituted a reasonable 
task over and above the stipulation that workers were not supposed 
to spend more than nine hours in the fields. Tasks were established 
by field managers on the basis of experience. 
Present tasks are reasonable. If they were not I should 
give either more or less. Tasks are given on the merits 
of the work and an experienced eye only acquired after 
years of specialising in this particular branch of 
business. Tasks are estimated to occupy not. more than 
nine hours. A strong working boy can of course 
complete his task in less. (21) 
Tasks also varied according to the conditions in the 
fields. In his 
reply to a labour questionnaire in 1931, the Head 
Overseer of the 
Marromeu Estate remarked that "it is impossible to 
lay down a set 
task for many kinds of field work. Tasks have continually 
to be 
altered to suit various conditions prevailing 
in the fields where the 
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work is being carried on. " He added "I have gongs at present weeding 
all over the estates at tasks varying from seven men per acre to 1.5 
men per acre. The difference is not due to the class of labour but 
to the amount of weeds in the various fields. "(22) While it is 
obvious that tasks had to vary with conditions in the fields this 
very variance allowed management considerable leeway in establishing 
tasks. Since its aim was to make profits it was in the interests of 
management to wrest as large a task as possible from the worker. 
There were three principal ways in which SSE's management 
sought to increase the production of surplus value through the task 
system. Firstly, as already demonstrated in Chapter III, SSE used the 
excuse of the international recession in the early 1930s to 
unilaterally increase every agricultural field task on the estates. 
This it did without raising wages. Indeed, these productivity 
increases were introduced in a period when SSE was also cutting 
the money wages of its labourers. Secondly, SSE attempted to use 
the fact that men from certain areas were more adept at certain types 
of field work to impose larger tasks on the men who worked with them. 
It also used the first group of men recruited from an area to set 
the pace for subsequent groups of men. 
It was decided during this crop to endeavour by 
gradually working up their tasks to get the same 
amount from them /men from Alto Mol6cue in Zamb6zia 
as we had been accustomed to expect from Charres or 
local prazos. In point of fact they eventually 
exceeded these and all our expectations at the same 
time. Subsequent guias /-contingents 
% of Angurus 
were not such a striking lot as the first two, 
but 
the latter had already paved the way and we were 
able to insist on standardising the tasks 
for all 
Angurus. (23) 
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The use of target setters to increase the intensity of 
labour is reminiscent of a tactic used by employers who operated 
a piece rate in 19th Century England. (24) However, here the 
similarity between the two systems ends, for, whereas in England 
the worker received a wage which varied according to the number of 
pieces produced, in Zam'bzia the 'piece' was the whole day's labour. 
At SSE partial completion of the task did not result in partial 
payment of the day's wage. Men who failed to produce the whole task 
were marked as absent and lost the wage for the day. (25) At SSE, 
then, the task system allowed capital to increase the production of 
surplus value by appropriating unpaid labour. Yet, denying men who 
had turned up for work their wages was not the only way in which 
SSE appropriated unpaid labour from the work force. The third 
principal way in which SSE used the task system to increase the 
production of surplus value was by extending the working day without 
increasing the wage paid for the task. This it did in two ways. 
The RTI of 1930 stipulated that 'natives' were not to work 
for more than nine hours a day. Any worker who had not completed 
his task after nine hours was to have the day's work marked 
for 
payment. (26) A government inspection of SSE's working conditions 
in 
1956 revealed that the company had been making its workers stay 
in 
the fields until their tasks were finished. The men started work 
at 6 a. m., but some men only returned to the compound ct 
4.45 p. m. 
When the Inspector asked the men why they were 
delayed they replied 
that their tasks were excessive. The Inspector accepted 
the men's 
version of events and in his report criticised 
the firm for making 
the men work for eleven hours without a 
break. 
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It is proven and accepted without question that 
the native who works a task seeks to finish it as 
quickly as possible. Nobody is taken in by the 
fact that the great majority of workers do not 
return to the compound at midday or 1 o'clock as the 
company erroneously asserts but at 4.30,5 o'clock 
or later still! (27) 
The Inspector also pointed out managers to whom he had 
spoken said that the tasks were the some as always. " In his view 
this mecnt that the company had never attempted to find out whether 
the capacity of the men contracted from the different regions was 
the same and compatible with the task imposed. (28) This is an 
important point. The physical capacity of workers affected their 
output, as did their age and ability to adapt to the hot and humid 
conditions of the river delta. SSE's management was aware of these 
factors. 
I hope to induce Angurus now that they have become 
used to the work and are no longer new to take up 
a task of seven men loading three trucks instead 
of eight men as previously, always providing that 
they are sound and physically it and not half 
composed of outs. 9 
emp asis added) 
However, SSE`s management did not take these factors into account 
when it compared the output of men from different areas. 
Thus, 
"Anguru" labour was condemned for producing only 60-80 per cent of 
the output of men from Angonia. (30) Yet, if the 
"Anguru" gang was 
composed of men who were debilitated, very old or very young, 
75 per 
Gent of the task of men from Angonia might have represented an 
increase in production even though the absolute 
task set by the 
company was not fulfilled. 
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The report of the Government Health Inspector is important 
not only because it showed that SSE had for many years been imposing 
tasks which coula not be completed in nine-hours, without a super- 
human effort, but also because it highlighted the systematic 
deception practised by the firm with regard to meal breaks. 
Not only were men working continuously for 11 hours, but, 
including the walk to and from the compound to the fields, they 
were also regularly going for 13 hours without food. 
The RTI of 1930 stated that men contracted to work outside 
the area where they lived were to receive a meal between 11 am and 1 pm 
and an hour's rest. (31) In 1957, another government inspection of 
SSE's plantations revealed that men were sometimes working for 
eight hours without a break and without being given anything to eat. (32) 
Writing to SSE's General Manager about the matter, one of SSE's 
Directors confirmed that this was the case. 
As you rightly point out this matter of continuous 
work in excess of the legal period has been raised 
from time to time and always by people who wanted to 
do harm to the company. We have, I believe, always 
rebutted the arguments put forward successfully, 
but there is no getting away from it that more and 
more companies are being forced to comply with the 
letter of the law. 
If we can comply with the law without prejudicing 
work in the plantations, it is of course to our 
advantage to do so... It occurs to me that as we 
are now experimenting with an issue of bread to 
be eaten in the fields, between you you may be 
able to evolve a token break from work whilst 
the bread is consumed, without prejudice to normal 
fieldwork. (33) 
The implications of SSE`s policy of distributing rations will 
be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. However, it is pertinent 
to point out in this context that by systematically 
denying the labour 
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force the legal lunch break to which they were entitled SSE was able 
to increase the appropriation of unpaid labour (surplus labour) at 
the rate of six hours per worker, per week; and at this rate over 
a period of many years. 
The Use of Child Labour 
It was SSE's policy to encourage workers to bring their sons 
to the estates with them. (34) Child labour formed a significant part 
of the field labour force although it could not be relied on for 
planning purposes since the numbers of children who accompanied their 
fathers fluctuated considerably. (35) For accounting purposes two boys 
were assessed as one man. However, whereas boys were paid two thirds 
of a man's wages in 1942 by 1951 they were earning less than half. (36) 
Furthermore, boys received less food than men. (37) Yet boys produced 
more than half a man's daily output and sometimes did the same task 
as a man. 
In fact we reckon a boy at half the value of a man 
for many classes of work and more than that for 
light weeding or collecting beetles. (38) 
The main source of our supply of minors are the 
Angurus and the Angonis. These form a very 
important part of our labour force and at 
specialised jobs such as light weeding or the 
collection of beetles do every bit as 
large a 
task as their father. (39) 
For producing a task which in some types of 
field work was as large 
as their father's not only did boys receive 
less food than their 
fathers and lower wages but they also received 
fewer items of 
clothing on being engaged. (40) In addition 
SSE saved on recruiting 
costs when it employed minors since children were not 
specifically 
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recruited but encouraged through their fathers to join them on the 
estates. Finally, boys produced proportionally more than their 
fathers in relation to wages. They were, therefore, the cheapest 
sector of the labour force at SSE. 
The Effects of SSE's Strategies 
Cver the years, the tactics described above did result in 
higher productivity among the labourers employed at SSE. Thus, 
whereas the maximum amount of cane cut by the most productive 
sector of the labour force was three tons in 1930, by 1952 it had 
risen to four tons. Similarly, whereas in 1930 eight labourers from 
Zamb6zia ("Angurus") loaded three trucks with cane by 1956 only six 
men were employed on this task. 
Increases in Output: Cutting and Loading 1930-1956(41) 
Cone Cutting 
1930 3 tons per man maximum(a) 
1931 3.5 tons " 11 " (a) 
1950 3.85 tons " " (b) 
1952 4 tons 11 It (c) 
Cane Loading "Anguru" Labour Other Labour 
1930 8 men x3 trucks 6 men x3 trucks (a) 
1931 5 men x3 trucks (a) 
1950 8 men x4 trucks 6 men x4 trucks (b) 
1956 6 men x3 trucks 6 men x3 trucks (d) 
(a) SSE Ar., File 94, Labour for Marromeu, Reply to Labour 
Questionnaire, n. n. ua o 1931, and Labour Questionnaire 
Reply, H. N. Usher, Zrromeu, 2 Nov. 1931. 
in An onic Quelimane, (b) SSE Ar., File 133A, Recruit Local, MT 
to Col. Hornung, ep. No. 155/50 rivate Series, 
Recruiting in Angonia. 
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(c) AHM, NI 194,1952-1957, Relat6rios dos 
e Delegados de Saude, No. 46, Concelho 
Relat6rio de Mäo-de-Obra, Admin. Julio 
Dec. 1952. 
(d) 
(d) SSE Ar., File 184, Native Labour Organ. 
Manager to General ýa an ger, 10 Apr. 19. 
Labour. 
Agentes do Curodor 
do Chinde, 2° Semestre, 
dos Santos Peixe, 17 
isation, Hut Tax, Field 
5, eire and rrumbala 
Although productivity, seen in the task requirements, was 
increased over time, the imposition of larger tasks without a 
corresponding increase in payment sometimes resulted in discontent 
among the labour force (see Chapter X). When, on the other hand, 
increased productivity was accompanied by an additional bonus payment 
workers appear to have been more willing to increase their output. 
Speaking of the labour situation in general in 1931 the Head Overseer 
at Luabo noted that 
Since I have been with the company I have seen the 
percentage of efficiency of labour working increase 
from 56% to 99%, which can mainly be attributed to 
increased gratuities... when prazo boys received 
100 reis gratuities they worked two or three days 
a week, when it was increased to 500 reis they 
worked 6 days a week. (42) 
Hence, another tactic employed by SSE was to mask increases in task 
requirements either by lowering wages or by not raising them in 
proportion to their former amount. 
METHODS EMPLOYED BY SSE TO CONTAIN LABOUR OUSTS - MANIPULATING PAYMENT 
AID CONTRACT LENGTH 
Basic Wages and Bonus Payments 
The wage paid to plantation workers was 
divided into two 
parts. The worker received a cash wage. 
He also received part of his 
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wage in kind. This was represented by the food and shelter which 
the company was obliged to provide to workers resident on the estate. 
Together the two parts of the wage formed the direct wage paid to 
plantation labour. 
The kind element of the wage, that is, food and shelter, 
was only paid to labour directly engaged in production. With the 
exception of men from Angonia whose families could accompany them to 
the estates, this element of the wage did not cover the subsistence 
needs of workers' families; nor did it cover the needs of workers 
during the 'rest' period between contracts. The cash element of the 
wage also failed to cover the subsistence needs of workers between 
contracts and the needs of their families throughout the year. As 
already demonstrated in Chapter II the cash element of the wage was 
established by the government in direct relation to the 'native' tax 
in force. The total wage needed to reproduce the individual labourer 
during the course of his life time and the labour force as a whole 
over generations, was therefore subsidised by the peasantry from which 
plantation labourers were drawn. This meant that capital could 
buy 
labour power below the cost of the total range of goods and services 
needed for its reproduction. It meant, therefore, that plantation 
capital could increase the production of surplus value 
by reducing 
the ratio of necessary to surplus labour time expended 
in the 
production process. 
In addition to developing a system of 
labour supply which 
provided capital with low paid labour, 
the state also ensured, 
through the relationship between the 
tax and the cash element of the 
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wage, that workers would be encouraged to work regularly and produce 
what was demanded of them. Failure to earn sufficient cash to meet 
the tax meant that the worker was liable to punishment by the state. 
This negative incentive to regular attendance and production at the 
work place was supported by another which resulted from the particular 
method established by the state for the payment of the cash wage. 
Contract workers only received their basic (cash) wage at 
the end of the contract. (43) During the contract itself men were 
issued with metal discs which signified that they had completed their 
daily tasks. These discs were handed over to the compound super- 
intendant on Saturdays, who marked off the numbers of days worked on 
the company's pay sheets and on the individual's work card. The 
only cash paid out by SSE during the contract period were the weekly 
attendance and productivity bonuses to which all sections of the 
field labour force were entitled. These were paid to workers who had 
completed either five or six tasks during the week (and who hod, 
therefore, also worked for five or six consecutive days). (44) By 
reducing the kind element of the wage to the bare minimum needed to 
keep workers alive, (see Chapter VI) SSE ensured that its workers 
needed cash; cash which could only be earned through regular 
task 
completion. In addition to the weekly bonuses 
SSE also introduced 
a system of bonuses which were calculated on the number of 
days per 
month or per contract that the men had worked. 
In both cases the 
bonuses were intended to stimulate regular attendance and 
task 
completion. However, the latter had the advantage over 
the former 
of encouraging men to work regularly 
for extended periods rather than 
for weeks at a time. (45) 
4 
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Direct Productivity Bonuses 
Sometimes SSE offered direct productivity bonuses to the 
labour force. For instance, in 1954, the General Field Manager 
suggested that all workers who loaded four instead of three cane 
trucks a day (in groups of six men) should receive a bonus of one 
escudo each. Whereas six men from Zambezia ("Angurus") loaded three 
trucks of cane a day at a cost of 24 escudos a truck, six men from 
Morrumbala and its administrative Post of Derre loaded four trucks 
a day at a cost of 18 escudos per truck. Both groups of workers 
earned the same waged. (46) The General Field Manager calculated that 
the bonus payment would increase the cost of loading a truck to 19 
escudos, 50 centavos in the case of men from Morrumbala and Derre. 
It would reduce the cost of loading, in the case of men from Zambezia, 
by four and a half escudos per truck. Since the men from Morrumbala 
and Derre were expected to load 24,000 trucks against the 96,000 
trucks of the men from Zamb(zia during the harvest, the overall 
saving to the company would amount to 432,000 escudos. To save 
£4,500 or 48,000 labour days (25 per cent of the labour required 
for loading from Zambezia) SSE would only need to invest £450 in bonus 
payments to those who already loaded most. (47) 
Increasing the Length of the Contract 
The principle behind the productivity and attendance 
bonuses 
was also applied to the contract itself. In 
1944, for example, the 
Governor of Zambezia agreed to allow men contracted 
from his province 
to work for eight instead of six months. 
The scheme only lasted for 
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three years because its advantages were gradually eroded by the 
government, the men involved and SSE's competitors. The government 
insisted that the contracted men should receive an eight month 'rest' 
period and a double set of clothing. The absenteeism rates were high 
during the seventh and eight months of the contract, and SSE's 
competitors capitalised on the situation by retaining the six 
months contract. Nevertheless, during the period that the extended 
contract was enforced SSE made an overall saving of 25 per cent on 
labour costs, even though it paid its labourers an extra four escudos 
a month for working eight months. (48) 
Attempts to increase the contract length of men from the 
local rý azos were more successful. Whereas these men were only 
recruited for a month at a time in the 1890s, by 1951, following 
a series of extensions to the contract length at various times, they 
were working for six consecutive months. (49) It can be assumed that 
savings in the order of those described above resulted. 
The extension of the contract period, even when accompanied 
by increased remuneration, served one of the purposes 
fulfilled by 
productivity and attendance bonuses. It led to savings on 
the 
numbers of men employed, and consequently to a reduction of 
labour 
costs. However, the use of bonuses to increase 
the productivity 
of the labour force was only a part of 
SSE's overall wages policies. 
Productivity and attendance bonuses were also 
introduced as a means 
of manipulating basic wages. It is 
to this aspect of SSE's policy 
that I shall now turn. 
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THE MANIPULATION OF BONUSES TO AVOID WAGE RISES 
As was demonstrated in Chapter II the minimum wage levels 
established by the government were directly related to the 'native' 
tax in force. Whenever the tax was increased new minimum wage 
levels were imposed in order to maintain the ratio established 
between the two in the RTI. SSE, therefore, faced pressure on cash 
wages, as a result of periodic increases in basic wages imposed 
by the government. This was a problem which confronted all employers 
in Zambf! 5zia. However, it was compounded in SSE's case as a result of 
the physical location of its plantations. Among employers in central 
Mozambique SSE appears to have been unique in controlling estates 
which were situated in two provinces where minimum wage levels were 
different. Often men recruited from the same area for the same 
type of work were divided between the two estates and could compare 
their wages. Higher wages on the Marromeu estate, which resulted 
from the higher minimum wage in force in Manica and Sofala Province, 
therefore, tended to put pressure on wages in Luabo. Similarly, 
Government moves to increase the minimum wages of workers in Zambezia 
tended to have repercussions on the wages offered to workers from 
that province employed at k. arromeu. Hence in both cases a wage 
rise to labour on one side of the river tended to affect the wages 
paid on the other side. In order to confront these problems and 
to hold back the cost of labour, SSE required, above all, a 
flexible 
wages policy; one that would allow it to avoid wage rises on either 
or both sides of the river, or to offset them against reductions 
in other areas. Using the bonus system and the 
fact that minimum 
wages were different on the two estates, 
SSE was able to 
counteract the threat of wage rises in several ways. 
Firstly, the 
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company gradually eroded wage differentials. Secondly, it introduced 
bonuses instead of an increase in basic wages when new minimum wage 
levels were established. Thirdly, it replaced bonuses with advances 
on wages in order to avoid paying higher wages. Fourthly, it 
attempted to avoid unilateral increases in wages by offering a rise 
only to the lowest paid workers engaged in a particular area of 
production. 
Holding back the Wages of Workers employed in Monica and Sofala 
Following the Agreement reached in 1932 between SSE and the 
Mozambique Company over the employment of labour from Zambezia on 
SSE`s estates in the territory administered by the Mozambique 
Company, SSE was able to transfer labour from Zambi6zia to Marromeu 
(and Caia) at the lower rate in force in Zamb6zia. This SSE appears 
to have continued to do for the next ten years. (50) In 1942, however, 
the Governor General of Mozambique ruled that labour employed from 
Zamb6zia in Manica and Sofala was to receive the basic wage in force 
in that province. Instead of 30 escudos a month men were to receive 
55 escudos a month. (51) 
SSE protested to the Minister of the Colonies. It argued 
that the modus vivendi established in 1932 had been overridden. 
The company had hoped to see an equalisation of wage rates 
in the 
two provinces (meaning a reduction of wages in 
Monica and Sofala) 
when the Mozambique Company's territory passed 
to the direct 
administration of the state. Instead the 
difference between the 
basic wage rates in the two provinces 
had widened. SSE argued that 
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the tax was higher in Manica and Sofala than in Zamb4zia. A wage 
rise to labour from Zamboýzia working in Manica and Sofala would mean 
that whereas these men would be able to earn enough to meet the 
tax after 39 days labour men from Monica and Sofala would take 81 days 
to meet the tax from their wages. 
It does not seem fair... to want to introduce the some 
level of wages for two natives who by chance work in 
the same place and do the same work (one of them doing 
a much smaller task than the other) whose rate of 
taxation is so different, that is, 175 escudos 
compared with 85 escudos. It would be completely 
counterproductive not only for the firm concerned, 
but also, and especially, for the state itself. (52) 
SSE then voiced its real fear, which was that the "massive" wage 
rise to labour from Zambezia working in Monica and Sofala would have 
to be matched by planters in Zamb4zia. It added, for good measure, 
that increasing wages without increasing the 'native' tax would 
encourage idleness and allow the 'native' from Zamboýzia employed in 
Monica and Sofala to avoid wage work. (53) 
A compromise was eventually reached and labour from Zamb9zia 
working in Monica and Sofala received a wage rise of ten escudos 
(334 per cent), which was still 15 escudos less than the increase 
originally envisaged. (54) However, over the years SSE gradually 
eroded this increase by not maintaining the additional payment, 
when basic wages in Zamb6zia were increased. Thus in 
1951 SSE's 
General Manager wrote: 
This relationship of an extra 334 for work at 
Marromeu 
for boys from this side of the river was not maintained 
as time went on, because basic wages went up 
from time 
to time and one clearly did not feel justified in 
maintaining such a difference as a spontaneous gesture 
on our part, nor was it called 
for. (55) 
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Replacing Wage Rises with Bonus Payments 
In 1951 minimum wages were increased throughout Mozambique. 
Men employed on agricultural work in Manica and Sofala were to receive 
a basic wage of 100 escudos a month, while those employed in agricultural 
work in Zambezia were to receive 60 escudos a month. Men from Zambezia 
employed in Monica and Sofala were to receive the Monica and Sofala 
rate, as against the Zamb6zia rate, which they had been receiving. (56) 
SSE's General Manager pointed out to the company's Managing Director 
that if the 331,2 per cent increase were maintained for men from 
Zamb6zia working in Monica and Sofala these men would receive a rise 
of 20 escudos a month. Instead the company hoped to leave the 
basic wage at 60 escudos a month and meet the increase through increased 
bonuses. The General Manager proposed to offer a weekly bonus of 
two escudos 50 centavos for six consecutive days worked and a special 
daily cutting and loading bonus of 60 centavos which, if the men 
worked every day of the contract and completed every task would bring 
their earnings up to 85 escudos 60 centavos per month. This was 
still below the new basic rate of 100 escudos a month that they 
were supposed to earn. (57) SSE's General Manager urged the company's 
directors to adopt this solution. 
I strongly recommend this course as an essential 
compromise mecsure, which, if accepted, will tend 
to 
help us maintain, if not increase, numbers 
from Mopea/ 
Marral for Marromeu and should satisfy the authorities. 
On the other hand it follows automatically that 
the 
proposals will be framed in such a way as 
to propose 
that it should cover a free hand on our part 
to transfer 
other contracted labour for Luabo to 
Marromeu as and 
when required for this or that period, 
by paying them 
the said monthly bonus of 15 escudos extra 
for a full 
26 days worked. (58) 
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In the meantime, the Administrator of Mopeia had suggested 
an alternative scheme. This maintained the weekly bonus but replaced 
the daily bonus, which was payable regardless of the number of days 
worked, with one linked to attendance over the whole contract. The 
Administrator proposed the introduction of the following scale: 
Days worked/tasks completed 
170 - 180 
150 - 170 
120 - 150 
Bonus 
1$ per day 
0$ 70 per day 
0$ 50 per day (59) 
Men who did not work for 120 days or who did not complete 120 tasks 
would not receive the bonus. This proposal not only allowed the 
company to avoid the wage rise but it also related the bonus much 
more directly to attendance, as the General Manager was quick to 
point out to SSE's representative in Lourenco Marques. 
I must confess that the proposal has been well 
thought-out... and because there are always a lot 
of days lost during the course of a contract, it 
would in fact give almost the same as we have 
proposed with, however, one additional advantage, 
that is, it is an incentive for the natives not to 
miss work. (60) 
Advances on Wages 
In 1942, SSE's doctor complained to the Provincial Director 
of Civil Administration that the pay sheets of men from Angonia, who 
were about to be repatriated, contained two columns called 
"local 
bonuses" . 
Some of the men involved had asserted that they had only 
received one of the bonuses. After making enquiries 
the doctor 
found that the sum of local bonuses registered in one column equalled 
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the amount of the weekly attendance/productivity bonus. He wrote, 
"that is, the ignorance of the interested parties is abused; they are 
given a bonus in the work-place which is the same as that given to 
the rest of the workers, but this is then deducted from the total 
amount of the wages which they will receive when they return to 
Angonic. " (61) 
SSE admitted that this was the case when it in turn wrote to 
the Provincial Director but it also managed to suggest that resisting 
a wage rise was in the workers' own interests. SSE's General Manager 
wrote that in 1936 the wage payable to men from Angonia working in 
the territory of the Mozambique Company had been increased to 60 
escudos a month. The previous wage of ten shillings a month 
(50 escudos) remained in force in Zambezia. As a result of this 
discrepancy all workers from Angonia wanted to work at Marromeu, 
or wanted to receive the Marromeu rate in Luabo. (62) This SSE was 
not prepared to consider. It therefore decided to adopt a solution 
which involved standardising wages on both sides of the river. Men 
from Angonia working in Marromeu received 60 escudos a month 
without the weekly bonus, and the money received as 
such was considered as an advance to be discounted 
at the end of the contract, as was done with... 
advances in the district for the hut tax wich 
gave a wage which was almost equal to that at 
Luabo where they continued to receive the weekly 
bonus (freely). (63) 
(emphasis original) 
The General Manager then presented the arithmetic in a form which 
graphically illustrates how the former bonus was turned into an 
advance to avoid a wage rise. 
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Luabo 
50$ 00 x 12 months = 600$ 00 
plus 1$ 00 x 52 weeks = 52$ 00 
652$ 00 
Marromeu 
60$ 00 x 12 months = 720$ 00 
minus 1$ 00 x 52 weeks = 52$ 00 
668$ 00 
He added that this solution had been accepted by the workers with 
the knowledge of the Governor of the district and the Agent of the 
Curator (of Native Affairs) in Angonia. It had been practised and 
maintained since then (1936) "openly and without subterfuge, perfectly 
within the ambit of the ruling norms. "(64) 
It was not only field workers from Angonia to whom SSE applied 
this tactic. Following a national wage rise in 1950 the rate for 
industrial work was increased to 130 escudos a month in Monica and 
Sofala and 90 escudos a month in Zambezia. Men from Zambk<-zia employed 
on industrial work in Marromeu were only to receive 90 rather than 130 
escudos. Nevertheless, the General Manager instructed that "all and 
any gratuities" paid to men employed on industrial work at Marromeu, 
wherever they came from, "shall cease as from the same period onwards. "(65) 
He suggested that the men should receive advances on their wages in 
place of the previous bonuses. This was permissable under the Native 
Labour Regulations which allowed the employer to advance between 
25-50% of the basic wage in the work place. (66) 
What will now be necessary is for someone in authority 
to clearly explain to the boys concerned that by order 
of the Government their wages have been put up, and it 
now embraces all previously paid gratuities, also that 
in order to still give them ready cash for local purchases 
per end of a month, the company will instead be giving 
them local advances in future, but only to those that had 
worked their full 24 days per month. (67) 
SSE's General Manager then discussed the possible extension of the 
scheme to other sections of the labour force and in unequivocal 
terms 
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stated the company's policy. 
I must add that such modified procedure is fully legal 
and I discussed the issue the other day with the Chinde Administrator, and in regard to a similar procedure to be adopted at Luabo; he promptly replied that it had his full approval and that nobody could possibly 
object to it; actually in each case the boys concerned 
will get a larger amount of cash in the long run, but 
it is obviously our bounden duty to counteract any 
wholesale increase in wages at this stage by limiting 
other proviledges, or such as the suspension of 
weekly and other gratuities which have been given by the company on a purely voluntary basis, and in 
your case for the time being affecting factory 
Crop gang s and Gombe /loading, unloading and 
mooring boys. (68) 
In 1953, SSE did take this policy one step further. It 
abolished bonuses for all workers from Zamb(zia whether they worked 
at Marromeu or Luabo. Instead the company replaced the bonus with 
compulsory advances of up to 25% of the basic wage. However, the 
policy was not successful partly because recruiters for other firms 
(which had not followed suit) were able to attract the men SSE was 
hoping to recruit, and partly because the men themselves expressed 
their dissatisfaction by signing on with other employers. (69) 
Narrowing Differentials between Grades of Workers 
The final method employed by SSE to resist wage rises consisted 
of giving an increase in basic payment to the lowest paid workers 
employed in a particular area of production. The wages of other 
workers employed in the same area were not raised. 
An example of 
this occurred in 1949 when men employed on SSE's river steamers 
complained to the company's General Manager that their wages were 
lower than those of other men doing similar work. They added, moreover, 
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that they were not receiving bonuses. In response the General 
Manager ruled that all steamer crews would receive a weekly bonus 
and that the monthly wage of the lowest grade would be increased. 
No other grades were to receive increases. (70) 
In this instance it was in SSE's interests to narrow the 
differentials between the various grades (based on skill) of river 
steamer workers. In effect by narrowing differentials it reduced 
the wages of the most skilled members of the crew. This is very 
different, therefore, from the examples cited above, where men were 
employed at different rates for doing the same work. To the degree 
that SSE could not avoid offering higher basic wages to men from 
Manica and Sofala when the government increased minimum wages, it was 
in the company's interest to allow the wages of men from Zamb6zia 
to fall as far behind those of men from Manica and Sofala as possible. 
It could then attempt to substitute more highly paid labour from 
Manica and Sofala with lower paid labour from Zamb6zia. The following 
table, which plots changes in the minimum monthly wages imposed by 
the government between 1950 and 1960 gives some idea of the savings 
which could be made by SSE through transferring labour from Zamb¬zia 
to Marromeu. 
Changes in the minimum monthly wage levels imposed by the government, 
1950-1960(71) 
Minimum months wa ge 
Year Province ogricu tore industry 
1950 Zambezia 60$ 00 90$ 00 
Manica & Sofala 100$ 00 130$ 00 
1954 Zambezia 80$ 00 110$ 00 
Monica & Sofala - - 
1957 ZambLia 90$ 00 120$ 00 
Manica & Sofala 120$ 00 160$ 00 
1960 Zambezia 110$ 00 150$ 00 
140$ 00 180$ 00 
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The Effects of SSE's Strategies on Wages 
Over the years, the wages of all sections of the labour force 
at SSE were increased by the government, as the table above demonstrates. 
Whereas the minimum wage for agricultural workers in Zamb6zia was 30 
escudos a month in 1930, by 1960 it had risen to 110 escudos a 
month. (72) However, SSE always tried to find ways of resisting 
these increases. By offering bonuses instead of wage rises as such 
the company gave itself a margin of manoueverability which enabled 
it to withdraw the bonuses when a statutatory wage rise was announced. 
Alternatively SSE could replace the bonus with an advance on wages. 
Advances had the advantage, from the company's point of view, of 
appearing as bonuses. In the short-term, at least, they had the 
effect of reducing the overall wages bill. (73) 
The following table illustrates the effects of SSE's policies 
and shows how the application of the strategies described above led 
to a narrowing of the differentials between different groups of 
workers over time. Whereas in 1940 men from the areas 
bordering on 
the estates in Monica and Sofala (Sena)(74) and contract 
labour from 
Zamb6zia ("Angurus") were earning half the wage of a man recruited 
from 
Angonia, by 1950 the gap had narrowed to three fifths. 
Monthly Wages 
A goni Sena A 
1940a 60$ 00 30$ 00 30$ 00 
1942b 50$ 00 30$ 00 30$ 00 
1944° 75$ 00 45$ 00 40$ 00 
1948° 90$ 00 60$ 00 45$ 00 
1950° 100$ 00 60$ 00 60$ 00 
(a) SSE Ar., File 133A, Recruitin An onia Quelimane 
Local, ºAT to Col. 
Hornung, 12 Sep. 1950, No. , Recrui in gonia. 
(b) SSE Ar., File 184, Native Labour Organisation, 
Hut Tax, P. 
85/42/HO, 
iano 
Rodrigues, to Admin. Cc-once o do in e, 30 Mar. IY4Z, 
No. 
Ref. Nota No. 372/15/2 de 14 de Margo de 1942, 
Resposta ä Nota da 
cýto dos Sal6rios aos Indigenas. 
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Yet these figures understate the real situation for two reasons. 
Firstly, the productivity of men from Angonia was always higher than 
that of men contracted from Zambezia Province. For example, referring 
to the wages paid to men from Angonia in 1950, SSE's General Manager 
pointed out that men from Angonia produced more than men from Zamb4'zia 
"at all times". He assessed the output of two men from Angonia as 
equivalent to that of three men from Zamb6zia. (75) Secondly, men from 
Angonia were recruited for a year at a time, whereas local men worked 
for shorter periods; and never for more than six months. The cost 
of recruiting labour from Angonia was, therefore, proportionately 
less than that of recruiting men from Zamb6zia. 
Other Tactics Employed by SSE to Reduce Wages 
Before leaving the subject of wages two further points need 
to be made about SSE`s policy. Firstly, the company attempted to 
increase the amount of unpaid labour appropriated from its workers 
by making men work on days when they were entitled to a rest. Thus, 
on at least two occasions SSE was accused of making men work on 
national holidays without payment, and of not giving men a day's rest 
in lieu of a Sunday worked. (76) Secondly, it was in the company's 
interests to have as many tasks as possible defined as agricultural 
work because agricultural workers received a lower minimum wage than 
men employed on industrial work. (77) On one occasion, at least, it 
was successful in this. In 1949, the authorities in Manica and 
Sofala agreed that men recruited from their province for railway work 
in the fields could be defined as agricultural workers. They continued 
to receive the agricultural rate of 100 escudos a month instead of 
the 
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new industrial rate of 130 escudos a month. The authorities, however, 
did not agree to SSE's petition that men who worked on the banks of 
the river loading, unloading and mooring steamers should also be 
defined as agricultural workers. (78) 
SSE's POLICY WITH REGARD TO 'NON-NATIVE' WORKERS 
Strictly speaking this part of the thesis is concerned with 
the effect of SSE's policies on the African labour force. However, 
it is pertinent to point out in the context of wages that SSE also 
sought to apply its wage-reducing policies to other sectors of the 
labour force, and in so doing acted with the full complicity of the 
authorities. 
Workers from Cape Verde 
In 1948 as a result of severe famine conditions in Cape Verde 
the Portuguese government planned to move over 20,000 people from 
the islands to the other African colonies. Employers in Zambezia were 
urged by the government to accept some of the people affected. 
Dependent as they were on administrative support for recruiting 
labour; support which the authorities threatened to withdraw if 
the employers did not co-operate, the major companies in 
Zamb4zia 
were forced to comply with the government's wishes. (79) 
They were 
reluctant to do so for a number of reasons: the 
heavy cost of 
transport and food; housing difficulties; the physical weakness of 
the Cape Verdians and their lack of experience of field work. 
(80) 
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The main reason for the companies' reluctance, however, was the fact 
that the Cape Verdians were not defined as 'natives'. Hence employers 
feared that they would have to pay higher wages to the Cape Verdians 
than they paid to labour from Zamb6zia. 
The employers' fears were partially allayed when the Colonial 
Office agreed that the Cape Verdians could be covered by the Mozambique 
Native Labour Regulations, and would therefore receive the some wages 
as 'natives' contracted in Zambezia. (81) This illustrates a point 
made earlier in Chapter II, namely, that the category of 'native' 
worker was no mere semantic distinction. The powers given to 
individual colonial governors to define, who within their colony, was 
to be included in the 'native' category had important practical and 
economic implications. In the case cited here it meant that wages 
could be reduced. (82) In the event the men from Cape Verde received 
a slightly higher wage than men from Zamb4zia although this wage 
was agreed "without prejudice to other, higher wages which might be 
given to workers from the Province of Zambezia. "(83) 
"Mistos and Assimilados" 
SSE employed a number of coloured (mixed race) and 'assimilated' 
African workers %-mistos and assimilados 7. Assimilated and coloured 
people were socially and economically distinct from the 
African labour 
force because they were not liable to pay the 'native' tax, nor 
could they be contracted under the Native Labour 
Regulations. They 
were, in fact 'non-natives'. At SSE the coloured and assimilated 
workers formed a stratum of permanent skilled 
labour. They were 
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exclusively employed either as craftsmen in various areas of production 
or as clerks and typists. (84) 
As 'non-natives' the "mistos and assimilados" were entitled 
to the same pay and conditions as their European counterparts. However, 
the law governing their situation was liable to various interpretations; 
interpretations which usually favoured the employer. For example, 
employers were allowed to discount part of the wage paid to this group 
of workers on the grounds that they had difficulty in finding 
employment. In asking for permission to reduce the wages of the 
assimilated and coloured workers SSE's reasons were somewhat 
different from those put forward by the government. 
Excellency, Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd. has in its 
service... coloured and assimilated people, who, 
because of less preparation and their natural 
habits, have a very low level of productivity, 
linked, moreover, to a much lower level of needs 
in terms of food and clothing... (85) 
The company then went on to ask, whether, in view of this situation, 
it could discount 30 per cent of the legal wages to which this group 
of workers was entitled. (86) 
Towards the end of the 1950s the colonial government was 
becoming alarmed about international response to its labour policies. 
There were suggestions that the wages of coloured and assimilated 
workers should be brought into line with those of Europeans employed 
in the same work. 
If you remember the Portuguese have in the past run their 
native affairs on a somewhat different basis to other 
countries and have always managed to withstand outside 
interference on this subject... The position has com- 
pletely changed and from the way Dr. Juvenal 
de 
Carvalho talked there is something near panic existing 
today in Government circles. He no longer spoke of any 
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discount from the basic European salary but talked 
only of equalising the Assimilodo with the European. 
He stressed time and time again that the only way in 
which it would be possible in the future to keep out 
foreign Commissions of Investigation would be for the 
Province to put its own house in order most quickly 
and on a basis which other countries have adopted. (87) 
One strategy discussed within SSE to counteract this change in policy 
was to equalise the wages of some coloured and assimilated workers 
while maintaining the reduction for others. In this way the company 
hoped to deflect criticisms of racial prejudice and yet still maintain 
its policy of reduced wages for most of the assimilated and coloured 
workers. 
Thus, if we could modify the petition made in the 
sense of not deducting from all rof them 
p the 
maximum which the law permits, but different per- 
centages, according to their greater or lesser 
aptitude for the work, and even not making any 
deduction for two or three, I think we would be 
able to avoid accusations of racial prejudice 
and be more likel to get a favourable solution 
/-to the problem . 
Y%(88 
) 
At the same time the government-backed 'union' was trying to 
force the government to decree that every "assimilado" should be a 
member and earn the basic wage for the job. SSE's response to this 
development was to try "to organise our affairs so that only the ones 
who are of use to us go into the syndicate and receive their 
due rise 
in salary and that either with the approval of the government or without 
it we try to get rid of the ones who are no good to us. 
"(89) SSE was 
here relying on the fact that many of the coloured and 
'assimilated' 
workers were probably unable to produce legal proof of 
'non-native' 
status, without which they could not join the union. 
However, the 
company feared that with the new rulings many of 
the people concerned 
would acquire proof, join the union and automatically 
become entitled 
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to the full rate for the job. In reference to this possibility 
SSE's General Manager wrote to one of the company's Directors "I will 
always have this in mind and try to get rid of them as soon as possible, 
but, as you know, this can only be done very gradually, and in a way 
that does not attract attention, to avoid any reaction from the 
Quelimane Governor and other authorities. "(90) SSE's position was 
clear. If it could not continue to employ lower-paid coloured and 
assimilated workers in place of higher-paid Europeans it wanted to 
dismiss as many of the 'Assirnilados' as possible, and rely exclusively 
on skilled European labour. 
There are striking parallels between SSE's policy towards 
the "mistos and assimilados" and its policy towards African labour 
from Zambýzia employed at Marromeu. In both cases the company sought 
to replace more highly paid labour with lower-paid workers. These 
policies, and the company's policy towards workers from Cape Verde, 
were, in turn, only possible because of the support capital in Zambezia 
received from the state. It was the state, through the coercive 
labour regime, which first established the conditions in which companies 
like SSE were able to manipulate the wages and working conditions of 
the labour force. It was the state which established the racial 
categories which could be used by employers to divide the labour 
force and reduce wages. It was the state, which having established 
the conditions in which exploitation could occur, then encouraged 
capital to manipulate the law to increase the exploitation of the 
labour force. 
The role of the state in the labour conscription process 
in 
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Zamb6'zia also helps to explain the persistence of migrant labour as 
the dominant form of labour use at SSE despite a growing shortage of 
labour in central Mozambique from the mid-1930s onwards. Seen as a 
whole, the institutionalisation of migrant labour by the state 
served three interrelated purposes. Firstly, the state established 
the conditions in which plantation capital could operate a low wage 
policy. Secondly, a part-proletariat was a particularly appropriate 
form of labour use for plantation capital. The numbers of workers 
employed could be adjusted to the seasonal demands of the crop. This 
allowed management to deploy labour economically over the agricultural 
year and hence to avoid unnecessary expenditure on labour. Furthermore, 
reliant on a labour process which involved a minimum of training and 
a low level of specialisation, plantations could rationally allocate 
labour in the fields on the basis of the daily work in hand. Thirdly, 
state control of labour supply gave rise to a particular organisation 
of work and payment on plantations which allowed capital to reduce 
the overall cost of labour still further. The migrant system meant 
that individual men were expendable. As one worker was exhausted 
so another would come forward to take his place. Since migrant 
workers were also powerless, and were forced to accept the conditions 
of their employment under threat of punishment, this meant that capital 
could seek to increase the appropriation of surplus value 
(unpaid 
labour) by extending the working day and increasing the intensity 
of labour within it. At SSE, this occurred through manipulation 
of the task system. The company set tasks which could not 
be 
accomplished within the limits of the legally established normal 
working day. The company further pursued this policy 
by denying 
labourers the legal lunch break to which they were entitled. Finally, 
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in relation to the task system, SSE sought to gradually increase the 
productivity of the labour force by increasing the daily task without 
increasing wages. In all three cases, its ability to do so rested on 
the complicity of the authorities. 
The manipulation of tasks was not the only means through which 
SSE tried to reduce overall labour costs. SSE also sought to mask 
increases in productivity by a policy of reducing cash wages. This it 
did by manipulating basic wages through bonuses payments and by 
offering advances on wages. Again, the success of its policies depended 
on the support it received from the authorities. The ability to 
manipulate cash wages was especially important for SSE which operated 
plantations in two provinces where minimum wages rates were different. 
Not only, therefore, was migrant labour cheap labour for plantation 
producers, but, because of the special and particular conditions in 
which the supply of labour was organised and maintained to plantations, 
plantation capital in Zamb6zia was given wide powers to ensure that 
it remained cheap labour. Yet, notwithstanding the collusion of 
the authorities over the wages paid to workers on plantations and 
the conditions in which they laboured, at times, SSE ignored even 
the minimal restrictions placed on it by the state in its attempts 
to reduce the cost of labour. In this context it is pertinent to 
cite the conclusions of the 1956 Government Inspection of SSE's 
plantations, referred to above. Having reviewed the living and 
working conditions of the African labour force employed at SSE the 
Inspector wrote: 
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With cold objectivity, although animated by the 
best of intentions towards the firm, there is no 
doubt that the impression received from this visit 
was, frankly, bad and painful. 
We are left with only one firm conclusion and that 
is that the native worker is seen as no more than 
a simple, cold and inanimate part of a huge machine. 
A part which is lubricated, a machine which is 
supplied, but with the only aim that it produces 
the return which is expected of it, and which is 
substituted with ruthless indifference when it 
is worn out or useless. (91) 
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NOTES 
(1) P. P. Courtenay, Plantation Agriculture (G. Bell and Sons Ltd., London, 1969), p'assim. 
(2) J. A. Mollett, "The Sugar Plantation in Hawaii: A Study of Changing Patterns of Management and Labour Organisation" (Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station, College of Tropical Agriculture, University of Hawaii in Cooperation with the Agricultural Experiment Stations of the Western States, 
Agricultural Economics Bulletin, July 1965), passim; Phillips Foster and Peter Creyke, "The Structure o Plantation Agriculture in Jamaica" (Agricultural Experiment Station, 
University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, Miscellaneous 
Publication 623, May 1968), passim; John Davidson Shillingford, 
"Financial, Potential and We Implications of Sugar Cane 
Harvest Mechanisation on Jamaican Plantations" (unpublished 
Ph: D. thesis, Cornell University, 1974), p. 127 and passim ; ILO, Committee on Work on Plantations, Third Session, Geneva 
1955, Possible Measures within the Countries and Industries 
Concerned for Stabilising Employment and Earnings of Plantation 
Workers (ILO, Geneva, 1955), p. 45: "Attempts to mechanise 
harvesting processes in certain crops have failed because of 
technical difficulties or adverse effects on the quality of 
the product. It may, therefore, be assumed, that for some 
time to come a large number of processes on many plantations 
will continue to be carried out by hand. Thus the efficiency 
of a plantation may depend to a substantial extent upon the 
efficiency of the labour employed. " The conclusion will examine 
the factors affecting the mechanisation of field operations 
at SSE. 
(3) Noel Deer, Cane Sugar: A Textbook on the Agriculture of the 
Sugar Cane, te Manu acture of ne Sugar, and the Ana sis of 
ugar ouse Products, (Norman Rodger, London, IM), p. . 
(4) The harvest date is critical since the cane produces an optimum 
amount of sucrose which thereafter rapidly declines. The 
amount of sucrose also depends on the age of the cane, (Deer 
op. cit., p. 136). In Zamb6zia the yield of sugar also depends 
on when the cane was planted. In 1976 cane planted in July, 
which was first cut 14 months later gave a yield of 90 tonnes 
per hectare, while cane planted in December-January which was 
first cut 18 to 20 months later gave a yield of 160 tonnes 
per hectare, (interview with L. Duarte, General Field Manager, 
SSE, 4 Mar. 1977). 
(5) Because of the various planting programmes and ages of the 
ratoons the different sections of cane will require attention 
at different times of the year. In some parts of the world 
two harvests of cane are possible, and in Peru, because of 
climatic factors, the harvest can be extended indefinitely, 
(Courtenay, op. cit., pp. 87-90). For the implications of 
labour use in the Peruvian sugar industry where "unlike almost 
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(5) (continued) 
all other sugar industries... there is virtually no 
seasonality of production" see Chris Scott, "Labour Process, 
Class Conflict and Politics".. Development and Chan e X, No. 1 (Jan. 1979), pp. 57-89. In am zia on y one 
harvest occurs in the dry season between approximately May 
and November. In this respect sugar production in Zamb6zia 
can be compared with sugar production in Jamaica (see 
Shillingford, op. cit. ). 
(6) For an overview of plantation production see Courtenay and 
Deer above. See also George L. Beckford, Persistant Povert : 
Underdevelopment in Plantntion Economies of the it or 
(Oxford niversity Press, New York, 1972), and for a detailed 
but concise account of the main features of sugar production 
in every country of the cane-producing world see Dudley Smith, 
Cane Sugar World (Palmer Publications, New York, 1978). 
(7) The harvest period at SSE sometimes started in April and/or 
ended in December, (SSE Ar., File 184, Native Labour 4r anisation, 
Hut Tax, HNU (Usher) General Field Manager to General Manager 
12 May 1954, Your letter no. 11/54 Mgt Refers, Labour Supplies; 
Interview with L. Duarte, General Field Manager, SSE, Luabo, 
4 Mar. 1977. 
(8) SSE Ar., File 184, HNU General Field Manager to General 
Manager 12 May 1954; op. cit,, see p. 159. 
(9) SSE Ar., File 94, Labour for Marromeu, Article from The Beira 
News, 22 June 1932; Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., 0 Que Que 
es d Vale Economica e Socia mente, xposigao das ctivi a 
con micas de cam ique Commemorativa da Visita de Sua 
Excelencia o Presidente da Republica, General Fransisco Higino 
Graveiro Lopes, Agosto 1956 (LM 1956). 
(10) SSE Ar., File 204, Native Diet and Rations, MT SSE Mopea, 
Observagoes feitas a pe io do xmo. nr. jor Serpa, 
Director dos Neg6cios Indigenas no Territ6rio da Companhia 
de Mocambique sobre a Viablidade de Substituir a Ragoo Indigena 
por Assifcar em Vez de Identica Quantidade de Ceriais, 27 
June 
1933, (13,000 workers a day); SSE Ar., File 204, SSE Ltd. to 
Governador Geral da Prov. de Mog., Luabo, 15 Dec. 1956 (average 
20,000 men); SSE Ar., File 10, (Obsolete), Native Settlement, 
Wheat Ex eriment, SSE Ltd., Relagao da Mho e ro ecruta a 
durante o no e 1961, monthly average, Luabo, 10,100 men and 
boys (including 1810 specialist workers), Marromeu 9,883 
(including 1810 specialist workers). Overall labour needs 
were much higher. In 1928 SSE employed 25,472 men, 
in 1929, 
24,112 men and in 1930,19,839 men, (SSE Ar., File 
94, The 
Beira News, 22 June 1932, op. cit. ). SSE's Labour Office gives 
teo owing figures for the numbers employed 
during the first 
four years of the 1960s: 1960 37,418 1961 34,227 
1962 34,228 
1963 25,788 
1965 27,450 (SSE Ar., Sena Sugar 
Estates Ltd., RelatOrio Anual, Servicos de Wo-de-Obro, 
1964 
nnd 1966). 
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(11) SSE Ar., File 94, SSE Ltd., Mao-de-Obra Indigena 1942, Trobalhodores 
que Prestam Service nos Anos de 1940,1941 e 1942 nos Propriedodes. 
(12) ibid., SSE Ltd., Origem dos Trabalhadores E mpregados nos Propriedades em 1940,1941 e 1942. 
(13) SSE Ar., File 184, P. Viana Rodrigues to Admin. Concelho do Chinde, 30 Mar. 1942, No. 85/42/HO, Ref. Nota No. 372/15/2 
de 14 do Margo de 1942, Resposta ö Nota da RepartiSäo Central 
dos Negocios Indigenas sobre o Pagamento dos Solarios aos Indigenas. cf. Shillingford op. cit., p. 42, cutters and loaders in Jamaica were mobilised in gangs of 40-100 workers. 
(14) SSE Ar., File 184, Resposto ä Nota da RCNI... 30 Mar. 1942, 
op. cit. 
(15) In 1952 20,900 agricultural workers were employed on the 
Luabo Estate. Besides these there were 121 ploughmen, 157 
locomotive operators and 116 tractor drivers, (AHM, NI 194, 
1952-1957, Relat6rios dos Agentes do Curador e Delegados de 
Saude, No. 46, Concelho do Chinde, 1952,2° Semestre, 
Relatörio de P? o-de-Obra, Adm. Julio dos Santos Peixe, 17 Dec. 
1952). 
(16) SSE Ar., File 94, Reply to Labour Questionnaire, n. n. rLuabo 7, 
1931 and Labour Questionnaire Reply, H. N. Usher, Marromeu, 2 17ov. 
1931; Interview with L. Duarte, General Field Manager, SSE, 
4 Mar. 1977. According to Beckford the low level of skill 
required is a general characteristic of plantation production. 
"It bears emphasis that the special factor combination 
that distinguishes plantation production from other kinds of 
farming is the bringing together of as many unskilled labourers 
as is economically profitable with each of a few highly skilled 
supervisor-managers who direct production. As Jones succinctly 
puts it 'the plantation substitutes supervision-supervisory and 
administrative skills - for skilled labour, combining the 
supervision with labour whose principal skill is to follow 
orders'. " (Beckford, op. cit., p. 6, quoting W. O. Jones 
"Plantations" in International Enc clo edia of the Social 
Sciences, XII (19, p. t SSE it should be pointed 
out that 'gangers' i. e. foremen, and field supervisors were 
themselves not trained in the agriculture of cane production. 
Their function was only to supervise labour working in the 
fields. Only in the 1960s did SSE start to introduce training 
programmes for foremen. 
(17) SSE Ar., File 94, Labour Questionnaire Reply, 2 Nov. 1931, 
op. cit. 
(18) SSE Ar., File 184, HNU General Field Manager to General 
Manager, 12 May 1954, op. cit. The totals given here are the 
book numbers of unskilled labour required. Actual daily needs 
were considerably less. An explanation for the disparity 
between the book numbers required (or numbers of men who had 
to be employed to put the appropriate number of men in the 
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(18) (continued) 
fields) and the actual numbers needed is given in the text below. In addition, book numbers had to accommodate other demands on unskilled labour and had to allow for high levels 
of absenteeism, (although 'absenteeism' at SSE did not 
necessarily mean that men did not turn out for work. What is described as absenteeism often covered men who had failed to 
complete the daily task, see p. 164). 
(19) SSE Ar., File 133, Recruitin Quelimane and An onia (1930-1939), MT Acting General Manager to state Hager uG o, 20 May , Prazo Labour Recruited by Mr Pinto Basto, from 1931 razo' labour was recruited for three months at a time. The 
volunteer workers employed by SSE could also be used to cover 
exceptional needs, especially volunteer workers engaged 
locally, whose contracts were made for a month at a time with 
the option of renewal (SSE Ar., File 184, Resposta ä Nota da 
RCNI... 30 Mar. 1942, op. cit. ). 
(20) Without access to SSE's detailed budgeting and accounts it is 
impossible to support this point empirically. In 1956 besides 
the costs of purchasing seed, fertilizer and pesticide , the fixed costs of field production included the costs of purchasing 
and maintaining 30 locomotives, 1700 cone trucks, 70 tractors, 
30 ploughs and disc harrows, 24 stecm engines,. 2 diggers, 
2 groups of pumps and 350 kilometres of railway track. Against 
the cost of this capital equipment, which could be spread 
over a number of years, SSE had to supprrt an annual bill of 
60.800.330$ 00 on labour. This figure excludes the cost of 
maintaining health services for the work force. It also 
excludes the costs of employing supervisory staff (Sena Sugar 
Estates Ltd., 0 Que e0 Que Vale Economica e Socialmente... 
op. cit. ). According to Courtenay, op. cit., pp. 49-50 "it 
is not unusual for labour costs to represent 60 per cent of 
a plantation's total operating costs... " 
(21) SSE Ar., File 94, Reply to Labour Questionnaire, 1931, op. cit. 
(22) SSE Ar., File 94, Labour Questionnaire Reply, 2 Nov. 1931, 
op. cit. 
(23) ibid. 
(24) "In the Engineering Trade of London, a customary trick is the 
selecting of a man who possesses superior physical strength 
and quickness, as the principal of several workmen, and paying 
him an additional rate, by the quarter or otherwise, with the 
understanding that he is to exert himself to the utmost to 
induce the others, who are only paid ordinary wages, to keep 
up with him. " Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I (Lawrence and 
Wishardt, London, 1967) p. 554, note 3. 
(25) The task system is not unique to plantation production in 
Mozambique. In its Report on Living and Working Conditions and 
Productivity on Plantations the ILO notes that "there is a 
large variety of systems of wage payment; but two of them seem 
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(25) (continued) 
to predominate; viz. payment by time and payment by results. The latter system is more common, specially for field work... Payment by results is to be found in two principal forms: 
piece work and task work. It seems that, in general, task 
work is more widely applied than piece work. " The report 
concludes, "under the system of payment by results the 
intensity of labour effort, particularly during the peak 
season, is at its maximum. Thus, any rise in labour 
productivity, is, on the one hand, the result of the 
intensification of labour effort, and on the other, achieved 
at the expense of the non-observance of standards for hours 
and some other conditions of work. " (ILO, Committee on 
Work on Plantations, Third Session, Geneva, 1955, Living and 
Working Conditions and Productivity on Plantations (ILO, 
Geneva, 1955) pp. 96-97. ) cf. Marx, op. cit., p. 554, "Given 
the piece wage, it is naturally the personal interest of the 
labourer to strain his labour-power as intensely as possible; 
this enables the capitalist to raise more easily the normal 
degree of intensity of labour. It is, moreover, now the 
personal interest of the labourer to lengthen the working day, 
since with it his daily or weekly wages rise. " As was stated 
above, the 'piece' at SSE was the whole day's labour. Here, 
then, the incentive for men to work hard was even greater than 
under the piece work system described by Marx, for there was 
no partial payment for partial task completion. 
(26) RTI, Art. 102, p. 31 and Art. 104, p. 32. 
(27) SSE Ar., File 118, Native Compound, Secretaria Distrital de 
Saude, Zambezia, C6pia an ormapo no. 26 destes Servicos 
e do Despacho de 25 do corrente, do Exmo. Snr. Governador do 
Distrito, vela Exarado, Assunto: Sobre as Condicoes de 
Trabalho dos Servigais Indigenas. Da Inspecgao a Sena Sugar 
Estates Ltd. no Luabo, Manuel Saraiva Junqueiro, Herdeiros, e 
Ch6 Mocambique Lda. no Guru6,4 Sep. 1956. (Translation J. H. ). 
(28) ibid. (Translation J. H. ). 
(29) SSE Ar., File 94, Reply to Labour Questionnaire, 1931, op. cit. 
(30) SSE Ar., File 133A, Recruiting, An onia Quelimane, Local, 
HNU General Field Manager to General Manager, Oct . 1750, 
Task Efficiency, Native Labour. 
(31) RTI, Art. 212, p. 63. 
(32) SSE Ar., File 204, DA to NHDB, 2 Dec. 1957, No. 206/57 Private 
Series, Dr. Miranda Guedes' Visit. 
(33) SSE Ar., File 204, NHDB to DA, 9 Dec. 1957, No. 259/57, Native 
Diet, Fruit and Vegetables, re. 205/57 and 206/57. 
(34) "Every encouragement is also being given to bring increasing 
numbers of minors ... the return 
for w. e. 5.4.47. shows 753 
more minors than last year. " (SSE Ar., 
File 133A, MT to Col. 
Hornung, 9 May 1947, No. 67/147 Private Series. ) 
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(35) SSE Ar., File 93, Labour 
Gen. Field Manager to n 
Labour in General. (For 
between 1940 and 1942 see 
and Recruiting, Government Side 
eras Manag 
numbers of 
p. 156). 
r Luabo, ZY June 1953, 
boys employed at SSE 
(36) SSE Ar., File 184, HNU General Field Manager to General 
Manager, 15 July 1954, Future Labour Requirements, Your 
Letter No. 81/54 Mgt. Refers; SSE Ar., File 184, Resposta a 
Nota da RCNI... 30 Mar. 1942, op. cit., SSE Ltd. Discos de 
Marcayao de um Dia de Trabalho Distribuidos Di6riamente aos 
Trabalhadores E. Whereas the basic monthly wage for a man who 
voluntarily sought employment was 30 escudos a month, that of 
a boy was 20 escudos a month. Men however, could increase 
their earnings by working for bonus payments which were not 
paid to boys at the same rate; SSE Ar., File 94A, Labour for 
Marromeu, Sena Sugar Estates, Limited, Luabo, Sol6rios e 
Gratýcagoes aos Trabalhadores Indigenas, Luabo, 11 de 
Outubro de 1951, volunteer men who stayed for more than six 
months earned a basic monthly wage of 65 escudos, boys earned 
a basic wage of 30 escudos a month... The figures cited above 
relate to boys over 14 years of age. However, SSE also 
employed boys under 14, who earned less than those over 14 
(SSE Ar., File 94A, Gerente da Feitoria, Marromeu, to Horacio 
de Souza, Caia, 17 May 1943, No. 69/43, Recrutamento de 
indigenas nos Circunscricöes de Sena, Chemba e Mutarara). 
Whereas boys over 14 earned 30 escudos a month, boys under 
14 earned 25 escudos a month in 1943. 
(37) SSE Ar., File 204, Nova Tabela de Ragoes de Acordo com o 
Circular Dando o Despacho de 25 de Junho de Sua Exa. 0 Snr. 
Governador Geral, 11 Aug. 1952. 
(38) SSE Ar., File 93, General Field Manager to General Manager, 
29 June 1953, Labour in General. 
(39) SSE Ar., File 133A, MT to Col. Hornung. 12 Sep. 1950, No. 
155/50, Private Series, Recruiting in Angonio. 
(40) For example in 1944 whereas adults from Mopeia received one 
singlet, one pair of shorts and a blanket, minors only 
received a singlet and a blanket (SSE Ar., File 133A, 
General Manager to Acting Manager SSE Ltd Mopeia, 7 Dec. 1944, 
No. 94/44 Mgt). 
(41) cf. Courtenay op. cit., p. 87. In 1962 Courtenay states 
that 
the average amount of cane cut by one man in Cuba 
(average 
for 160 Centrales) was 24 -3 tons; Shillingford, op. cit., 
p. 67ff., states that the amount of cane cut per man on nine 
Jamaican estates ranged between 1.72 tons and 4.06 tons. 
He notes, on the other hand, that West Indian cutters 
in 
Florida averaged 8.59 tons per day in the some year 
(1971). 
He attributes the greater productivity in Florida 
to better 
wages, morale, management and the better selection of workers. 
(42) SSE Ar., File 94, Reply to Labour Questionnaire, 1931, op. cit. 
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(43) Half of the cash wage was paid in the work-place, the other half was paid in the administrative district where the worker 
was contracted. The only exceptions to this general rule were i) men contracted on a verbal contract (normally for domestic 
work) and ii) men contracted with the intervention of the 
authorities for work in their own district for a period not 
exceeding three months (RTI, Arts. 182-184, pp. 53-54). 
(44) SSE Ar., File 184, Resposta ä Nota da RCNI... 30 Mar. 1942, 
op. cit. 
(45) ibid. In 1942 volunteer labourers (men) received a bonus of 
10 escudos for each month of 26 days worked when they stayed 
at the estates for six consecutive months and 20 escudcs for 
each month of 26 days worked when they stayed at the estates 
for 12 consecutive months. See also SSE Ar., File 94A, SSE 
Ltd., Luabo, Salarios e Gratificagoes aos Trabalhadores 
Indigenas,... 11 Sept. 1951, op. cit. In 1951 "Prazo" labour 
from Luabo received a bonus of 27 escudos for more than 44 
months spent on the estates; contracted men from Zambezia 
received a bonus of 12 escudos a month for a minimum of 160 
days worked and boys received a bonus of five escudos a month 
for remaining at the estates for more than six months. 
(46) This led to discontent among the men from Morrumbala and 
Derre. SSE's General Field Manager remarked they know that 
they have always done so and also that Mopeias and Marrces 
do the same task, but there again, Mopeas and Marraes at 
Marromeu earn 100 escudos instead of 80 escudos. " (SSE Ar., 
File i84,, Usher, General Field Manager to General Manager, 
29 May 1955, Re: Matabichos to Native Labour. ) This quotation 
illustrates another aspect of SSE's wages policy which will 
be examined in detail below, namely, that SSE sought to reduce 
wages by paying labour at Luabo less than labour at Marromeu 
for doing the same work. 
(47) ibid. 
(48) SSE Ar., File 133A, MT to Col. Hornung, Sep. 1947, No. 67/47, 
Private Series, Recruiting. 
(49) Companhia do Assucar de Mocambique, Relatorios e Contas das 
Gerencias de 1895 e 1896 (Imprensa I erna, is , 
p. , men wore 
for 24 days at a time; SSE Ar., File 133, 
MT to Estate Manager, Luabo, 21 May 1931, op. cit., "prazo" 
labour was recruited for two months at a time with a 
two 
month interval; SSE Ar., File 184, Resposta 
b Noto do RCNI... 
30 Mar. 1942, op. cit., " razo,., " labour received an extra 
bonus 
if it stayed on the estates for four and a 
half months; 
SSE Ar., File 133A, Notes and Considerations Re. Future Native 
Labour Requirements covering Luabo and Marromeu and 
Mainly in 
Reference to Angurus Contract Labour, MT General Manager Luabo, 
12 Oct. 1944, men from Luabo were now recruited 
for six months 
instead of four and a half months; SSE 
Ar., File 94A, Sena 
Sugar Estates Ltd,, Luabo, Salarios e Gratificagoes aos 
trabalhadores indigenas, 11 Oct. 1951, op. cit., men 
from all the 
rp azos were now recruited for six months at a 
time. 
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(50) The 1932 Agreement was in fact illegal since Decreto 16: 475 (6 Feb. 1929) designated Zambezia Province as a labour reserve 
with a ban on the recruitment of men from there to work in 
neighbouring provinces. (See Chapter II). Sympathetic, 
local governors overcame the ruling by treating men contracted in Zambezic as volunteer labour if they passed from Luabo to 
Marromeu. For example writing to a recruiter in 1938, SSE's 
General Manager told him not to worry if passes were refused for men from Zambezia whom the company wanted to send to 
Marromeu. Given SSE's agreements with the local authorities 
in Zambezia, men could always pass over to Marromeu from 
Luabo without passes (SSE Ar., File 133, MT to Sarmento 
Pimental, 7 Feb. 1938). This situation persisted until 
1942. "Six month Anguru contract labour has always been 
engaged as if they were all coming to Luabo, and 'Marromeu' 
never appeared on the contracts or paysheets - it was a 
subterfuge of which all and sundry were well-aware, since it 
suited everyone that as much labour from the Quelimane 
District should be employed" (SSE Ar., File 94, MT to Col. 
CBR Hornung, 2 May 1942, No. 45/42 Private, Native Labour, 
Increased Wages). The matter seems to have come to a head 
in 1942 because SSE's competitors were struggling against an 
increasing labour shortage and resented the company's ability 
to substitute more highly paid labour from Manica and Sofala 
, with 
lower-paid labour from Zambezia. SSE's General Manager 
writing to Col. Hornung in the same year, noted that a former 
governor of Zambezia had "arranged that we should be allowed 
to send labour from this side of the river to Marromeu as 
and when we pleased, but without specifically contracting 
them for Marromeu, it being considered that the natives, 
provided each with an individual pass, were virtually going to 
Marromeu as volunteers, which was the only and effective means 
of stemming the ever present opposition towards our employing 
Quelimane labour at Marromeu with evidently advantageous 
results from the economic point of view but also ever- 
increasing jealousy on the part of those who could not, 
only to mention the Buzi company. In this manner, contract 
Angurus, Mopeas and Marraes have regularly been working at 
Marromeu, and the next Quelimane Governor, who since has been 
transferred to Benguela, similarly endorsed the ruling given 
by Capt. Ferreira de Carvalho. " (SSE Ar., File 94, MT to Col. 
CBR Hornung, 28 May 1942, No. 56/42 Private, Marromeu Native 
Labour - Increased Wages). 
(51) SSE Ar., File 94A, MT Gerente Geral SSE Luabo to Ministro das 
Col6nias, 11 July 1942. 
(52) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) 
(53) ibid. 
(54) SSE Ar., File 94A, MT to Col. CBR Hornung, 3 Dec. 1951, No. 
230/51, Private Series, Labour from Mopea/Marral working 
at Marromeu. 
(55) ibid. 
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(56) ibid. 
(57) ibid. 
(58) ibid. 
(59) SSE Ar., File 94A, MT to Dr. J. dos Santos Callado, SSE 
Lourengo Marques, 11 Feb. 1952, No. 12/52, Reservada, Salarios 
Indigenas a Pagar em Marromeu a trabalhadores Oriundos do 
Distrito de Quelimane. 
(60) ibid. (Translation J. H. ). 
(61) SSE Ar., File 94,0 Director Provincial, Direccao Provincial 
de Admin. Civil, Prov. da Zambezia, to Gerente Geral, SSE, 
Luabo, 14 May 1942, No. 1862/6/15/2/5 (quoting a letter from Dr. Saboya Ramos). (Translation J. H. ). 
(62) SSE Ar., File 94, MT Gerente Geral SSE, to Director Provincial 
dos Servigos de Admin. Civil, Quelimane, 20 May 1942, No. 
123/4/HO, Ref. Nota No. 1862/13/15/2/5 de 14 de Maio "the 
natives do not understand that for the same work for the same boss and for the same contract period, wages on the Marromeu 
property, on the right bank of the river Zambesi were 60$ 00 
a month, when on the Luabo property on the left bank of the 
some Zambesi they continued to stay at 50$ 00 a month. They 
demanded to be transferred to Marromeu or the payment of a 
wage of 60$ 00 in Luabo. " (Translation J. H. ). 
(63) ibid. (Translation J. H. ). 
(64) ibid. (Translation J. H. ). 
(65) SSE Ar., File 94A, MT to Estate Manager Marromeu/Cain, 15 May 
1950 No. 28*/50 MGT, Increases in Bcsic Minimum Wage to Native 
Labourers. 
(66) ibid. 
(67) ibid. 
(68) ibid. See also SSE Ar., File 94, MT General Manager to Acting 
General Manager M'meu/Caia Estate, 25 Sep. 1943, No. 108/43 
Mgt, Native Wages Monica and Sofala. In 1943 the industrial 
wage rose from 75$ 00 to 82$ 50 a month. SSE, therefore, 
abolished the weekly bonuses and introduced advances on wages 
instead. At the same time the Administrator of Marromeu 
agreed that workers %-presumably agricultural 
7 working in the 
district where they were recruited could receive 60$ 00 a 
month instead of 66$ 00 a month. 
(69) SSE Ar., File 184, Memo Dealing with the Question of Regular 
Conditioned Advances to Native Labourers on the Estates, in 
Lieu of Gratuities, the Abolition of that System and the 
Proposed Reintroduction of Weekly Gratuities with a System 
of Special Gratuities for Work in Excess of 
Normal Tasks, 
MT, Luabo, 30 Apr. 1955. 
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(70) SSE Ar., File 184, MT General Manager to Manager SSE Ltd., 
Chinde, 9 Aug. 1949, No. 69/49 Mgt, Re: Native Crews, River 
Steamers; SSE Ar., File 184, MT General Manager to Manager, 
Transport Dept. Chinde, 16 Aug. 1949, No. 100/49 Mgt, 
Present Scale of Wages to River Steamer Crews, Weekly 
Gratuities to Same. 
(71) SSE Ar., File 204, Memo from General Manager to Mr Teles, 
22 Mar. 1961, Saldrios Indigenas Minimos em Vigor em 1952 e 
sews Sucessivos Aumentos ate a Presente Data (22 Mar. 1961). 
NB. the difference between the minimum wages in Monica and "fala and Zambezia was narrowed over the years. 
(72) For wages in Zamb4zia in 1930 see SSE Ar., File 94, G. Hornung 
Director SSE Mopea, to Governador da Companhia de Mocambique, 
Beira, 9 July 1932. 
(73) In the case of workers from Angonia, cited above, this tactic 
was successfully applied for six years between 1936 and 1942. 
(See pp. 178-180 above). 
(74) Since men from Sena were resident in the Province of Monica 
and Sofala they should have been earning the higher minimum 
wage in force in that province. That they were apparently 
not doing so is probably explained by the fact that until 
1930 SSE also sub-leased some razos on the south bank of 
the river. Hence men from Sena mig t have been classified 
as rp azo" labour. 
(75) SSE Ar., File 133A, M1' to Col. Hornung, 12 Sep. 1950, op. cit. 
(76) SSE Ar., File 138, The Case of Dr. Sabo o Ramos, Saboya Ramos 
to Max Thurnheer, 2y articular; Ar., File 94, 
Age"ncia da Curadoria dos Ind genas da Circ. Civil de M'meu, 
to Gerente Geral da Feitoria, SSE, M'meu, 17 Sep. 1942, Serie 
de 1942, No. 35/813. 
(77) See p. 182 above. The distinction between agricultural work 
and industrial work appears to have been arbitrary, Reparticeo 
Central dos Neg6cios Indigenas, Notas - Circulares Nos. 
1.701/B/15/12 e 1.758/B/15 de 26 e 31 de Maio de 1950, 
"... the work of natives employed on the felling of trees 
for 
transformation into wood for sale and other uses must 
be considered as 'industrial' for the purposes of wages. 
In the case of tree-felling the only object of which is 
to 
clear the land for agricultural purposes... the work will 
be considered 'agricultural'; " Reparticäo Central 
dos 
Neg6cios Indigenas Circular No. 926/6/15/2 de 27 de Margo 
de 1950, in the District of Lourengo Marques and Province 
of the Sul de Save, work on the railways and roads was 
defined as agricultural work. 
(78) SSE Ar., File 94A, MT to Estate Manager M'meu/Caia, 15 May 
1950, No. 28/50 MGT, op. cit. 
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(79) SSE Ar., File 232, Labour from Cape Verde and Namarroi, Dr. Armindo Monteiro to-7o-D- oo Hornung, r. , No. 14/48. 
(80) ibid. 
(81) SSE Ar., File 232, MT to Col. Hornung, 3 Aug. 1948, No. 110/48, 
Private Series, Cape Verde Labour. 
(82) See Chapter II, note 6. 
(83) SSE Ar., File 232, APR %Paiva Rapozo 7 to SSE Ltd., London, 
23 June 1949, No. 114/4, Re: Cape Verge Labour. (Translation 
J. H. ). The Cape Verdians were initially expected to work for 
four years. In fact, however, they only stayed in Zamb4zia 
for two years. In 1950 a combined petition to the Government 
from emmployers in Zamb4zia led to their repatriation. The 
petition emphasised the disruptive affect Cape Verdian labour 
was having on the 'native' workers (SSE Ar., File 232, MT to 
Hornung and Co. Ltd., 20 July 1950, No. 366/50 GM; SSE Ar., 
File 232, Companhia do Boror, Dr. Souza Neves, Sociedade 
Agricola do Madal, Joao Bonone, Companhia da Zamb4zia, 
Breyner & Wirth Lda., Sacadura Bote to Governador Geral, 
Lourengo Marques, 14 June 1950). 
(84) SSE Ar., File 329, Mistos and Assimilados, SSE Lourengo Marques 
to Governador Geral de Mocambique, 2 June 1956, Relacäo dos 
Trabalhadores Nestkos e Assimilados ao Servigo da Sena 
Sugar Estates Ltd. 
(85) ibid. 
(86) ibid. 
(87) SSE Ar., File 329, NHDuB to Col. CBR Hornung, 16 Oct. 1958, 
No. 239/58 Private Series, Native Policy. 
(88) SSE Ar., File 329, J. dos Santos Callado to Director SSE 
Luabo, 24 Oct. 1958, No. 70/58/Reservada "Estritamente 
Confidencial" Assunto: Assimilados. (Translation J. H. ). 
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CHAPTER VI 
SENA SUGAR ESTATES' FOOD POLICY 
A distinction of the migrant labour system is that part of 
the wage that capital pays to labour is not received in its money 
form. Whereas under the conditions of generalised commodity production 
where a full proletariat exists the individual worker is usually 
responsible for supporting the costs of providing housing and 
sustenance for himself (and his family) from the wage he receives, 
(1) under a migrant system part of these costs fall to capital. 
For the period that the worker spends on the estates away from his 
own home the employer is responsible for providing food and shelter. 
The separation of the total wage into one part which is paid 
in cash and another part which is represented by food and housing 
presents itself to the worker as two separate things. While the cash 
wage appears as payment for his labour, the food and housing he 
receives is made to appear as a 'gift' from the company. This 
means that a struggle on the wages front is not necessarily related 
to a struggle to improve social conditions. To the employer, on the 
other hand, the cash and kind components of the wage are seen as but 
two halves of the same whole, and failure to hold back the expenditure 
on one can be offset by attempts to reduce the expenditure on the 
other. Attempts to increase the appropriation of surplus value are 
therefore not confined simply to the production front, through the 
manipulation of wages and productivity. They are also extended 
to 
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attempts to reduce that part of the wage represented by food and 
housing. 
This chapter will examine the ways in which SSE's management 
sought to further cut the cost of labour by reducing its expenditure 
on the kind element of the wage represented by food. The first part 
of the chapter will examine the source of foodstuffs provided to the 
migrant labour force. The second part will examine the content of 
the diet. Finally, the third part of the chapter will examine the 
form in which the rations were distributed. 
SENA SUGAR ESTATES' FOOD PURCHASING POLICY 
Securing Produce directly from the Peasantry: the Companhia do 
Comercio de Mocambique 
Before the First World War the SSF had established a trading 
company, run as part of the sugar company, whose main aim was to 
acquire peasant produce to feed the plantation labour force. 
The whole aim and object of this business from the 
start has been the purchase of Native Foodstuffs 
for consumption of the labour working on the Sugar 
Estates. (2) 
The Companhia de Comercio de Mocambique (CCM) was originally a 
wholesale trading company. However, by the Second World War, 
following 
various reorganisations, the business was "exclusively retail. 
"(3) 
The CCM controlled a series of stores along both banks of the river 
Zambesi, and others inland, which sold general trade goods and 
sugar from the plantations and bought peasant produce. 
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There were probably two reasons for the change in the nature 
of the business. The first was that buying produce directly from 
the producers lowered the cost by cutting out the middleman. Linked 
to the first reason was the second, the increasing importance of 
raw sugar as an item of local trade. This was a trade which the CCM 
was soon able to monopolise through its favourable arrangements with SSE. 
Raw sugar was much sought after by the local people as a 
fermenting agent for making beer. 
The very enhanced sales during last year are of course 
mainly due to the large sums of money that the natives 
received in connection with cotton, and not being 
educated or forced towards elevating their own 
standards of living in other directions, raw sugar, 
respectively drink, is the nearest thing to turn 
the surplus money into. It certainly sounds 
enormous expressed in figures if one thinks of it 
that 2,700 tons of raw sugar sold by us on the 
Zambesi last year represent practically 50,000 in 
hard cash. (4) 
Through its subsidiary company SSE was able to sell sugar in the 
retail stores and thus capture much of the peasant trade in the 
area. This had important consequences for its capacity to control 
food supplies. The CCM bought sugar from SSE on credit and at cost 
price(5) whereas the company's competitors, the Asian traders of 
the interior(6) were obliged to buy sugar from CCM retail stores for 
cash and at retail prices if they wished to retain their general 
trade. (7) Nevertheless, despite the importance of raw sugar sales 
as a means of capturing the market in peasant produce and despite 
record sales of raw sugar during the 1944 'crop', in 1945 
SSE decided 
to stop selling raw sugar in its CCM stores. (8) The 
decision was 
taken reluctantly in anticipation of the extension of a government 
ban on the sale of raw sugar. (9) SSE feared that the replacement of 
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raw sugar by white sugar, which lacked the fermenting agent, would 
lead to a general decline in trade and hence to a drop in the supply 
of peasant produce acquired through the CCM stores. However, sales 
of white sugar were higher than anticipated, and the income from 
the sale actually increased because white sugar commanded a higher 
retail price than raw sugar. (l0) Furthermore, since SSE was still 
the only supplier of sugar in the region its monopoly position was 
not affected by the change. Indeed the company recognised the 
importance of retaining and expanding the local market, even if it 
meant losing out on higher prices obtainable elsewhere in the 
short-term: 
Our policy must be to encourage sales to the natives 
and consequently I do not agree to your suggestion 
to restrict our sales during the current year so as 
to make more available to the Ministry. The price 
which we receive from the Ministry today is con- 
siderably better than what we obtain for local 
sales, but we have to think of the future, and I 
do not believe that the present Ministry price 
will be maintained when there is over-production 
in the world, as there is sure to be in the next 
two or three years. (11) 
This policy of encouraging local sales was pursued and in 
the late 1950s the company was still the principal supplier of sugar 
in the region. In 1958 it was supplying 17 stores in the Circumscription 
of Marromeu alone with sugar. (12) By selling sugar, the X4 and 
through it SSE, continued to receive peasant produce. In Mopeia, for 
instance, where the OCM enjoyed a monopoly of trade and drew custom 
from both sides of the river, its stores had been buying thousands 
of tons of produce for years and had been making good profits 
"mainly because they do not lack a product much sought after by the 
natives - sugar - which the ODA disposes of freely. "(13) 
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As a result of its control of the distribution of sugar through 
the CCM stores SSE was assured a supply of whatever peasant produce 
was available locally. However, the quantity of peasant produce 
provided by the local trade fluctuated from year to year. In part, 
the climate was responsible. The weather in the region around the 
estates was unpredictable. According to an Agricultural Department 
Survey of 1927 the rains either came too early or too late, and it 
was either too wet or too dry to produce adequate harvests. Furthermore 
the Zambesi was subject to frequent flooding which destroyed African 
crops and left the "natives without resources and they are forced to 
suffer long periods of famine". (14) There were also periodic droughts. 
In 1941, for example, peasant crops "suffered terribly" where they did 
not fail completely because of the worst drought on record for 
decades. (15) 1954 too was a bad year and peasant crops were once 
again either ruined or non-existant because of the acute drought 
conditions. (16) The spread of forced cotton cultivation also 
contributed in part to the irregularity in the supply of locally 
produced foodstuffs. As cotton cultivation increased so the supply 
of foodstuffs for sale declined. (17) A third reason for the uncertain 
supplies of peasant produce was the development towards the end of 
the 1940s of government-controlled grain-marketing boards. The 
establishment of fixed markets "practically prohibited them F the 
peasants 7 the free sale of their holdings at the various trading 
stores... as had been the custom for ever so long. "(18) 
The inability of the OCM stores to buy up and thus supply 
all the produce necessary to feed the labour force led to a 
suggestion by SSE's directors in 1942 that a total of 
11 stores 
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should be closed. (19) The directors felt that their closure would 
not bring a loss to the company since in the first six months of the 
year they had only supplied 176 tons of grain out of the total of 
4,854 required. (20) The directors also feared that as shipping became 
easier the cost of merchandise imported from England would drop and 
the COA stores would be left with expensive stocks which they could 
not sell. A drop in the cost of merchandise to the 1939 level would 
not cover the CCt's debt to SSE. (21) In his reply SSE's General 
Manager pointed out that the debt referred to was 'disturbing' 
but temporary since it coincided with the height of the 'native' 
buying season, May/June/July, when ready cash was needed to buy 6,000 
tons of maize and mapira at an average price of £6 a ton. The 
General Manager was anxious to keep the stores open not only 
because they showed an average nett profit of 15 per cent but also 
because their closure would cause great inconvenience to SSE staff 
and labour. He feared that the bulk of the business would go to the 
ACM's competitors and not to the OCM's other stores of which only two 
would remain in the vicinity. (22) 
In other words, although the COil stores had been established 
originally to acquire local peasant produce to feed the labour force, 
their activities had expanded as SSE itself had expanded. At least 
in the General Manager's eyes, the expansion of the general trading 
business was as important as the securing of locally produced 
foodstuffs. In his appeal to keep the 11 stores open he was quite 
explicit. He pointed out that while the reminder by the director 
that the stores only existed to buy native foodstuffs(23) was 
correct, they also performed other essential functions. 
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It is incomprehensible at this stage of development 
not to consider the labour force which you employ 
in relation to the purchases of essentials that 
they are able to make on or in the neighbourhood of 
your plantations, and by closing all the Marromeu 
stores, for instance, they would be completely at the 
mercy of the remaining Ban ans /Asian traders 7, who 
would then put their prices up etc. We have also at 
this stage an ever increasing half-caste population 
that is actually employed by us, or better class 
natives who definitely and exclusively depend upon 
what they can get at our stores. The coi, although 
they had unavoidably to increase their retail 
selling prices, are definitely today still the 
cheapest selling concern throughout the colony, 
a point which can be translated into a function 
that is definitely in our interest and beneficial 
in the long run. (24) 
Nevertheless, SSE did try to exand its specifically food- r- 
buying activities when the opportunity arose, by cutting out middlemen 
and extending its control over the local trade. To this end, when 
the Native Grain and Buying Markets were abolished in 1950 the 
company considered opening a store in PAorrumbala. This was an idea 
which had been mooted before but rejected after the advent of the 
Grain Purchasing Board. 
We are consequently back to where we were before, and the 
question of doing something towards securing a major share 
of the Native Foodstuffs grown in the Morrumbala District 
has accordingly come to the fore. (25) 
There were two main reasons for the choice of Morrumbala. The first 
was that the district had an annual potential of 3-5000 tons of 
produce per annum. (26) Secondly, Mutarara District had been the 
main supply area, but from 1941 it had been incorporated into 
Monica 
and Sofala Province and all grain transactions had been controlled 
by 
the Beira Maize Board whose prices were higher. (27) Thus Morrumbala 
had become the major supply area close to the estates, and the company 
wanted to secure a "permanent footing there". In 
1949, the company 
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had bought 1,500 tons from third parties and wanted to increase 
its purchases, but lacked transport to be able to do so. By setting 
up a CCM store, SSE could justify the use of its own lorries to supply 
the estates with the produce acquired. The General Manager suggested 
that the lorries might also transport cotton and workers to the 
estates. (28) The scheme had the administrator's approval since the 
only trading stores in Morrumbala were controlled by the Lopes Brothers 
or their relatives, who, in the eyes of the administrator were "rather 
exploiting the natives". The administrator therefore welcomed 
competition. (29) SSE's London management company was persuaded by 
the General Manager. Its members approved the decision to open a 
store in Morrumbala on the grounds that "it will enable us to lay 
our hands on considerably more foodstuffs without the interference of 
third parties. "(30) 
It was clearly in SSE's interest to directly control as much 
of the buying of foodstuffs for the labour force as possible, and 
thus avoid the extra costs incurred in buying through other traders 
and merchants. However, the sheer numbers of workers involved, the 
irregular climate, the effects of both labour demands and forced 
cotton growing on food-crop production meant that the peasant produce 
acquired locally was not sufficient to feed the labour force. 
Despite the network of CCM stores which were able to control the 
local trade because of their monopoly control over sugar, and the 
financial backing they received from SSE at the critical buying 
season, (31) SSE still had to rely on other merchants in areas beyond 
the immediate vicinity of the estates. 
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Acquiring Foodstuffs through other Traders 
Apart from the area around the estates SSE's three main 
supply areas of foodstuffs were Angonia, Milange(32) and Morrumbaio. (33) 
Occasionally the company also bought maize from Niassa. (34) Angonia 
was the site of the company's former Prazo, and in Milange the 
Hornung family controlled a tea plantation. (35) In both areas, 
therefore, SSE had long-established links with local merchants, and 
in Milange at least it was able to reduce overheads by using the some 
agent to supply foodstuffs to both the tea and sugar estates. (36) 
In Morrumbala, besides buying through its own store, the company also 
bought maize directly from the plantations controlled by the Lopes 
Bros. (37) Although there is no direct evidence for the earlier period, 
a letter written in 1972 throws some light on the arrangements SSE 
made with merchants and/or European producers such as Lopes Brothers. 
As with the local Asian traders, SSE's monopoly control over the 
supply of sugar appears to have been instrumental in assuring the 
supply of foodstuffs from these sources. In return for guaranteed 
supplies of sugar SSE expected to receive "some form of reciprocity... 
possibly in the form of maize flour at competitive prices on 
both 
sides of the river... This will reduce the stocks of maize which we 
will have to pay for and hold. "(38) 
Even when SSE acquired its food supplies through 
third parties 
it was still in the company's interest to exercise as much control 
as 
possible over the price of the commodities purchased. 
This it did 
partly by establishing reciprocal arrangements of 
the type described 
above, and partly by 'shopping around'. Thus, one of 
the reasons 
SSE used "three main suppliers in Angoni 
land" (39) was to avoid 
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purchasing grain from the Beira Cereals Board whose prices were 
higher. Writing about the supply of maize for the Marromeu Estate in 
1953 SSE`s General Manager noted that sufficient amounts of maize 
beans were available from the suppliers in Angonia. 2,000 tons 
would be delivered in May and June of 1953. "In this manner we have 
been successful in cutting out more expensive purchases from the 
Beira Maize Gremio and with the latter's full consent since we are 
paying them a small tax. "(40) 
The other way of ensuring that foodstuffs were not too costly 
was by attempting to control the price paid to the producer. The 
minimum buying prices for peasant produce were established by the 
colonial government. (41) On one occasion at least, in 1952, the 
authorities asked SSE, as an interested party, about the prices it 
thought should be established. 
suggested the following: 
Buying from the Natives 
The Company's General Manager 
Selling price 
Price per kilo perkw lo(42) 
Maize and mapira /-sorghum 7 1$ 1$ 50 
Mealie meal (maize flour) 1$ 80 2$ 20 
Kaffir beans 1$ 50 2$ 
Meixeira /-millet-7 1$ 50 2$ 
European type beans 1$ 80 2$ 
On another occasion, purchasers of peasant produce in Milange made 
a joint representation to the local authorities asking for a 
reduction in the buying price of maize from 1 escudo to 75 centavos 
a kilo. (43) SSE`s General Manager, in a letter about the matter 
to the company's Agent in Milange, asked if there were any similar 
steps being taken to bring about a reduction in the price of cassava 
paid to the peasants. He added: 
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As you say, the whole movement is something in the 
right direction, for it was high time that steps 
were taken to bring down costs in this or that direction, and to bring down the cost of native food is clearly a major consideration, which 
again is only possible by paying less to the 
natives. (44) 
Summarising the company's food-buying policy in 1953 
SSE's General Manager wrote that the policy was to continue as before. 
The au stores were to buy what they could on both sides of the river. 
The company's agent in Milange was commissioned to buy maize, sorghum, 
cassava and beans, but he was always to try and obtain lower prices. 
Maize for the Marromeu plantation was to come from Angonia, thus 
cutting out the more expensive Beira Maize Board. (45) The reduction 
of the cost of food, was the prime consideration in the formulation 
of food-buying policy. 
Thus through its control of the local sugar trade, network 
of trading stores, reciprocal agreements with other traders and 
European producers, and attempts to reduce the price of food crops, 
SSE attempted to secure a cheap supply of foods for the labour force 
on its plantations. 
THE CONTENT OF THE DIET 
The Regulamento do Trabalho dos Indigenas of 1930 which was 
the cornerstone of all legislation on African employment conditions 
until 1962 stipulated that workers resident on plantations and other 
private enterprises in the colony were to receive a daily diet of 
800 to 1000 grammes of flour made from maize, cassava, rice, beans or 
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any other vegetable substance with equal food value; 250 grammes of 
meat or dry fish, and sufficient salt and oil for cooking the rations. 
No mention was made of other protein foods or fresh fruit and green 
vegetables. The meat and fish ration could be altered according to 
local circumstances. Fresh meat could be substituted by 150 grammes 
of dried or pickled meat if the former was difficult to obtain. 
Furthermore, the ration could be altered "in accordance with the 
preferences of the natives and local resources" if proposed by the 
local authorities of the region with the Medical Inspector's 
approval. (46) 
Throughout the period of this study workers at SSE received 
the f lour ration to which they were entitled. Flour was cheap and 
came from local producers. Flour was also a commodity over whose 
price SSE was able to exercise some control. Similarly, salt was 
issued regularly, since SSE itself produced salt. Besides producing 
sufficient salt to feed the labour force SSE also produced a small 
surplus which it marketed in its trading stores-(47) The provision 
of meat and fish, however, did constitute a problem, mainly 
because 
they were the most expensive items in the diet. Writing to the 
Administrator of the District of Mopeia in 1937, A. A. Azevedo of 
SSE 
listed the prices of the items which made up the daily rations of 
the 
labour force: 
maize 67.2 centavos a kilo 
flour 78.4 " 11 
beans 95.2 It 
peanuts 1 escudo 12 
salt 56 
dry meat 2 escudo 80 
fresh 
meat 2 escudo 46 " 
dry fish 2 escudo 30 " 
fresh 
fish 1 escudo 37 " (48 ) 
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Meat and Fish 
Meat was expensive mainly because it was costly to produce 
locally. Zambezia Province lay within the tsetse zone. Traditionally 
Africans did not raise cattle, but limited their animal husbandry 
to the keeping of small animals: goats, pigs and fowl. (49) Cattle 
appear to have been introduced by Europeans as a source of meat, 
manure, and as work animals. (50) 
Besides being susceptible to attack by tsetse fly cattle were 
also vulnerable to a number of other diseases and parasites. In 
addition, the problem of finding strains of cattle which could adapt 
to the climate and region were considerable. However over the years, 
these problems were gradually brought under control. By the mid- 
1940s there were some 29,988 cattle in European hands in Zambezia, 
of which SSE owned approximately 4000. (51) From its herd SSE 
slaughtered three steers a week for (European) staff consumption. (52) 
Despite the difficulties, then, it was possible to raise 
cattle in Zambezia. However, it was not until 1957 that the expansion 
of the herds was seriously considered as a way of providing fresh 
meat for the labour force. It was only considered then because of 
the growing labour shortage. 
With the warnings of labour, shortages in the future, 
and the general difficulty and expense of our 
recruiting, we feel that our herds of cattle should 
in the future be turned to the greatest possible 
advantage in attracting native labour. We believe 
and would appreciate your confirmation, that an 
issue of fresh meat is about the most popular 
food with most of the tribes and if this could 
be maintained at Luabo the propaganda value 
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would be considerable. Furthermore, we believe 
that the size and rate of increase of the herds 
at present is insufficient to contemplate such a 
course however desirable it may be. (53) 
The reason for the failure to develop the herds as a source of meat 
for the labour force was economic. Whereas beef could be sold to 
the European staff, albeit at subsidised prices, and also sold to 
others outside the company, the provision of fresh meat for the 
labour force was a cost to the company with no visible return. 
As for fish supplies, the fishing industry in Zambezia 
was rudimentary and under-developed throughout the period. In his 
1943-7 Report, the Governor of Zambezia noted that the fishing 
industry was run by a small nucleus of indo-Portuguese in Quelimane, 
while "a dozen natives" operated from Chinde and other places along 
the coast. (54) Small boats and canoes, made locally, were the only 
craft in use. The most common fishing methods consisted either in the 
use of a type of seine net operated by small boats close to the 
shore, or a net dragged along the shore by two men. (55) 
The fish which SSE gave its workers was in the main dry fish 
imported from Angola through the port of Chinde. (56) v1eat was mostly 
supplied by local game hunters. For example, one consignment of 25 
tons was made up of 200 buffaloe, 33 elephants, 20 hippopotami, 
66 waterbuck and 66 zebra. (57) 
quantities stipulated by law. 
Yet neither food was issued in the 
In 1937, for example, instead of a 
daily helping of 250 grammes of fresh meat, men were receiving 
150 
grammes a week. (58) 
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In 1942 the Central Department of Native Affairs altered the 
diet introduced in 1930. The new diet included 100 grammes of 
groundnuts which were formerly lacking. However, the meat and fish 
ration were reduced. When these items were difficult to obtain 
employers were allowed to substitute them with either beans or 
groundnuts. Meat and fish only had to be offered on three days out 
of seven. In effect this meant that the amount of fish and meat 
included in the 1930 diet had now been reduced by a kilo a week. (59) 
Nevertheless SSE still complained about the new diet. It argued that 
it could not put it into immediate effect because of meat and fish 
shortages. (60) Meat was in short supply because there was not enough 
ammunition available to shoot wild animals. Dry fish was in short 
supply because of the difficulties of transporting it by sea. 
Fresh fish was hard to find because of the shortage of string to 
make nets. All three shortages were blamed on war-time conditions. (61) 
In the years that followed other changes were introduced in 
the diet. Sometimes the meat and fish ration was increased, at other 
times it was decreased. However, these changes and the legal diet 
itself bore little relation to the food actually provided by SSE. 
For example, in 1957 a new diet was introduced which stipulated that 
workers were to receive 400 grammes of fresh meat a week. 
(62) Yet 
SSE's General Manager noted in 1961 that the company never managed to 
obtain fresh meat. (63) A year later N. H. Du Boulay wrote 
to a fellow 
director about the changes SSE should introduce into the 
diet in line 
with new government recommendations. 
issued were not imaginative enough. 
He remarked that the rations 
Workers were receiving an 'unbroken 
weekly diet of flour, groundnuts, beans, fish and salt. 
Meat was 
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difficult to obtain because shooting game was unremunerative and 
dried meat was expensive and of doubtful quality. (64) The Director 
was trying to organise the introduction of fresh meat into the diet, 
which he knew would be popular with the labour force. This letter 
was written five years after the decision was taken in principle to 
expand the company's cattle herds in order to supply fresh meat to 
the labour force, and five years after a regulation requiring 
the introduction of a diet which included regular issues of meat. 
Between 1930 and 1960 SSE systematically avoided giving their 
labourers the meat and fish ration to which. they were entitled by 
law. Notwithstanding the company's argument that meat and fish 
shortages prevented the inclusion of these items in the quantities 
stipulated, the main reason for their absence from the diet was 
economic. The production costs associated with developing herds of 
cattle or other meat-supplying animals, and stocking local streams 
and rivers with fish would have pushed the overall cost of labour to 
a point which the company considered unworkable. However, SSE did 
not only avoid giving its workers meat and fish. The company 
also resisted proposed changes in the diet designed to increase the 
variety of foodstuffs offered and to improve its overall quality. 
Once again, the company's resistance to the proposed changes was 
ultimately founded on economic arguments. 
Fresh Fruit and Green Vegetables 
The original diet stipulated in the 1930 Labour Legislation 
made no mention of fresh fruit or green vegetables. By the end of 
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the 1930s, however, the authorities were beginning to worry about the 
effect of the diet issued on plantations on the health of the labour 
force. Many workers were being admitted to hospital suffering from 
the effects of vitamin deficiency. (65) To overcome this problem the 
provincial authorities ordered plantations to start planting fruit 
trees. In 1942 SSE was ordered to plant bananas, mangoes, paw paw 
and cashew trees. (66) 
In an attempt to evade carrying out the new instructions 
SSE immediately sent a petition to the provincial authorities which 
explained its food policy. 
This company wishes to bring to the notice of those 
in authority that the rations distributed to its 
native workers were always considered sufficient. 
They are as varied as the region permits. They 
also obey the agricultural policy of this district. 
Agricultural produce is acquired from the natives 
of the region. Moreover the wishes of the natives 
themselves are satisfied. They receive the foods 
which they most like, for example, beans and 
maize. (67) 
In its letter to the authorities SSE also implied that the diet it 
offered was fully adequate for the workers' needs. It compared the 
diet recommended by the League of Nations for work in cold climates 
with that given for "light" work in tropical climates. It then 
compared the diets issued by the Rhodesian and South African mines 
with the diet recommended by the Native Affairs Department and that 
given by SSE. SSE's argument was based exclusively on the calorie 
content of the four diets. It ignored the nutritional value of the 
diet and specifically the lack of vitamins, which was the point of 
dispute. From its comparisons SSE concluded that the Native Affairs 
Department recommended such an "excess" of calories that work on the 
mines was considered less arduous than agricultural work in 
Zambezia. (68) 
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SSE also asserted that the 'natives' obtained as much fruit as they 
needed from trees growing on the edges of the cane fields and from 
plots that they cultivated themselves. (69) As a demonstration of the 
adequacy of the diet SSE then listed the average weights of its 
workers from different regions. The average weight of men from 
Ile was 51.51 kilos, from Alto Molocue 52.84 kilos and from Angonia, 
59.23 kilos. Yet, out of a sample of 1,474 men only 311 weighed 
over 60 kilos. (70) Finally, SSE enclosed copies of its ration sheets. 
These included foods available in the region and therefore fulfilled 
the demands of the law. Despite the fact that 15 separate tables 
were attached the diet contained no fruit or green vegetables. 
It was composed of maize/cassava flour, peanuts, beans, fish, coconut 
and one issue of meat and sugar a week. However, not all of these 
foods were issued daily. The first three tables appended give 
a clearer indication of three possible daily diets. 
A maize flour 900 grammes B maize flour 900 grammes 
meat 300 peanut 125 " 
salt 20 beans 160 
salt 20 
C maize flour 900 
peixe 150 
beans 160 
salt 20 
Alternatively workers returning from the fields might have received 
ration D. After a hard day's work, and having eaten nothing 
during 
the day they were presented with a handful of beans and nearly a 
kilo 
of flour, and salt. (71) 
In 1945 an amended diet introduced by the Native Affairs 
Department included fruit and vegetables. Workers were to receive 
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150 grammes of fruit and vegetables three times a week. (72) SSE did 
not implement the diet. It did, however, send its own diet sheets 
to an expert at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
for analysis. The expert pronounced the diet "very deficient in 
Vitamin A and riboflavin" and added that it could not be considered 
adequate without a fair quantity of fresh vegetables. (73) Never- 
theless SSE ignored the expert's advice just as they had ignored the 
advice of local doctors, and continued to avoid giving their workers 
fresh fruit and vegetables. 
In 1956 the colonial government again published a new diet 
which insisted on the provision of 250 grammes of fruit and vegetables 
daily. The new diet was to be put into immediate effect. SSE's 
Assistant General Manager immediately had talks with the Zambezia 
Company and the Madal Company, both of whom agreed that it was 
impossible to supply 250 grammes of fruit and vegetables daily. 
SSE's Assistant General Manager then spoke to the Governor of Zambezia. 
The Governor affirmed that other companies had not supplied the fruit 
and vegetables and were not intending to do so "counting with the 
authorities passively. "(74) The Governor agreed that SSE could not 
supply the ration and agreed that it should present a petition to 
the Governor General. SSE's Assistant General Manager then saw a 
representative of the Buzi Company. The Buzi Company did not intend 
to implement the law. Finally, the Assistant General Manager saw 
the Governor of Beira, whom he knew well, having been his father's 
Aide de Camp. The Governor of Beira "quite agreed" with SSE. He 
had never thought about the matter and had no intention of enforcing 
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the law. Writing to the London Management Company about the matter 
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SSE's Assistant General Manager added: 
While I was in Beira I had the opportunity of seeing, 
on more than one occasion, Eng. Jorge Pereira Jardim, 
former Under Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry, and at present Director of Lusalite in Beira and M. P. for Mocambique. We talked about the 
subject, and he said the Government could not take the fruit and vegetables off the ration list; they 
had to stay there for International reasons, U. N. O., Anti-Colonialism etc.; but everybody knew that it 
was impossible to comply with the issuing of rations 
of fruit and vegetables. (75) 
A statement was prepared for the Governor General. In it the 
Assistant General Manager emphasised the impossibility of supplying 
250 grammes of fruit and vegetables daily. With an average work 
force of 20,000 men a day SSE would require 5 tons of fruit and 
vegetables daily. Not only would the company require more labour, 
which would aggravate the existing shortage, but the cost of rations 
would increase 'extraordinarily'. He added that fruit and vegetables 
were not available locally and that the company would, therefore, 
have to grow them. He said that SSE would increase its orchards and 
vegetable gardens, but asked whether part of the ration could be 
substituted by flour, beans or peanuts, or any other product the 
Governor General suggested, bearing in mind that workers were able to eat 
cane freely and that there were some fruit trees on the compounds. (76) 
The statement prepared for the Governor General was explicitly 
designed as a stalling mechanism. The Assistant General Manager felt 
that it would be several months before a decision was reached, if 
ever, because the statement had to be passed up the bureaucratic 
hierarchy through the local administrator. Furthermore, by making 
the statement, SSE had covered itself against possible attacks 
by 
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interfering administrative officials because it appeared to be 
doing something: 
I have written the 'exposigoo' /-statement 7 which 
will be handed in here to the Posto, to go to Quelimane through the Chinde Administrator,... 
I think a copy ought to be given to the Marromeu 
Administrator. In this manner all the Authorities 
concerned will know that the subject is going to be appreciated at higher levels, and this should 
act as a brake should they intend making trouble, 
which I do not think they do. It will also stop 
any interference from the Medical Authorities... 
I am sure that many months will pass before the 
Governor General gives a 'despacho' rofficial 
communication 7 on our 'exposicäo', if he ever 
gives one, as I will not be surprised if it 
should be forgotten in some drawer, but at 
least we are safeguarded in connection with 
the question of native rations if any Admini- 
strative or Medical Authority ever thinks of 
causing trouble. (77) 
In 195 7 SSE received an answer to its petition. The Governor 
General gave the company three months in which to fulfill the law. 
250 grammes of fruit and vegetables were to be supplied daily and 
could not be substituted by flour, peanuts or anything else. (78) In 
a letter to SSE's Lourenco Marques representative one of the company's 
directors wrote that SSE had cultivated enough sweet potatoes to 
feed about 500 men. It employed 10,000 men at Luabo and about the 
same number at Marromeu. With these numbers to feed the company 
would need to produce about 200 tons of fruit and vegetables a year. 
He added that one did not have to be an "agricultural engineer" to 
calculate the organisation and work that such a project would involve. 
The director then raised what he saw as the company's chief negotiating 
point. 
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If the Governor General continues to insist on the 
rigorous fulfilment of the Decree, it is clear that 
Colonel Hornung will have to, to defend the company's 
interests, raise in Lisbon, in Ministerial spheres, 
the possibility of a future decrease in our production. 
As you well know, we have undertakings and agreements 
with the various Ministries in Lisbon, interested in 
the supply of sugar to the Empire, which it is our 
obligation to fulfill. (79) 
In the final letter on the subject the director wrote to the 
Managing Director of SSE that the company was looking at ways of 
growing fruit trees outside the cane fields, near the compounds, taking 
in as little cane land as possible. "It is very doubtful even at 
the end of a year whether or not it would be possible to fully comply 
with the law, which was obviously made for small farmers around big 
towns. "(80) SSE never, 'in fact, provided fruit as part of the rations 
and vegetables were only rarely included. (81) 
Even if SSE was simply uninformed before the 1940s about the 
foods necessary to make up an adequate diet, thereafter it continued 
to deprive its work force of fruit and vegetables and to cut down 
on the issue of meat and fish, in spite of the fact that both the 
colonial authorities and an independent expert of the company's own 
choice had confirmed the necessity of distributing these items. 
SSE's work force continued to receive a monotonous and unbalanced 
diet until well into the 1960s. Paring down the cost of rations, and 
providing workers with only sufficient food to keep them alive and 
working was part of a deliberate strategy evolved by SSE to 
keep the 
costs of labour low. 
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THE DISTRIBUTION OF RATIONS IN THEIR UIST ECONOMICAL FORM 
The Advantages of Uncooked Rations 
The 1930 Regulamento do Trabalho dos Indigenas allowed 
employers to distribute uncooked rations to their labourers. (82) From 
SSE`s point of view there were clear advantages in doing so. Firstly, 
the company was able to avoid investment in kitches, cooking utensils 
and canteens. Workers received their uncooked rations from a store 
located in the compound. They then took them away to their own huts 
to be cooked. Secondly, the company avoided investment in cutlery 
and crockery, which the workers themselves provided. The workers 
also had to provide a container in which to receive the rations. 
Only in 1962 did SSE seriously consider providing a container for 
rations, and then only because of pressure from the authorities. 
We were previously criticised because the labour either 
receive their rations in their hat, a dirty handkerchief 
or their shirt tails. None of this is very hygienic 
and it also necessitates the flour getting mised 
/'sic 7 
up with everything else. (83) 
Yet it was at a loss to know what kind of receptacle to provide. 
Paper 
bags were rejected as being "far too expensive. "(84) Thirdly, the 
company avoided employing cooks. When, between 1929 and 
1931 there 
was a short-lived experiment with cooked food, SSE needed one cook 
for 
every 60 workers. (85) On the basis of the numbers employed 
during 
the 1935 'crop' SSE would have needed 160 cooks. By abolishing cooked 
food it could avoid employing 160 men who were not engaged 
in direct 
production. 
The -lourtLh advantage of providing uncooked 
food emerged from the 
task and payment system, and was probably the most 
important. Workers 
received their daily rations in the evening, after 
they had finished 
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work. (86) This system of distribution had two implications. It 
meant that SSE could avoid giving its field workers a break during 
the day. Thus, as already demonstrated in Chapter V, it could 
appropriate an hour's unpaid labour from each man in lieu of the 
break. The dimensions of this appropriation can be derived from 
the following figures for the period between 1948 and 1952. Each day 
represents one day's labour, hence it also represents one unpaid hour 
of labour. 
Labour days Marromeu Luabo (87) w. ýr mow. 
1948 1,425,818 2,197,803 
1949 1,589,615 2,388,719 
1950 1,480,785 2,588,955 
1951 1,401,622 2,275,945 
1952 1,563,723 2,615,538 
The distribution of the day's rations after work also meant that 
only workers who had successfully completed their daily task received 
the food disc which allowed them to collect their rations. Not only 
did this act as an additional and very direct incentive to regular 
task completion but it also meant that the company did not have to 
support the costs of maintaining workers who did not produce the 
stipulated task. It meant, therefore, that SSE avoided supporting 
men who were absent from work. It also meant that men marked as 
absent but who had actually turned out to work were denied both the 
wages for the labour time they had expended and food. The 
distribution of uncooked rations at the end of the day was therefore 
another means by which SSE sought to appropriate additional surplus 
value from its labour force. 
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1945, Chan es in the Law: the Provision of some Cooked Food 
In 1945 the Native Affairs Department issued a Circular which 
called on employers to issue partly cooked food to their labourers. 
According to SSE's General Manager, the Governor of Zamb4zia did not 
like the Circular and only intended to introduce it gradually. The 
Governor of Manica and Sofala on the other hand, insisted on the 
letter and spirit of the law being carried out immediately. 
Nevertheless, it was only in 1947, two years after the Circular was 
issued and two years after the publication of a new diet which 
included the provision of a cooked breakfast, that SSE started to 
issue cooked porridge to labour working in Marromeu. 
The 1945 diet(88) stipulated that workers were to receive 
porridge made from 150 grammes of maize flour and 75 grammes of sugar 
in addition to the uncooked rations which comprised the other two 
daily meals. In his letter to the Estate Manager of Marromeu 
instructing him to implement the new ruling the General Manager wrote 
that the early morning porridge would be made from. 100 grammes of 
flour and 50 grammes of low grade sugar per head. He added: 
All this implies that the existing distribution of 
raw food rations continues and shall not suffer 
any specific change but it is clear that in so far 
as mealie meal is concerned, the individual ration 
issue does not necessarily and in all cases amount 
to the standard quantity of 900 grammes but probably 
less... (89) 
It is not clear when a cooked breakfast was provided at Luobo, but the 
fact that the maize ration was reduced by 20 per cent in September 
1947 suggests that it was probably shortly of terwards. 
(90) If a start 
must be made then an early morning meal should 
first be introduced with a 
slight reduction in raw rations issued to compensate 
for it. "(9l) 
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Aware of the implication of issuing breakfast before the day 
was worked, the General Manager instructed that a new set of tickets 
were to be issued to labour with its task and raw food tickets the 
evening before to prevent those who had not worked receiving the 
porridge. 
It stands to reason that in addition to the normal 
ration disc against which they will exchange the raw 
food ration as heretofore, each labourer concerned 
will also have to be given a separate ticket or 
token that will entitle him to porridge the following 
morning, failin which you would have all and sundr 
lining up for the orri e meal with no uarcntee as 
to a day's work following thereupon(92) (emphasis added) 
When SSE was forced to provide a breakfast for its labour force 
in 1947 it was worried that it would also be obliged to provide a 
second cooked meal. "If... we are compelled to issue another meal of 
sorts at midday then the only feasible answer would be either biscuits 
or chappaties made of mealie flour which it would be necessary for 
each overseer of a gang to requisition from the compound to which his 
gang belongs. "(93) In the event, the "Beira Governor" did not 
insist on a second cooked meal and the Governor of Zambezia was 
content to let things stay as they wer-e. (94) For ten more years SSE's 
labour force continued to receive uncooked rations. Apart from the 
'breakfast' of maize porridge and a cup of tea, the men ate nothing 
until they had finished their task and returned to the compound in 
the late afternoon. 
In 1958 the issue of cooked food was again raised by the 
authorities. This time SSE could not afford 
to ignore the rulings 
on a second cooked meal. The company was already 
in trouble with the 
authorities over the fruit and vegetable 
issue. It was in further 
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trouble because it had been accused of exchanging food discs for 
cash in the company stores and finally it had just been the subject 
of a critical report by the Labour Inspectors. (95) Nevertheless the 
company avoided implementing the spirit of the law. It decided to 
evade the legislation by issuing a "token meal" of bread in the 
fields; a meal, which as we have already seen did not prevent the 
workers from continuing with their tasks. "The natives should 
be told when the loaf is issued, at 10 am. that they must have one 
hour's rest, and as they certainly will refuse, the local authorities 
should be taken to the spot, so as to certify that we wanted to comply 
with the orders received, but that the natives would not agree to 
them. "(96) 
In 1962 SSE was forced to undertake another experiment to see 
if the labour force would prefer a cooked meal in the fields to the 
bread distributed after 1957. The work force responded with a 
"blank refusal". (97) Some men felt that if they were given a hot meal 
in the fields it was because the company expected them to stay in 
the fields longer; others because they could eat their bread in the 
intervals between tasks. Hot meals meant taking plates to the fields 
which would get lost. SSE therefore decided against making any 
change. (98) Workers were still only receiving bread or another 
porridge in the fields as late as 1970. (99) 
For 27 years SSE managed to avoid the law which stipulated 
that workers were to receive three meals a day. When the authorities 
finally clamped down on the company it was able to manouevre in such 
a way that the letter of the law was adhered to 
but its spirit ignored. 
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Workers were given a bread roll to eat in the fields, and thus technically, 
they received a second meal. They were still given no break and the 
excessive tasks continued. Indeed the task system and the ticket 
system remained unchanged and the appropriation of an hour's unpaid 
labour in lieu of the break continued. (100) 
The Disadvantages of Uncooked Rations 
Apart from the advantages already demonstrated, there were 
also disadvantages in issuing uncooked rations. Firstly, estate 
management recognised that men who received their only substantial 
meal of the day late in the afternoon were often too hungry and tired 
to prepare their meals properly. Thus it was not uncommon for men 
to receive their rations, "stir some mealie flour into cold water and 
drink it. "(101) The General Field Manager added "provided native 
prejudice could be overcome, the cooking of rations, efficiently 
managed, would give good results from the point of view of the health 
and productive capacity of our labour. "(102) Yet, despite this apparent 
advantage, SSE consistently avoided changing to cooked rations. Its 
reasons, as I have already tried to show, revolved around the additional 
costs involved in running canteens, employing cooks, providing cutlery and 
crockery, and allowing workers meal breaks. Related to these, was 
the fact that the company did not necessarily stand to save on labour 
costs by employing a healthy work force. Chapter VIII will show that 
men who were genuinely sick seldom sought 
hospital treatment, and that 
the treatment provided was minimal. Men on the other hand, who were 
debilitated through undernourishment but who nevertheless turned out 
for work were denied food and payment 
if they failed to complete their 
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tasks. From them SSE appropriated unpaid labour. The only cost 
which accrued to the company from maintaining such workers on its 
books was the cost of housing. This was a fixed cost which had to 
be supported whether the men were healthy or sick. Obviously there 
was a limit after which an unhealthy work force became a liability 
to the company, It had at least to cover the cost of recruiting 
workers and had to ensure that they entered production. However, 
it can be assumed that the diet the company offered was sufficient, on 
average, to sustain workers in production for the duration of the 
contract. SSE was not concerned about the long-term health of the 
labour force. What happened to men after they had completed their 
contracts was not of interest to the company. 
A second advantage of introducing cooked food, according to 
SSE's General Manager was that it would lead to a saving on flour. 
A kilo of cooked mealie flour does not by any means 
represent a kilo of raw flour. The average labourer 
cannot eat a full kilo of flour daily. At Marromeu 
when rations were cooked the consumption per Anguru 
was only about 800 grammes daily and even so there 
was considerable wastage of cooked food thrown away 
after meals. (103) 
Related to the saving on flour was the possibility of reducing 
absenteeism "since to obtain his food the labourer must go to work 
or go to hospital. He cannot build up a reserve of cooked food. "(104) 
The monotony of the diet, and the large quantities of flour 
which made up the bulk of the daily diet meant that men were seldom 
able to eat all the rations distributed. 
By cooking together in 
groups, or by saving some of the excess 
flour, men were able to build 
up a reserve of food which they either used 
for trade to supplement 
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their diet and buy small luxuries or kept against the days when 
they did not work. 
The natives themselves of course infinitely prefer the issue of raw food since, the ration of flour being in excess of their daily needs and messing 
as they do five or six together, they cook 
only about three fifths of the flour and build 
up a reserve of the remainder which they use for barter or keep for days when they do not feel inclined to work. In addition to this, food discs have a definite monetary value and 
are used as currency when sufficient stock of 
poco /-food 7 has been accumulated. (105) 
Ironically, the incentive value of the ticket system, whereby 
the worker only received food after the task had been completed, 
was in part undermined by the distribution of too much food of a 
certain kind. Day to day absenteeism which the distribution of 
excessive quantities of flour encouraged disrupted field work and 
upset labour calculations in the short term. In the long term, the 
company recouped some of the losses disruption implied, for men who did 
not complete their contracts were made to work an extended contract 
and/or lost the wages owed to them. (106) Once again, therefore, it 
can be assumed that on balance the company preferred to support the 
costs of retaining a proportion of unproductive labour to incurring 
new costs that the introduction of cooked food would have entailed. 
Furthermore, the disadvantages of distributing uncooked food were also 
in part offset by the company's policy of buying back food tickets 
from the labour force. (107) 
One advantage of offering a monotonous diet and offering a 
diet which only just kept the labourer alive and working was that 
workers were encouraged to work for the weekly cash 
bonus which was 
234 
then spent in the company stores on the purchase of items which were 
lacking in the diet. By extending this policy to include the buying 
back of food tickets SSE consolidated its trade hold over the labour 
force. The money the worker received for the food ticket, which he 
then spent in the company stores was spent on items whose selling 
price already included a profit margin for the company. Thus, the 
three escudos which the worker received for his food ticket(108) was 
spent on items whose actual cost was less than three escudos. The 
company, through its stores was able to pocket the difference and 
thus give the worker less than the cost of the food he might otherwise 
have consumed. 
There have been various references made in this section to 
the reaction of the workers themselves to a change from uncooked to 
cooked food. The General Field Manager, in his assessment of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the two systems placed considerable 
emphasis on this factor. "To sum up - in a change from raw to cooked 
rations - probably the most serious obstacle would be the prejudice 
of the natives themselves. "(109) Uncooked rations allowed the workers 
the only control over their lives that they were able to exercise on 
the plantations. Not only were they able to decide when to eat, with 
whom, and how much to eat, but they were also able to vary their diet 
by bartering excess flour for other foods. In addition, they could 
sell or exchange their food tickets without the necessity of working 
an extra task to acquire the money to do so. The labourers also 
preferred uncooked food because they did not have to pause midday to 
eat a meal. They rightly felt that an hour's break which would 
have 
accompanied a cooked midday meal would have 
been appended to the working 
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day rather than deducted from it. For these reasons the men themselves 
opposed cooked food. SSE had never, however, shown itself to be 
over-concerned with the effect of its policies on the work-force. 
Thus its apparent concern for the workers' reaction to cooked food 
needs to be explained. 
Although labour was directly coerced into wage work by the 
colonial authorities private companies were still obliged to maintain 
recruiters and at least go through the motions of engaging labour 
independently. In practice, going through the motions usually amounted 
to picking up a contingent of men at the 'concentration' held outside 
the district administrative offices. There was always the danger, 
however, that the unwillingness of men from an area to go to a 
particular firm might have resulted in an enquiry into conditions 
in the work-place by the more enlightened colonial officials, and/or 
that administrators might have insisted on more rigorous recruiting 
by the firm. In other words, the more men who were prepared to sign up 
with the company directly, or as a result of the 'concentration' the 
less interference from the authorities, the less work for recruiters, 
and of course, as a result, the less the expense. There was no point 
in SSE denying its own interests simply because they coincided with the 
interests of the workers. 
Like its policy over the organisation of work and payment, 
SSE's food policy was dictated by the primary need to reduce the cost 
of labour. To this end SSE's food policy contained three principal 
elements. Firstly, the company sought to secure a cheap supply of 
foodstuffs from the local peasantry. This it did either directly 
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through the trading stores of its subsidiary company or indirectly 
through third parties. Secondly, SSE tried to exclude more expensive 
items of food from the diet. Not only, therefore, did the firm avoid 
giving the foods stipulated by law; a law which was weighted in the 
employer's favour, but it also resisted changes in the law designed to 
improve the quality of the diet. This it did in the full knowledge 
that the work force was under-nourished. When SSE was unable to 
avoid implementing new legislation it introduced token changes to 
pacify the authorities. In this respect the company's policy is 
strikingly similar to the policy it pursued with regard to 'coloured 
and assimilated' workers, (see Chapter V). When these tactics failed 
SSE made covert threats to the authorities, implying that it would cut 
back the production of sugar. Thirdly, SSE distributed the rations 
in the most economical way. Despite certain advantages accruing from 
the provision of cooked food SSE persisted in the distribution of 
uncooked rations. Apart from the savings made on kitchens, cooks and 
the like, the distribution of uncooked rations at the end of the day 
meant that only men who had completed the task demanded of them were 
given food. By ensuring, in this way, that that part of the indirect 
wage represented by food was only paid to labour engaged directly in 
production, SSE cut wages to a level related to the direct subsistence 
needs of the individual workers during the contract period. Yet, this 
was not the only advantage of distributing uncooked food. By 
withholding food, and hence that part of the wage represented by 
the daily ration, from workers who had worked but nevertheless 
failed 
to complete the stipulated task, SSE established an additional 
incentive to regular task completion. 
It is in relation to this aspect of the company's 
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policy that the second object of a monotonous 
diet becomes clear. Workers could barely survive on the food provided 
by the company. If they wished to vary their diet they had to work 
to earn the weekly cash bonus. This was then used, in part, at least, 
to purchase items locking in the diet; items which could most easily 
be purchased in the company's stores. Through the stores and the 
mark-up on the goods sold, SSE recovered part of the money paid out in 
bonuses. By allowing workers to sell their food discs in the some stores, 
SSE reduced the overall cost of rations since the price of the items 
exchanged for the discs already included a margin of profit for the 
company. 
At no time, except over the issue of cooked food, did SSE 
show any concern for the labour force. Even here the company's 
'concern' was motivated primarily by its own self-interest. Like 
pack-animals, workers at SSE had to be fed. They were fed just 
enough to keep them alive, for unlike pack animals, from SSE's point 
of view the working life of a labourer was approximately six months. 
After six months he was replaced by another man. The long term 
effects of the inadequate diet offered were of little interest to 
SSE. Similarly, as for as SSE was concerned, the quality of life 
on the plantations themselves was irrelevant. The company's primary, 
and indeed, only consideration, was to derive as much profit as it 
could from the exploitation of the labour force. By reducing 
expenditure on food it helped to fulfill this aim. 
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Group, May, 1975). 
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(3) SSE Ar., File 287, MT to Col. Hornung, 14 Jan. 1942, No. 9/42, 
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Hornung, 29 Jan. 1943, No. 14/43, Raw Sugar Sales to Natives. 
See also: SSE Ar., File 153, MT to Col. C. B. R. Hornung, 
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Province despite attempts by the government in the 1940s to 
break their control of trade and boost European competition. 
"The expansion of Asian commerce, in whose hands almost all trade 
with the natives is concentrated, has greatly contributed to 
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had refused to grant licences to Asians who wished to open new 
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de Mop., Prov. da Zamb4zia, Relat6rio do Governador, Capit6'o 
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In his 1958 Report the Governor of Zamb4zia remarked on the 
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Prov. de Moc., Governo da Zamb4zic, Relat6rio do Governador 
do Distrito, 1.1.1958 - 31.12.1958, p. --297). (Translation J. H. 
) 
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I 
CHAPTER VII 
HOUSING AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS 
AT SENA SUGAR ESTATES 
By law private employers were obliged to provide housing 
for workers whose home was not in the immediate vicinity of the 
work-place. (1) At SSE the housing provided consisted of huts grouped 
in compounds among the cane fields. Partly as a result of the large 
numbers of workers employed and partly as a result of the type of 
short-life housing provided, the numbers of huts needed was high. 
This in turn meant that the numbers of men employed on housing 
construction and maintenance was high. For instance, in 1931, a 
standard hut, consisting of a frame of wooden poles covered by 
tbdtched straw, required 22 men for initial construction. (2) Over 
the three year period of the hut's life a total of 32 men were needed 
to build and maintain the hut. (3) The break-down of labour employed 
on hut-building and maintenance on the three estates was as follows 
for the year 1931: 
Mopr. eia Marromeu Lu! Total(4) 
Head boys 3 3 
Carpenters 64 46 110 
Bricklayers 45 45 
Gangers 325 325 
Beach gang 
Unskilled men 14,666 16,258 22,342 
72 
53,266 
boys 71 71 
Total 14,730 16,446 22,716 53,892 
Daily average 47.2 52.7 72.8 
172.9 
The estimated cost of 53,892 labour days was £2,500, or, as 
the writer 
of the report put it, the interest at 6 per cent on a capital of 
£41,666.13 . 4. 
(5 ) 
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Besides the cost of employing labour which did not contribute 
directly to production, investment in housing (building materials, 
social and sanitary facilities) was also an investment which did 
not offer any direct return. Whereas the food provided for the 
labour force at SSE was only given to men who produced the daily 
task demanded of them, housing had to be provided whether the men 
completed their tasks, and indeed, whether they worked, or not. 
Hence, even more than in the case of food, it was in SSE's interests 
to reduce its expenditure on housing as for as possible. This 
chapter will examine the ways in which SSE tried to limit its 
investment in housing. The first part of the chapter will examine 
the company's policies with regard to the permanent compounds on 
the plantations. The second part will look at SSE's approach to the 
problem of the transit camps it was obliged to maintain on the major 
routes to the estates. 
WORKERS' HOUSING ON THE PLANTATIONS 
Building Materials: the Choice of Housing 
The typical hut of the 1930s was the thatched straw hut 
described above. Grass and reeds were gathered around the 
plantations. Most of the wooden support poles were taken from 
timber felled in the forests of SSE's concession. The cost of building 
materials was, therefore low. However, against the advantage of 
cheap building materials several disadvantages had to be weighed. 
Firstly, the wooden support poles were susceptible to attacks 
from 
white ants and had to be replaced frequently. 
(6) Secondly, as local 
forests were depleted of wood SSE would have to seek wood 
from 
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further afield and transport costs would increase. (7) Thirdly, 
straw huts required continual maintenance and only had a life of 
three years, after which they had to be completely rebuilt. (8) 
Fourthly, the men occupying the huts contributed to their 
deterioration. According to the Luabo Estate Manager the greatest 
damage to huts was caused by the occupants pulling out the roofing 
poles to use as firewood. (9) 
As a result of the disadvantages of the straw huts, as early 
as 1931, SSE sought alternatives. One possibility was to use all- 
iron portable buildings. This idea was rejected because it was 
felt that the huts would probably be too hot for the climate. (10) 
Another possibility was to use metal-frames covered with straw which 
was held in place by binding wire. This solution, it was felt, 
would prevent damage to the huts, since the binding wire would make 
it difficult for the men to pull the straw from the sides and roof, 
and the metal frames could not be used as firewood. Given an 
occasional coat of tar these huts could last for many years. 
Considerable savings could therefore be made on the cost of 
maintaining these huts. (11) 
SSE's Managing Director, with whom these possibilities were 
discussed was not however, convinced that the metal-framed huts 
were cheaper than wooden-framed huts. Writing in 1931 he pointed 
out that the original cost of a straw hut in Luabo was 
14 shillings. 
The cost of maintaining the hut for three years amounted 
to 18 
shillings. The total cost of a grass hut 
(building and maintenance) 
for three years was 107 shillings. At Marromeu the original gross 
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hut cost 16 shillings to build. Repairs over three years cost 
20 shillings. The total cost of a straw hut for ten years was 
120 shillings. (12) On the other hand the cost of an iron-framed 
building amounted to 115 shillings and eight pence for ten years; 
74 shillings and eight pence to purchase, transport and erect the 
frame and thatching at four shillings a year. The Managing Director 
also pointed out that whereas the calculations estimated labour 
costs at a shilling a day, they were in fact less and nearer to 
nine pence. Thus, iron-framed buildings were even more expensive 
than his calculations suggested since their price was fixed 
irrespective of local labour costs. (13) Nevertheless, in 1931, 
66 iron-framed huts were built, apparently on an experimental basis, 
at a total cost of £234.18.3. (14) 
A third alternative to the straw hut was a brick dwelling. 
However there were objections to this type of construction on health 
grounds. Firstly, white ants soon entered the walls which crumbled 
away and became a source of infection and lodging for insects of 
all sorts. Secondly, the floors of brick huts, which also harboured 
insects, could not be changed, whereas the floors of straw huts 
could be changed by resiting the structure. (15) Nevertheless, brick 
huts had one major advantage over iron-framed huts. They could be 
constructed entirely from local materials and paid for in escudos. 
Iron-frames, on the other hand, had to be imported, and a new 
currency decree made this disadvantageous. 
(16) SSE's local management 
therefore decided to build 100 brick huts on on experimental basis 
in 1933 despite the health risks. (17) However, four years 
later the 
experiment was condemned as a failure, 
largely on health grounds, 
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and the question of iron-framed 
Yet, by the time a decision was 
dwellings using imported frames 
Thereafter the Second World War 
obtaining materials seems to haý 
plans. (20) 
buildings was again raised. (18) 
taken to erect more permanent 
the price of the latter had risen. (19) 
and the general difficulties of 
ve led to a postponement on building 
After the war the company continued to discuss alternative 
types of housing, but it also continued to prevaricate and postpone 
a decision. Although the cost of straw huts rose as labour costs 
increased(21) the high initial capital outlay on new housing seems 
to have been the major reason for the lack of new building programmes. 
This, at least, was the reason advanced by the Administrator of 
Chinde for the company's lack of action. He noted in 1952 that all 
previous administrative reports had remarked on the provisional 
nature of the accommodation provided by SSE. Yet despite these 
repeated criticisms in 1952 all of the 2350 huts on the nine Luabo 
compounds were made of straw. SSE justified this situation on 
the grounds that it could not construct more permanent dwellings 
because of the nature of the subsoil and the threat of frequent 
flooding. The Administrator felt that this was simply an excuse. 
In my opinion and looking at the problem super- 
ficially, it seems to me that the justification 
is a mere expedient for avoiding greater expenses. 
In truth, 2,350 brick-built huts... could not, 
I think be built for less than 11,750 contos; 
that is, taking as the basis (of the calculation) 
a minimum estimate of 5000 escudos per hut. (22) 
SSE continued to prevaricate until 1954 when -the Governor of 
Zambezia finally insisted on improvements in accommodotion. (23) 
In that year SSE gave an undertaking to build permanent 
housing for 
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its workers. The programme was to begin in 1955 with 300 huts 
a year until all the straw huts on the Luabo compounds were 
replaced. (24) Yet, eight years later, in 1963, Hornung and Company 
"regretted" that the old-fashioned straw hut still predominated on 
both estates. SSE's Management Company felt unable to improve 
the amenities of the African labour force unless it received higher 
prices for its sugar. 
The SSE's contribution to the evolution of possibly 
the largest concentration of labour in Mozambique 
is coming to a standstill because the value of 
their produce does not suffice to meet the 
additional expenditure which we all know should 
be undertaken in the general interest. One simply 
must presume that the Government have weighed 
up the facts and considered that there is no 
great urgency to increase the value of the sugar 
produced despite the general advantages which 
the increased profitability of the company 
would produce. (25) 
On only two of the eight Luabo compounds and one of the seven 
Marromeu compounds were there any brick huts. Major rebuilding was 
out of the question because of the company's limited budget. 
As SSE's General Manager remarked: "We cannot indulge in this kind 
of investment without reducing costs to the very minimum. "(26) 
Thus, despite the inadequacy of the straw huts and the existence 
of more suitable types of housing most workers at SSE in the 
mid 1960s were still living in huts similar to those occupied by 
their predecessors in the 1930s. Notwithstanding frequent plans 
to replace the straw huts nothing was done to improve housing on 
the estates because improving housing ultimately meant increasing 
labour costs, and hence the overall cost of production. 
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The Lay out of the Compounds and the Provision of General Facilities 
Between 1930 and 1960 the number of compounds on SSE's 
plantations varied as some were demolished and resited and others 
were enlarged or reduced in size. Over the 30 year period however 
there were between six and nine compounds on each estate. (27) The 
numbers of men living in each of the compounds also varied. 
For example, in 1939, SSE's doctor stated that there were 3500 
people living on one of the Marromeu compounds. (28) In 1956 there 
were 609 workers living on the Caoxe compound in Luabo, although 
the total numbers were probably higher since some workers were 
accompanied by their families. (29) In 1965 it was estimated that 
on average 1000 workers lived on each of the Luabo compounds. (30) 
The huts on the compounds were arranged in straight lines 
at a set distance from each other. (31) The dimensions of the huts 
changed little over the years. For example, in 1931, a round 
straw hut had a diameter of 12 feet. The walls were six feet high. 
The conical roof gave the hut a maximum height of 12 feet where the 
roof reached an apex in the centre of the hut. Within this space 
five men were expected to sleep and live out the 
free hours of the 
contract. (32) In 1944, eight men were housed in a 
hut whose diameter 
was approximately 16 feet (4.20 metres) despite the 
fact that the 
law forbade the lodging of more than six men in a hut and insisted 
on a surface area of four metres per man. 
(33) The brick huts built 
in the 1950s had a surface area of 16 square metres. 
(34) There is 
no record of how many men they housed 
but since they appear to 
have been based on the provincial governor's recommended 
design it 
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is reasonable to assume that they accommodated the numbers he 
suggested, namely, five or six men. (35) 
Workers whose wives accompanied them to the estates were 
given a hut to themselves of the some type as that given to single 
workers. Only in the 1960s were houses specifically designed for men 
with families. Originally these were planned to have an inside area 
of four times three metres. However, anxious to reduce the cost of 
these houses SSE asked the builder for a discount price. He 
agreed to build 60 houses for 15,800 escudos each instead of the 
original 19,200 escudos, providing one or two modifications were 
made. These included a reduction in size to 3.50 times three metres. (36) 
No furniture was provided inside the huts. Indeed, the straw 
huts had neither hearths nor windows, although both were later 
provided in the brick huts. (37) Not until the 1960s was mosquito 
netting placed over the windows of huts that had them, despite the 
fact that malaria was endemic in the region. (38) The floors of 
the huts seem to have consisted of beaten earth. (39) It is not 
clear whether SSE provided straw mats for the workers to sleep on 
or whether the men brought mats to the estates with them, but 
whichever, it was only in the 1960s that metal beds were provided. 
In conformity with the Co'digo de Trabalho Rural, which in 1962 
replaced the C6digo (and Regulamento) do Trabalho dos Indigenas, 
SSE ordered 2000 beds made of a sheet of solid steel. (40) No 
mattresses were provided for the new beds. The provision of 
mattresses was not written into the law and SSE felt unable to 
provide them without formal compulsion. "No action whatsoever 
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should be taken about providing mattresses unless we are absolutely 
forced to do so, as the cost is so high. "(41) The beds alone 
cost £30,000 for something under 20,000 workers, with mattresses 
as well the total cost would have risen to over £100,000. (42) Instead, 
SSE investigated the possibility of using stretched tarpaulins or 
beds without mattresses. This the company did without informing 
the authorities, in case the latter insisted on the provision of 
mattresses. (43) 
By law kitchens were also supposed to have been provided 
where six to 12 workers could cook together. (44) However, the law 
was ignored and there were few kitchens on the compounds. Writing 
in 1962 about changes to be implemented on the compounds in line with 
the government's new labour policy, one of SSE's Directors noted 
that apart from two kitchens in Luabo and two in Marromeu which had 
been improved in preparation for a visit by inspectors of the 
International Labour Organisation, the kitchens on the other compounds 
were a disgrace. He added: 
All kitchens should be completely mosquito-proofed 
with a cement floor which can be washed daily and 
have a sheeted roof. Within a year of the thatched 
roof being renewed an endless stream of insects and 
dried grass is falling into the food being cooked 
below. (45) 
In general the men were expected to cook their rations wherever 
they could, either inside or outside the huts. 
Not until 1962 was the idea of providing electric 
light 
mooted. The decision, was, however, postponed, although management 
recognised that electric lighting would become a necessity within 
five years. (46) In 1962 one of SSE's Directors wrote 
that illumination 
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could be disregarded for the time being "because rising at four in 
the mornings the compound population is perfectly happy to eat at 
dusk and sleep immediately after. "(47) 
There were few trees on the compounds. Some planting of 
fruit trees had been ordered in the 1940s following government 
pressure but little was done after this. Apart from a grass hut 
where workers could meet, a weekly scribe who read and wrote 
letters for workers on some compounds, and the occasional showing 
of a heavily censored film, there were no recreational facilities 
provided. Workers were expected to work, eat and sleep and to make 
their own amusements if they had either the time or inclination for 
leisure activities. (48) 
Sanitary Arrangements on the Compounds 
It was not until the 1960s that SSE seriously turned its 
attention to providing adequate running water on the compounds, 
, although the company's management had long been awcre of 
the 
inadequacy of the arrangements that existed. For instance, in 1943, 
following a general inspection of the compounds on the Marromeu 
Estate SSE's General Manager declared himself surprised at their 
poor state of repair. He placed the blame 
for this situation on 
the company's management rather than on the compound manager and 
ordered that things must change completely. 
(49) The General Manager 
recognised that all the work could not 
be completed in one year but 
insisted that the problem of water supply was to 
be tackled immediately. 
Bore holes were to be sunk and concrete cement rings were 
to be 
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placed around the wells. (50) The General Manager then ordered a 
report on the compounds and called for an estimate of the work to 
be done. He listed the following as priority areas: water supply, 
suitable drainage, brick huts for first aid assistance, the planting 
of fruit trees and strips of pineapples and the building of a 
limited number of latrines. (51) 
In 1945 the list of necessary repairs and an estimate of 
their cost was presented to the General Manager. Four out of the 
six Marromeu compounds required reconstruction. Three required 
wells and two needed to be resited, one because of lack of water in 
part of the compound and overcrowding, the other because there was 
no water at all on the compound. Water was brought to the compound 
in a tank. Four compounds needed levelling and drainage. The other 
improvements were those outlined by the General Manager in 1943. 
The total cost of the necessary work was estimated at £2,330. (52) 
Despite this estimate, in 1962, the water supply on the compounds 
was still inadequate. In some instances one well supplied the whole 
compound. (53) Two years later the situation was little different. 
Only two compounds had water laid on with drinking fountains and 
sinks for washing clothes. The other 13 compounds on the two 
estates still relied on wells and consequently had neither drinking 
fountains nor sinks. (54) 
Following a visit to the estates by the government Labour 
Inspectors in 1962 SSE's management was obliged to improve the 
sanitary arrangements on the compounds. Referring to the problem of 
water supply Major Du Boulay, in a letter to 
the company's Managing 
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Director, remarked that each compound should be provided with a 
well. The well could be supplied with a hand driven pump since 
there were a number of men on the compounds who did not work in the 
fields and who could therefore maintain the water supply. (55) It is 
instructive to compare this observation with one made earlier by the 
company's General Manager. Writing to the engineer in charge of 
building a new transit camp at Mopeia in 1959 he instructed that 
an engine-driven pump was to be installed to supply the well. 
The water tank supplying the camp could only be filled in five 
hours with the existing hand pump. This was most inconvenient 
since at times there were "hundreds" of natives in the compound. (56) 
The lack of piped water on the compounds meant that water 
for washing and lavatories which flushed were also not provided. 
For much of the period of the study men were expected to wash in 
rivers and streams and to defecate and urinate where they could. 
"We did not have latrines and we washed in the river... We fetched 
water from the River Mapancane. There were a lot of crocodiles there 
and many of us were eaten. "(57) The testimony of these former workers 
at SSE is supported by the evidence of the company's own doctor. 
Referring to sanitary arrangements in the fields he noted in his 
report covering the period January to June 1939 that "some lavatories 
were improvised along the railway line, next to the cane fields, 
where the water flows relatively quickly towards the interior of the 
plantation and joins some other small rivers, in order not to 
leave the cane fields infected. "(58) In the same year the 
doctor 
criticised the sanitary arrangements on the compound adjoining the 
Marromeu factory, 
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The water of the Zambesi flows upstream and 
downstream from the factory almost imperceptibly 
in a slow backwash, accumulating for this reason 
a great quantity of organic matter etc., exactly 
in a spot super-inhabited by 3,500 natives. And 
it is in this water that the natives wash and 
according to their habits, after their ablutions 
wash their mouths!!!... (59) 
In 1942 the same company doctor again criticised SSE. On 
this occasion he took the company to task over the complete lack 
of hygiene and sanitary facilities in the flour mill at Marromeu. 
He noted that the men worked 12 hour shifts in the mill. The shifts 
changed weekly so that the men worked one week of nights and the 
next of days. The night shift was locked in the mill and the 
supervisor kept the key. Having remarked on the obvious fire-risks 
attendant on such a procedure the doctor then pointed to some of the 
other dangers involved. 
If by chance any worker needs to defecate it is 
there that he does it using a sack or a rag 
(generally a sack) to keep the excrement until 
he has finished his shift... afterwards he is 
obliged to pick up the sack and throw it away. 
In cases where a worker has to pass water, it is 
obvious that he cannot go out. He has to do it 
there as well, but this cannot be picked up and 
thrown away when work is over because it is a 
liquid and therefore it stays inside the... 
building where there are tens of bogs of flour... 
it is beyond understanding that a place where 
flour is milled, a product which is handled 
for human consumption, also serves as a urinal 
and a place for def ecation. (6O) 
Not until the 1950s is further mention made of 
the provision 
of lavatories in SSE's records. However the evidence 
that emerges 
in that period suggests that during the intervening years 
little 
had changed. In 1956, for instance, a government 
inspection which 
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was initiated after the discovery of an "excessive" mortality rate 
at SSE, revealed the inadequacy of the sanitary arrangements on the 
estates. SSE was told to initiate a latrine-building campaign 
among the workforce and a design of a simple pit latrine with a 
grass shelter was sent to the company. In a revealing statement 
the Government Medical Officer wrote that firms which did not provide 
lavatory facilities for their workers would be reported to the 
authorities. (61) 
The next reference to lavatories and washing facilities was 
made in 1962. Again, it seems that little had been done to improve 
the situation after the 1956 inspection. Referring to changes the 
company would have to introduce as a result of the Government's 
new policy towards African workers one of SSE's directors remarked 
that "money must be spent on lavatories and showers for the compounds. " 
He added "This, however, is expenditure which has been legally 
necessary for some years but it has been put off by the company and 
the authorities have closed their eyes to the problem. "(62) Elsewhere 
discussing the same matter the director reiterated this point. 
Sanitary arrangements depended on the legislation but this was 
not strictly enforced and itself depended on the personal inter- 
pretation of the senior medical officers who carried out inspections. 
He added, however, that following a visit from the ILO Inspectors 
SSE's arrangements had been criticised. The criticisms were valid. 
The latrines provided at SSE were "somewhat rustic" and inadequate 
in number. They were also often inconveniently sited, serving only 
one side of the compound. (63) The company would therefore 
have to 
make improvements. Legally one lavatory was supposed 
to be provided 
260 
for ten men. According to the Director this was for too many and 
also far too expensive an undertaking, for the compound population 
ranged fron 1000 to nought over the crop cycle. The Director 
therefore decided that lavatory accommodation for 300-400 men would 
be 'ample'. He added that if this was provided SSE would have more 
facilities than any other large employer of labour in Mozambique. (64) 
Since a decision had already been taken to provide 30 showers on 
each of the compounds(65) it was decided to adapt the "normal simple 
type of latrine" in the same building as the shower room. These 
would be sited in three blocks on each compound "taking account of 
the prevailing wind and drainage. " Each block was to have its own 
well and manual pump and an adequate water supply was to be kept in 
the roof. (66) Elsewhere in an unsigned document written in the same 
year it was noted that the company would not be able to rely on 
wells to supply the showers and lavatories with water. Wells 
occasionally failed, even when there were enough for this purpose. 
Instead boreholes would have to be sunk which supplied overhead 
tanks through diesel operated pumps. (67) However, despite these 
plans, two years later in 1964, SSE's chief labour inspector wrote 
in his annual report that the Luabo compounds still did not have 
enough lavatories and one compound still had the old sort, namely 
a fenced area containing a pit in the earth. (68) 
THE TRANSIT COMPOUNDS 
Besides the permanent compounds situated on the estates 
SSE 
also maintained a number of transit camps along 
the main routes taken 
by workers on their journey to and from the plantations. 
By law 
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these camps had to be situated in places where large numbers of 
'natives' normally gathered to await transport and to rest from their 
journey. (69) Apart from the injunction that the camps had to 
have "sufficient capacity for the shelter and lodging of workers 
in transit"(70) the law did not regulate the accommodation to be 
offered, nor did it discuss the sanitary facilities to be provided. 
Furthermore, the law governing the numbers of men to be housed in 
the some building was specifically waived in the case of transit 
camps. 
In the dwellings to be built a type of small 
detached house, arranged in regular lines, will 
be adopted, it not being permitted to house more 
than six workers in the same compartment, except 
in the case of camps for workers in transit or 
buildings designed to receive contingents who 
will be distributed to the differ nt wor - 
Paces. 7 (emphasis added) 
the lack of legislation governing the conditions in transit camps 
meant that employers were not obliged to provide even the minimal 
facilities available in the permanent camps. The following two 
sections will examine the effects of this legislation, or rather 
lack of it, on SSE's transit camps. 
The Journey to the Estates 
The outer radius of SSE's recruiting zone in Zamb4'zia was 
the 
about 320 kilometres from the estates as the crow 
flies. From the 
District capital of Angonic it was about 400 kilometres 
to Marromeu 
as the crow flies. By law private firms were obliged 
to use rail 
and river transport to carry their workers to and 
from the workplace 
if these means of transport were available. 
(72) Two rail lines were 
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used by SSE's recruiters. One took men from Angonia to Dona Ana in 
the Mutarara District where they transferred to the company's river 
steamers to complete their journey. The other took men from Mocuba 
to Nicoadala in Zombezia. Nevertheless men still had to walk from 
their own homes to the rail head and from Nicoadala to Mopeia if they 
came from central or northern Zambezia; a distance of approximately 
120 kilometres. (73) Only in the 1940s were lorries introduced to 
take the workers between the main recruiting areas and the railway 
or steamers and the last leg of the journey from Nicoadala to Mopeia. 
However, the lorry service was unreliable. In part the weather was 
responsible. The dirt roads of the district were affected both by 
heavy rains during the wet season and intense heat during the dry 
season. Often impassable during the rains the roads were bumpy and 
dusty in the summer. (74) Hence, long after the lorry service was 
introduced there were often considerable delays in providing workers 
with transport, which not infrequently resulted in men walking part 
of the journey to and from the estates. (75) 
One of the stretches of road most affected by the weather 
was that between Mopeic, where SSE's main reception camp was situated, 
and the railhead at Nicoadala. Here the introduction of 
lorries 
had led to the gradual running down of the transit camps which 
had 
formerly provided overnight shelter for workers who walked 
this 
stretch of the journey. By 1952 these camps were 
"in a very poor 
state of repair. " Of the six camps, "grass sheds'; along 
this stretch 
of the road only two had been purpose-built as compounds. 
The others 
were cotton markets whose installations 
had been modified to serve 
as overnight resting places for workers 
in transit-(76) 
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Another casualty of the introduction of the lorry service 
was the main transit camp at Nicoadala. The site on which this was 
to have been constructed had been abandoned by SSE after criticism 
on public health grounds. (77) In its place the company built a new 
camp some 12 kilometres from the town. However, the unreliability 
of the lorry service and its frequent failure to co-ordinate with 
the arrival and departure of trains often meant that workers had to 
spend several days waiting in Nicoadala for transport or travel back 
and forth to Licaure until the train arrived. After one particularly 
distressing delay in 1945 the Provincial Governor of Zamb4zia ordered 
SSE to abandon the Licaure compound and resite the camp in Nicoadala. 
The Governor supported his order with evidence which showed that 300 
men had arrived in Nicoadala on 16th December 1944. It was raining 
heavily and there was no train. The next train was due on the 20th 
December. The men, who had left the estates six days earlier, 
therefore either had to wait another four days in Nicoadala without 
shelter or make a further return trip to Licaure. (78) SSE's representative 
in Quelimane, in his reply, said that the company would certainly 
consider building a camp in Nicoadala like those along the rood to 
Mopeia. The Governor rejected this proposal. He wanted to see the 
construction of a more permanent building because the example he 
cited was not the first occasion on which men had been obliged to 
spend several nights in Nicoadala waiting for a train which only 
left on Wednesdays and Saturdays. (79) This was confirmed by 
SSE's General Manager, who confessed that better organisation was 
needed to ensure that men did not arrive in Nicoadala on days when 
the train was not running. (80) 
SSE's justification for not building proper transit camps 
was based on its view that the workers only spent one night in the 
shelter provided, and that this shelter, therefore, only needed to 
be temporary and rudimentary. The introduction of the lorry service 
allowed the company to avoid further investment in many of these camps. 
However, since the lorry service operated erratically and was often 
unco-ordinated with the rail service the end result was that workers 
either had to wait for several days in places where no shelter was 
provided or spend nights in camps which were unfit for human 
habitation. 
Conditions in the Camps 
Following a government inspection of the main reception camp 
at Mopeia in 1951 the authorities ordered SSE to make immediate 
improvements in the sanitary arrangements and living conditions 
offered. In their report the inspectors criticised almost everything 
about the camp. They wrote that it consisted of a brick shed covered 
by a corrugated iron roof. It was completely lacking in furniture 
and did not even contain bunks for the workers. The roof was not 
lined which meant that there was a great difference between the day 
and night-time temperature. The camp had no lavatories, instead 
there was an open ditch which workers were expected to use. There 
were no kitchens and the building could not accommodate the numbers 
of men who gathered there and who stayed there at any one time. 
(81) 
SSE replied to the inspectors' criticisms one 
by one. In 
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so doing it admitted that the conditions described were 
the conditions 
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which existed. Nevertheless, the company tried to suggest that the 
conditions were not as bad as the inspectors suggested. Thus, 
referring to the lack of space within the building SSE's General 
Manager remarked, 
It Fthe building 7 has ample space to shelter, at 
any one time, the maximum number of natives who happen to be passing through IAopeia... if we take into con- 
sideration the existence of wide verandas and the 
possibility of sheltering a large number of natives 
on the ground, that is, under the main floor, whenever 
necessary, for protection against the sun and rains. (82) 
In reply to other points made by the inspectors SSE's General 
Manager tried to suggest the company itself recognised the inadequacy 
of the existing arrangement but was hampered by the 'natives' wishes. 
For instance, in relation to the difference between the day-time and 
night-time temperature, the General Manager wrote: 
Obviously there are, as in all identical cases, 
differences in temperature between night and day, 
which, besides, are generally found in all other 
buildings in these parts, but the undeniable 
fact must be borne in mind that the natives... 
normally opt to sleep in the open, sheltering 
inside the hangar only in the rainy season, 
when by force of circumstances the temperature 
inside drops automatically. (83) 
Replying to the criticism about the lack of kitchens the General 
Manager wrote: "in fact it has been the habit and custom of the 
natives in transit to cook in groups here and there, which they 
choose themselves, but we are the first to admit that it would be 
useful and advisable to have a kitchen for that purpose. "(84) 
Nevertheless, no immediate action was taken, for two years later 
the local administrator remarked on the deficiencies of the camp 
in his annual report. He noted that the building could not 
accommodate the 200 or 300 men who stayed there 
for two or three 
days at a time. SSE had been told to enlarge the 
building but 
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continually made excuses to avoid doing so. One of these excuses 
included the argument that the verandas were wide enough to afford 
workers shelter. The Administrator, did, however, remark that 
the showers and sanitary facilities were adequate. (85) 
Not all the transit camps were like the camp at Mopeia. 
The state of the transit camps varied individually and over time. 
Thus, for example, in the same year that the Administrator of Mopeia 
criticised the conditions in the camp at Mopeia the Administrator 
of Mocuba visited the transit camp there. He wrote that 20,000 
workers passed through it annually. The food provided was adequate. 
The camp had good dormitories, a first aid post and food stores. 
It also had showers with hot and cold water. (86) Like the Mocuba 
camp the new camp in Nicoadala was also given a favourable report 
by the local Administrator in 1953. He wrote that 5000 'natives' 
passed through it each year on their way to Luabo from Nhamarroi, 
Pebane, Ile, Lugela, Maganja da Costa and Mocuba. There were 200 
workers in the camp at any one time. The camp had good showers and 
lavatories. The food given met the legal requirements, although this 
only after an inspector's report had led to improvements in the diet. 
The compound had a kitchen and a refectory. It also had water. (87) 
The favourable reports on conditions in the Nicoadala and 
Mocuba camps, were not, however, representative of general conditions. 
Both camps were atypical in that they were the most important of 
SSE's transit compounds. They received a continual flow of workers 
throughout the year, and over the year as a whole accommodated a 
very large number of men. Thus, to the 
degree that SSE could not 
266 
267 
avoid improving conditions when rebuilding was undertaken it could 
in part offset the cost of the facilities provided against the large 
numbers of men using the camps. This was not, however, the case with 
smaller camps. Here the costs of installing permanent buildings, 
kitchens, lavatories and showers were proportionately much greater 
when only a few men used the camps at any one time. Thus until the 
1960s, conditions on the smaller compounds which served individual 
catchment areas rather than a wide recruiting zone remained much as 
they had been in the 1940s and 1950s. As late as 1962 there was no 
compound at all in Baixo Licungo. When workers needed to shelter 
from the rain they spread out over the verandas of shops. In Mugeba 
too no shelter was provided for recruited men. All that existed 
there was a brick house for the African auxiliary and a hut for the 
compound guard. Similarly, in Pebane, Mualama, Naburi, Morrumbala 
and Mutara there were no facilities for recruited men. Finally, 
in Angonia the few huts which existed were not used by contracted 
workers. Here, as in many of the places mentioned above there was 
urgent need for a new compound. (88) Thus, despite the 
law which 
ordered that shelter was to be provided for workers in transit and 
despite the pressure exerted at various times by the authorities, 
SSE was content to allow its migrant labourers to sleep 
in the open 
without any protection from the rain, without cooking and 
sanitary facilities, until well into the 
1960s. 
Like its policies with regard to the provision of 
food, SSE's 
policy towards workers' accommodation was shaped around 
the need to 
reduce labour costs. By cutting 
down on the expenditure on housing 
SSE indirectly cut the wages of the labour 
force, for housing costs 
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were part of the total wage paid to the company's workers. In pursuit 
of this aim SSE's policy revolved around the provision of just 
enough shelter to keep the work force alive and at work, and at the 
same time just enough shelter to satisfy the authorities. Besides 
seeking to build only the cheapest type of accommodation possible, 
SSE also sought to house as many men as possible within the huts 
constructed, for the more men who could be accommodated in the some 
space the less the cost of housing and ultimately of labour. This 
reasoning was also applied to the sanitary and recreational facilities 
on the compounds. The former simply did not exist and the latter 
were rudimentary in the extreme. Effectively, SSE managed to avoid 
providing lavatories, showers and even an adequate supply of 
drinking water on the compounds until the 1960s. As a result its 
compounds were overcrowded, unsalubrious and generally forlorn in 
appearance. Indeed, so depressing were they, that in 1962 the 
authorities insisted on immediate improvements "to remove the gloomy 
air of concentration camps that they generally have. "(89) 
Yet, if conditions were bad on the permanent compounds on 
the estates, they were, if anything, worse on the transit camps. 
Resting on the argument that only temporary shelter was needed for 
workers in transit, for much of the period under study SSE avoided 
the construction of anything other than grass sheds. The introduction 
of lorry transport worsened the plight of workers, for the company 
could use the excuse of transport as a reason for further neglecting 
the existing camps. Only on the large and permanent 'showpiece' 
transit camps, and even then, only during the 1950s, were facilities 
matching those on the permanent compounds provided. On the smaller 
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camps in the interior of the province no facilities at all were 
provided for many of the workers in transit. 
SSE's policy of deliberate neglect was only possible with 
the tacit approval of the authorities. However, at times, even the 
authorities were shocked at the conditions on SSE's compounds and 
insisted on changes. To avoid undertaking improvements, which 
would have increased costs, SSE stalled the authorities with tactics 
which should by now be familiar. These tactics were of three main 
types. The first consisted of informing the authorities that the 
company was about to do something and initiating small-scale 
programmes. In this way SSE could postpone the day when real changes 
were introduced. (90) The second involved the use of arguments which 
stressed the company's policy of providing the facilities that the 
workers themselves demanded. The third emphasised the limitations 
imposed on the company by the environment. An argument of this 
type was the one which emphasised the poor drainage and sub-soil. 
It should be noted, however, that these limitations did not prevent 
the construction of a sugar factory nor the construction of two- 
storey brick houses for European staff both of which were adjacent 
to African 'temporary' housing. When these arguments failed SSE 
invoked as a defence of its policies the low prices it received for 
its sugar on the protected Portuguese market. 
(The 
reasons for the 
occasional concern of the authorities, especially when the whole 
organisation of 'native' policy was designed to further employers' 
interests, is beyond the scope of this study. However, the effects 
of this tacit approval of SSE's policies was the existence 
in the 
mid-1960s of housing and sanitary conditions on its estates which 
had been condemned as early as the 1940s. (91) 
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(1) Rh , Art. 214, p. 64. 
(2) SSE Ar., File 118, Native Compound, n. n. to General Manager, 15 Dec. 1931, Native Huts. 
(3) SSE Ar., File 118, M. Durante Estate Manager Luabo to Col. 
C. B. R. Hornung Mopea, 22 July 1931. In the first year 14 
men were neede d to erect the hut and four men to repair it, during the sec ond year six men were needed to maintain the hut and during the third year eight men. 
(4) SSE Ar., File 118, Native Labour emp loyed on Straw Barracks 1931, Mopea, 1 8 Feb. 1932. 
(5) ibid. 
(6) SSE Ar., File 118, Mr Nurse Marromeu to Col. Hornung Luabo, 
22 July 1931. 
(7) By 1937 the timber situation was critical and the company 
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reasonable cost (SSE Ar., File 118, General Manager to 
SSE London, 9 July 1937, Steel Frames for Native Huts). 
(8) SSE Ar., File 118, CBR Hornung to Captain G. Hornung, 23 July 
1931, Iron Frames for Native Huts. 
(9) SSE Ar., File 118, JAK (Knip? ) to General Manager Mopea, 
28 Oct. 1931 Grass Huts. The company took punitive action 
against workers whose huts were found damaged. "Regarding 
the destruction of the huts by natives, by pulling grass 
from roof and sides and occasional upright poles for 
lighting fires. Since my arrival at Luabo the procedure 
adopted has been, any hut found partly destroyed, the labour 
occupying such hut were sent, after their daily task had been 
completed, to cut the necessary grass or pole and replace, 
and only after which were they given their food and pay 
ticket. " (SSE Ar., File 118, Durante to Hornung, 22 July 
1931, op. cit. ). 
(10) SSE Ar., File 118, JAK to General Manager, 28 Oct. 1931, 
op. cit. 
(11) ibid. 
(12) SSE Ar., File 118, CBR Hornung to Captain G. Hornung, 
23 July 1931, op. cit. The higher cost of huts at Marromeu 
is probably explained by the higher wages men received on 
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(13) ibid. 
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Government Side, Gerente da Feitoria Marromeu to Gerente 
Geral, 15 June 1944, No. 31/44 Mgt., Relatörio da Propriedade 
de Marromeu/Cain Referente ao Ano do 1944 e Pianos para as 
Condigoes apöz Guerra). 
(22) AHM, NI 194,1952-1957, Relato*rios dos Agentes do Curador e 
Delegados de Saüde, No. 46, Concelho do Chinde, 1952,2° 
Semestre., Relat6rio de Mäo-de-Obra, Adm. Julio dos Santos 
Peixe, 17 Dec. 1952. The only huts which were not made of 
straw were 15 huts on the "Auxiliares" compound. In the 
same report the Administrator wrote that SSE's workers at 
Chinde lived six men to a hut measuring 5.70 x 4.30 metres. 
The huts were made of palm leaves, were badly finished and 
were "extremely deficient. " Elsewhere in the report Peixe 
discussed the living conditions of the woodcutters SSE 
employed at Chinde. Some of the 460 men employed in this 
capacity lived at home. Others were housed in huts on two 
compounds made of wattle and daub covered with palm leaves 
or grass. He remarked that these huts were "badly finished 
and, in my opinion, hardly suitable to instal workers in. 
They are called temporary compounds but the truth is that 
they have been in the same place for a pretty long time. " 
(Translations J. H. ) 
(23) SSE Ar., File 118, NHDB to SSE Ltd. Luabo, 13 Sep. 1954, 
No. 270/54, 'A; Account No. 851, Compounds. 
(24) SSE Ar., File 118, MT Gerente Geral SSE to Admin. do Concelho 
do Chinde, 30 Oct. 1954, No. 645/54/HO, Acampamentos pars 
Indigenas no Luabo, Gradual Construpo de Habitagoes 
Permanentes. SSE's Managing Director agreed to spend 
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(24) (continued 
£15,000 in 1955 in addition to the money normally put aside for compound maintenance. This money was intended "to go some way" towards meeting the Governor of Zambezia's requirements (SSE Ar., File 118, NHDB to SSE Luabo, 13 Sep. 1954, op. cit. ). 
(25) SSE Ar., File 133A, Recruiting, An onia Quelimane Local, Hornung and Co. Ltd. to AF Sousa, 4 Dec. 1963, No. 403/63, 
Recruiting Labour. 
(26) SSE Ar., File 133A, JPK to Hornung and Co. Ltd., 10 Aug. 1965, No. 303/65 Private Series, Recruiting and Labour; SSE Ar., Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., Relatorio Anual, Servico 
de Mao-de-übra, 1964. 
(27) SSE Ar., File 118, SSE Ltd., Marromeu Estate, Medical 
Officer's Report on Camps and Posho Stores for the Month 
of August 1942, there were six compounds on the Marromeu Estate at this date; SSE Ar., File 204, Native Diet and Rations, M. J. Gomes to Gerente C, eral Luabo, 6 Aug. 1957, 
Comida Cozinhada, there were seven compounds on the Luabo 
estate in 1957; SSE Ar., Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., Relatorio 
Anual, Serv co de Mao-de -0bra, 1964, op. cit. 
Compounds 
(N. B., the names of 
Luabo 
Caoxe 
Checanhama 
Muide Novo 
Mapangane 
Inhatera 
Muanavine 
Capitaes 
the compounds 
Marromeu 
Balieira 
Marrai 
Juncua 
Central 
Cepe (Sepe) 
Guex 
Nhamadaua 
also changed over the years). 
(28) SSE Ar., File 138 (Obsolete) The Case of Dr. Saboya Ramos, 
J. Saboya Ramos to Exmo. Snr. Gerente da Sena Sugar Estate 
Limited Marromeu, 1 July 1939. 
(29) SSE Ar., File 118, Secretaria Distrital de Saude, Zamb(zic, 
Copic da Informaýäo No. 26 destes Servicos, e do Despacho de 
25 do corrente, do Exmo. Snr. Governador do Distrito, nela 
Exarado, Assunto: sobre as Condicoes de Trabalho dos 
Servicois Ind genas. Do Ins, peccbo d Sena Sugar Estates 
Lda, no Luabo, Manuel Saraiva Junqueiro, Herdeiros, e Chä 
Mocambique Lda, no Gurue, 4 Sep. 1956. 
(30) SSE Ar., File 367, Advancement African Womenfolk; Maria 
Helena Vieira de Noronha Directora Instituto de Educagao e 
Servico Social to Inspector Marques dos Santos SSE Luabo, 
Proc. J No. 20/42, Reg. B. O. 156, Desloca ao da Assistente 
Familiar, Ilda Farinha Nogueira d Sena 
Sugar 
Estates Ltd., 
Luabo, de 23 de Agosto a 10 de Setemembro 1965; SSE Ar., 
File 204, MJ Gomes to Gerente Geral 6 Aug. 1957, op. cit., 
the numbers of workers on the compounds at Luabo were as 
follows on this date: 
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(30) (continued) 
Cooxe 1800 
Mapangane 1100 
Muide Novo 2000 
Inhaterre 1000 
Muanavine 1100 
Luabo 3800 
(31) RTI Art. 215, p. 64; SSE Ar., File 118, MT to Acting Estate 
Manager Marromeu/Cain, 21 Aug. 1942, Native Compounds. The 
General Manager ordered that the space between huts was to be reduced from 25 metres in either direction to 16 metres in one direction and 20 metres in the other. Obviously, a 
reduction of the space between huts reduced the amount of levelling and drainage which had to be undertaken. It also 
released more land for cane. 
(32) SSE Ar., File 94, Labour for Marromeu, Labour Questionnaire 
Reply, H. N. Usher, Marromeu 2 Nov. 1931; SSE Ar., File 138, 
Saboya Ramos to Max Thurnheer, 29 May 1937, Particular. 
Dr. Ramos complained, among other things, about the fact 
that for reasons of economy the 'natives' were having 
to sleep six in a hut. 
(33) RTI, Art. 215,10 and 20; SSE Ar., File 135, Viana Rodrigues, 
Ac-ampamento dos Trabclhadores, 23 Feb. 1944, op. cit. 
(34) SSE Ar., File 118, n. n., 23 Aug. 1954` Custo das "Palhotas" 
de Alvenaria em Experiencia (Superficie de Coda 16 mq. ). 
(35) GOV. Q, Col. de Moc., Prov. da Zambezia, Relatörio do 
Governador, Capitao da Infantaria Cesar Maria de Serpa Rosa, 
Respeitante ao periodo de 4 de Maio de 1943 a 31 de Dezembro 
de 1947, p. 174. The Governor recommended a round brick hut 
of three different diameters, 3.50 metres for a couple, 4.50 
metres for four workers and 5.50 metres for six workers. 
(36) SSE Ar., File 347, African Policy, Cantinas and Aca mentos 
Public Address System, SPH Stephen Hornung_ to A. F. Sousa, 
16 Nov. 1962, No. 412/62, La&our Code, Habitation; SSE Ar., 
File 347, Manuel de S. M. Maia, Constructor Civil, Luabo to 
Gerente Geral SSE Ltd Luabo, 30 Nov. 1962. 
(37) SSE Ar., File 118, Custo das "Palhotas" de Alvenaria... 25 
Aug. 1954, op. cit. 
(38) SSE Ar., File 347, J. de Queiroz Soares, Adjunto do Gerente, 
Propriedade de Marromeu, Relat6rio da Visita a Marromeu dos 
Inspectores do Trabalho Indigena, Snrs. Intendentes Joao 
Granjo Pires, Afonso Ivens Ferraz de Freitas e Alberto Cotta 
de Mesquita, 3 Jan. 1962. 
(39) SSE Ar., File 133, S. Cooke to Hornung and Co., 14 Sep. 1932, 
op. cit. 
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(40) SSE Ar., File 347, SPH (Stephen Hornung) to A. F. Sousa, 31 Oct. 1962, No. 388/62, Labour Code. 
(41) SSE Ar., File 347, NHDB to Mr Sousa, 11 July 1962, No. 253/61 /-sic 7, Beds and Mattresses. 
(42) ibid. 
(43) ibid. 
(44) RTI Art. 217, p. 64. 
(45) SSE Ar., File 347, NHDuB to Col. J. D. Hornung OBE tC, 27 Mar. 1962, No. 112/62 Private Series, Policy. 
(46) SSE Ar., File 347, African Policy, 29 Apr. 1962, n. n. 
(47) SSE Ar., File 347, NHDuB to Col. Hornung, 27 Mar. 1962, op. cit. 
(48) SSE Ar., File 347, J. de Queiroz Sogres, Relatirio da Visits 
a Marromeu dos Inspectores do Trabalho Indigena... 3 Jan. 
1962, op. cit. The inspectors recommended an extensive list 
of improvements in the compounds, which meant that the things 
they suggested did not exist at that time. For facilities 
that did exist prior to 1962, namely, grass sheds for meetings 
and occasional films see SSE Ar., File 118, MT to Estate 
Manager Marromeu/Caia, 14 July 1947, Beira Governor's Official 
visit to Marromeu. See also SSE Ar., File 118, Eduardo C. 
Mendota Frias, Chefe do Posto, Admin. do Concelho do Chinde 
to Gerente Geral SSE Ltd., 29 June 1953, No. 343/A/22 and 
SSE Ar., File 347, AFS Gerente Geral SSE to Admin. do Concelho 
da Beira, 6 Feb. 1963, Confidencial, Psco-Social. 
(49) SSE Ar., File 118, MT General Manager to Acting Estate 
Manager M'meu/Caia, 5 Mar. 1943, No. 41/43 Mgt. Native 
Compounds. 
(50) ibid.; SSE Ar., File 118, MT General Manager to Acting 
Estate Manager Marromeu/Caia, 24 June 1943, Native Compounds. 
(51) SSE Ar., File 118, MT Gerente Geral to Acting Estate Manager 
M'meu/Caia, 21 Aug. 1942, No. 64/42 Mgt., Native Compounds. 
(52) SSE Ar., File 118, M. P. Lopes Estate Manager M'neu/Cain to 
General Manager SSE Luabo, n. d., No. 63/45 Mgt. 
(53) SSE Ar., File 347, African Policy, 29 Apr. 1962, op. cit. 
(54) SSE Ar., Sena Sugar Estates Ltd. Relat6rio Anual Servico de 
Mao-de-+Obra, 1964, op. cit. 
(55) SSE Ar., File 347, NHDB to Col. Hornung, 27 Mar. 1962, op. cit. 
(56) SSE Ar., File 238, Mopeia Estate, General, Instructions, 
Reports, Policy, General Manager to The Superintending 
Engineer Luabo, 25 May 1959, No. 46/59 MGT, Pump for 
Mopeia Camp. 
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(57) Interview at Gile, 14-15 July 1976. (Translation J. H. ) 
(58) SSE Ar., File 138, Saboya Ramos to Gerente Geral SSE Ltd., 1 July 1939, op. cit. (Translation J. H. ) 
(59) ibid. (Translation J .H. ) 
(60) SSE Ar., File 138, Col. de Mo . Circ. de Marromeu, Gabinete do Administrador to n. n. rSSE 
_7,10 
Apr. 1942. This letter 
includes an extract from 17amos' complaint. (Translation J. H. ) 
(61) SSE Ar., File 118, Circulo de Saude da Zambezia, sobre a Campanha Contra Infestacöes, 0 Inspector, Candido de 
Barros, Med. Insp. Desg., 4 Sep. 1956, Quelimane, Re: 
Informagao No. 26 deste Circulo de Saude. 
(62) SSE Ar., File 347, NHDB to Col. C. B. R. Hornung 15 Feb. 1962, 
No. 38/62, Private Series, Policy. 
(63) ibid. 
(64) SSE Ar., File 347, NHDB to Col. Hornung, 27 Mar. 1962, op. cit. 
(65) SSE Ar., File 347, African Policy, 29 Apr. 1962, op. cit. 
(66) SSE Ar., File 347, NHDB to Col. Hornung, 27 Mar. 1962, op. cit. 
(67) SSE Ar., File 347, African Policy, 29 Apr. 1962, op. cit. 
(68) SSE Ar., Sena Sugar Estates, Ltd., Relatörio Anual, Servi5o 
de Wo-de -0bra, 1964, op. cit. 
(69) RTI, Art. 149, p. 45. 
(70) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) 
(71) RTI Art. 215,10, p. 64. (Translation J. H. ) 
(72) R Art. 146,2°, p. 44. 
(73) Some men were still walking the whole of the distance to 
the estates as late as the early 1940s. "I and my companions 
left Gile on foot for Luabo in the years 1941,1942 and 1943. 
Our journey took two months... We slept anywhere we could in 
the hamlets /-we passed through 7. There were compounds 
in Mulevala, lvlocuba, Nicoadala and from there to Mopeia. " 
(Interview at Gile, op. cit. ) (Translation J. H. ); "I went 
to Luabo... on foot... we left here in a large group. 
On the road we had to stop for several days because one 
of our companions was bitten by a snake. After he 
recovered we continued on our way. We rested for some days 
in Mopeia. From there we went on to Luabo. " (Interview 
at Alto MolöcuZý, 16-17 July 1976. )( Translation J. H. ) 
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(74) Only in 1962 did SSE seriously consider improving the 
transport offered to workers. "As it has been and is being done, it is inhuman and illegal and I am certain that the day any Labour Inspector saw it enormous complications 
would arise. " The writer then went on to say that 'natives' 
recruited from Magonja do Costa and Baixo Licungo for work in Quelimane and its suburbs were already transported in 
proper passenger buses. SSE still used lorries. "It is 
very easy to imagine what passes through the native's mind 
when he sees Sena Sugar's worker being carried in a 10 or 15 
ton cargo lorry, worse at times than any goat, and that of 
the Quelimane employers' seated comfortably with shades /-at the windows 7 if the weather demands!!! ... the 
continuation of Things as they are will represent a cancer 
in the heart of our recruiting organisation. " (SSE Ar., 
File 305, 
, Native Labour, Transport of Labour, Etc., A. Almeida Azevedo Milange to Gerente Geral SSE Luabo, 
13 Jan. 1962, Nova Sistema de Recrutamento. ) (Translation J. H. ) 
(75) "'From -the Posto de Cam o to Mopeia (86 kilometres) they /-the contracted men 
7go 
on foot when the lorry service is 
not functioning... " (AHM,, NI, 32, B/24/4/1,1945-1947, 
Relat(5'rios Trimestrais dos Agentes do Curador, Mopeia, 
Relat6'rio Geral sobre a M66-de-Obra Indl*g'ena Referente aos 
anos de 1945 e 1946. See also the reports for Namarroi, 
Lugela, Morrumbala and Maganja in the same series). (Translation J. H. ) 
Transport continued bad throughout the 1950s, and delays 
were still common in the 1960s. For example, in March 1962, 
the Nicoadala/Mopeia road collapsed. All traffic was held 
up for about three weeks. This meant that men waiting to 
leave the estates could not go home. "He Fthe Provincial 
Governor7looked frightful and had obviou-; ly lost his head 
and was Talking about an ensuing uprising among the boys 
and hinting that they would have some justification. " 
(SSE Ar., File 305, NHDB to Col. J. D. Hornung, 30 Mar. 1962, 
No. 114/62, Private Series, Lourengo Marques Visit). A year 
later conditions in the province were even worse. The 
Mocuba/Alto Molocub road was cut. Lorries could "just about" 
get through on the Mulevela road if the occupants pushed 
most of the time. The road from Mocuba to Magania da Costa 
was also cut as was the road from Mualama and Naburi to 
Pebane. It was, therefore, according to one of SSE's 
Directors, very difficult to move labour. He added "it 
is incredible to me that such chaos should now be an annual 
occurrence in this District, and yet the Governor seems to 
escape the blame. " (SSE Ar., File 133A, NHDuB to 
Col. 
C. B. R. Hornung, 3 Apr. 1963, No. 128/63, Private Series, 
Recruiting Conditions). 
(76) SSE Ar., File 118, MT General Manager to Manager SSE 
Ltd. Mopeia, 4 Mar. 1952, No. 17/52 Mgt., Labour Transit 
Compounds, (Grass Sheds) between Nicoadala and Mopeia; 
SSE Ar., File 135, Viana Rodrigues, Acampamentos dos 
44 Trabalhadores, 23 Feb. 1, op. cit. 
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(77) SSE Ar., File 118, MT to Alexandrino Fragoso de Souza 
Quelimane, 9 Jan. 1945, No. 4/45/Reservoda, Trbo'nsito de 
Indi"genas por Nicoadala. Referring to the site at 
Nicoadala the author remarked that "the water was 
neither sufficient nor of good quality, and... the 
agglomeration of natives in that town was becoming an 
obstacle to public health and hygiene. Hundreds of natives 
gathered there at a trading post without public sanitary 
conditions. They made the place filthy, dirtying everything, 
from the walls of the stores to the earth of the street and 
neighbourhood, with fruit peel, papers, rags, bits of straw 
and remains of all kinds; polluting the air, filling it with 
gases coming from tFe-Termentation and putrification and from 
the inevitable smells of the natives themselves, who have 
no notion whatsoever of individual hygiene and carry dirty 
clothes impregnated with sweat, with unpleasant smells, 
without the possibility of washing in abundant flowing 
water, which can only be found at the River Licaure. And, 
what was equally important their stay in Nicoadala provoked 
and fostered swarms of flies... " (Translation J. H. 
(Emphasis original) 
(78) SSE Ar., File 118, A. A. Azevedo to Max Thurnheer 20 Dec. 
1944, Transito de Indligenas por Nicoadala. 
(79) ibid. 
(80) SSE Ar., File 118, MT to Souza, 9 Jan. 1945, op. cit. 
(81) SSE Ar., File 118, Camilo Ferreira d'Almeido Circ. Admin. de 
Mopeia to Gerente Gerat SSE, 12 June 1951, No. 489/B/15/2, 
Acampamento do Tra sito da Sena Sugar Estates. 
(82) SSE Ar., File 118, Max Thurnheer Gerente Geral SSE Ltd. 
to Admin. do Circ. de Mopeia, 10 Dec. 1951, No. 489/51/HO, 
Acampamento de Träahsito para Ind genas em Mopeia. 
(Translation J. H. ) 
(83) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) 
(84) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) 
(85) AHM, NI 202,1952-1957, Relatörios dos Agentes do Curador e 
Delegados de Sadde, No. 54, Circ. de Mopeic, Ladislau 
Batalha Junior, 12 Jan. 1954. In an appendix to this report 
written in 1953 the then administrator 
had written "the 
building is not big enough for the workers in 
transit. 
There are many workers on the verandas, under 
the building 
(the building is on pillars) and spread around outside without 
any protection. " (Translation 
J. H. ) 
, 
(86) AHM, NI 195,195-957, Relatorios dos Agentes 
do Curador 
e Delegados de Saude, No. 
47, Concelho de Mocuba, Relatorio 
Relativo ao Ano de 1953. 
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(87) AHM, NI 204,1952-1957, Relatorios dos Agentes do Curador 
e Delegados de Saude, No. 56, Circ. de Namacurra, 
Relatorio sobre Mö'o-de-Obra Ind gena, Ano de 1953. 
(88) SSE Ar., File 305, A. Almeida Azevedo to Gerente Geral 
SSE, 13 Jan. 1962, op. cit. 
(89) SSE Ar., File 347, Admin. do Concelho do Chinde, 12 Apr. 
1962, C6pia Confidencial, Distrito do Zamb6zia, ServiFo 
de Acsäo Psico-Social, Gabinete de Zona, Suggestöes as 
Empresas para Prosseguimento da Politica de Moralizacäo 
do Trabalho e Elevacäo do Nivel Social e Econ6mico dos 
Trabalhadores. 
(90) Examples of this kind of manoeuvre are the experimental 
huts built during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. 
(91) Little had changed by the 1970s. The Guardian %London 7 
reported on the living conditions at SSE in the following 
terms in 1973. "Mr Peter Du Boulay, an assistant general 
manager and grandson of the firm's founder, talked about 
the conditions under which the African work force were 
living, paid and recruited... The workers all live in 
compounds of small octagonal huts which Mr Du Boulay 
described as "squalid" from a European viewpoint but 
satisfactory for the Africans. The compounds appear 
squalid from any viewpoint, without running water, 
sanitation or electricity. " (Guardian, 30 July 1973). 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE HEALTH OF THE LABOUR FORCE 
The combination of overcrowded and unhygienic living conditions 
and an inadequate diet resulted in an environment at SSE in which 
workers were susceptible to numerous illnesses. Afflictions 
affecting the labour force can be divided into two main groups. 
On the one hand there was a range of communicable diseases whose 
transmission was facilitated by overcrowding and lack of hygiene. 
On the other hand there were a variety of complaints which resulted 
from a combination of poor hygiene and inadequate diet. The latter 
group tended to affect only the individual. Nevertheless, at SSE 
they were often endemic precisely because the conditions in which 
they flourished affected everyone. This chapter will examine some 
of the more common complaints affecting SSE's labour force. It will 
also look at the measures taken by both the estate and the state 
to combat these diseases. 
AILMENTS AND DISEASES AFFECTING SSE's LABOUR FORCE 
Controlling Smallpox and Tick Fever 
The problem of the easy transmission of infectious diseases 
was recognised early in the twentieth century. Thus, 
for instance, 
the Hornung Contract of 1921 included clauses which obliged the 
employer to vaccinate and re-vaccinate all contracted men against 
smallpox. Failure to do so resulted in a 
fine. (l) This legislation 
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was carried through to the Regulamento do Trabalho dos Indigenas. 
Employers were obliged to provide smallpox and other treatments 
aimed at preventing infectious-contagious diseases. (2) The 
authorities were given powers to order vaccinations or any other 
treatments to prevent epidemics whenever they deemed them necessary. (3) 
However, despite the legislation there was, at some time during 
or before 1931, an outbreak of smallpox on one of the Marromeu 
compounds at SSE which resulted in the Medical Officer ordering the 
destruction of all huts. (4) Unfortunately, there is no further 
discussion of the effects of this outbreak, but the fact that smallpox 
is not mentioned again in SSE's records probably indicates that the 
lesson was a salutary one for the company. As has already been 
shown, hut building was costly. The replacement of an entire 
compound was an expensive undertaking. The replacement of all the 
compounds, had an epidemic developed, would probably have been 
prohibitive. It can, therefore, reasonably be assumed, that 
thereafter SSE ensured that its workers were regularly vaccinated. 
The problem of preventing the spread of tick fever was not, 
however, so easily overcome. Many of the areas through which SSE's 
workers passed on their way to the estates were inhabited by various 
species of wild animals which acted as hosts for ticks. Walking 
through the bush, sleeping rough or in grass huts and compounds 
infested with rodents men easily picked up ticks. Since there was 
no effective vaccination against tick fever public health measures 
were necessary to stop the spread of the parasite and 
hence the 
incidence of the disease. When, in 1944, there was an outbreak of 
tick fever amongst workers arriving at Mopeia SSE discussed a number 
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of measures which could be taken to eliminate the problem. It was 
proposed that workers' baggage should be fumigated in Mopeia and a 
shower constructed where all workers would be obliged to bathe before 
passing on to the various properties. (5) Before passing through the 
shower the men's hair would have been cut and they would have been 
shaved. Their clothing was also to be disinfected. (6) 
Disinfecting workers and their baggage on arrival at the 
main reception camp in Mopeia would have helped to prevent the 
spread of ticks and hence tick fever to the permanent compounds. 
Nevertheless, the problem of tick-infestation in the transit 
compounds still remained. Workers, bitten by a disease-carrying 
tick, could still arrive at the main compound and lose several days 
or weeks of the contract as the disease took hold. Indeed, this 
was the situation when the company first appears to have become 
alerted to the problem in 1944. There had been numerous complaints 
about ticks infesting the transit compounds along the Nicoadala rood 
and the gaol at Luabo. There were also several cases of recurrent 
fever. (7) More radical measures than the mere disinfecting of the 
persons and personal effects of workers were therefore needed to 
eliminate the problem. 
The grass roofs of huts, the cracks and crevices in the 
walls and floors provided a lodging for all sorts of potentially 
hazardous insects. The most effective way of preventing insect- 
infestation of the huts was to destroy the insects, their eggs and 
larva by burning down the huts. This solution was adopted in the 
Luabo compounds where the structure of the huts was iron or old wood. 
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It could not be adopted in the transit compounds, however, unless 
new buildings were erected to replace the barracks destroyed. 
Instead, SSE decided to disinfect these barracks and at the same 
time to build huts in their place. It was cheaper to fumigate or 
destroy a small hut designed to accommodate a few men than a large 
structure aimed at accommodating several hundred men. After 
disinfection the grass barracks on the transit compounds were to 
be used exclusively as cotton markets. (8) 
When these proposals were made SSE recognised that the problem 
of insect-infestation of the huts would recur. The company therefore 
also sought an acceptable solution to the long-term problem of 
eradicating disease-carrying insects from the compounds. Various 
solutions were proposed. The straw or reed roof of the huts could 
be'burnt away and the structure taken to pieces and dipped in 
disinfectant. Alternatively the roof could be burnt off leaving 
the structure of the hut intact. These were considered relatively 
cheap ways of keeping the huts insect-free because they had to be 
re-roofed every two years anyway. Hence, disinfection of the 
huts could precede re-roofing. Another alternative was to use 
iron-f ramed huts. According to SSE's General Manager iron 
buildings were "obviously" better than grass huts because fire could 
eradicate the insects with less outlay on time, labour and materials. 
This solution could, however, only be considered after the war. 
(9) 
As already demonstrated, despite their several advantages, iron- 
framed huts were never in fact introduced on a wide scale, 
largely 
because the price of iron made them more costly than grass 
huts. 
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Following the outbreak of tick fever in 1944 further 
proposals were made which were intended to keep the problem under 
control. These included the regular cleaning and fumigation of 
the interior of the barracks. All garbage was to be destroyed. 
Cracks in the floors and walls were to be filled with lime. 
Rudimentary bunks were to be installed "if possible". These did 
not necessarily have to be single beds but would need to be light 
enough to be carried out of the building when not in use. They 
were to be placed away from the walls of the barracks and were to 
be raised at least 30 centimetres from the floor. In addition, 
workers were to be forbidden from bringing their belongings into 
the barracks and were to take a shower before entering it in order 
to destroy any larva clinging to their legs and bodies. A light 
was to be kept on during the night since the insects only emerged 
in darkness. All vegetation near the compound was to be destroyed 
and a ditch dug around it which was to be filled with ashes to 
prevent animals carrying ticks from entering. Finally rats, 
porcupines and other animals were to be "combatted". (10) 
The recommendations made in 1944 do not appear to have been 
taken up by SSE, for in 1953 more ticks appeared, this time in the 
Luane compound at Marromeu. The ticks appeared soon af ter some 
workers f rom Marral (Posto do Campo) arrived there. On investigating 
the outbreak SSE's Medical Officer discovered that the workers' 
baggage had not been fumigated when they arrived in Mopeia. 
He urged 
the Manager of the Marromeu Estate to insist that this was 
done in 
future. (11) Referring to the matter SSE's General Manager wrote 
that the disi'nfection of labour had never advanced beyond the 
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experimental stage, although he was interested in introducing 
regular disinfection at the earliest opportunity. (12) Presumably, 
the experimental disinfection was not taken up because the costs of 
installing the necessary showers and the costs of providing equipment 
were considered too high. As has already been shown in some cases, 
bathrooms were not installed in the compounds until the 1960s. 
Since ticks and other harmful insects could largely be kept under 
control by occasional disinfection of huts when their roofs were 
replaced, SSE appears to have preferred the loss of production 
which the sickness brought about than the creation of an effective 
system of prevention; a system of prevention which in any case 
implied far more wide-ranging measures than the proposals above 
suggest. Besides disinfection of workers, their baggage and the 
buildings the men slept in, prevention also implied providing showers 
and fumigation facilities on all the transit camps, and not just the 
major reception centre at Mopeia. It also meant providing more 
accommodation and individual space for the men using the compounds, 
for clearly, the ticks could spread between men more easily if living 
conditions were cramped and overcrowding normal. These were measures 
which SSE did not even consider. (13) 
The recorded outbreaks of tick-fever and smallpox were few 
at SSE. It can be assumed that in the case of smallpox the 
prophylactic treatment was effective in controlling the disease. 
However., the same assumption cannot be made for tick fever. 
Firstly, the conditions in which the ticks flourished continued to 
exist at SSE for many years after the company was first alerted to 
the problem. Secondly, workers suffered from a number of 
diseases 
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whose symptoms were fever. Amongst these malaria is the most 
obvious example; it was probably also the most widespread. Thus, 
it would seem likely that the symptoms of tick fever were often 
disguised by the sym-ptoms of other diseases. Thirdly, workers at 
SSE were loathe to seek medical treatment. The reasons for this 
reticence will be discussed below. However, the fact that men 
did not present themselves at the company's hospital when sick 
probably means that the disease occured more often than SSE's 
records reveal. Like other ailments which did not manifest them- 
selves in an acute form, therefore, the recorded outbreaks of tick 
fever probably do not reflect its real incidence. 
Pneumonia and Dysentry 
In his report for the first six months of 1939, SSE's 
doctor at Marromeu noted that there had been abnormally high mortality 
rates from pneumonia and dysentry. (14) Indeed, so critical was 
the situation that SSE had only narroývly avoided af ul. 1--scale enquiry 
by the health authorities. Writing to the Estate Manager at 
Marromue/Ca-; a, SSE's General Manager stated that the Quelimane 
recruiter, Sarmento Pimental, and the Marques de Ficalgo had "both 
complained bitterly about the physical conditions of the last batch 
of Angurus that was repatriated f rom your estates. " He added "it 
was only through the understanding nature of the Marques, who on his 
own attributed the deplorable fact to the flood, that a major enquiry 
has been averted. " The General ýIanager then asked if it could have 
been "purely the flood conditions with the batch in question, or were 
there other reasons, such as a major infection of bilharzia or 
hookworm? " (15) 
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The comments of the doctor at Marromeu are instructive. 
In relation to the high sickness and death rates, 79 men died from 
dysentry in the first three months of 1939, he suggested that 
SSE's record was actually acceptable in view of what might have 
happened. 
The rate of mortality and morbidity from dysentry 
and pneumonia - it rained almost every day in the 
flood period - were abnormal. If we think, however, 
about the worst, about what might have happened 
in an agglomeration of over 3,500 natives living in 
perfect discomfort, in an extremely limited area, 
without the minimum notion of hygiene, and if they 
had not been taken from the compounds and huts and 
if prophylactic measures had not been pursued, 
these rates ought to be considered very low. (16) 
This particular outbreak of pneumonia and dysentry was probably 
exacerbated by the flood conditions. There can be little doubt, 
however, that poor diet and unhygienic living conditions 
contributed to the high incidence of the diseases, as the doctor 
himself suggested. Elsewhere in his report he elaborated. 
In the first fortnight of May there were still 16 
cases of dysentry among natives who had fled and 
who belonged to the group who were repatriated in 
June. There was not a sinqle case among the natives 
of the new contingents -w-F-o"w-arrived here at the end 
of April, in ýky and at the beginning of June. 
The mortality rate was still abnormal in May and 
June among patients who were admitted to hospital 
in March and April with dysentry. Ninety per 
cent of them died during their convalescence, the 
f inal cause of death being toxaemia, anoemia, cardiac 
infection and vitamin deficiency ... 
In spite of everything the majority of natives had 
a very weak physical resistance -a fact which is 
always observed in the season of torrid heat and 
torrential rains. On the other hand, their physique 
develops and weight goes up during the cold season 
and the harvest because of the high numbers of calories 
furnished by the cane that they suck, very rich in sugar. (17) 
(Emphasis original) 
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The diet offered to SSE's workforce has already been 
discussed. Nevertheless it is pertinent to point out, in the 
context of health, that the diet was known to be vitamin deficient 
as early as 1939. In that year, Medical Officers attached to 
some of the districts from which SSE's workers were recruited, noted 
that unless they died, the men's health always improved when they 
returned home from the estates. At home they received a more 
balanced diet and the food was better prepared. (18) To this degree, 
the findings of the government doctors confirmed the observations of 
SSE's own doctor. Men were most debi'Litated towards the end of the 
contract. They were also more debilitated when their diet could 
not be supplemented, either by cane or other foods. 
In Chapter VI it was noted that SSE rationalised the diet 
offered on the plantations by pointing out that workers acquired 
locally foods which were not available in it. These included cane 
from the fields which they took during the harvest, vegetables and 
fruits which they planted themselves, and meat and fish which were 
either hunted or purchased locally. However, referring to the 1939 
outbreak of dysentry and pneumonia, SSE's doctor shed a rather 
different light on this situation. 
The guards in charge of cleaning and maintaining 
order destroyed many hundreds of kilos of rotten 
meat from animals caught in the river's current 
and spoilt fish, in a real state of putrification, 
which other natives came to sell in this village 
in canoes. (19) 
This quotation suggests that SSE's workers were suffering from 
hunger, for nobody would consider eating rotten meat and fish if 
fresh 
meat and fish were available. It would appear, then, that 
the men 
were both desperate for food as such, and desperate to acquire any 
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food which would relieve the monotony of the normal diet. That 
the men were obliged to purchase rotten meat and fish suggests that 
these items were not as readily available in local markets as the 
company tried to imply. 
Like meat and fish, fresh fruit and vegetables were also 
not as readily available as SSE suggested. Quite apart from the 
physical impossibility of the men planting enough vegetables and 
fruit trees to meet their consumption needs over the course of 
the contract the availability of these items was limited by the 
climate. 
Even if this company oposed to produce them Ffresh 
f ruit and vegetables 
7directly, 
there would býT a 
period in the year j. -n which it would not be possible 
to have them and several hundreds of hectares would 
have to be cultivated under irrigation ... We would add, further, that... during part of the year, the 
hot season, not even the European population has 
sufficient fruit and vegetables and hence, it would 
not be possible, even by planting a very extensive 
area, to produce the five tons required daily. (20) 
Effectively, then, SSE's workers' diet consisted almost exclusively 
of the foods which the company itself provided. As a result the 
men's physical condition gradually deteriorated over the course 
of the contract. 
The deterioration of the men's health was compounded by the 
problems arising from poor food preparation. In Chapter VI it was 
stated that men did not receive a proper meal until they returned 
from the fields in the evenings. Often, unwilling to spend a long 
time cooking their rations, the men ate them uncooked. The 
effects of eating uncooked foods Y&-re noted by SSE's doctor in 
relation to locust consumption. Locusts, properly cooked and 
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prepared with a special sauce, appear to have been something of a 
local delicacy. (21) Men at SSE caught locuststo eat when they 
appeared. They did not, however, prepare them properly. 
Others, such as the Angurus, do not 
their culinary preparation. 
They eat therr Flocusts 7raw, with 
and bitter parTs, whici7often, when 
abundance, if they do not produce a 
irritation of the mucous and lining 
intestines, lead to death by obstru 
tonitis and perforation.. (22) 
lose time with 
all their innards 
Featen 7 in 
Ttrong - 
of the 
ction, peri- 
Poor diet, irregular meals and the consequent lack of 
careful food preparation and cooking all contributed to the debility 
of the work force at SSE. Lack of hygienic living conditions and 
the general lack of comfort on the estates further reduced the 
workers' resistance to disease. Huts varied greatly in temperature 
between day and night. Men were expected to sleep on the floor 
without even a mat, or outside the building, with only a blanket 
to cover them. They had few warm clothes. On being contracted 
they were issued with a singlet, a pair of shorts and a blanket. 
On arrival at the estate they also received a sugar sack. (23) 
Most men could not afford shoes and hence had to walk through mud 
and rain in bare feet when it was wet. In addition they slept five 
or eight men to a hut; washed, urinated and defecated in water that 
they were also expected to drink, and only ate one meal a day, 
a meal which consisted in the main of flour. The weakness that 
this combination of factors engendered was compounded by the 
fact that many men were already weak when they arrived at the 
estates. In 1939, for instance, according to a local government 
Health Officer., 78.8 per cent of men working on the estates had 
parasitical infections. (24) In 1954 it was estimated 
that almost 
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100 per cent of the workers had internal parasites and suffered 
from hookworm. (25) In the same year, hookworm appeared most 
frequently as the cause of death in the estate records. (26) 
The eggs of the hookworm are deposited in the faeces of an 
infected person. The larva then pass through the soles of the feet 
of anyone who treads on the infected faeces or their traces. Since 
SSE, did not construct hygienic lavatories until the 1960s and since 
hundreds of men, most of whom walked around barefooted, lived in 
overcrowded compounds, the degree of contamination was probably high. 
Furthermore, in these conditions, men who were not infected when they 
arrived at the estates probably picked up the parasite after they 
arrived. 
A similar cycle of transmission existed for such afflictions 
as dysentry and bilharzia. In the latter case, the eggs of the worm 
were passed through the urine of the infected person. If the person 
urinated in water the eggs thrived until they found another host 
in the person using that water. In the case of dysentry it was 
sufficient for an affected person to fail to wash his hands before 
preparing food for the disease to be transmitted to those eating the 
food. Thus, a vicious circle of original infection, lack of hygiene 
and undernourishment ensured that such diseases remained endemic. 
Whereas healthy, well-nourished people might have survived for 
some time with only minor discomfort, men who were already weak 
were prone to death not only from the havoc wreaked by the parasite 
but also to death from secondary complications. 
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The eradication of these diseases required a three-pronged 
attack on diet, hygiene and public awareness. Diet and hygiene, 
as we have seen, were largely ignored until the 1960s. Formal 
education of the African population hardly moved beyond the 
rudimentary stages in Zambeo'zia until the 1960s. (27) Health services 
were almost non-existant. (28) With the exception of a soap-making 
campaign and the previously ref erred-to latrine campaign in the 
mid-1950s, health education was unknown. (29) 
THE PROVISION OF HEALTH CARE 
Health Care on Plantations 
Private firms which employed over 100 workers were obliged 
by law to provide health care for their workers. (30) The type of 
care provided and the qualifications of those providing the service 
depended on the numbers employed. Thus, at SSE, for example, on 
the Luabo estate the company had its own private hospital. The 
company employed a doctor, one European and two auxilliary nurses. 
There were also sick bays on some of the compounds and two words in 
Mopeia and Matilde run by auxilliary nurses. (31) At Marromeu there 
was a hospital and f irst-aid posts on some of the compounds . 
The quality of care offered by private firms was low. 
For instance, in his 1939 Report SSE's Doctor described the 'native' 
hospital at Marromeu. This consisted of 
two pavilions with room f or 75 patients, able without 
prejudicing the principles of hygiene to accommodate 
20 more., 
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One pavilion consisting of one large room for dressings and treatment and another, smaller one, for clinical observation and consultations. Four huts for the isolation of patients with infectious-contagious diseases which are destroyed by fire when the patients die or are discharged, 
with room for 10 patients. 
Four detached brick houses for 12 female patients. One mortuary; that is, a hospital with 64 beds. Exceptionally it accommodates 232 patients! !! (32) 
However, it was not only in 1939 that the 'hospitals' provided by 
SSE were, to all intents and purposes, a mockery. By 1951, 
conditions had not changed at all. Thus, the 'sick-bay' on the 
main reception camp at Mopeia consisted of "one house... which is 
completely lacking in furniture and equipment. "(33) 
In part, the lack of health care facilities on the estates 
was related directly to cost. SSE was loathe to invest in adequate 
curative facilities when the state ensured that the supply of 
workers would continue regardless of their health. In this 
situation the company could afford to accommodate a percentage of 
wastage through ill-health. In part, however, the lack of facilities 
was a reflection of the ideology of forced labour. It was assumed 
that the African was naturally lazy and hence resisted all attempts 
to ma! -e him work. Pressure, sactioned by law, was needed to make 
him take up wage work and to stay in it once recruited. Absenteeism 
was regarded as proof of this assertion. Failure to appear for work 
could only mean one thing; that the labourer was shirking. The idea 
that men were simply making excuses if they said that they could 
not work because they were ill in turn led to a system of treatment 
whose aim was not to cure the sick but rather to bully them back 
into work. (34) In the workers' minds periods spend in hospital 
meant periods of ill-treatment. Men therefore avoided going to the 
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company's hospitals at all costs and only appeared when they were 
on the verge of death. As a result the company's hospitals became 
associated with death which meant that the men's suspicions were 
confirmed. 
The people who were ill were seen as shirkers ... When a person felt ill he was even afraid to go to the hospital. Many of them,, when they had pains, fled from 
the compound and stayed in the bush because in the 
compounds there were people called sangiras who asked "why are you in the compound? " If you said that you 
were ill they took you to the hospital, but if you 
went to the hospital the nurses who treated you there 
asked you what was wrong with you. If you said you had 
stomach ache or some pains they said you were not ill 
but were only avoiding work. The nurses gave 
injections, which the patient felt were very compli- 
cated. Many of them died and if you were not lucky 
you did not escape. Thus, with this situation, when 
the men felt ill they preferred to stay in the bush 
rather than go to the hospitol. (35) 
Resistant to hospital treatment during the contract, men 
were even more resistant to being admitted to hospital at the end 
of the contract, for reasom which are obvious. To avoid the sick 
escaping, SSE subjected workers about to be repatriated from the 
estates to a medical examination. In 1939, for instance, SSE's 
doctor wrote in this context 
when one of the contingents of Angurus was repatriated 
at the end of April I prevented some escapes - which 
have always happened, still happen and will continue 
to happen... I agreed with the compound chief that 
only those natives examined on the evening before 
who presented a special ticket which was distributed 
to them /-then 7 would be allowed to embark. 
The supervision was rigorous at the hour when they 
embarked. It was exercised by the compound chief 
(European), by two native nurses and various guards. 
Nevertheless, some managed to escape; the majority 
of them natives who had not been admitted to the 
hospital. (36) 
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However, at some point after 1939 this system of inspections broke 
down for in 1954 there was an internal enquiry within SSE following 
the deaths of two men who were on their way home from the estates. 
The men had left Mopeia on the 15th April and arrived at Vicente on 
the 16th. There they waited for eight days for transport because 
the lorries had broken down. They finally arrived at Cundine, on 
the Nicoadala/Mopeia road, on the 19th April. Two days later SSE's 
manager in Mopeia received a call from the Post of Campo saying that 
two men had died and six more were unfit and unable to travel on. 
They required hospital treatment. (37) The six men were sent back to 
the estates. Referring to the matter, the Manager of the Marromeu 
property wrote to SSE's General Manager, 
there is no doubt that the six men who were returned 
from Mopeia for treatment were all of a poor physical 
appearance, and had been in hospital, but considering 
that they left Marromeu on 15th April and returned on 
29th April, and that for two weeks they had been living 
at Mopeia and Cundine in conditions which are unlikely 
to be as good as in proper compounds, it is not 
surprising that their condition should have deteriorated. (33) 
The Manager admitted that 'natives' could avoid appearing at the 
final medical inspection if they "had any doubts that the doctor will 
not allow them to proceed to their homes. "(39) To prevent this 
situation recurring in future, therefore, the system already in 
operation in Luabo was to be adopted at Marromeu. When given their 
final medical examination, the doctor would issue cards to those men 
he found fit to travel. Immediately before leaving the estate these 
cards would be collected by a European employee. The men would thus 
receive a second inspection f rom the overseer and would be prevented 
from leaving if they were found unfit. (40) 
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The breakdown of the system of final medical inspections 
after 1939 probably occurred for two related reasons. On the one 
hand, SSE wanted to avoid high mortality rates on the estates. 
From SSE's point of view it was better than the men died at home 
than at work. Deaths, other than from accidents, led to awkward 
questions and enquiries by the authorities. The end result of 
these enquiries, as has already been demonstrated, was pressure on 
the firm to improve the facilities provided. This in turn implied 
increased expenditure on labour. On the other hand, keeping back 
workers who were sick itself meant spending money on their care; 
care which, however rudimentary, had to be provided af ter the worker 
had ceased to be of any use to the company. Further, if, as often 
happened, the worker died after admission to hospital, another 
enquiry was likely to follow, with the consequences described above. 
The lack of a rigorous inspection at the beginning of the recruitment 
process, however, arose for different reasons. 
Medical Examinations of Recruited Workers 
When workers were recruited by SSE they received a medical 
examination from a doctor employed by the company for that purpose. 
Until 1942, these examinations were made 'en masse'. However, in 
that year, SSE's doctor on the estates complained about the way in 
which men were selected for work. The complaint arose after the 
repatriation of a group of workers from Angonia. 792 men were 
contracted in April 1941. A year later 688 were repatriated. Of 
the remainder, 17 had not arrived at the estate in the first place, 
32 had escaped, eight had already been repatriated, 16 men 
had died 
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and 31 were in the company's hospital. (41) In his report about 
this particular group of contracted men SSE's doctor complained 
about their poor physical condition. He added that many of them 
should never have been recruited in the first place. 
The bad recruitment when men are contracted, in the 
overwhelming majority Fof cases 7 of weak physical 
constitution, many being over 45 years of age or 
boys without the necessary robustness and at a 
critical age in their development ... 
Fhas 7 
contributed to the high and even exce-ptionUal 
morbidity and mortality rates for this property... 
Almost all of the Angonis, approximately 85 per 
cent leave Marromeu in a weakened state. (42) 
The recruiter responsible for engaging these men wrote to 
the doctor who had examined them on recruitment asking for 
confirmation that they were healthy when they left their homes. 
He felt that he was being blamed for their poor physical state. (43) 
The doctor replied to the effect that of the 49 'natives' rejected 
by SSE in May 1942 he had only examined 38. The two leaders of 
the group were well. He added that there were certainly some old 
men among the group but said that it was well-known that SSE in a 
"laudable attitude of care and protection for the native" gave them 
light work such as compound cleaning. Nevertheless the doctor 
criticised the system of mass inspections and added that these had 
now been replaced by individual examinations. (44) 
Yet, despite the doctor's criticisms the selection of men 
without the necessary strength to cope with plantation 
labour 
continued in other areas. For instance, in 
1954, referring to 
the deaths of the two men cited above, the Manager of 
the Marromeu 
estate admitted that "the Maganjas, generally speaking, 
have, for 
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some time been considered a poor type of labour, and a large 
percentage of each batch requires medical attention, but to my mind 
this particular guia was composed of a very poor type of native. " (45) 
This opinion was confirmed by the doctor who had examined the men in 
question before they left for the estates. He felt that the 'race' 
was physically deficient. "They can die from moment to moment ... 
especially natives who in the majority, such as the Angurus, have 
very weak physical resistance from birth. "(46) The doctor suggested 
that the medical examination on recruitment should be supplemented 
by a further examination when the men arrived at the estates, because 
the 'natives' practised all sorts of subterfuges and substituted 
each other at the examinations. However his next words undermined 
this assertion, for by implication they revealed the absolute 
inadequacy of the first examination. So long was the list of 
complaints from which men suffered that it would have been impossible 
for healthy men to have substituted all those who were unhealthy 
in the first examination. The doctor wanted to 
repatriate immediately after their arrival all the 
workers with heart complaints, anaemia, hernias, 
those without limbs, cripples, the almost blind, 
deaf-mutes etc., who are frequently and in abuse 
Fof the law 7 sent to work in our company. (47) 
He added that he also wanted to reject natives "who, on being 
contracted suffer from the following symptoms: hernias, but who 
say that they can and want to work, and the same thing when one is 
dealing with people suffering from hydrocele and sometimes people 
with heart disease for whom not even the lightest work is possible, 
and the same thing for limbless men, cripples etc. when the situation 
occurs from time to time. " In substantiation of his claim the 
doctor added that "not long ago there arrived at Marromeu a contingent 
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of some 300 men of whom 37 were immediately admitted to hospital 
and many more were admitted in the first days after their arrival. "(48) 
The vicious cycle of original infection, increased debility and 
secondary complications, alluded to above, started at the point of 
recruitment. Men who were already unfit were passed as fit in the 
mass inspections. If they did not succumb to illness on the 
journey to the estates they gradually become sick during the course 
of the contract. 
It is reasonable to assume that the numbers of men who 
slipped through the medical inspections(49) was a reflection of the 
growing labour shortage in Zambe"zia - As the pool of able-bodied 
men dried up so labour recruiters were increasingly obliged to contract 
men who were not able-bodied, either through physical incapacity, 
old age or because they were too young to cope with the arduous work. 
Until the numbers slipping through reached proportions which could 
not be ignored, the company's doctors colluded with the recruiters. 
To the degree that workers were expendable and to the degree that 
they received no wages and no food for the days when they did not 
work, SSE had little to lose by turning a blind eye to the irregular 
practices of its recruiters. 
This chapter has examined a range of illnesses suffered by 
the labour force at SSE. It has also looked at the measures 
introduced by the company to deal with sickness among the labour 
force. Most of the afflictions suffered by plantation workers were 
the result of a combination of poor diet and overcorwded and unhygienic 
housing conditions. Even when diseases could not be attributed 
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directly to these causes their transmission and/or hold on the 
individual was facilitated by them. Prevention of disease required 
not only a concerted attack on living conditions on the estates but 
also the development of a wide-ranging health education programme 
in conjunction with an effective curative health service. Neither 
the state nor the estate was prepared to consider either of these 
possibilities seriously. On the one hand they implied a substantial 
increase in expenditure. On the other the ideology of forced labour 
militated against them f or ill health was seen primarily as a means 
of avoiding work. The lack of concern over health and the consequent 
lack of health care facilities resulted in a work force which was 
weak and sickly if not actually racked by illness. 
The policy pursued by state and company alike in Zamb4zia 
with regard to the health of the labour force had obvious repercussions 
on other aspects of policy. For example, the ill-health of the 
labour force affected the men's ability to produce the task demanded 
of them. Ultimately it meant that companies such as SSE had to 
tolerate reduced levels of production. (50) Yet, as has been shown 
elsewhere, one of SSE's aims was to increase the productivity of the 
labour force. How, then, is this apparent paradox to be explained? 
Its explanation is consistent with the main argument of this 
dissertation and lies in the very nature of the forced migrant 
labour system which operated in Zamb(ýzia - While 
labour was coerced 
into wage work by the colonial state at wages set in the employer's 
favour there was little need to increase production by employing a 
healthy work force. Brute force was a cheaper method of maintaining 
production levels than investing in effective preventive and curative 
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health care. Providing the worker only missed the occasional 
day's work the overall cost of maintaining the labourer was low, 
for on the days when he was sick he received neither food nor 
payment. If, on the other hand, he managed to work for part of 
the day, the company actually stood to gain from his debility 
because he did not receive payment for partial task completion. 
Finally, as long as the worker was not hospitalised for an extended 
period during the contract the burden of supporting his physical 
recuperation fell on his family. During the six months "rest" 
period his health recovered sufficiently for him to take up another 
contract, unless he died. And if he died coercion by the 
state and the rotating supply of labour ensured that another man 
would take his place. General debility and weakness could therefore 
be tolerated to the extent that it did not prevent men from working 
for lengthy periods. However, as has been demonstrated, SSE 
increasingly started to recruit men who were likely to be ill for 
part if not all of the contract period. This policy, which could 
have had no economic advantage, can only be explained by the growing 
labour shortage in Zambe*zia. SSE presumably felt that it was better 
to recruit men who might produce a task, even if crippled or ill, 
than to forego the use of their labour altogether. It can only 
be assumed that it was cheaper to support sick workers than to 
instal labour-saving machinery. 
Quite apart from the long-term effects of such policies on 
generations of workers and their families in Zambezia, the short- 
term effects of SSE's policies reveal a total disregard for the 
welfare of the labour force. The sickness and death of a worker 
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was not a matter of human concern. It mattered only to the degree 
that it might reflect on the company's image and lead to unwelcome 
attention from the authorities. Workers at SSE were, as far as 
the company's management was concerned, no more than units of 
production to be put to work in the least costly way. 
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SSE Marromeu, 29 Feb. 1944, and Fernando Barros to Gerente 
Geral 4 Mar. 1944, op. cit. 
SSE Ar., File 93, Labour and Recruiting, Government Side, 
Torre do Vale de Lacerda to SSE Marromeu, 25 Mar. 1953. 
(12) SSE Ar., File 93, MT General Manager to Estate Manager 
M/meu/Caia, 3 Apr. 1953, No. 24/53 MGT. 
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Notwithstanding the fact that the costs of maintaining 
sick workers had been specifically advanced as one of the 
reasons preventive measures were needed in 1944 (SSE Ar., File 135, Vianna Rodrigues, 23 Feb. 1944. ) SSE's policy of doing the minimum possible was also pursued in spite of the fact that the company's management had been alerted to the dangers of easy transmission of ticks and the fever to Europeans: SSE Ar., File 135, J. Barros Lima to Gerente 
Geral Marromeu, 29 Feb. 1944 and Fernando Barros to Gerente 
Geral 4 Mar. 1944, op. cit. 
(14) SSE Ar., File 138 (Obsolete), Ihe Case of Dr. Saboya Ramos 
J. Saboya Ramos to Gerente da SSE Ltd. Marromeu, 1 July 1939. 
(15) SSE Ar., File 94, Labour for Marromey MT General Manager to 
Estate Manager Marromeu/Caia, 6 May 1939, No. 45/39 MGT, 
Anguru Labour Recently Repatriated. 
(16) SSE Ar., File 138, Saboya Ramos to Gerente SSE, 1 July 1939, 
op. cit. (Translation J. H. ) 
(17) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) 
(18) SSE Ar., File 204, Native Diet and Rations Abel da Costa 
Ferreira, Admin. do Concelho do Chinde, to Gerente Geral 
SSE, 26 Jan. 1942, No. 129/B/15, Enclosing Information 
from the Administrator of Alto MolocA given on 14 Aug. 1939 
and from Dr. Calisto Baptista, Sub-Delegado do Sa6de, Circ. 
de Massingire. 
(19) SSE Ar., File 138, Saboya Ramos to Gerente SSE, 1 July 1939, 
op. cit. (Translation J. H. ) 
(20) SSE Ar., File 204, SSE Ltd n. n. to Governador Geral da 
Prov. de Moc., 15 Dec. 1956. (Translation J. H. ) 
(21) "The natives consider the locust a splendid titbit. They 
eat them, after they have been cleaned and cooked, with a 
sauce which does not compete with those of the celebrated 
'savarin' but which is much apprecicted!!! " (SSE Ar., File 
138, Saboya Ramos to Gerente SSE, 1 July 1939, op. cit. ) 
(Translation J. H. ) 
(22) ibid. 
(23) SSE Ar., File 135, Fernando Barros to Gerente Geral, 4 Mar. 
1944, op. cit. The sugar sock was the only form of 
protective clothing the workers received, even when 
they entered the cane fields after the leaves had been 
burnt off the plants prior to harvesting. Barros suggested 
that during the dry season the workers should receive the 
sack when they arrived in Mopeia. They could then use it 
to keep themselves warm while their own clothes were drying 
after disinfection. 
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(24) SSE Ar., File 204, Abel do Costa Ferreira to Gerente Geral SSE, 26 Jan. 1942, op. cit. 
(25) SSE Ar., File 93, Torre do Vale de Lacerda to Gerente Geral SSE Luabo, por Intermedio do Gerente Geral do Propriedade de Marromeu, 5 May 1954. 
(26) SSE Ar. , File 133A, Recruiting, Angonia, Quelimane, Locall MJG (Gomes) to Director de Admin. Civil da Zambezia, 
Quelimane, 12 Oct. 1954, Deaths at SSE between January and September 1954. 
(27) There were only eight primary schools in the whole province in 1947., but "Africans hardly attend them for, as a result 
of the legal dispositions in force, only g-ssimilados can be 
admitted. " For African pupils the Catholic Church ran 'rudimentary' schools. In 1942,1500 students matriculated from the 'rudimentary' schools in Zambezia. In 1946 the 
syllabus of the 'rudimentary' schools was "profoundly 
altered". According to the Governor of Zambezia "the new 
programmes mark, without any doubt at all, a better under- 
standing of the needs and reality of the native pupil, 
and are not imbued with the mysticism of the ABC which dominated the rudimentary schools in the previous period. " 
The aims of the rudimentary schools were "l) to teach the 
pupils to work and to instil in them a sense of the dignity 
of work, 2) to teach them to speak the Portuguese language, 
3) to teach the most apt pupils to read and write. " (GOV. Q, 
Col. de Moý., Prov. da Zambezia, Relatdrio do Governador, 
Capitffo da Infantaria Ce'sar Maria de Serpo Roso, Respeitante 
ao P6riodo de 4 de Maio de 1943 a 31 de Dezembro de 1947, 
pp. 18-24). (Translation J. H. ) (Emphasis added). 
(28) Relat6rio do Governador (Zambe"zia) 1943 ... 1947 op. cit., 
pp. 40-46. 
(29) SSE Ar., File 118, Dirrecao ucgoes dos Servigos de"Sa6de, Instr 
I para a Campanha a favor da Limpeza dos Indigenas de Mocambique, 
LM, 17 Mar. 1944, o Director dos Servigos de Sat; de, Air"es 
Pinto Ribeiro; SSE Ar., File 118, Circulo de Saude do Zambe'z'ia, 
Sobre a Companhc contra Infestag6es, o Inspector, Candido 
de Barros, Med. Insp. Desg., 4 Sep. 1956, Quelimane, Re: 
Informacdo No. 26 deste Circulo de Saude. 
(30) RTI, Art. 225, p. 67. For the detailed legal dispositions 
concerning medical assistance for 'natives' see pp. 66-73. 
(31) Relatd'rio do Governador (Zambe"zic) 1943 ... 1947, op. cit., 
p. 50. 
(32) SSE Ar., File 138, Saboya Ramos to Gerente SSE, 1 July 1939, 
op. cit. It can only be assumed that since the totals of 
patients which the hospital could accommodate do not tally 
with the number of beds given, there were in fact only 64 
actual beds, although floor space existed for more patients. 
(Translation J. H. ) 
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(33) SSE Ar., File 118, Camilo Ferreira d'Almeida Circ. Admin. 
de. Mopeia to Gerente Geral SSE Luabo, 12 June 1951, 
Acampamento de Transito da Sena Sugar Estates. (Trans- 
lation J. H. ) 
(34) In many ways this attitude is analogous to the philosophy 
which governed the nineteenth century Poor Low Reform in 
Britain. Relief was seen as a means by which the idle would 
avoid wage work "It /-r-elief 7 gives him, strange as it may 
appear, a sort of inUependen-ce. He need not bestir himself 
to seek work, he need not study to please his master; he 
need not put any restraint upon his temper; he need not ask 
relief as a favour. He has all the slave's security for 
subsistence, without his liability for punishment. " 
(Tony Novak, "Social Policy, Poverty and the Working Class, 
the 1934 Poor Law Amendment Act" (Durham University Political 
Economy Group, Paper presented 28 Oct. 1975), mimeo, p. 12, 
citing the Report of His Majesty's Commissioners for Enquiring 
into the Administration and Practical Operation of the Poor 
Laws, 1834, p. 57). In both cases it was assumed that the 
provision of- adequate hospitals or reasonable unemployment 
relief would encourage the worker to cease employment. 
(35) Interview at Muide Compound, SSE Luabo, 14 Nov. 1976. 
(Translation J. H. ) cf. Charles van Onselen, Chibaro: 
African Mine Labour in Southern RhodeLic, 1200-1233- 
(Pluto Press, London, 1976), p. 59. 
(36) SSE Ar., File 138, Saboya Ramos to Gerente SSE, 1 July 1939, 
op. cit. (Translation J. H. ) 
(37) SSE Ar., File 93, Antonio Queiroz Mopeic to Gerente Geral 
Luabo, 28 Apr. 1954, No. 6/54ACT. 
(38) SSE Ar., File 93, flAancger 7 Marromeu to General Manager 
Luabo, 13 May 19547, No. 39/54 "Mgt", Case of the Maganja 
Repatriates. 
(39) ibid . 
(40) ibid. 
(41) SSE Ar., File 94, /Fknager 7 Marromeu to D. Antonio de 
Noronha M'kame Angonic PorTuguesa, 24 Apr. 1942, Natives 
recruited by D. Ant6nio de Noronha, Circ. de Angonia, 
Contracts 1,2,3/41 of 22 Apr. 1941. 
(42) SSE Ar., File 94, Joao Sabaia Fzdc7 Ramos to Gerente 
Geral SSE, 25 Apr. 1942. (Tra-nslation J. H. ) 
(43) SSE Ar., File 94, Antonio de Noronha Mkame to Dr. Ayres 
de Sousa Neves Vila Coutinho, 7 Aug. 1942. 
(44) SSE Ar., File 94, Dr. Ayres Correa de Sousa Neves Vila 
Mouzinho to SSE Agente M'kame, (n. d. but from other 
correspondence on the file probably 13 Aug. 
1942). 
(Translation J. H. ) 
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(45) 
(46) 
SSE Ar., File 93, /-14onager-7Marromeu to General Manager, 
13 May 1954, op. clit. 
SSE Ar., File 93, Torre do Vale de Lacerda to Gerente Geral 
SSE, 5 May 1954, op. cit. (Translation J. H. ) 
(47) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) 
(48) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) 
(49) SSE Ar., File 184, Native 
-Labour Organisation, Hut Tax MT General Manager to M. J. Gomes Luabo 29 June 1954, 
No. 77/54/Mgt. The General Manager here referred to the large numbers of labourers)who slipped by with normal 
contingents, who were not fit to do a day's work. 
This was a situation that had parallels in many other areas 
where plantation production existed. According to the ILO 
"in general, conditions on estates do not favour good health, 
and many diseases are prevalent. The state of under- and 
mal-nourishment greatly diminishes resistance to diseases 
and deprives workers of the physical stamina necessary for 
hard and sustained work. Laziness and lack of interest in 
work., of which plantation workers are occasionally accused, 
may often be the result of disease and/or undernutrition. " 
(ILO, Committee of Work on Plantations, Third Session, Geneva 
1955, Living nd Working Conditions and Productivity on 
Clantations (ILO Geneva, 1955) p. 101). On p. 103 the 
report outlines some of the more common diseases found on 
plantations, and discusses their causes and effects. The 
diseases are all the diseases (with the exception of tick- 
fever) which have been discussed in this chapter. The 
Report concludes: "the high incidence of certain diseases 
reflects the low level of health of workers on some of the 
estates which must at least in part be ascribed to unsatis- 
factory living conditions. No doubt this state of health 
affects the level of labour productivity. " 
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PART II 
THE IMPACT OF THE COERCIVE LABOUR REGIME, 1930-1960 
ii. Workers' Responses to Forced MigrantLabour 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST LABOUR RECRUITMENT 
The single most important factor which shaped workers' 
responses to migrant labour was their condition as forced labour. 
Regardless of their personal inclinations or the existence of 
alternative opportunities for making a living, African men between 
the ages of 18 and 55 were obliged by law to enter an annual 
contract either with the state or a private employer. It was only 
in 1962 that the RTI, which asserted the duty of African men to 
take up regular employment, was abolished, and even after this date 
forced labour continued, albeit in a disguised form. 
The effect of this legislation, as already demonstrated, 
was the development of a system of labour organisation and supply 
in which the state took on the central role in providing capital 
with labour. It was state officials, the administrators and their 
subordinates, the state-appointed chiefs and headmen, who were 
directly responsible for rounding up men for work on plantations. 
The role of the private recruiter was, in general, limited to 
collecting his contingent of men and boys at the 'concentration' 
organised by the administrator. It was also state officials who 
supervised the work of contracted men with private employers and who 
punished men who failed to fulfil the conditions of their contracts. 
This meant that at every stage of the labour recruitment process 
contracted workers came into direct contact with the state. Indeed, 
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their primary contact with wage work was not with capital but with 
the state. They saw themselves being "bought" by private companies from 
the state. (l) It was, therefore, primarily towards the state and 
against the labour system as such that their energies were directed. 
It is this that explains the need for coercion to conscript men in 
the first place and the increasing use of coercion over time. However, 
the degree to which men could express their opposition to the labour 
system was severely limited by the extensive nature of the controls 
and punishments which were part and parcel of it. Organised protest, 
except at the most spontaneous level, required great personal courage 
and was doomed to almost certain failure. Unable to confront the 
state through direct political action and still less through open 
rebellion, migrant workers were forced to adopt a strategy which 
involved avoiding the demands of the state and hence avoiding forced 
labour. This chapter will examine the four principal forms this 
strategy took. 
MANIPULATING THE CON1RADICTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY 
One of the problems the Portuguese colonial state encountered 
in its attempt to impose an administration which would generate 
revenue through tax collection and mobilise labour for capital was 
the effective use of indigenous political leaders. Like many other 
colonial regimes elsewhere, the Portuguese followed a policy of 
delegating authority to 'traditional' rulers who acted as the agents 
of its authority and actually saw that the law was carried out at 
base level. The Portuguese devised a three-tier system of 'native' 
authorities. At the highest level there was the or 
'chief' 
who supervised the work of the sub-chief s under him and was 
directly 
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responsible to the administrator or chefe de Posto. Below the 
were the chefes de Grupos-de Povoa(; oes who supervised a I- 
J-_ number of hamlets. Finally, there was the chefe de Pov22Sao, or the 
head of the hamlet. Orders from the administrator were transmitted 
through these three tiers and f inally executed by the lowest-level 
'chief', the village headman. (2) By ensuring that a compliant 
strata of 'chiefs' and 'headmen' were inserted into positions of 
authority within the wider administrative divisions, responsibility 
for tax collection and labour conscription could be devolved to them 
without the expense of employing an extensive network of European 
administrative officials. Apart from the purely economic function 
of this system of delegated authority it also served an ideological 
purpose. It meant that the population was divided amongst itself. 
Criticisms of the regime as such could be deflected to criticisms 
of individuals who supported it. The fostering of divisions among 
the people in turn meant that the possibility of recognition of their 
common experience of oppression and united opposition to it was minimised. 
However, the system of delegating certain areas of 
responsibility to the 'native authorities' implied a series of 
practical problems. These confronted the regime in some areas of 
the Province throughout the period under study. Firstly, the 
over-riding aim of the colonial authorities was to impose the most 
cost-effective administration. This meant that ideally, admini- 
strative boundaries had to correspond to population distribution. 
It was clearly uneconomic to maintain posts with only a small and 
scattered population which cost as much to run as posts with a large 
and concentrated population. On the other hand, in areas where the 
population was dispersed, or if in general the administrative unit 
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was very large, control over the population, which was clearly as 
important as rational economic organisation, was undermined. Secondly, 
rational definition of the boundaries of administrative units from 
the economic and demographic standpoints conflicted with the actual 
organisation and distribution of the 'traditional' authorities. 
Reorganisation of administrative divisions to obey economic and 
demographic criteria implied splitting up the traditional socio- 
economic and political units and with it unrest. Thirdly, moulding 
a strata of compliant 'chiefs' and 'headmen' in itself implied eliminating 
those traditional leaders who were recalcitrant, disobedient, or 
otherwise ineffective from the administration's point of view. It 
entailed a contradiction between the need to use 'native authorities' 
whom the people would respect and obey and the need to find 'native 
authorities' who would themselves respect and obey the government. 
The confusion which resulted from the various attempts to reconcile 
these contradictory needs gave the ordinary people an opportunity 
to avoid the demands of the regime. Through a brief discussion of 
the administrative history of the circumscription of Alto Molocue 
I shall show how this happened. 
Between 1919, when a civil administration was first installed 
in Alto Mol&A, and 1933, when the external boundaries of the 
district took the shape they were to retain for the rest of the 
colonial period, the major preoccupation of successive administrators 
was to reorganise the internal boundaries of the district in order 
to maximise the revenue from tax collection and minimise the expense 
incurred in gathering it. 
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According to the writer of the administrative history of the 
area, commissioned by the Governor of Zambe"zia in 1954, it appeared 
to some people that after 1933 the problems of effective administration 
had been resolved through boundary changes. In his opinion, 
however, these changes only led to further confusion which increased 
the problems of the administration. 
Wth the fusion of areas confusion arose about the 
native authorities and there was a consequent impossibility of supervising and administering the 
areas and people by the administrative authority, 
and Fthere was 7 the dispersal of documents and the Jisappearan-ce of old buildings, which are being destroyed by the weather. (3) 
These problems were compounded by the frequent reorganisation of the 
areas supervised by the native authorities; brought about in an 
attempt to rationalise tax collection. 
We remember that in 1947 it was ordered that regedorias 
which did not have at least . 1400 taxpayers should be fused. Absolute barbarities were committed, to the 
point where there were some administrative posts of 
over 8000 square kilometres with only one regedor or 
two, because the number of taxpayers did not allow 
for more. (4) 
1%. 
The writer of the history, the then Administrator of Alto Mol&cue, 
remarked that these reforms were errors "only justified on the basis 
of the principle of reducing expenses. " He added "and it has been 
in obedience of this terrible principle that the circumscription of 
Alto Molocue is now and f rom the point of view of native policy 
divided in the worst possible way and badly administered. " (5) 
In practise, as the Administrator pointed out, the frequent 
reforms rather than consolidating colonial rule tended to undermine 
it for they afforded the ordinary people an opportunity to ease the 
burdens imposed on them. One way of doing this was to move out of 
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the area of an unpopular 'native' authority and into the orea of 
one who was less rigorous in fulfilling his duty. These moves 
generally took place when the government interfered with the 
succession of the traditional rulers. There was, for instance 
the case of the Regedor Nivava. 
In 1921 the Eegedo Nivava was responsible for collecting 
893 taxes. In 1938, however, the authorities decided to abolish 
the Regedoric because the incumbent at that time was a "bad servant". 
The people under his jurisdiction passed instead to that of the 
Re Malua. There was discontent among the people as a result of 
this change which led to the movement of large numbers of people to 
Milange, Nyasaland and the Administrative Post of Molumbo. Over 
time the region became more and more depopulated and was gradually 
invaded by wild animals, and especiclly by lion and leopard. This 
in turn led to further population movement from the area until finally, 
even those who were "most attached" to the soil had moved away. 
In 1939 or 1940 those people who had stayed with the Regedor 
Malua used a change of administrator to ask to be liberated from a 
chief who in three years had done nothing positive for them. On 
the contrary "whenever the Regedor Malua was called upon to do any 
work he went to the /-former 7 Regedoria Nivava and sacrificed people 
for contracts, for unpaid labour service Fcontribuic6o bracal 
7 
.11- 
and for the roads. " As a result "many people took flight ... until 
the administrative authority took note and once again restored 
authority to those from whom it had been taken, although to a new 
individual from the lands and family of the old Nivava. "(6) 
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The new incumbant was a certain Pedro Nivava who, according 
to the writer, was an alcoholic and a drug addict who had not the 
slightest notion of his duties and responsibilities. Pedro Nivava 
was finally exiled for concealing a murder committed by his 
assistant. The Regedoria then passed to Andre' Nivava who was the 
closest heir in the blood line. He was chosen by the people. Other 
regedorias were subsequently incorporated into that of Nivava and 
by 1954, the controlled 465 taxpayers (2,334 people). (7) 
The administrator did not record the effects of the 
incorporation of smaller regedorias into the reformed Regedoria 
Nivava. However, examples of similar reorganisations elsewhere 
in the circumscription suggest that reorganisation was usually 
accompanied by discontent which expressed itself in a flight of 
people. Changes in administrators usually led to petitions to 
restore the old rulers. Fearful of losing still more people the 
administrator often had to succumb to these demands even if the 
person chosen was patently unsuitable from his point of view. 
The second major way in which people were able to profit 
from the contradictions of administrative policy was to attempt, 
when reorganisations were taking place, to ensure the nomination of 
chiefs who were acceptable to them. Even if the regedoria was 
left 
unaltered the administrator still had to try and ensure that only 
those candidates who were acceptable to the colonial government 
succeeded. However, this was difficult, because the colonial 
authorities were generally ignorant of the lines of succession(S) 
and the people used their ignorance to further confuse 
the authorities 
whenever the question of succession arose. 
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In his 1954 Report, the Administrator of Alto MolOCuý 
placed great emphasis on the problem of succession. He described 
typical meetings he had held with the people to tell them of the 
Governor's intention of establishing a "native hierarchy" on the true 
blood lines. He tried to encourage the people to discuss their 
choice of chief but on the whole encountered only "a great lack 
of interest" among them. He wrote that he and his colleagues had 
repeatedly brought the question up at census meetings where most of 
the people were gathered: "attentive faces but absent minds". 
As the meeting progressed more and more people started to f idget 
and finally to steal away "on the sly". Asked about the first 
representatives of local authority few if any knew how to answer 
"but instead tell the story of such and such a man who presented 
himself to the whites and offered them a goat or some help. " When it 
came to the question of geneaology the people became very muddled 
confusing "sons with nephews, grandparents with aunts and uncles and 
the detailed distinction between the true blood line and the interest 
they have begun to want to sell us, to ensure their own comfort/ is 
impossible to make. " Various illegitimate successors were suggested 
until the true blood line was lost. 
The talk continues with a smaller and smaller audience, 
until in the end half a dozen old natives are lef t 
listening to us. Generally speaking they indicate 
not the true heir but a native wholresembling and 
distantly related to one of the many to whom reference 
has been made, has the following qualities: indifference 
and lack of interest, obvious mecn-spiritedness, 
attraction to idleness and vagrancy and no desire to 
work hard. In short, the choice falls on the 
individual who will offer them the most comfortable, 
lazy and drunken life. Often, faced with various 
candidates we ask the question "why did you choose 
this one and not that one who seems to us to have an 
equal right but more self-confidence. " Silence, and 
the crest-fallen gaze of those present continues 
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until one of them raises his head and, facing the 
immediate censure of the rest, says "we want this one because he does not seize people. "... In fact, the 
mentality of the people is this: they want a chief 
who does not seize people, who does not invesiigate 
idleness and crime ... (9) 
Without more detailed studies of individual circumscriptions, 
like the one above, it is impossible to say how generalised this 
tactic was. The limited evidence available suggests that it was 
most effective in outlying regions where capital and settler 
penetration were weakest. In areas where European settlement and 
capital penetration were greater, in an arc spreading out from 
Quelimane with an arm along the Zambesi river, problems of 
a administrative control had probably been resolved. Here it was, 
P, Tor example, in the urban and semi-urban areas that administrators 
could ignore the lines of succession and appoint the men of their 
choice to positions in the 'native hierarchy'. (10) Nevertheless, 
even in these areas there was no guarantee that 'chiefs' ana 
'headmen' would be scrupulous in carrying out their duties. 
They formed an intermediary strata between the authorities and 
the people and were therefore, subject to pressure from both. 
Some clearly opted for the advantages that office brought. Oihers, 
on the other hand, tried to balance the demands of the authorities 
against their desire to maintain the people's respect-(11) 
The two tactics described above, namely, fleeing to an area 
where either the native authorities or the colonial officials were 
more lenient in their demands, and confusing the administrative 
authorities to ensure the succession of native authorities who would 
not be over-zealous in the fulfilment of their duties, or who could 
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be bribed to prevent the recruitment of men(12) were tactics which 
rested on the notion of prevarication. Their objective was to delay 
the inevitable for as long as possible. 
POSTPONING THE CONTRACT FOR AS LONG AS POSSIBLE 
Another form of prevarication practised by men in Zamb4zia 
involved trying to postpone the contract either indefinitely or at 
least until the time when it was I-east inconvenient for the 
individual to leave his own home. It appears from SSE's records 
that it was always difficult to recruit labour during the planting 
season and after harvests. For instance, in his 1958 recruiting 
report, SSE's recruiter in Zambezia wrote that it would probably 
be difficult to arrange enough men to replace those leaving the 
estates in August and September, for the reasons which arose every 
year, 
it te appearance of the cotton and rice markets, 
the natives have quite enough money at their 
disposal to pay their taxes and meet their other 
needs, thus avoiding contracting themselves. 
On the other hand, land preparation for the new 
cotton machambas Ffields 7, work done exclusively 
by men, has begun-. (13) - 
One of the ways in which men managed to delay the contract was by 
using a change of administrator to play for time, since it took a 
while for the new incumbant to familiarise himself with local 
conditions. Thus, for example, while the Administrator of Magania 
was absent for a period during 1951 the recruiting situation 
deteriorated in the area. (14) Similarly, in 1958 the difficulties 
over recruitment, alluded to above, were exacerbated by the absence 
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of the administrator, who was on leave. (15) In the same year the 
recruiting situation in Vorrumbala was "bad" because the area was 
without an administrator. According to SSE's recruiter in the 
area, things would only return to normal when an administrator was 
appointed. (16) 
Men also took advantage of changes in 'native' policy to 
avoid taking up a contract. Hence, when forced recruiting was 
temporarily suspended in 1944, SSE's recruiter in the Ile/Gile/Mulevala 
region of northern Zambe"zia anticipated that this change would lead 
to 'ýome dif f iculties and a little resistance on the part of the 
natives, who, in recent years have always been accustomed to being 
forced to come to work by the authorities. "(17) 
More serious were the fears at the end of the 1950s that 
forced recruiting would come to a complete end. SSE's views on the 
possible change in the law were expressed by one of the company's 
directors in a letter to the General ýAanager. 
If the obligation to work after the six months rest 
period were not enforced, I feel that the labour 
position throughout the district would become 
chaotic. For many years now the Native has been 
educated in the belief that he only has to find 
work when the Administrator /-obliges him 7. 
Consequently, if that pressu7e were remov7ed it is 
probable that the great majority of the labour 
force in the District would be content to remain 
in their villages and quickly lose the little 
civilisation which they gain during the six 
months that they spend with us. (18) 
The Director's fears were realised for when forced recruiting was 
officially banned in 1962 the immediate result was that men were 
very difficult to engage. The numbers of men recruited from 
inland Zambezia, Mopeia and Morrumbala dropped considerably. 
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By August, despite the fact that it was a "notoriously bad month" 
for recruitment, there was a growing reluctance of any man to work. 
"Our recruiters are no doubt doing all they can but they are so 
used to being helped by the Government Authorities that they are 
inclined to resign themselves to the fact that without such help 
they will be unable to produce the desired results. "(19) 
FLEEING ABROAD 
The first part of this chapter showed how men living in 
areas of the province which were least effectively administered 
were able to avoid entering a contract by moving out of areas 
where the authorities were active to areas where they were either 
unable or unwilling to fulfill their duties seriously. In general 
these areas comprised the northern border of the province with 
Moýambique Province. Along the extensive border with Nyasaland a 
similar problem existed, although here it was compounded by less 
repressive living and working conditions in the English colony. 
According to the Administrator of Milange the authorities in 
Nyasaland were attracting men from Mozambique 
because of the excessive liberties that they concede 
to him. Today they regret this and are sorry that 
they did not adopt our methods. The working 
conditions offered to the native worker there are 
inferior to those offered in Milange, but the 
native enjoys freedom to work which borders on 
vagrancy, and it is that liberty which leads to a 
situation where he prefers to work in Nyasaland... 
Understand, therefore, that emigration... has as 
its principal cause the lack of forced labour in 
that Territory. (20) 
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The wild, hilly country along the Nyasaland border, its 
length, and the lack of European penetration in parts of it all 
combined to make effective patrolling of the numerous crossing 
points impossible. As a result, clandestine emigration to Nyasaland 
was a problem which plagued the authorities throughout the period. 
It was, moreover, an exodus which had more serious implications 
than the temporary avoidance of wage labour within Zambezia, for 
it implied an absolute withdrawal of labour from the province and 
a drain on the pool of cheap labour which employers and the state 
alike were both so concerned to maintain. 
Reference has already been made in passing to the withdrawal 
of groups of people to Nyasaland when administrative boundaries 
were changed or the 'native authorities' replaced. In addition to 
these population movements there was also a continual trickle of 
individual men across the border. Milange appears to have been a 
favourite crossing place. Men who had completed a contract on the 
tea-plantations on the Portuguese side of the border would then 
cross to Nyasaland in search of wotk. (21) 
Because the emigration was clandestine accurate estimates 
of the numbers of men involved do not exist. However, that it was 
a grave problem is demonstrated by the authorities' response to it. 
Until the mid-1950s the labour laws were relaxed in both Morrumbola 
and Milange to prevent a wholesale exodus of people. (22) In 
addition, the unpaid labour service or contribuig3obrar"al was 
replaced by a money tax in the border regions in an attempt to 
discourage men from emigrating to avoid it. (23) Finally, there was 
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a campaign in the rrid-1940s to encourage the cultivation of the 
candlenut tree /- aleurite 7. This "very cppreciable source of 
wealth" was intended to attract men back f rom Nyasaland and at the 
same time to dissuade others from leaving Zombe, "zia. (24) 
For a short while in the rr. id-1940s it appeared that the 
emigration had stopped. This was when the aleurite cultivation 
programme was introduced "to consolidate this exceptional situation. " (25) 
/-Emphasis added 7. The emigration only apparently stopped however, 
because although the census for 1947 revealed a net increase of 
88,627 more individuals in ZamVzia than in the 1943 census, the census 
was never accurate. (26) Furthermore, it was relatively easy for 
men to cross and recross the borders and to confuse the authorities 
by registering as nationals on both sides cr by keeping a family 
on one side of the frontier and registering on the other. (27) The 
authorities lack of awareness of the full extent of the problem 
is also revealed by their discovery that men from Mozambique were 
selling their passes to men from Nyasaland. 
Natives who hold identity cards issued in our territory 
frequently die in Rhodesia and even South Africa. 
Their effects are sent to Milange bur rarely are the 
t times, that the heirs found, and it happens even, a-, 
very native, given as dead, is found in his home. 
After investigations have been conducted the 
following emerges: the Nyasaland authorities do 
not allow natives from that territory to leave for 
Rhodesia or South Africa, and those natives, in 
order to be able to emigrate, buy the passes of 
Portuguese natives, since, cs Portuguese natives 
they can emigrate. The trade in Rasses has reached 
considerable proportions bý6--tit 1-s being rigorously 
suppressed by stopping the renewal of passes which 
have been mislaid unless the veracity of the claim 
is proven. (28) 
(Emphasis added) 
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An intense dislike of forced labour and the compulsory 
period of labour service, coercion to recruit men and the lack of 
choice of employer which accompanied it, appear to have been the 
principal reasons for the flight of men to Nyasaland. Yet, for men 
who did not live near the western border of the province this option 
was not available. They had to resort to other means to avoid 
forced labour. 
"PLAYING OFF" THE DIFFERENT SECTIONS OF CAPITAL AGAINST EACH OTHER 
In Chapter IV the effects of the growing demand for labour 
within Zambelzia were discussed. The chapter argued that at the 
I provircial level the demand for labour was controlled by the 
readjustment of recruiting zones within Zamb4ha and by other 
measures designed to redistribute labour within and between the 
different sections of capital in the region. These changes were 
accompanied by the introduction of harsher penalties for men who 
infringed the labour law. The chapter also attempted to show, 
however, that in spite of these developments, at district (as 
opposed to provincial) level, where the actual distribution of 
labour depended directly on the administrator concerned and his 
interpretation of the regulations, the growing shortage of labour 
was often accompanied by growing competition for labour. One of 
the major areas of competition discussed was that between cotton 
concessionaries and the labour recruiters for plantations. 
SSE was 
partially able to resolve this problem through its policy of 
only distributing cotton seed to women on its own concession. 
In 
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other areas, however, as has been shown, cotton concessionories 
sought various legal and illegal means of acquiring male labour. 
The widespread resistance to forced cotton cultivation and 
the general abhorrance felt by women cultivators towards the crop(29) 
should not obscure the fact that there was c: distinction between 
'the cultivation women were obliged to enter and the cultivation 
that men could opt to take up. Women appear to have been forced to 
grow cotton whether they wanted to or not and this in addition to 
their normal cultivation of food and/or cash crops. Men, on the 
other hand, could register as cotton farmers provided they agreed 
to sow one hectare of land and an odditionol half hectare for each 
wife. Cotton growing was thereafter regarded as their full-time 
occupation and they were exempted from the obligation to enter a 
contract. (30) Thus, whereas forced cotton cultivation undertaken 
by women was analogous to the forced labour undertaken by men, for 
men it provided an alternative to forced labour and one that offered 
certain advantages. Firstly, whereas most plantation workers were 
separated from their families and had no contact with them during 
the course of the contract, cotton farmers lived at home. Secondly, 
by cultivating cotton and working on the family plot the danger 
of the family starving was reduced. Thirdly, whereas the contract 
labourer worked for others, the cotton former appeared to be 
working for himself, and appeared to control his own means of 
production. Fourthly, despite controlled prices the evidence 
also suggests that "considerable sums" could be earned from cotton 
production. There are references in the records relating to the 
1940s to the amount of cash available from cotton; these continue 
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into the 1950s. In 1956, for instance, referring to the shortage 
of labour in the Province, the Governor of Zambezia was to remark 
that the percentage of men recruited for wage work in the Morrumbala 
district was small in relation to the numbers available. 
We must also remember that among eligible natives, 
but those who are not available for work, are 
included about 8000 cotton farmers, the great 
majority of whom are "registered vagrants". 
Some of them come to ask the administrator to 
punish their wives for not producing enough 
cotton to enable them to buy bicycles. (31) 
As late as 1959 SSE's recruiter in Zambezia was complaining about 
the amount of cash the 'natives' received from their cotton harvest. 
I know that in certain areas... there were a great 
number of natives who received for their weights 
3,4, or 5000 escudos. With these results it is 
natural to expect less reluctance on the part of 
the natives for cotton cultivation and greater 
propaganda by the concessionaries. Cotton 
cultivation, therefore, will be the great enemy 
of recruitment in the future. (32) 
It would be misleading to infer from the foregoing that 
cotton cultivation provided a welcome alternative to forced labour. 
As the quotation above 5uggests, even with the cash available from 
cotton cultivation, men did not rush to register as cotton farmers. 
Like plantation managers the agents of the cotton concessionaries 
were anxious to derive as much profit from their concessions and 
from their cultivators/labourers as they could. The actual 
conditions of cotton cultivation were therefore probably little 
different from those experienced by plantation workers. 
Nevertheless, viewed in the context of the situation as a whole, 
cotton cultivation provided the only opportunity for avoiding 
wage labour which was available to many men in the province. 
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This chapter has reviewed the four principal ways in 
which men in Zamb4z 
To a certain extent 
In the outlying and 
to postpone, if not 
by manipulating the 
the border was also 
ia responded to recruitment for forced labour. 
there was a regional distribution of responses. 
border areas of the province some men were able 
to permanently avoid, their labour obligations 
contradictions of administrative policy. Where 
a national boundary, they could flee from the 
repressive labour regime by emigrating. However, in central and 
eastern regions of the province, by and large, these options were 
not available. There men either had to resort to playing for time 
when, for one reason or another, the continuity of the local 
administration was interrupted, or they sought to exploit the 
competition which existed between cotton concessionaries and 
plantations by registering as cotton farmers. 
The limited range and the essentially passive nature of the 
0 responses discussed was conditioned by the whole administrative 
and socio-political framework established by the authorities. The 
repression exercised over migrant labourers was decisive in 
both limiting and determining the options available to them - 
Me" 
Nevertheless, the passive nature of the responses outlined should 
not disguise their common underlying characteristic. Discontent 
hinged principally around the system of forced labour; a system 
which was identified with the state. To the degree, therefore, 
that workers were able to struggle against forced labour, their 
struggle was directed against the state. Yet despite the 
existence of resistance to labour recruitment, the fact remains 
that many thousands of men in Zambezia were still being forced to 
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work on plantations as late as 1962. The following chapter 
therefore, will examine their reactions, not to the labour system 
as such, but to the actual conditions they encountered in the work- 
place - 
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CHAPTER X 
FORMS OF STRUGGLE ON THE ESTATES 
The most striking point to emerge from SSE's records between 
1930 and 1960 is the lack of militant action by the work force in 
pursuit of higher wages and better working conditions. With the 
single exception of a collective demand for higher wages by river 
steamer crews in 1949(l) there is no other mertion of organised 
action by the work force or sections of it. Yet, as has been shown 
in the foregoing chapters wages at SSE were low, the work arduous 
and living and working conditions bad by any standards. How then 
is the lack of organised opposition to these conditions to be 
explained and did its absence denote a passive work-force either too 
oppressed or too apathetic to organise in defence of its own 
interests? 
It is the oppression of the labour force which provides the 
key to understanding the lack of militant action at SSE. Firstly, 
as suggested in the lost chapter, the principal concern of men in 
Zamb4zia was to avoid forced labour. This is not to say that men 
did not struggle against conditions on the estates but it is to SOY 
that it was the state rather than capital which wos seen as the 
major protagonist, and that the struggle against the 'labour system 
took place primarily at the point of recruitment. Secondly, as 
in the case of opposition to the labour system itself, the role of 
the state in controlling both the conditions of labour and 
the labour 
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force was critical. The administrative mechanisms aimed at 
maintaining the flow of cheap labour to the estates applied as much 
to men working on plantations as to those at other stages of the 
labour recruitment process. Hence, there was no legal means through 
which men could protest against wages and conditions in the work- 
place. Any attempts by workers to form organisations or even 
collectively to discuss working conditions would have been construed 
as acts of disobedience at best and acts of rebellion at worst, and 
both were punishable in terms of the RTI. So extensive was the 
list of misdemeanours to which punishment applied that it was only 
at the immediate point of production that plantation management 
assumed responsibility for controlling the labour force. Even here 
administrators could be called in to supervise the work of men who, 
for whatever reason, failed to produce the stipulated task. (2) 
Hence, the legal sanctions which discouraged men from openly resisting 
labour recruitment equally discouraged them from openly protesting 
against their conditions of service. 
Besides the system of control exercised by the state, a 
system which has already been discussed elsewhere, there were two 
other factors which inhibited the development of workers' organisations 
on the estates. Firstly, SSE's management devised a system of 
supervision in the fields which was designed to facilitate control 
of the labour force. Secondly, therewere a series of structural 
constraints which arose from the way in which the flow of 
labour 
to plantations was organised. These two constraints will 
form 
the first part of this chapter, which will briefly examine 
their 
principal features. The second part of the chapter will 
then examine 
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the range of responses which, despite the extensive system of 
control, were available to men at SSE. 
CONSTRAINTS INHIBITING THE GROWTH OF WORKERS' ORGANISATIONS 
Control on the Estates 
According to a memorandum written by one of SSE'sDirectors 
in 1962, compound staff at SSE were subordinate to field staff and 
control of the field staff over the work-force was "absolute". (3) 
The role of the compound staff, was, therefore, essentially one 
of supporting the f ield staf f. The main task of the compound 
superintendent, apart from the administration of the compound and 
supervision of food and payment, was to ensure that labourers got up 
early and arrived in the fields on time. To this end the first task 
of the superintendent and his assistants in the mornings was to rouse 
the labourers and "encourage" them to go to work. (4) 
Unfortunately, SSE's records contain few references to field 
supervision methods prior to the 1960s. However, of ter this date 
there is more evidence, mainly because the system was revised in an 
attempt to 'buy off' the labour force and deflect criticisms of the 
labour regime. Thus, by extrapolating f rom remarks made in the 
1960s 
an idea of field supervision methods in the earlier period can 
be 
given. Authority in the fields, as has been shown, extended 
directly from the head overseer/estate manager to his assistants, 
and below them to the ca s down to the foremen of 
field gangs. 
The role of the field staff was primarily supervisory. 
They received 
no agricultural training and were not required 
to understand the 
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cultivation process. Their function was to make sure that workers 
completed their daily task. (5) The resulting low-level of SSE's 
field staff was criticised by the government inspectors in 1962; 
a criticism which one of SSE's directors reiterated in relation to 
the changes to be introduced. He remarked that amongst the lower- 
level European staff only those who had failed to make good in their 
own societies came to Luabo. (6) The quality of the African foremen 
was also low and their behaviour towards the labour force was 
cited as one of the reasons for the high levels of absenteeism. (7) 
When, in 1962, a new Welfare and Administration Department 
was created to take over the responsibility for matters relating 
to tasks and discipline from the field staff it was instructed not 
to be "soft" with the African worker. However, it was also told 
that the old inflexible methods of ensuring task completion were to 
change. According to the memorandum which included these instructions, 
gone were the days when a task stated meant a task completed. The 
General Field Manager was also instructed to set more reasonable 
tasks. These had previously been unfair. (8) Both field and welfare 
staff had at times been tactless. A report on this aspect of company 
policy also revealed that. "however well the plantation staff may 
handle labour some of the practices they employ are illegal -" (9 
) 
In future, punishment of the African worker was to be consistent 
throughout the business. It was also to comply with the low. 
Today this unfortunately is not so. The field staff 
are naturally not legal experts and they apply what 
they understand of the law in a rough and ready way. 
This has been perfectly adequate for many years, but 
it will no longer be adequate because we could 
easily get into the position when the African 
labourer knows the field staff is not within the 
law. (10) 
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Apparently this instruction did not take immediate effect 
for a year later SSE's recruiter in the Mocuba region reported that 
he was finding it very difficult to contract men. The reason he 
gave for the difficulty arose from the reports of bad treatment 
brought bock by workers returning from the estates. This was 
confirmed by the administrator. While the men were receiving their 
deferred pay the recruiter overheard some of the complaints. The 
men were saying that 
all workers who do not finish their task are brought 
from the compound by the capatazes in the presence 
of the police... and are punished either at home or 
in the secretariat. Afterwards they remain prisoners 
for a week. If they miss work for two days, besides 
being punished they are imprisoned for three months ... (11) 
Control in the fields, therefore, rested firmly on the power 
of the immediate supervisor to mete out punishment in a "rough and 
ready way. " It also rested on the fear instilled in the labour 
force of the possible consequerces of failing to do what the 
supervisor ordered. These consequences included summoning the 
authorities who took over responsibility for punishing the worker 
either by beating, detention and/or unpaid labour service. 
After punishment the worker was returned to the estates to 
complete his contrcct. 
It is the involvement of the authorities in discipline of 
the labour force at the workplace and their collusion with estate 
management in all matters relating to the punishment of workers 
which explains why the compounds were not closed at SSE. In 
principle men were free to wander off the estates and into the 
local 
town. In practice, according to recruited men 
V-we 7 cannot go to 
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the town of Luabo to buy things, have c drink or talk with our 
friends because /-we 7 are immediately persecuted and imprisoned 
by the ouxiliary police and taken to the Post. " (12) Nevertheless, 
compared with the situation van Onselen describes direct policing 
of the labour force by SSE employees to keep it on the estates was 
limited. (13) Expenditure on fences and police patrols were not 
necessary precisely because the authorities were responsible for 
capturing, punishing and returning to the estates men who deserted 
from them. 
Structural Constraints in the Labour System 
The relative lack of direct policing of the labour force by 
estate management was also in part the result of the way in which 
the flow of labour was organised to the plantation sector and the 
nature of the labour provided. Firstly, there was no guarantee that 
men would return to the some company after their six month 'rest' 
period had expired. The result of the growing demand for labour in 
central Zamb4zia, was, as has already been shown, an increasing 
competition for labour, not only between the different sections 
of capital within the region, but increasingly within them. 
As exclusive labour reserves for particular employers were abolished 
in response to the labour shortage so individual men were able to 
exercise more choice over their employer. This in turn meant that 
the likelihood of their returning regularly to the same firm 
decreased. (14) Secondly, even when men did returr regularly to 
the some employer they did not necessarily fulfill the contract on 
the same estate. As has already been shown, field work at SSE was 
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unskilled work. This meant that SSE cculd deploy and redeploy lobour 
between the various estates either to meet particular needs and/or 
to undercut wages. Hence, there is the major excmple, already 
discussed, of the transfer of lower-paid labour from Zambýzio to the 
plantations in Manica and Sofala. In addition to the transfer of 
labour between plantations there was also an interchange of labour 
within a single plantation. Whereas some rren were recruited for 
specific work, most of the labour force was recruited for "general 
field work". This meant that it could be used as and when necessary. 
Thirdly, again, as has already been demonstrated, men did not 
necessarily work in the same groups regularly. Gangs were organised 
on the basis of the work in hand, and both the numbers of men in 
them and their composition depended on the particular conditions in 
the fields and also on the time of year. Finally, and related to 
the organisation of field work, men did not necessarily return to 
the same compound after every 'rest' period. Compound allocation 
depended on the numbers of men on the estates at any one time. 
It also depended on the type of work to be done. (15) Thus the 
element of continuity which is vital for the establishment of an 
organisation, which requires cadres and time to develop contacts, 
trust and networks of activities, was almost impossible within the 
migrant labour system. The result of these limitations, was the 
impossibility of the development of overt and organised struggle 
against conditions on the plantations. Hence, just as men were 
obliged to resort to a series of tactics to avoid recruitment 
for 
forced labour which eschewed direct and open confrontation with 
the state, so too were they forced to adopt strategies on the 
estates which sought to mitigate the conditions of their 
labour 
without rebelling openly against it. 
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WORKERS' RESPONSES TO CONDITIONS AT SSE 
The Work/Prote 
In their paper "Plantation Protest: The History of a Mozambican 
Song" Leroy Vail and Landeg White analyse the development of a song 
which was sung in the area of the estates from the time when the 
Hornung family first started to produce sugar in the region in the 
1890s. The content of the song changed over the years to include 
new experiences of repression and exploitation, yet it continually 
referred to a man called Paiva. Although various Paiva Rapozos were 
K and members of the family worked for the company associated with S. 
for intermittent periods until the 1950s, the authors suggest 
that the song did not so much refer to an historical individual as 
to the company itself. 
Paiva from the very beginning is the company itself, 
the name under which it has alienated land and 
commandeered labour. The song is an attack on the 
inequalities brought to the area by the monopolistic 
company system, a satire on the disproportion between 
wages and profits. Those other Paiva ... keep the 
song alive by maintaining its direct relevance, 
giving exploitation for each successive generation 
of workers a fresh human face. (16) 
Despite its protest element, the song was also a work song. 
No doubt its insistent beat and rhythm, which matched the pace of 
work in the fields, helped the men to work. The insults directed 
against Paiva olso appear to have helped. According to Vail and 
White, former field workers asserted that they liked singing the 
song so much because it gave them strength in the fields. 
However, 
as the authors point out "work song and protest song, in the context 
of forced labour, would seem close to being contradictions 
in 
terms. "(17) The clue to explaining this apparent contradiction, 
lies, 
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they suggest, in the all-pervasiveness of the company in the lives 
of the people in the Mopeia/Luabo region. (18) The song offered 
the people one area of expression in which their own separate 
identity was asserted. "What is secured in 'Paiva' is not just a 
private rebellion but a whole tradition of rejection. It is in 
the song that the people's identity is preserved. "(19) 
As far as it goes Vail and White's analysis is surely 
correct. Men who were unable to find legitimate forms of protest 
against their conditions and for whom even illegal or clandestine 
protest entailed a risk of imprisonment and even death, must have 
needed the affirmation of solidarity that such a song provided. 
The song stressed the identity of the group and their common 
experience of exploitation and thus distinguished them from the 
company to whom all their experience suggested they belonged. 
As Vail and White point out, the song provided the men with 
a separate identity and reaffirmed their status as independent human 
beings. By stressing the common identity of the group and by mocking 
or lamenting the situation in which the group found itself, the song 
stressed the historicity of the events through which the men were 
living. In effect, through satire the song distanced itself from 
the present and implied that however oppressive and enduring the 
present situation there had at least been a different post even if 
there was not a different future in sight. 
However, it is over the question of the work-protest element 
of the song, which Vail and White saw as being close to a contra- 
diction in terms, that their analysis falls short. Surely these 
two 
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elements are a contradiction in terms, but one which reflected the 
reality of the men's lives? The song expressed a real contradiction 
in the situation which confronted SSE's workers. They did not want 
to work for the company but it was difficult to avoid doing so. 
The tasks were long. The individual was faced with the choice of 
either finishing his task and receiving payment, however meagre, 
or not finishing his task and facing loss of earnings and punishment. 
In this context the song as a work song helped the men to get through 
the work, which for most was an objective necessity if they did not 
want to increase their suffering. Yet, at the same time, the song 
as a protest song, restated their own alienation from the Work, the 
injustice of their situation and their recognition of its injustice. 
In effect it was saying: we have to work to live. We must therefore 
work, but let us also remember that we do not do so from choice. 
It might be asked whether songs which insulted the field 
staff and which were sung to their faces were a prelude to octs 
designed to 'get back' at the company in a more direct way than 
mere verbal abuse. In SSE's records there is no mention of such 
acts. There are no recorded incidents of deliberate arson, for 
example, which were not unknown on the Rhodesian mines. (20) Nor do 
the records reveal any other acts of deliberate sabotoge. (21) 
The contradiction described above and the general repression 
associated with forced labour probably explain this lack of dramatic 
protest. (22) However, that protest was not dramatic does not mean 
that it did not exist. One way of resolving the contradiction 
between the need (and compulsion) to work and the dislike of 
doing so was by seeking to evade work. Work evasion at 
SSE took two 
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principal forms. Firstly, there were those men who were absent 
for days or weeks on end during the contract or who deserted from 
the estates altogether. Secondly, there were men, who, while 
appearing to meet the daily task requirements, actually found various 
ways of avoiding doing so. 
Absenteeism 
In SSE's records, frequent mention is made of the assiduidade 
of the labour force. Literally translated this term means assiduity 
or diligence. At SSE the task system and the manner of marking 
tasks meant that only those men who had completed their daily task 
were entitled to payment. By definition those who had failed to 
complete the task were marked as absent. Hence, productivity and 
attendance were inextricably linked, and absenteeism rates 
disguised, what was, strictly speaking, lack of task completion. 
There was also a second problem associated with the ticket 
marking system which tended to blur the distinction between failure 
to turr out for work for one or several days and definitive desertion 
from the estates. SSE did not take daily roll calls of the workers 
presumably because this was both time-consuming and expensive. 
Nor did the company refine its system of allocating metal discs, 
probably for the same reasons. Discs were not date-stamped. They 
only registered the origin of the worker, and this for payment 
purposes. Only at the end of the week was the man's daily attendance 
during the course of the week noted in the company's books. 
It was 
therefore, relatively easy for men to miss work for various periods 
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of time, and only appear to hand in their metal discs when they hod 
acquired the five or six which entitled them to a cash bonus. 
SSE was well aware of the limitations of its payment 
and task-marking system. Indeed, the company used the fact that 
workers were able to acquire discs without working as a defence 
against accusations of exploitation. Thus, in reply to a letter 
from the Provincial Government about its payment system in 1942, 
SSE wrote 
This simple mechanical form does not allow the exploitation 
of the worker by the capataz or by the marker because he 
would demand the handing over of the disc ... on finishing his task or day's work, or the payment of the weekly bonus 
to which he was entitled. It does, however, permit the 
exploitation of the boss by the worker as regards the 
weekly bonus for five or six days worked, because it is 
evident that many of them keep their discs from one week 
to the next, when, for example, they have only appeared 
for work three or four days in the week and with the 
aim of being able to present six discs for six con- 
secutive days to receive the corresponding weekly 
bonuses. (23) 
As a result of the limitations of the system, therefore, SSE did 
not know for certain until the end of the contract who had fled 
from the estate. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of distinguishing between 
the different types of absenteeism, and bearing in mind that the 
figures also disguise the appropriation of unpaid labour, absenteeism 
as a whole was a major problem for the company. For instance, 
in 
an assessment of future labour needs SSE's General Manager reported 
that in 1952 absenteeism both for the whole week and one to 
five. 
days had absorbed 15 per cent of the total field labour 
force over 
the year. (24) 
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Day to day absenteeism, as already demonstrated, was 
facilitated by SSE's policy of distributing large quantities of 
flour. Men planning to miss work could save part of the flour 
ration they received on days that they had completed the task to 
cover days when they did not intend to work. It was also facilitated 
by the dishonestry of some of the capatazes. According to former. - 
workers at SSE it was not uncommon for capatazes to acquire more 
discs than were actually required. Each morning the capatazes 
counted the number of people working on their section that day. 
They were then supposed to request the number of discs appropriate 
to that number of men. Apparently, they also often requested a few 
discs which they kept back for later sale. Some men, who were on 
good terms with the capatazes, were able to receive payment for every 
day of the contract without ever having worked a single day. This 
system depended on the laziness of the European overseers. They 
soon tired of the laborious business of checking discs against workers 
present, and as long as some discs were handed back at the end of 
the day for men who had not worked or who had not completed their 
tasks they did not investigate the precise situation. According to 
the informants a number of caj2atazes were socked because of the 
discrepancies between the numbers of discs requested and the numbers 
handed back. (25) 
In addition to a trade in discs organised by the capatozes 
there was also a trade in discs among the men themselves which 
facilitated the individual's ability to evade work. 
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The natives, who are not always the childish natives that many people in good faith imagine, when they don't appear at work for some days of the week, and in order not to lose the weekly bonus, lend their 
discs or exchange them for different things with 
other colleagues, and even those who flee from work 
after a few days sell the discs which they have not 
managed to have marked, or have not used, to other 
colleagues. (26) 
Desertion 
Unlike day to day absenteeism which rested on the ability 
of the individual worker to manipulate the contradictions of SSE's 
payment system, desertion from the estates seems to have been 
related more to the degree of administrative repression exercised in 
the areas f rom which the men were recruited. (27) Where administrators 
and/or company employees were not rigorous in suppressing the 
problem of desertion, other factors, such as the pressure of 
forced cotton growing or the existence of alternative opportunities 
for making a living came into play. 
In 1945, the manager of SSE's Matilde plantation went on 
leave. According to the Administrator of Chinde the percentage of 
desertions went down to 19-20 per cent while he was away, and 
then climbed steadily again after he returned. During the 
Manager's absence he was replaced by a "young, ehthusiostic lad" 
full of vigour and energy who presented to me in 
the Secretariat /-of the Administration 7 all the 
contracted nativýTs, who had not fulfilleU their 
contracts regularly. They were punished with 
detention for a reasonable period - which 
increased the period they had to work - and the 
result is clear. Now, with the arrival of Snr. 
345 
Matos Pereira everything has changed. This 
gentleman never brought a iomba/ ýeserter/absentee 
to the Secretariat and I know tTat he prefers the blacks' friendship to problems with them. (28) 
The initial recruiting drive organised by the Admini strotor in 
1945 for the Madal company and SSE produced only 80 men for work 
at SSE from the Micaune region (compared with 500 men from Chinde 
itself). Of these, almost all the men fled from the estates. 
They were captured and interrogated about the reasons for their 
f light. 
They alleged that they were given 'Lomwe' capatazes, 
common people, that the water given to them was scarce, 
that the food given to them was mixed with 
hippopotamus meat which they could not eat, finally 
that the tasks were exaggerated and that the firewood 
given to them for heating and cooking was insufficient. 
There were exaggerations in the statements of the 
blacks, but in certain cases there was some truth Fin their allegations 7. 
The 12rincipal reason is that the black of Micaune does 
not need to work to live, to pay his taxes and to 
aress decently. All of them have palm trees which 
Qiv them 500, -600,1000 and more escudos per Far-vest. (29) 
(Emphasis added) 
Notwithstanding the existence of an alternative income, when the 
Administrator increased the contract length to discourage 
desertion not a single man fled. (30) 
It is clear from the above, that both conditions on the 
estates and the existence of a remuneration f rom peasant production 
which compared favourably with the wages offered contributed to 
the men's reluctance to work. Nevertheless, increased sanctions 
against men who did not take up or complete a contractr or stepped-uP 
administrative pressure where formally it had been locking, had the 
effect of increasing attendance at the work place. In Mopeia, 
for 
instance, when in 1943 absenteeism rates among labourers 
from the 
Go 
area on six month contracts reached over 50 per cent, SSE gave the 
spread of forced cotton cultivation as one reason for the high rates. 
Nevertheless, it also stressed the need for firm administrative 
action to ensure that men fulfilled their contracts. "The question 
of labour fromMopeia, Marral and Derre for Marromeu was likewise 
discussed, and the administrators concerned were instructed to 
exercise more pressure with a vew to minimising the ever-increasing 
percentage of absentees. "(31) 
Ten years later the recruiting situation had again deteriorated 
in Mopeia. Levels of absenteeism had once more "recently" reached 
45 per cent according to SSE's General Manager. In a letter about 
the matter to the Acting Manager at Mopeia the General Manager 
noted that "the administrator did promise to look into the matter 
immediately and actively, having also suggested that the task would 
be eased if we were to take on additional native police under his 
control and paid for by us. "(32) 
In 1954, a new Administrator took up his po, st in Mopeic. 
In his report to the Native Affairs Department he noted that the 
effectividade of men from Mopeia working at SSE's plantation in 
Marromeu was only 55 per cent in July 1953. Out of 100 men 
contracted only 55 worked "the remaining 45 fleeing at one time. 
11 
He added 
There were contracts in which less than half arrived 
at the work-place and of these a few days afterwards 
already a great many more had fled who never again 
put in an appearance. - 
The wage sheets were separated, one for the 
effectivos and the other for those who had fled. 
Of ten the numbers of the latter were greater than 
the numbers of the former. (33) 
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The Administrator attributed the large number of flights to the 
difference in wages between a man recruited from Mopeia (Zambýzia) 
for work in Marromeu and a man recruited from Marromeu (Manica and 
Sofala) for work there. Whereas the man from Mopeia received 70 
escudos a month, an attendance/productivity bonus and an additional 
bonus of 15 escudos 50 centavos, a man from Marromeu received a 
basic wage of 100 escudos a month in addition to an attendance/ 
productivity bonus. (34) To overcome the problem the Administrator 
took steps to stop men crossing the river to Manica and Sofola without 
due authorisation. He also "initiated a policy of great repression... 
Fand7 seized many natives, punishing them with a certain severity. " 
The Administrctor added that as a result of his action effectividade 
was now better among the men from Mopeic. Only 15-18 Per cent of 
the men were absent from work, although were still a problem-(35) 
Elsewhere in Zambezia the drive to increase the attendance 
of the work force and to cut down on absenteeism also gave results. 
In the 1954 meeting of the Administrators of Zamb&ia the 
Governor thanked the Administrators for their work in making sure 
that the attendance targets for the Province had been fulfilled. 
These were set at 80-85 per cent for the first two years of the 
implementation of a 1953 order. Attendance/productivity, said the 
Governor, had increased recently. 
This was due, without doubt, to the efficient action 
of the Administrators. Without any exception this e, action was truly appreciable, as in the case of 
Gurue' 
where there exists a work discipline which could only 
be surpassed with difficulty. (36) 
Definitive desertion from the estates, therefore, was only 
a feasible response to forced labour if the men involved 
knew that 
348 
they stood a reasonable chance of avoiding detection. The examples 
above illustrate that men were quick to seize the opportunity to 
desert where it existed but refrained from doing so when the 
likelihood of detection and therefore punishment increased. 
Work Evasion Tactics on the Estates Themselves 
Strictly speaking the ability of men to manipulate the 
contradictions of SSE's payment system and hence to miss work without 
losing the right to collect the weekly bonus was a form of work 
evasion. It was one, however, that was likely to be detected at 
the end of the contract, for when the man was paid off the total 
number of days he had worked during the contract became apparent 
to the estate management. Only by deserting from the estate and 
avoiding capture could he preclude the imposition of an extended 
contract which detection entailed. Yet, if he took this option he 
lost his basic wage for the entire contract period. Absenteeism, 
therefore, in all its forms, was a response which while bringing 
short-term gains also brought losses in the long-term. There were 
however, other methods of mitigating the conditions of forced 
labour which were less liable to detection, and if successfully 
employed brought only advantages to the individual worker. These 
were the range of tactics which comprised attempts to evade meeting 
the daily task requirements while appearing to do so. They appear 
to have been applied to almost every field task. There was 
for 
instance, the planting task. 
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The planting task involved preparing lengths of cone and then 
laying them in a row with their ends touching. The row, which wos 
360 metres long was then covered with soil. Instead of planting 
the cone at the appropriate depth it was common f or men to simply 
cover the cane with a thin layer of soil. It was also common for 
men to leave wide gaps between each separate length of cane or to 
deposit the seed cane in one large hole. (37) Shortly after planting 
workers were moved on to moulding. Moulding involved building a 
small mound around each length of planted cane. The mound not only 
anchored the plant more firmly and helped to prevent the plant from 
being blown over by heavy winds, but it also encouraged the growth 
of roots and secondary shoots. Workers allocated to a moulding 
task either did not make the mounds or did not make them properly. (38) 
Periodically the rows of newly planted cane and rows of ratoons 
were weeded. Instead of weeding the whole row men allocated to this 
task would trample down the weeds in the middle of the row on the 
assumption that the or would not walk down every 
single line and check it. (39) 
The most serious problems for SSE arose from the workers' 
'dodges' on the cutting task. Most of the sucrose content of the 
cane plant is concentrated at the base of the stem. Failure to 
cut even two or three inches at the base of the stem can 
lead to uP 
to a 30 per cent loss of sugar. It also inhibits the growth of 
the ratoon. It was, apparently, common for workers to cut 
the 
stem above soil level rather than at the point where 
the stem 
emerged from the soil. Workers given a cane-cutting 
task were also 
supposed to cut the leaves from the stem and to cut 
the top off the 
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stem in the right place. This was necessary, 
'clogging up' the factory with a lot Of waste 
to cut down on the acid content of the cane w 
the top of the stem. Lack of due care, which 
of the task., led to inefficient processing of 
wear and tear of processing machinery. (40) 
firstly to avoid 
material and secondly 
hich concentrates at 
hastened completion 
the cone and unnecessary 
On the loading task workers tried to build "a proper rat's 
nest". Instead of chopping up the cut cane and laying it horizontally 
in the truck men criss-crossed the stems vertically over each 
other. A layer of horizontally laid cane would be placed on top 
of the load to give the appearance of a full truck. According to 
some of SSE's former workers those who knew how to make the trucks 
look full often finished their tasks by about ten o'clock in the 
morning whereas those who did not know how to make the carts look 
full had difficulty in finishing their tasks and often went on 
loading until two or three o'clock in the afternoon. (41) Unless the 
foremen and overseers were very rigorous in their checking of loaded 
trucks in the fields the deception was only discovered when the 
trucks were weighed at the factory gates. By this time it was almost 
impossible to tell which group of men had loaded the particular truck 
and the capitao received the blame. He lost a day's pay. If, 
however, the capitao himself knew which group of men were involved 
he would thereafter stand and watch them working, climb onto the 
trucki chop the cane up and press it down so that more could 
be 
loaded. Often, men harrassed in this way fled. (42) Often, 
however, 
as the workers themselves pointed out, the c2jýJAZies and capatozes 
failed to carry out their own duties diligently. 
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It is for this reason that it is difficult to draw any 
firm conclusions about the African supervisory staff employed at 
SSE. Clearly, since their own wages and bonuses depended on 
proper task completion by their gangs they had an economic incentive 
to work hard. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that 
since the discrepancies between them and their European colleagues 
were so great in terms of salaries, housing, status and promotion(43) 
some at least attempted to walk a tight-rope between not incurring 
the wrath of their own supervisors and not coming down too heavily 
on the men. In this sense the position of the African supervisory 
staff on the estates was analogous to that of the 'native 
authorities' in the countryside. Yet, whatever their personal 
feelings and however conscientious they were it was nevertheless 
difficult for the and still more for the capataz to have 
his eyes on every worker all the time. While the foreman's back 
was turned men he was not watching could engage in various 
subterfuges. Apart from those described above, men also abandoned 
their own uncompleted task and moved onto the line their friend 
had already completed, whatever the task. The friend's task would 
then be presented for marking again. (44) 
The tactics described above were all tactics employed by 
individual workers, albeit with the collusion of their friends and 
colleagues. Only rarely is mention made in the records of a collective 
response to the conditions encountered. There is the example, already 
mentioned in Chapter V, of large-scale desertions following 
the extension of the compulsory contract period from six 
to eight 
months. There is also one recorded example of what appears 
to have 
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been a collective go-slow. In 1954, SSE's General Field Manager 
wrote to the General Manager that it was impossible to achieve the 
some output from different 'tribes' . Men from Quelimane in particular 
refused to complete the task set for them. 
The authorities have rendered us every assistance in 
trying to get them to complete tasks but to no effect. 
Early this year at Marromeu we had a particularly 
glaring example in a gang of about _500 Quelimanes. The local Administrator visited them several times 
and at one time suggested that the task given at 
planting must be too large. To demonstrate to him 
we put a gang of children to plant fields on one 
side of the main line and the Quelimanes on the 
opposite side and gave them an equal task which 
was two thirds of the normal planting task per- 
formed by Mopeas and Marraes. The Administrator 
put cipaes with the Quelimanes to see that they 
worked. Every day for a week they worked opposite 
each other and every day for a week the children 
finished their tasks by about 1.30 p. m. and most 
of the Quelimanes had to be sent home at 4 p. m. 
with tasks unfinished. (45) 
This quotation suggests that these men were aware of the advantages 
of unity. They saw that whereas individual workers could be picked 
out, isolated and punished, it was very difficult for the estate 
management and authorities alike to confront the collective 
disobedience of hundreds of men. The quotation also suggests that 
groups of workers, either consciously or unconsciously set their 
own pace in work and refused to be bullied into producing more. 
Unfortunately, the lack of evidence of similar responses precludes 
a discussion of the many questions that this example throws up. 
Suffice it to say, however, that by implication, the very 
differences 
in task output which was the constant complaint of SSE's management, 
suggests that this form of protest was much more widespread 
than 
the records suggest. 
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At the beginning of this chapter I noted that the recorded 
incidences of organised industrial action to improve wages and 
conditions were few at SSE. There is no evidence of overt mani- 
festations in the form of strikes, and only one indication of a 
collective wage demand. I have argued in the course of this 
dissertation that such manifestations were not even possible given 
the structure of labour conscription, the system of labour use and 
the system of control established and operated by the state with the 
collusion of capital. However, in this chapter, I have tried to 
show that the absence of a conventional workers' organisation is not 
necessarily a priori evidence of a lack of consciousness. It should 
be clear from the examples discussed above that workers at SSE were 
conscious of their exploitation but were forced to adopt ambiguous 
forms of struggle against it in order, ultimately, to protect their 
own lives. Hence, the range of work evasion tactics described 
above as well as serving to alleviate the ardours of forced labour 
were also a sophisticated (in that they reveal an understanding of 
the situation, its implications, and the forms of struggle appropriate 
to it) but necessarily disguised way of preventing SSE from 
continually increasing tasks without increasing wages. In other 
words, unable to struggle overtly on the wages front, workers sought 
to struggle covertly against arbitrary attempts to increase 
productivity. This is not to suggest conclusions about the 
proletarianisation of the migrant labour force over time, nor 
to draw a mechanistic distinction between the response of peasants 
prior to recru . itment and the response of workers after recruitment. 
It seems obvious that men will always respond to the particular 
circumstances they encounter. It is, therefore, simply 
to say that, 
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while on the estates, men attempted to struggle against the 
conditions they found in the only ways that were available to them. 
Thus, just as a relative lack of administrative repression seems to 
have been decisive in prompting individual men to flee from the 
estates altogether, so too did SSE's more blatant attempts to 
increase the appropriation of surplus value call forth an immediate 
response from the labour force; a response that cannot be pinned down 
to any one sector at any one point in time - This chapter has reviewed 
some of -the forms this response took. Chapter V looked in more 
detail at the particular conditions that led to these responses. 
Taken together they show that when tasks were increased attendance/ 
productivity dropped; when wages did not rise proportionately or 
were not increased when other employers offered wage rises, labour 
was either more difficult to recruit or deserted. When the 
compulsory contract period was arbitrarily increased mass desertions 
followed. Conversely, higher wages, better bonuses or reduced 
ly. Although these tasks led to greater attendance/productivill. 
were, in general, individual responses by individual men, when they 
occurred on a wide scale SSE could not ignore them. Thus, 
although the different responses of SSE's labour force, taken in 
isolation, were not dramatic, taken as a whole they had the 
overall effect of checking SSE's more blatant attempts to intensify 
exploitation. In this, the effects of the responses of SSE's 
labour force were no different from the effects of the more 
conventional responses of a 'free' labour force. 
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NOTES 
"I had yesterday at Luabo o combined representation from 
crews of river steamers 'Quarra', 'Morrumba' and 'Zomba, 
which amounted to a plea for increased remuneration, and this on the grounds that other labour doing similar work for the company was earning more etc. " (SSE Ar., File 184, 
Native Labour Organisation, Hut Tax, MT General Manager 
to the Manager SSE Ltd Chinde, 4--A-ug. 1949, No. 96149 Mgt, 
Re: Native Crews, River Steamers. ) 
(2) See below, p. 352. 
(3) SSE Ar., File 347, African Policy, Cantinos and Acampomentos, 
Public Address Sysi-e-m, N. H. DO Boulay, 30 t. 1962, Re-moron m 
the Division of Responsibility between the Native 
Welfare and Administrative Department and the Plontotion 
Staff. 
(4) SSE Ar ., File 93, Labour and Recruiting, Government Side,, Jose Vaz Cunha to A. Marques dos Santos Adjunto do Gerente 
Geral, 29 Mar. 1973, S/N, Assunto: Servico dos Chefes de 
Acampamentos. 
(5) cf. SSE Ar., File 94, Labour f 2r Marromeu, Labour 
Questionnaire Reply, H. N. Usher, Marromeu, 2 Nov. 1931, 
"the white overseer's time as a ganger here has always 
been a sort of chrysalis stage - the budding second overseer 
learning his job. I don't remember any overseer who would 
have cared to come back on a second contract merely to look 
after a gang again. The work is too monotonous for anyone 
possessed of a normally active brain ... I think the 
ideal 
system of gangs is a good coloured ganger together with 
good native capitaes adequately supervised by a second 
overseer who has not more than three gangs to control. 
Because, I believe in future, unless a white man is 
near at hand the natives will not be so easily controlled 
by a coloured ganger. Yet it is no job for a white 
man to spend his whole day standing behind one weeding 
gang. 11 
(6) SSE Ar., File 347, PHDB (Du Boulay) to Domingos Arouca, 
19 Jan. 1962, No. 23/62, Native Labour and Recruiting, 
New Official Policies. 
(7) SSE Ar., File 133A, Recruiting, Angonia, Quelimane, Local, 
(n. n. London) to AF Sousa Luabo, 7 Aug. 1963, No. 
270/63. 
(8) SSE Ar., File 347, N. H. Du Boulay, 30 Oct - 1962, 
Memorandum. -- 
op. cit. 
(9) SSE Ar., File 347, NHDB to A. F. Sousa 30 Oct. 1962, 
No. 384/62, Welfare and Administration Department. 
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(10) SSE Ar., File 347, N. H. Du. Boulay, 30 Oct. 1962, Memorondum..., 
op. cit. 
(11) SSE Ar., File 133A, J. Borato Gomes Mocuba to Gerente Geral 
SSE Ltd., 20 July 1963, No. 1/63 Mgt. (Translation J. H. ) 
(12) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) 
(13) Charles van Onselen, Chibaro: African Mine Labour in Southern 
Rhodesia 1900-1933 (Pluto Press, London, 1976), pp. 128--=. (The author is here referring to the closed compound system first used in the Rand and later adopted in Rhodesia). 
There were other reasons for the open compounds at SSE. 
Firstly, unlike gold and diamonds which are both easily 
concealed and valuable, cane was hardly worth robbing 
except for personal consumption. It was also bulky 
and difficult to conceal. Secondly, SSE's plantations 
were isolated. The nearest large centres of population, 
Quelimcne and Beira, were both over 200 kilometres from the 
estates. Fleeing to either of these towns meant avoiding 
the only road that led to them and walking through the bush 
(which was, for much of the way, heavily-wooded and full of 
wild animals) at night. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, 
within limits absenteeism was actually profitable for the 
company. As long as men who deserted were captured by 
the authorities they lost the wages owing to them and were 
also made to work an extended contract. Men who were not 
captured lost their wages. Thus providing deserters worked 
long enough to cover the cost of recruiting them the company 
could appropriate unpaid labour from them. 
(14) See Chapter IV. In addition men also crossed into Manica 
and Sofala in search of better-paid work. 
(15) SSE Ar. , Dr. Luis Cardoso 
de Menezes, Impress6es do 
Visita a Africa de 28 de Abril a1 de Julho de 1966, Lisboa, 
Julho/Agosto 1966. 
(16) Journal of Southern African Studies V, No. I (Oct. 1978), 
p. 6. 
ibid., p. 20. 
(18) ibid., p. 24. 
(19) ibid., p. 25. 
(20) van Onselen, op. cit., p. 242. 
(21) It could be that the destruction of huts mentioned 
in 
Chapter VII as well as being an act of necessity was 01501 
in part or at times, a sign of disgust and an attempt 
to 
hit back at the company. Certainly in 1777 
SSE's General 
Field Manager attributed deterioration of the compounds 
to 
I vandalism' by the workers. (Interview with 
L. Duarte, 
General Field Manager, SSE Luabo, Feb. 1977). 
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(22) This is not to imply that labour was not repressed on the Rhodesian mines. It is simply to suggest that in the 
absence of other evidence the repression exercised over labour in Zamb6zia would seem to provide the most reasonoble 
explanation for the lack of this particular response. Only 
very detailed comparative studies of the impact of different 
systems of forced labour in different areas would allow the 
particular factors which shaped workers' responses to 
oppression to be isolated. 
(23) SSE Ar., File 184, P. Viana Rodrigues to Admin. Concelho do 
Chinde, 30 Mar. 1942, No. 85/42/HO, Ref. Noto 372/15/2 de 
14 de Margo de 1942, Resposto a Noto do Reparticao Central 
dos Negdcios Indigenas Sobre o Pagomento dos Saf6rios aos Indigenas. (Translation J. H. ) 
(24) SSE Ar., File 184, MT General Manager to General Field 
Manager Luabo, 12 July 1954, No. 81/54 Mgt. Re: Future 
Labour Requirements. The 1954 labour needs were based on 
an estimated rate of absenteeism of 15 per cent. 
(25) Interview at Muide Compound, SSE, Luabo, 14 Nov. 1976. 
In 1948 SSE discovered that food tickets had been stolen, 
probably from the company's strong room. In one particular 
week "a rather high number", more than were issued were 
handed back (SSE Ar., File 204, Native Diet and Rations, 
from Rapozo Luabo, 6 Oct. 1948, Re: Pay cnd Food Discs, and 
(attached) For GA's Favour of Consideration and Decision, 
Re. Pay and Food Discs, 4 Oct. 1948). Although it is not 
within the period covered by this study there is one 
reported incident of capitoes and ca2atozes working a 
fraud in bonus payments. In 1968 in a conference on the 
bonus for loading it was discovered that bonus cards existed 
in duplicate and triplicate; that there were cards whose 
numbers corresponded to those of workers already repatriated; 
that cards were marked for more days than were actually 
worked, etc. Working together, several capit6es and 
capatazes had arranged to steal the original car2s which 
one of their colleagues later stamped as valid. This fraud 
cost SSE 84,000 escudos for one season alone, and the 
company suspected that it had been going on for several 
years (SSE Ar., File 184, Informacoo, Froude em Bonus de 
Carregamento, Marromeu, 26 Aug. 1968. ) 
(26) SSE Ar., File 184, Resposta a nota do RNCI ... 30 
Mar. 1942, 
op. cit. (Translation J. H. ) 
(27) For some men, however, desertion was clearly an act of 
individual desperation. For others it resulted from 
conditions on the estates and particularly from the 
employers' practice of aribtrarily extending the contract 
period. This, at least, was a reason put forward 
by the 
authorities for desertion. "Having considered 
the causes 
of the not infrequent flights from work and poor assi-d-ulid-OAII 
we must recognise as one of the principal causes 
the 
illegal procedure which has come to be adopted 
in some areas 
r, 7 
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(27) (continued) 
of contracts by months being fulfilled by days actually 
worked. Hence, it is common to f ind natives bound to 
work f or one employer for periods of over a year, although 
with contracts of six months ... From this practice results 
.. a flight from work. " GOV. Q, Rep. Port., Prov. de Moý., Governo da Zambezia, Acta da Conf erencia dos Administradores 
31.8.1954-3.9.1954 Governo da Lamb6zia, Ordem Geral No. 
3/53. (Translation J. H. ) 
(28) AHM, NI 32, B/24/4/1,1945-1947, Relat6rios Trimestrais dos 
Agentes de Curador, Admin. do Concelho do Chinde, 
Relat6rio da kOo-de-Obra Relativo ao Terceiro Trimestre do 
Corrente Ano, 1946, Admin. Ladislau Batalha Junior. 
(Translation J. H. ) 
(29) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) Writing about the replacement 
of men from Gile with men from Maganja in 1951 SSE's 
General Manager noted that everything had been done to make 
the men from Maganja happy at SSE, in order that they would 
give favourable reports about the company when they returned 
home. Each "batch" of departing labourers went away "very 
satisfied" but asked if they would return said they would 
only do so if "specifically induced by the Administrator 
concerned, making it clear that if the choice of employer 
remained their own it would definitely be SSE but that they 
had in point of fact no real need to work since money was 
ample or fully /-sic 7 enough for their tax obligations 
and other needs as tFe direct consequence of the fact that 
great numbers of them owned their own coconut palms from 
which they derived a personal income. " (SSE Ar., File 133A, 
MT to Col. Hornung, 26 Sep. 1951, No. 145/51 Private 
Series, Labour from Quelimane District). 
(30) NI 32, B/24/4/1 ... Admin. do Concelho 
do Chinde, Relat6rio 
da M&-de-Obra ... 1946, op. cit. 
(31) SSE Ar., File 94A, Labour for Marromeu, MT to Col. C. B. R. 
Hornung, 25 Aug. 1943, No. 82/43 Private, Visit of His 
Excellency the Governor of Quelimane. 
(32) SSE Ar. I File 94A, MT to 
Acting Manager SSE Ltd. Mopeia, 
15 July 1953, No. 23/53 Mgt., Re: Labour from Mopeia/Marral 
for work at Marromeu. 
(33) AHM, NI 202,1952-1957, Relat6rios dos Agentes do Curador 
e Delegados de Saude, No. 54, Circ. de Mopeia, 
Ladislau 
Batalha Junior, 12 Jan. 1954. (Translation J. H. ) 
(34) ibid. 
(35) ibid. (Translation J. H. ) 
(36) Acta da Confergincia dos Administradores... 1954, op. cit., 
pp. 12-13. 
qpw- ! 
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(37) Interview with L. Duarte, General Field Manager, SSE Luabo, 4 Mar. 1977. 
(38) ibid. 
(39) ibid., and Interview at Muide Compound, SSE Luabo, 14 Nov. 1976. 
(40) Interview with L. Duarte, 4 Mar. 1977, Op. cit., and Interview at Muide, 14 Nov. 1976, op. cit. 
(41) ibid. 
(42) Interview at Muide, 14 Nov. 1976, op. cit. 
(43) The records do not contain a detailed comparison of the 
wages and benefits of European and African supervisors. 
However, the differences are indicated through the total 
expenditure on European and African staff given in Sena Sugar 
Estates Ltd., 0 Que ea Que Vale Econ6mica e Socialmente 
Exposi, cao do Actividades Econ6micas de Mogambique 
Commemorativa do Visita de Sua Excelencia o Presidente do 
Republica, General Fransisco Higino Graveiro Lopes, Agosto 
1956 (LM, 1956). 
(44) Interview at Muide, 14 Nov. 1976, op. cit. When the 
capitffo's bock was turned men at the front of a line would 
help those at the back in order to get the task marked 
more quickly. 
(45) SSE Ar., File 184, H. N. Usher General Field Manager to 
General Manager, 28 June 1954, Re: Future Labour 
Requirements, Your letter No. 59/54 'Mgt' of 29 May 1954. 
cf. Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy of SlaveLy: 
Studies in the Economy and Society ofth e Slave South - (Vintage Books, New York, 1967), p. 44-: - 'Ample evidence 
indicates that slaves worked well below their capabilities. 
In several instances in Mississippi, when cotton picking 
was carefully supervised in local experiments, slaves picked 
two or three times their normal output. " 
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CDNCLUSION 
Capital accumulation depends on the ability of the owner of 
the means of production to appropriate surplus value from the 
labourer during production. This is achieved by paying the labourer 
a wage related to the value of the commodities necessary for the 
production and reproduction of his capacity to labour but by wresting 
from him the additional value his labour-power creates during the 
production process. The cppropriation of surplus value, therefore, 
rests on the ability of the capitalist to increase the ratio of 
surplus to necessary labour time during production. The capitalist 
either seeks to make the individual labourer work harder and longer 
for the same or a reduced wage, or he seeks to increase the 
productivity of labour by mechanising production. In the latter 
case, as the ratio of constant to variable capital rises the share 
of wages falls (and hence exploitation increases) although the 
absolute level of wages may remain stable or even rise. For the 
greater part of the period under study SSE and its forerunners 
worked to increcse the appropriation of absolute surplus value 
by reducing wages and by increcsing the intensity of labour without 
increasing the ratio of constant to variable capital. 
The degree to which capital is able to increase profits 
depends on a variety of factors, not least of which 
is the availability 
of cheap labour and the role and nature of the state 
in ensuring 
its availability. Related to this is the ability of 
the labour force 
L 
If ( 
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to organise in defence of its own interests. In ýkzambique, 
from the 1870s and especially after 1930, the colonial state 
established a protected market for its sugar producers which 
effectively cushioned them against Competition. Of for greater 
importance, the colonial state also secured the conditions in 
which capitol could seek to reduce labour costs. Thus, the most 
striking point which emerges from a study of capital and labour in 
Zambezia is not that wages on plantations were low and conditions 
poor, but that the state sought to ensure that they remained low 
and poor. The consolidation of the migrant labour system after 1930 
which continued to furnish capital with cheap labour until the 
1960s was the direct result of state policy. 
The role of the state in guaranteeing favourable conditions 
for the accumulation of capital in Zamb4zia took two principal forms. 
In the first period, for approximately 40 years after 1890, the state 
sought to establish the conditions which would encourage the 
investment of capital in the province. These included the enactment 
of legislation which imposed a labour service and monetary tax 
on the African peasantry. This led to the creation of a part- 
proletariat which oscillated between periods of domestic production 
and labour. These policies, by "attracting" labour to production 
were also successful in "attracting" capital to the province. 
However, unable, for a variety of reasons to impose an administration 
which would effectively carry out its labour "attraction" policies 
throughout the whole of the province the burden of 
"attracting" 
labour fell to capital. This was a burden that capital willingly 
assumed for the costs associated with it were few. 
Under the RE2z-Os 
L 
legislation capital was allowed to call on unpaid labour, and secure 
revenue by collecting taxes from the people living on the prazo. 
The expansion of production on plantations which resulted 
from this policy meant that over time labour needs increased. 
Although the geographical area f rom which labour was drawn was 
enlarged, the specific contradictions of state policy: the division 
of the province between state and capital (prazo-leaseholders), 
the ineffectiveness of the administration imposed by the state in 
certain areas, and the attempt by the state to secure revenue through 
the sale of labour to South Africa (until 1913), gave rise to a 
labour shortage. This was a shortage that the state sought to 
suppress in 1930 by extending its odministration to the whole of 
the province and by taking direct control of labour supply. 
From approximately 1930 to 1960 the state consolidated its 
role in "attracting" labour to capital by establishing a labour- 
controlling monopoly. The role of capital in the labour conscription 
process diminished as the state took over more and more of the 
functions previosly undertaken by capital (the graz -leaseholders). 
New labour legislation was enacted which strictly defined the 
duties 
and obligations of the African population. This legislation required 
men to enter regular wage work at wages established 
by the state. 
It also made it the primary duty of state functionaries 
to suppress 
Ivagrancyl and 'idleness' and to ensure that men 
fulfilled their 
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legal duties. 
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However, the legislation which paved the way for the 
state's extended role was brought into f orce at a time when., because 
of the general recession in the economy of central Mozambique and 
the regions surrounding it and the effects the recession had on 
prices paid for peasant crops, labour was pouring onto the labour 
market. Capital, as exemplified by SSE, used this situation to 
bring about reductions in wages and to reorganise its labour 
supplies. Yet, if the state assumed a role which was perhaps not 
required in the first years of the 1930s this was not the case as 
the region began to recover from the depression. With recovery 
and a growing demand for labour, the legal and administrative 
mechanisms established in 1930 were brought into play. 
Recovery f rom the depression was accompanied by the growth 
of a new form of production: forced peasant cultivation of cotton, 
and the expansion of the plantation sector. These developments 
increased the demand for labour and gave rise to a new shortage of 
labour, the origins of which, however, were very different from 
that which existed until 1930. In an attempt to meet the labour 
needs of the different sections of capital in the province, the 
state, besides "attracting" labour, also sought to redistribute 
it within and between the competing sections of capital. 
Unable 
to enlarge the geographical area from which labour was 
drawn because 
of the existence of other competing capitals outside the province, 
the state sought to expand the labour supply by calling on 
the 
untapped labour sources within Zamb4zia. Hence, women and old 
men were conscripted into cotton production and old men and 
young 
boys joined the ranks of the able-bodied men recruited 
for plantation 
work. 
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Despite the growing shortage of labour within Zomb,, dzia 
no section of capital called for the ending of the migrant system. 
State conscription, direction and control of labour and the supply 
of labour provided cotton concessionaries with unpaid labour. 
They provided plantation capital with cheap labour. The maintenance 
of a partly proletarianised labour force was part of a deliberate 
state strategy to hold wages down, for wages in the plantation 
sector calculated on the existence of a peasant sector carrying 
part of the workers' costs of reproduction. In addition, the 
migrant system allowed capital to adjust its labour needs to 
seasonal requirements. It could avoid supporting unproductive 
labour during the slack period of the year. Yet, within this broad 
framework of labour supply the state also allowed capital, as seen 
through the activities of SSE, to reduce wages further. This SSE 
did in three principal ways. Firstly, it imposed arbitrary increases 
in productivity by extending the working day and increasing the 
intensity of labour within it. Secondly, it pursued a policy of 
offsetting increases in minimum wages against bonuses or advances 
on wages. Thirdly, it reduced overall expenditure on labour by 
reducing that part of the indirect wage which was represented by 
food and shelter. Finally, through the application of its 
legislation the state prevented the development of a workers' 
struggle against low wages. Coerced into wage labour by the state 
and punished by it for failing to enter employment or fulfill 
the 
terms of the contract, workers directed their struggle primarily 
against the state and against the system of labour recruitment. 
In the countryside -the struggle was directed against 
the colonial 
administrators and the 'traditional' authorities. 
However, the 
L 
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very structure of the system of controls imposed on workers by the 
state prevented anything but an essentially negative struggle; one 
which sought to avoid forced labour. On plantations, men who had 
been unable to avoid labour recruitment sought to evade work. Yet 
they were still constrained by the labour system and were, 
therefore, limited to essentially individual forms of struggle. (l) 
It is for these reasons that plantation capital supported state policy 
despite a growing inability of the system to supply the lobour 
needed. It is the success of the state's policies which explains 
why, as the labour shortage grew acute in the 1950s, capital was 
prepared to employ men who were crippled and sickly, and whose 
productivity did not match that of a man in his prime. 
Looking at the situation as a whole between 1930 and 1960, 
then, three trends can be discerned in the history of state, capital 
and migrant labour in Zamb6zia. Firstly, the state established 
a labour -controlling and selling monopoly. Through its monopoly 
it sought to "attract" and then redistribute labour in production. 
As the demand for labour grew it extended the labour supply by 
drawing on the reserve army of labour within the geographical 
boundaries of the province. Secondly, this framework of labour 
supply provided capital with cheap and docile labour. 
It resulted 
in the perpetuation of a backward system of production in the 
plantation sector. Capital did not need to increase the productivity 
of labour by mechanising production. This implied increasing 
the 
skill of labour, reducing labour needs and developing a settled 
proletariat. Instead it continued to rely on large numbers 
of 
unskilled labourers and increcsed the productivity Of 
the labour 
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force through physical coercion. Thirdly, the constraints of the 
labour system in general prevented the development of workers' 
organisations on plantations. This was compounded by the unspeciclised 
division of labour on the estates. Each man was more or less inter- 
changeable with his fellows. This further limited the already 
limited power of the work force, or sections of it to halt production 
and voice their demands. 
It was only in the 1960s that changes in state policy were 
introduced which altered the role of the state in the labour 
conscription process and the relation of capital and labour. 
However, these changes were already discernible in the 1950s. 
They resulted both f rom the labour shortage in the province and 
from political developments outside it. 
During the 1950s the provincial government first seriously 
called for the establishment of a free labour market. Employers in 
the plantation sector were enjoined to cut down on labour wastage 
and to mechanise production. They were instructed to "attract" 
labour by offering better wages and conditions. They were ordered 
to undertake their own recruitment of labour. In short they 
were instructed to compete for labour. At the same time cotton 
concessionaries were ordered to end the worst obuses of the 
cultivation. They were encouraged to establish peasant 
'co-operatives' where more social facilities and greater 
technical 
assistance would be provided. Finally, men were encouroged 
to return 
to full-time peasant production. (2) 
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Increasing concern about international opinion, which was 
reflected in these moves, and the various inspections of labour 
conditions on plantations, which was one of their consequencest 
resulted in a marginal, but nevertheless costly (for capital) 
improvement in conditions on the estates. 
In the meantime, partly as a result of the labour crisis 
and partly as a result of the changing direction of state labour 
policy, capital in the plantation sector began to discuss ways of 
reducing labour needs. In 1957, for instance, a combined group of 
tea and sisal planters, supported in the background by SSE, 
petitioned the government to extend the contract period and reduce 
the 'rest' period between contracts. (3) In the same year, SSE 
discussed its long-term plans. These included the mechanisation 
of loading and possibly planting. In the four years that it would take to 
introduce mechanisation the company embarked on an attack on 
absenteeism. It also sought alternative recruiting areas outside 
the province where it "could hope to develop a successful and 
unrestricted recruiting organisation. "(4) In 1960 the company gave 
its first serious consideration to a scheme aimed at settling 
labour around the estates; an idea which was rejected after the 
planning stage when the government ref used to support the social 
overheads implicit in re-settlement. (5) Yet, in spite of these 
developments, forced labour, the forced recruitment of labour by 
the state, and forced peasant production of cotton continued. 
Only in 1962 was the state's new thinking translated 
into 
a new national policy. In that year the ýT-I was replaced 
by the 
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Rural Labour Code. (6) Administrators and the 'native' authorities 
were prohibited from interfering in the recruitment of labour. 
Forced labour was abolished, men were given the right to freely 
choose their employer and profession and the right to opt out of 
wage work. Recruiting reserves were abolished. (7) Simultaneously 
forced cotton cultivation came to an end. (8) 
While these policies were being pursued at the national 
and provincial levels the state also instituted a much more 
rigorous campaign to improve working conditions in the plantation 
sector. Known as "Psycho-social action", this policy was designed 
to improve the employers' image and to placate the work force. 
Employers were enjoined to make wide-ranging improvements in every 
aspect of plantation life and work. (9) 
The immediate effect of these policies was a staggering 
decline in the number of men recruited for plantation work. (10) 
In the short-term SSE sought to overcome the labour crisis by 
recruiting men from Mogambique and Cabo Delgado Provinces. It also 
proceeded with its plans to introduce mechanisation. At the 
some time it began to encourage men to stay longer at the estates, 
return to work sooner and bring their families with them. 
These 
changes were to be accompanied by higher wages, increased 
bonuses, 
improved housing, training schemes and less punitive methods of 
supervision. In short, the company's long-term policy was 
directed towards creating a permanent and much smaller 
labour 
force, whose greater skill would more than offset the 
improved 
standard of living which would accompany its evolution. 
(11) 
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The liberalisation of the labour regime, both in the wider 
society and on plantations, together with Political unrest in 
Mozambique, also had their effects on the labour force. The 
forms of resistance witnessed in the earlier period were increasingly 
replaced by more militant and organised action by the work force. 
At SSE mass walk-outs were not uncommon and on several occasions 
strikes were threatened. (12) 
However, these changes, for all that they appear dramatic 
compared with the situation before the 1960s were only minor and 
embryonic. They suggested the direction of things to come, rather 
than actually confirming it, for in many respects the situation 
remained the some. Af ter only a short period recruiting began to 
return to its old moulds. (13) As FRELIMO's activity increased so 
did the overall level of repression. On plantations, technical 
problems impeded the pace of mechanisation. As a result, migrant 
labour recruited with the complicity of the authorities on short- 
term contracts persisted as the predominant form of labour use in 
the plantation sector. Nevertheless the importance of the changes 
should not be underestimated, for they point to three new and 
very important developments. Firstly, the state was beginning 
to 
abandon its role as a monopoly supplier of labour. With mechanisation 
in the plantation sector, the releasing of female labour 
f rom 
cotton production and the reorganisation of peasant agriculture, 
the state sought to restructure labour supply. 
Its new policy was 
designed to "expel" workers from production. By restructuring 
the 
demand for labour it intended to create again a reserve army 
of labour within the province, and so end pressure on 
wages and the 
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labour crisis. Secondly, capital, through the introduction of more 
mechanisation moved to reduce the overall cost of labour by increasing 
the ratio of constant to variable capital in the production 
process. In this way it could decrease its reliance on the state, 
bind its workers to it through the development of sPeciolised 
skills and financial and social inducements, and eventually depress 
wages when both its own and the state's new labour policies bore 
f ruit. - Thirdly f or labour, the liberal trends in state and capital's 
policy meant not only improved conditions but also growing power. 
As the division of labour became more specialised the firm's 
dependence on its permanent workers would increase. As the firm's 
dependence on labour increased the power of labour to voice its demands 
would grow. 
In the year leading up to Mozambique's independence these 
trends were slowed. With independence the colonial state was 
dismantled. The exodus of settlers and settler capital cut back 
production and threw men onto the labour market . Capital which 
remained sought to profit from these changes. SSE, for one, 
dismantled its recruiting organisation, and in an ottempt to offset 
the massive wage rises introduced during the period of transitional 
government, casualised the labour force. Men who had previously 
been recruited at the company's expense were now expected 
to make 
their own way to the estates in the hopes of picking up a 
day's work 
here and there. Only with FRELIMO's assumption of power would 
the 
prospect open for new forms of organisation of labour. 
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NOTES 
Just as the colonial administration sought to foment divisions among the African population in the countryside by incorporating 'traditioncl' leaders so too did it foment divisions on plantations. African workers were legally defined and socially viewed as different from both Europeans (the managerial strata) and "Mistos and Assimilados" (skilled workers). These racial categories 
cemented the division of labour and the differences in 
salary, status and treatment which flowed from it. They 
served, therefore, not only to disguise areas of common 
concern but also to rationalise, at an ideological level, 
the policies pursued. 
(2) A detailed account of policy changes in the 1950s can be found in the various Actas do Conferencia dos Administrodores 
dct-Zamb6zia (GOV Q., Rep. Port., Prov. de Mop., Governo do 
Zamb6zia). See the Actas for 1954,1955,1956,1957 and 1958, pa sim. . j_ 
(3) SSE Ar., File 204, Native Diet and Rations, D. Arouca to 
Major Du Boulay, 25 Oct. 1957, No. 173/57 Private Series, 
Labour, Enclosing: Comi ssao da Mao-de-Obra dos Plantadores 
de Cha' e Aluerites do Guru6, Apontamentos para Alterag5o 
do Regime Actual de M66-de-Obra Indi"gena, Inerente aos 
Trabalhos Agric6las do Guru6; SSE Ar., File 93,, Labour a 
Recruiting, Government Side DA Gerente Geral Interino to 
J. dos Santos Callado SSE LM, 19 Nov. 1957, Confidencial, 
Wo-de-Obra Indi'gena. 
(4) SSE Ar., File 93, NHDB to Gen. Manager, 30 July 1957, No. 
377/57 General (H and Co. Ltd), Labour. 
(5) SSE Ar., File 10 (Obsolete), Native Settlement. ftat 
EXperiments, passim. 
(6) Rep. Port., Minist4rio do Ultramar, 0 Trabalho na 
Prov4l"nclas Ultramarinas, Decretos Nos. 44309 e 44310 de 27 
de Abril de 1962, Aprovando o Codigo do Trabbilho Ru e 
Alterando a Estrutura dos Tribuncis do Trabalho no Ultramar 
(Agigncic Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, MCMLXII). 
(7) SSE Ar., File 347, AfricaI3 Policy, Cantinag and Acg! ngamentos. 
,, 
J. de Queiroz Soares Adjunto do Public Addressý SXgtem 
Gerente, 3 Jan. 1962, Propriedade de Marromeu, Relat6rio 
da Visito a Marromeu dos Inspectores do Trabalho Indfi'gena, 
Snrs- Intendentes, Joao Granjo Pires, Afonso Ivens Ferraz 
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